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# SENEGAL SUB-REGIONAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT

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# SENEGAL SUB-REGIONAL CONFLICT ASSESSMENT



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Senegal Sub-Regional Conflict Assessment

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## ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ACI	Africa Consultants International
ADRA	Adventist Agency for Resource Assistance
AN	Assises Nationales
ANOCI	Agence Nationale pour l'Organisation de la Conférence Islamique
APAC	Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance
APE	Association des Parents-Elèves
APRAN	Association pour la Promotion de l'Arrondissement de Nyasia
BSS	Benno Siggil Sénégal
CAF	Conflict Assessment Framework
CBO	Community Based Organization
CL	Convention Locale
CMM	Conflict Mitigation and Management
CNCR	Conseil National de Concertation des Ruraux
CNES	Conseil National des Employeurs du Sénégal
CONGAD	Conseil des Organisations Non-Gouvernementales d'Appui au Développement
CR	Conseil Rural
DCHA	Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DG	Democracy and Governance
DoD	Department of Defense
DoJ	Department of Justice
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
FONGS	Fédération des ONGs du Sénégal
GB	Guinea Bissau
GDC	Groupe de Contact
GOANA	Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nourriture et l'Abondance
GOS	Government of Senegal
ICAF	Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework
ICG	International Crisis Group

ICS	Industries Chimiques du Sénégal
IPS	Illicit Power Structures
KOEH	Kédougou Encadrement et Orientation autour de l'Homme
MC	Mouvement Citoyen
MCC	Millenium Challenge Corporation
MDL	Mineral Deposit Limited
MFDC	Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PADER	Programme d'Action pour un Développement Juste et Durable
PASMI	Programme d'Appui au Sous-Secteur Miniér
PDS	Parti Démocratique Sénégalais
PINORD	Plateforme des Initiatives du Nord
POAS	Plan d'Occupation et de l' Affectation des Sols
PS	Parti Socialiste
RADDHO	Rencontre pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme
SAABA	Synergies des Acteurs pour l'Assainissement de la Banlieu
S/CRS	Secretary's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
SO	Strategic Objective
SOW	Scope of Work
SSR	Security Sector Reform
UNCAD	Cheikh Anta Diop University
UNACOIS	Union Nationale des Commerçants et Industriels du Sénégal
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WARP	West Africa Research Program
WANEP	West Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WN	Wula Naafa

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This assessment is designed to help USAID/Senegal understand a range of conflict dynamics affecting Senegal and the sub-region and to provide guidance in designing appropriate interventions to manage conflict and reduce the potential for violence. It uses the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and Illicit Power Structures (IPS) frameworks as the principle tools of analysis. While recognizing the Casamance region as currently the main conflict prone area in Senegal, the assessment looks at drivers of conflict and violence in other parts of the country and the interaction between political, economic, and social factors. The team found that while an increase in violent conflict is a present danger that must be addressed, Senegal is a resilient society that has the capacity to avoid widespread violent conflict through systemic recalibration, including significant political and economic reforms, as it has done in the past.

Senegal is the only West African country that has not experienced a military coup and has been considered a model for democracy and political stability. Abdoulaye Wade's victory in the 2000 presidential election marked the end of forty years of Socialist Party domination. Many hoped that Wade's victory would usher in a new era in which democratization processes begun in the 1970s would be fully consolidated.

However, many Senegalese feel as though their expectations have not been met and that democratic values have weakened over the course of Wade's Presidency. Frequent constitutional changes, cronyism and corruption, efforts to intimidate the media, censorship, and harsh treatment of political opponents have tarnished the reputation that President Wade once enjoyed as an apostle of democracy. Senegalese place a high value on strong, but benevolent leaders who provide public goods through policies that are responsive to the needs of the people. These expectations have been reinforced through the internalization of democratic norms. The government's failure to use public resources equitably and to provide for public welfare in times of economic hardship violates these expectations and has become a major source of grievance. Senegalese citizens are especially upset by patron/client politics focused on the distribution of "rents," the flaunting of wealth by political elites, the growing gap between rich and poor, and the apparent insensitivity to the impact of deepening poverty on people's lives. In many of the interviews conducted for this assessment, the refrain "enough is enough" was repeated consistently across various segments of society.

Population growth and a diminishing natural resource base have increased competition for access to farm land, pastures, forests, and fisheries throughout the country. Conflicts between competing parties are becoming more frequent and less amenable to traditional conflict resolution mechanisms. Government expropriation of large tracts of land and their redistribution to foreigners and well-connected Senegalese is yet another major source of grievance. To survive and escape poverty, many young men seek to migrate to Europe and North America. A small percentage are increasingly participating in criminal activities—e.g. drug trafficking, street crime, cattle rustling, and banditry.

With regard to Casamance, President Wade promised a peaceful resolution to the conflict in the first one hundred days of his administration, but has shown little progress to achieve a negotiated settlement with the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance* (MFDC). The disbursement of government funds to various elements of the MFDC has exacerbated fractionalization and radicalized younger combatants who are challenging the moderate leadership to resume hostilities. The current escalation of rebel attacks on army convoys and increased banditry indicate that the rebellion is far from over. A renewal of the insurgency has the potential to merge with other regional trends to destabilize the entire the sub-region, even if it is unlikely to threaten stability at the national level.

Narco-trafficking has increasingly become a major factor in the region. Shiploads of South American cocaine are entering Guinea Bissau, in addition to other West African countries, where they are broken into smaller units, a percentage of which are being transported through the Casamance to Banjul and other West African ports for shipment to Europe. Although the extent of the trade and its impact is still being analyzed, the traffic is already spurring a host of illicit activities including extensive money laundering operations. MFDC

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involvement in narco-trafficking could further criminalize the movement and provide resources for an escalation of the conflict.

These grievances have mobilized individuals and groups from all walks of life to express their discontent through petitions, strikes, boycotts, demonstrations, and violent confrontations with government authorities. Government repression and failure to respond to popular grievances have resulted in more radical and violent forms of protest. Contested issues are being pressed with a new kind of brinkmanship that has left many concerned that core social and communitarian values are losing hold in an atmosphere of anger, greed, and personal ambition. The political opposition is encouraging people to take to the streets and calling on President Wade to resign. While these efforts have perhaps been limited to date, without a renewal of political dialogue between the government and the opposition and a more vigorous government response to address popular grievances, the current situation will likely deteriorate further.

While we found strong evidence for localized outbreaks of violence in urban and peri-urban, mainly focusing on the Dakar region, the team does not believe this will result in long-term, nationwide destabilization. Rather the team concluded that Senegalese society and its socio-political-religious institutions are resilient enough to ultimately re-calibrate in a way that mitigates and resolves conflicts. Many factors would have to be aligned before a critical mass of citizens take to the streets in prolonged violent protest; however, there are scenarios which some Senegalese intellectuals currently consider possible. For example, if there were massive electoral fraud in conjunction with popular outrage at egregious corruption and continuing economic hardship, a relatively small dose of inflammatory or manipulative leadership could cause significant, localized outbreaks of violence.

It is important to note that in neglected and marginalized peripheral regions like Kédougou and Kolda, there is potential for long-term, more entrenched systems which produce reoccurring violence as an avenue to express grievances. In these marginalized regions, systems of governance which could provide resiliency are weak in spite of the proximity between citizens and leaders and strong communal ties. In addition, recent political re-shuffling in peripheral areas appears to be motivated more by central state extension rather than consolidation of legitimate government at the local level. Although concerns are being voiced locally, the assessment team believes that regional issues tend to be marginalized and that this trend will continue without sufficient attention to its repercussions. When opportunism around natural resource extraction (minerals, forestry) is added, concerns about escalating persistent forms of violence are very real and should raise a red flag. We have already seen a similar phenomenon in Casamance, and it would be faulty to assume a similar trajectory could not possibly occur elsewhere. This is also a trend that has been demonstrated in other countries where peripheral areas are either abused for their resources or are ignored by the central government in ways that result in conflict.

Senegalese society is resilient and has in the past demonstrated a high capacity to manage, mitigate, and resolve conflict through mediation and dialogue. These traditions may check countervailing tendencies towards violence. Demand for political dialogue is high, whether in Dakar where the *Assises Nationales* has mobilized support for national dialogue and government reform or in the Casamance where citizens are demanding a negotiated settlement of the conflict. Local politics are also becoming more vibrant. In addition, many communities are organizing to meet their own needs and in the process developing new structures of civic organization.

The report identifies five critical windows of vulnerability during which the potential for conflict to be triggered or escalate is high, including the 2012 presidential elections; deteriorating economic conditions; an upsurge of violence in the Casamance; tensions in Kédougou and other peripheral areas; and regional instability. It also identifies opportunities for major reforms and entry points for effective USAID/Senegal programming. Through an analysis of current drivers and mitigators of conflict as well an analysis of these windows of vulnerability and opportunity, the following recommendations are made to USAID/Senegal:

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Recommendations for USAID/Senegal to manage and mitigate conflict address six major areas of intervention:

1. **Strengthening linkages.** USAID/Senegal should reinforce existing social patterns of resilience through support to critical avenues of communication and traditional forms of redress. This will help to prevent widespread devolution into violence, while still maintaining pressure for change and social improvement. USAID/Senegal programs should maximize consultation with local communities, civil society, religious leaders, and traditional mediators in project design, implementation and evaluation.
2. **Peace building in the Casamance.** Continue strong support for peacebuilding efforts that engage the government, civil society, and the MFDC in pursuing a definitive peace. Avoid large expenditures in Casamance infrastructure and development before a negotiated settlement.
3. **Land use and natural resource management.** Give special attention to foreseeing, mitigating, and resolving conflicts over governance of and decision making around land and other natural resources. In particular integrate conflict analysis and management as an indispensable complement to the local governance components of Wula Naafa NRM programs, particularly in peripheral areas most vulnerable to structural violence. Engage immediately with MMC and GOANA around issues of governance.
4. **DG interventions.** Design DG interventions to support political dialogue, elaboration of a consensual electoral code, and a peaceful election campaign, including working with political parties. Work with community groups, women, youth, and religious authorities in Dakar-Thiès to foster civilian participation in local government.
5. **Regional programming.** Consider establishing a Peace and Security Task Team once the Dakar Mission assumes regional responsibilities. Ensure effective liaison with other USG and international actors engaged in countering transnational threats, such as trafficking in people, goods and narcotics. Consider comprehensive programming in support of the new West Africa Counternarcotics Strategy.
6. **Synergy within USG agencies.** Strengthen contacts, collaboration, and synergy between USAID/Senegal, the Embassy and other USG agencies like the DEA, DoJ, and DoD in strategic planning. Develop a USG Casamance strategy that integrates diplomatic, defense and development approaches and programs to mitigate conflict.

The assessment concludes that Senegal is a resilient society that can avoid widespread violent conflict and bring about significant political and economic reforms. That said the Mission should expect an increase in isolated incidents of violence as has already been demonstrated during strikes and other public mobilizations. Additionally, the creation of protracted systems of violence is a real concern in more peripheral areas and deserves immediate attention through existing and additional programming.

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# I. INTRODUCTION: OBJECTIVES AND METHODOLOGY

## A. ASSESSMENT OBJECTIVES

The main purpose of this assessment as laid out in the Scope of Work (SOW) is to analyze the nature and scope of the conflict dynamics affecting Senegal and the broader sub-region and to provide guidance for USAID/Senegal in designing appropriate interventions to manage conflict and reduce the potential for violence.<sup>1</sup> Recognizing the Casamance as the only current location of ongoing violent conflict, the SOW calls for an analysis of emerging trends that could lead to violence in other parts of the country and the sub-region.

The December 2008 USAID/Senegal mid-term strategy review recommended that the Mission request a Senegal Conflict Assessment using the standard conflict methodology that would be tied to Mission strategy.<sup>2</sup> The updated strategy statement called for reconfiguring democracy and governance programs from a cross-cutting approach into a single “Good Governance Advanced” Strategic Objective, which would include conflict mitigation and management, including peace and reconciliation processes in the Casamance.<sup>3</sup> One of the main objectives of this assessment, as stated in the SOW, is to make recommendations to modify or to add to USAID/Senegal’s current portfolio and to delineate the boundaries of what the Mission can and cannot hope to realistically accomplish in the area of conflict management and mitigation.

Another important objective of the assessment is to test the utility of the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF) and Illicit Power Structures (IPS) methodology as tools for analyzing conflict in both Senegal and the sub-region.<sup>4</sup> The trend towards greater interagency collaboration in development programs requires integrating new factors and issues—e.g. illicit activities, conflict, terrorism, and corruption—into Mission strategy and programs.

## B. METHODOLOGY

### Composition of the Team, Preparatory Meetings in Washington, and Field Work

The core ICA team consisted of six members (in alphabetical order):

- Olivia Stokes Dreier, Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Specialist
- Abdou Salam Fall, Development Anthropologist and Sociologist
- Sheldon Gellar, Political Scientist
- Kathryn Lane, USAID/Senegal, Casamance Program Coordinator
- Rachel Locke, USAID/CMM, Conflict Specialist
- Julie Werbel, USAID/DCHA, Senior Security Sector Reform Advisor

Additional members included Ibrahima Gassama, a Casamançais journalist, Mamadu Jao, a Guinea-Bissau political scientist and specialist in public administration, and Nene Guèye, a Senegalese translator.

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<sup>1</sup> For the detailed SOW, see Annex IV.

<sup>2</sup> See the December 18, 2008 draft of USAID/Senegal Mid-Term Strategy Review: Findings, Conclusions & Recommendations of Structured Interviews, Workshop, and Other Meeting, pp. 14-16, 25.

<sup>3</sup> USAID/Senegal, *Updated Strategy Statement: USAID/Senegal* (Dakar: January 30, 2009), p. 7

<sup>4</sup> The IPS framework as applied to Casamance can be found in Annex VI.

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Before departing for Senegal, the core team minus the Senegalese members spent two days in Washington (June 18-19) participating in sessions working on ICAF, Illicit Power Structures (IPS), and systems mapping frameworks and methodology as well as team-building exercises. The team also participated in a roundtable discussion with representatives of government agencies interested in different aspects of the study to explain the methodology and share expertise in areas such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and other region-specific information.<sup>5</sup>

The team reviewed literature on CAF, ICAF, and IPS frameworks and methodology as well as relevant literature on the sub-region, Senegal, the Casamance, Guinea Bissau, and Gambia. A simple and open interview program was elaborated that focused primarily on feelings and forecasts to capture perceptions of grievances and conflict vulnerabilities. Combined with the facts culled through the literature review, this allowed the team to develop a sound analysis of conflict potential for Senegal and the sub-region.

The team spent close to three weeks in Senegal (June 28-July 17) where they interviewed a broad range of people and groups at both the national and grassroots level. The team spoke with US and Senegalese government representatives in Dakar, farmers, fishermen, businessmen, youth, women, taxi drivers, religious leaders, journalists, schoolteachers, mayors and other local government officials, MFDC leaders and militants, forestry and agricultural agents, and representatives of national and international Non-Government Organizations (NGOs), peacebuilding groups, and other community-based organizations (CBOs).<sup>6</sup>

Field work was conducted in Guédiawaye, Pikine, Thiès, Kaolack, Kédougou, Saint Louis, Mbane, Gae, Kebemer, Richard-Toll, the Casamance, Gambia, and Guinea Bissau. Given the time constraints and the need to work in several countries and regions, the team divided into three sub-groups. The first sub-group concentrated on fieldwork in Guédiawaye, Pikine, Thiès, Louga, and the Senegal River Delta; the second sub-group worked in Kaolack and Kédougou; the third sub-group worked in the Casamance, Guinea-Bissau, and Gambia.



### ICAF Methodology

The main tool of analysis for the study was the Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework (ICAF)<sup>7</sup>, which draws on the social sciences to identify societal and situational dynamics that increase or decrease the likelihood of violent conflict in a particular setting. The ICAF approach is diagnostic rather than normative, and views society as a system subject to both internal and external pressures that can lead to either conflict or

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
<sup>5</sup> For a list of participants in Washington, see ANNEX I.

<sup>6</sup> See Annex I for a full list of individuals and groups contacted in Senegal, Guinea Bissau, and Gambia.

<sup>7</sup> The ICAF methodology builds upon the original CAF methodology developed by the USAID's Conflict and Mitigation Office. See USAID, *Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development* (Washington, D.C.: April 2005). For a more detailed explanation of the ICAF methodology, see Annex 4.

constructive change. The methodology is intended to elaborate areas identified within the academic literature as increasing or decreasing conflict, but is not intended to be rigidly exclusive.

### EXHIBIT I: CONFLICT ASSESSMENT FRAMEWORK



The ICAF begins with a study of the context. For example, Senegal’s pride in its democracy and comparative military professionalism as evidenced by historical events must be considered when thinking through resilience and vulnerabilities. Within this over-arching context are found identity groups, be they ethnic, political, social, or otherwise defined, who may develop core grievances because of poor institutional performance and existing or evolving societal patterns. Social and institutional resilience reflects the inherent capacity of a society to manage, mitigate and resolve conflicts. Key actors can either mobilize individuals and groups around core grievances to drive conflict or on the contrary, mobilize people around sources of social and institutional resilience to mitigate conflict.

Windows of vulnerability are moments in time that present threats to stability through either a consolidation of violence or a fundamental shift in political or economic power. These moments generally require someone or a group – a “key actor” – to seize on them in order for a negative exploitation of the moment. Otherwise, it may pass without incident. It is therefore necessary to examine not only the vulnerabilities, but also those individuals or groups who may take advantage of them.

Similarly, windows of opportunity are moments that present opportunities to consolidate peace and reinforce resilience. These occasions provide opportunities for USG programs to provide additional support to pre-existing efforts at conflict mitigation. The ICAF framework goes beyond showing lists of causes and consequences, but demonstrates the dynamic relationships between different variables over time and the extent to which they increase or decrease opportunities for conflict and/or peaceful change and reform.

While the ICAF addresses factors that incite or mitigate violent conflict, the IPS framework focuses specifically on actors who engage in unlawful activity, be they rebels or criminal networks, and whose activities may disrupt peace processes or interfere with post-conflict stabilization. Illicit Power Structures are

defined as groups that challenge the state's monopoly on the use of force and/or engage in criminal economic activities; and threaten the state's ability to govern effectively. The IPS uses the following five lenses: worldview, motivations, resources, relationships, and internal structure to gain a more nuanced understanding of the often hidden inner life of these structures and to develop strategies that diminish deleterious effects while (where possible) supporting constructive engagement.<sup>8</sup>

## C. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT

### Background

Senegal has enjoyed a reputation for being a model of democracy and political stability. It is the only West African country that has not experienced a military coup. Abdoulaye Wade's victory in the 2000 presidential election marked the end of forty years of Socialist Party domination, and the regime change was peaceful. The Senegalese people hailed the election as a sign that Senegal had consolidated democratization processes begun in the 1970s, and they had high expectations that Wade's victory would usher in a new era. Upon his entrance to the Presidency many of Wade's political allies and most of the opposition gave him a free hand to change the constitution to concentrate more power in the hands of the executive. During Wade's first years in office, he retained much of his popularity, bringing more young people into the government and naming a woman as Africa's first prime minister.

President Wade also made campaign promises in 2000 to bring peace to the Casamance during his first hundred days.<sup>9</sup> The Casamance conflict began in the 1980s with demands for independence and has continued on and off ever since with varying levels of violence. Although Wade made some progress towards peace talks during his early years in office, negotiations have stalled because of a lack of government initiative since the signing of an agreement in 2004 with the political leader of the MFDC, Abbé Diamacoune (now deceased). While factionalism within the MFDC has made peace negotiations difficult, the inertia from the government's side has been a significant barrier to success.

During Wade's first five years in office, annual economic growth averaged over five percent. State finances benefited from reforms introduced by both President Wade and his predecessor, both of whom focused on increasing revenues with Wade also concentrating energy on increasing expenditures. However, by 2005 Wade's popular approval had begun to wane. Although polls indicated the majority of Senegalese still had confidence in him, he lost favor in urban areas and among the youth who had enthusiastically supported him in 2000.<sup>10</sup> While improving Senegal's infrastructure, the government's economic policies did little to stop the rising tide of youth unemployment. Poverty and the lack of economic opportunities have driven many young Senegalese to seek work outside the country and triggered violent outbursts among those who remain behind. After 2005, the rate of economic growth slowed. Most Senegalese have not seen improvements in living standards and perceive that benefits are going to the elite.

Wade's popularity plummeted after his 2007 reelection. By the end of 2008, he had lost the confidence of most Senegalese who widely criticize his government's performance. A recent Afrobarometer poll showed that Wade's government scored close to the bottom among 19 African nations concerning economic performance in areas such as managing the economy, reducing poverty, creating jobs, keeping prices down,

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<sup>8</sup> For more information on Illicit Power Structures, please see *Cleaning House: Confronting IPS in the Post-Conflict World*, Naval Postgraduate School, [http://www.csrns-nps.org/logistica/public/docs/cleaning\\_house.pdf](http://www.csrns-nps.org/logistica/public/docs/cleaning_house.pdf).

<sup>9</sup> For an account of the origins of the conflict and proposals for peace-building, see Linda Beck et al, *Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding Case Study: The Casamance Conflict and Peace Process (1982-2001)*. Washington, D.C.: MSI, October 24, 2001.

<sup>10</sup> See Hemicycle, "Le Premier Politiscope du Sénégal," [www.hemicycle.info](http://www.hemicycle.info), No. 241 (February 1 2006) for the results of a poll demonstrating Wade's greater popularity over his political rivals and general satisfaction with government performance in the health and education sectors.

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and narrowing the gap between rich and poor.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, 68% of those polled disapproved or strongly disapproved of the president's performance over the past 12 months.

The president's personalization of national politics and disregard for democratic values has also contributed to his declining legitimacy, his attempt to promote his son Karim Wade as his successor being the most notable recent example.<sup>12</sup> Frequent changes of the constitution, cronyism and corruption, efforts to intimidate the media, censorship, and political and verbal violence directed towards outspoken political opponents have tarnished the reputation that Wade once enjoyed as an apostle of democracy.

Growing competition for access to and control over land and natural resources and state allocation of community land to foreigners and regime allies are also creating tensions and conflict. Cattle rustling and conflicts between pastoralists and farmers are on the rise as farmers encroach on traditional grazing areas. Fishermen are losing access to traditional ocean fishing grounds, which have been taken over by foreign fishermen through government complicity. In Kédougou earlier this year, a protest against lack of job opportunities and transparent use of mining company social fund money resulted in the death of one local youth, the destruction of government buildings, and a number of arrests. Many people blame an overly reactive security force for the violence, raising questions about command and control in peripheral areas. Elsewhere, both in the capital and in peripheral regions, demonstrations and strikes are developing increasing violent undertones. Deepening poverty, the growing gap between the rich and the poor, and the sense of unresponsive government have fostered a growing sense of disillusionment and discontent by many Senegalese. These factors, coupled with political instability, undemocratic regimes, and drug and arms trafficking in neighboring countries could aggravate conditions and lead to further conflict.

## Context

### Political

When President Abdoulaye Wade won the 2000 presidential elections, Senegal had a hybrid political system characterized by presidential dominance, monarchical styles of ruling and clientelism<sup>13</sup> but moving rapidly towards embracing democratic norms. Wade came to power using a platform of "change" and he won because of the unpopularity of the *Parti Socialiste* (PS) that had ruled Senegal since independence. The PS was widely regarded as corrupt and non-responsive to the people's needs. After nine years in power, President Wade's *Parti Démocratique Sénégalais* (PDS) currently suffers from weak and non-representative party structures, internal strife between winners and losers in the battle for party office and nominations for public office. This infighting sometimes leads to violence as a means of settling scores and intimidating rivals, while it also creates chaotic management and inconsistent policies across the government. As the PS before them, the PDS is now seen as corrupt and non-responsive to the people's needs. The major opposition parties boycotted the 2007 national legislative elections, giving the president's coalition almost total control over the National Assembly.

Senegal's aging political class, whether in the government or the opposition has been traditionally wedded to clientelism. They use public office for private benefit while proclaiming their commitment to democratic norms and good governance. As one astute observer noted, "Senegal's political class consists primarily of those who had nothing before the *alternance* and are willing to do anything to preserve their current privileges

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<sup>11</sup> Eric Little and Carolyn Logan, *The Quality of Democracy and Governance in Africa, New Results from AfroBarometer Round Four: A Compendium of Public Opinion Findings from 19 African Countries, 2008* (East Lansing: Afrobarometer, May 2009).

<sup>12</sup> Penda Mbaw, "The Return of Personalism," *Journal of Democracy*. Volume 13 (January 2008).

<sup>13</sup> For an excellent critique of the rent-seeking behavior of Senegal's political and analysis of clientelist culture see Malick Ndiaye, *L'Éthique Ceddo et la Société d'Accaparement ou les conduites culturelles des Sénégalais d'aujourd'hui*. Dakar: Presses Universitaires de Dakar, 1996.

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and those who had power in the old regime are willing to do anything to regain those privileges.”<sup>14</sup> It would be unfair to attribute all of Senegal’s current ills to Wade.

Since 2007, the opposition has become more active and unified under the banner of the *Benno Siggil Sénégal* (BSS), which vigorously competed in the March 2009 local government elections.<sup>15</sup> In these elections, the pro-government *Sopi* coalition suffered defeat in many areas including Dakar, Guédiawaye, Thiès, and Saint Louis—urban areas which had been major bastions of Wade’s electoral strength in the 2000 presidential elections. The president’s son was badly beaten in his run for mayor of Dakar. BSS candidates, many of whom came from civil society and were not long time political activists, were successful running campaigns on a good governance and “throw the rascals out” platform. In general the tendency of the local elections was to get rid of those in power and bring in new leadership. Because SOPI held a majority of the locally elected seats, they were the biggest losers.

As Senegal moves closer to the 2012 presidential elections, pro-government and opposition candidates are jockeying for power. The president’s declining popularity and divisions within the ruling coalition coupled with the BSS’ movement towards presenting a unified front in opposition to the presidential coalition suggests that the 2012 presidential elections will be highly competitive. A victory for either side would be a challenge and could result in political confrontations and violence. The stakes are high since control over the state and its resources constitute the main road to gaining wealth and power.

As domestic politics become increasingly contentious, regional factors and recent events in the Casamance are placing additional stress on the system. Wade’s regime has failed to reach a definitive peace in the Casamance, and a recent resurgence of violence and banditry by more radical elements of the MFDC could further destabilize the region.<sup>16</sup> Moreover, porous borders between Guinea Bissau, the Casamance, and the Gambia, and a sharp increase in drug trafficking are creating concerns over increases in illicit activities, including money laundering. Tensions between Mauritania and Senegal over limited access of Senegalese fishermen to Mauritanian fishing grounds and Mauritanian take-over of access to natural resources along the Senegal River could erupt into violence. The recent military coups in Mauritania and Guinea, coupled with an increasingly repressive regime in the Gambia, also make relations between Senegal and its neighbors more tenuous.

## Economic

Overruns on major state infrastructure projects,<sup>17</sup> government over-spending across all sectors, alleged corruption, and grandiose and costly government projects like the African Renaissance statue<sup>18</sup> have contributed to declining state revenues, growing state deficits and the non-payment of government suppliers.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, because economic growth has declined, so have government revenues. The sorry state of public services has increased public criticism of government policies and undermined its credibility.

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<sup>14</sup> Interview with a former high-ranking government official.

<sup>15</sup> This marked a major departure from previous opposition practices of either boycotting or organizing weak campaigns because they saw only national level elections as significant. Voter turnout (over 60%) was also exceptionally high for local government because of widespread dissatisfaction with the government coalition.

<sup>16</sup> For a detailed analysis of recent developments in the Casamance and the MFDC, see the case studies in ANNEXES V and VI.

<sup>17</sup> For example, ANOCI, which was managed by Karim Wade, has come under sharp attack for cost overruns in the construction of the new Corniche road. This incident has been the subject of a new book by Abdoul Latif Coulibaly. For details, see *Sud Quotidien*, August 25, 2009.

<sup>18</sup> “*Monument de la Renaissance: Wade Accapare le Bien de l’Afrique*,” *La Gazette*, No. 16, (July 2 to July 9, 2009), p. 23-25.

<sup>19</sup> The non-payment of state contractors has caused some firms to go out of business or lay off their employees. For example, Hotel Indépendance was forced to close its doors because the government refused to pay them what it owed. Laid off hotel employees responded by engaging in a hunger strike, which drew public attention to their cause and finally resulted in the president’s promise to pay the bill in order to end the hunger strike.

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Foreign investors have allegedly benefited from making deals with the government to receive land, lucrative contracts, and taking over Senegalese industries. For example, many Senegalese citizens perceive that the government's *Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nutrition et l'Abondance* (GOANA) initiated in 2008 has provided foreign investors and profiteers with large tracts of lands in the Senegal River Delta. They also see an influx of Chinese merchants and imports as harmful to Senegal's informal sector. Senegal's fishing resources are dwindling due to over fishing by modern foreign fishing vessels off its coastal waters.<sup>20</sup> The government has not heeded increased demands for protection. On all these issues people may not have specific evidence of abuse, but their perceptions are that systems are not working in their favor. When it comes to conflict, people's perceptions are critically important and often matter more than the actual facts on the ground.

The current world economic crisis and rising energy and food prices have intensified the deepening of poverty in Senegal. Living standards have clearly deteriorated for most Senegalese. Higher food, electricity, and gasoline prices, coupled with a sharp increase in the cost of urban real estate, are pushing Senegal's middle classes to the brink of poverty. The volume of remittances coming from Senegalese working abroad has also declined as it has globally. On the other hand, construction of luxury villas and apartment buildings in Dakar is on the rise, some of which is a result of investments in housing by wealthy Senegalese living abroad. Some of the housing boom is allegedly the result of money laundering by those engaged in West African drug trafficking and other illicit activities.<sup>21</sup>

## Social

Although older societal patterns based on social hierarchies, caste, and patron-client relationships are still strong in Senegalese society, these patterns are declining in the face of movement toward greater social equality. The voices of women and youth are increasingly being heard. Caste identity has become less of a social barrier. Greater access to education and information is reducing differences between western educated elites and others. Political parties are courting the votes of women and youth. Muslim religious institutions are promoting education for girls and young women.

Urbanization is advancing rapidly at an annual rate of four percent, and half of the population lives in urban areas. The Dakar-Thiès metropolitan area has more than four million people, and the populations of Pikine and Guédiawaye now surpass that of Dakar. Rapid urbanization has sharply increased the demand for public services and jobs—well beyond the capacity of the economy and government to provide them.

Religious identity continues to play a central role in Senegalese society with nearly all Senegalese adhering to some form of religion. For more than a century, Muslims, Christians, and Animists have preached and practiced religious pluralism and respect for all religions. Despite the central role of religion in Senegalese society and the fact that ninety five percent of the population is Muslim, Senegal has remained a secular state. It affirms its neutrality in dealing with all religious groups in the country and is committed to religious tolerance.

Most Senegalese Muslims belong to Sufi Brotherhoods (*confréries*) led by *Grands Khalifes*. Senegal's two major Sufi Brotherhoods, Tijani and Mouride, were founded by Senegalese holy men in the 19th and early 20th

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<sup>20</sup> Tourism and fishing constitute two of Senegal's main sources of foreign exchange and provide employment for thousands of Senegalese. The recent upsurge in banditry and political violence has contributed to the decline of tourism in the Casamance.

<sup>21</sup> For more information about money laundering in Senegal and Senegal's participation in national and West African anti-money laundering institutions, see GIABA (Groupement Intergouvernementale d'Action contre le blanchiment d'argent en Afrique de l'Ouest), *Rapport Annuel 2008* (Accra: GIABA, 2009). Senegal originally looked at money laundering by Senegalese officials seeking to get embezzled funds out of the country. More recently, with the development of the transnational drug trade and other criminal networks in West Africa, Senegal may be becoming an important transit center for money laundering through the banking system, investments in real estate, and the illegal shipment of money, drugs, and precious metals through Dakar's port and the Léopold Sédar Senghor international airport.

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century. The original founders and the generation of brothers of the founders that succeeded them had great authority over their followers. Senegal's Muslim religious leaders (*marabouts*) have traditionally played a major role in Senegalese politics, providing electoral support to Senegalese political leaders, exercising influence over the choice of high-ranking government officials, and intervening as mediators to resolve political and social conflicts. Over the past decade, *marabouts'* authority to influence their followers to go along with their lead in politics has declined. The *Grands Khalifes* increasingly adopted a neutral stance towards presidential candidates and political parties contesting national elections.

The passing of the older generation of *Grands Khalifes* has contributed to the fragmentation and dispersal of religious authority and the emergence of a new set of Muslim leaders –the so-called grandchildren generation of the founder (*petits fils*). The new generation of *marabouts* has gone in different directions with some openly contesting the *Grand Khalifes'* authority. Others are becoming more politicized and starting their own political parties and movements. There have been incidents where followers of particular *marabouts* have physically attacked certain groups of people or have vandalized property belonging to organizations perceived as their enemies. Another consequence of changes in religious authority structures and personalities has been the emergence of autonomous grassroots religious leaders (Imams). They have close ties to the faithful attending their mosque and many espouse a commitment to democratic values and reject old-style *clientelist* politics.

Since coming to power, Wade has seemingly broken his predecessors' practice of maintaining a separation of Church and State and treating Senegal's major Brotherhoods and the Catholic Church equally. A Mouride, Wade went to Touba, the religious capital of the Mouride Brotherhood shortly after winning the 2000 presidential elections. He shocked public sensitivities by going as a *talibé* submitting to his spiritual guide rather than as the president representing all the people.

Indirectly courting the Mouride vote, Wade has been promoting the notion that he is the president of the Mourides, thus violating traditional norms of presidential neutrality. Wade's divide-and-rule tactics applied to the religious sphere have increased the danger of undermining traditional friendly ties and relations between Tijani and Mouride religious leaders and their followers.

Wade's relationship with the Catholic Church has also been problematic. In 2003, he sharply attacked Catholic religious leaders for criticizing the regime's apparent indifference to rising political violence. Afterwards, anonymous callers made threats against the lives of Catholic clergy. Public opinion and Muslim religious leaders rallied to support the Catholic clergymen. Wade toned down his attacks and provided assurances that the state would protect the clergy. Many Senegalese Catholics see Wade as politically marginalizing their community by offering Catholics fewer ministerial posts than in the past. He has also been accused of expropriating church property.

To date, radical Islamic elements advocating an Islamic state and proclaiming war on non-believers have had little influence in Senegal. Most Senegalese Muslims support the Sufi Brotherhoods, religious tolerance and coexistence, and deplore religiously-motivated violence. However, some fear that increases in extremism in the Sahel zone are having an impact on Senegal. As many people look to their religious leaders rather than politicians find solutions to their personal issues and society's problems this provides an opening for extremists to influence the population. This trend towards identity-based – rather than citizen-based – solutions could provide fodder for spoilers. While Senegal's risk of widespread religious extremism is relatively low, it is a vulnerability – one that exists in many countries – that deserves concerted and sustained attention in order to ensure the risk remains low.

With over fifty percent of Senegal's population falling between the ages of 15 and 29 years, the youth bulge has increased the demand for education, jobs, and services. While school attendance rates have gone up, the quality of education is still poor.<sup>22</sup> Cheikh Anta Diop University (UCAD) has more than 50,000 students for a university designed to handle 7,000 students. University students are dissatisfied with living conditions on

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<sup>22</sup> Double school sessions and the hiring of teachers with inferior credentials were introduced in the 1980s to deal with the growing demand for primary school education.



campus and have little hope for finding jobs after graduation. Rural youth are finding it increasingly difficult to have access to farmland and credit for farm equipment, while many are no longer attracted by a life of farming. In the absence of economic opportunities, they are moving to towns. Urban youth are often forced to engage in marginal commercial activities to survive. Many leave Senegal to seek work in Europe and North America, while a minority gravitate to petty crime and drug trafficking.

## II. FINDINGS

### A. CORE GRIEVANCES AND SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE

#### Patterns of Core Grievances

While many of the contextual conditions described in the previous sections create a foundation on which violent conflict could manifest, other countries with similar contextual factors do not slip into instability. Examining the current extent of heightened grievances and the potential for spoilers to exploit these grievances and motivate people towards violence is necessary for a complete analysis. This section provides a narrative of the core grievances in Senegalese society that if not addressed could exacerbate conflicts. Those grievances connected with disregard for the rights of citizenship, poor government performance, and expectations of adequate public goods seem most salient.

#### Violation of Democratic and Traditional Societal Norms

Senegalese are increasingly identifying themselves as citizens living in a democratic society. Afrobarometer public opinion surveys confirm that Senegalese are strong advocates of democratic norms, particularly freedom of the press, expression, and association; free and fair elections; and the rule of law. Most Senegalese expect the government to treat all citizens equally and for government to be responsive to public opinion. They are also placing increasing importance on governance issues, such as transparency and accountability in government operations.

For Senegalese with a strong identity as citizens with communitarian values, the violation of democratic norms has emerged as a major grievance. The Wade government has tried to suppress media criticism of the president, incidents of corruption, and controversial government policies. Wade's government apparatus has questioned, arrested, and imprisoned Senegalese journalists, suspended the publication of newspapers, and stopped independent radio and TV stations from broadcasting. Senegalese journalists interviewing MFDC leaders have also been harassed and arrested.<sup>23</sup> Opposition and civil society groups have attacked the government for not respecting the rights of citizens to demonstrate peacefully. Police reactions during demonstrations often escalate tension creating conditions for increased violence.

The government's use of judicial processes and police to further the regime's interests contribute to grievances in this area. The application of the government's *Grande Offensive Agricole pour la Nutrition et l'Abondance* (GOANA) program violated the 2004 Agro-Pastoral Orientation Law. This legal provision called for consultation and participation of representative producers' organizations like the *Conseil National de la Concertation des Ruraux* (CNCR) in elaborating agricultural policy and land tenure issues.<sup>24</sup> Evoking GOANA,

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<sup>23</sup> The introduction of private independent radio stations in the early 1990s expanded the audience seeking information on politics and government performance. It also gave citizens and politicians opportunities to express and debate their views while greatly increasing the number of Senegalese aware of and critical of government violations of freedom of the press and expression.

<sup>24</sup> See, République du Sénégal, Ministère de l'Agriculture et de l'Hydraulique, *Loi d'Orientation Agro-Sylvo-Pastoral* (Dakar:La Sénégalaise de l'Imprimerie, n.d.)

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the government expropriated large tracts of community land in rural communities. They distributed this land primarily to foreigners, politicians, and high-ranking government officials closely aligned to the regime. When the newly elected Rural Council of Mbane in 2009 moved to reverse the pattern of government land grabs, the government declared the local government elections invalid. The government claimed that voter intimidation in several key voting stations prevented the government list from winning. This claim was upheld by both the local level court and appeal court despite the fact that the *Sopi* coalition and the opposition BSS coalition both signed minutes stating that they had observed no irregularities.<sup>25</sup>

Frequent changes in the constitution without deliberation, usurping the prerogatives of local government, and refusal to meet with representative civil society organizations and grassroots associations critical of government policies have also fueled resentment. Although Wade often intervenes on a personal basis to help out individuals and groups, he and his government have not been responsive to meeting public demands for change in any long term or strategic manner. People at all levels of society resent not being consulted and feel that their voices are not being heard.<sup>26</sup>

Citizens also regret that the government is not currently reaching out to engage in dialogue with the political opposition, civil society, and ordinary people or using traditional mechanisms of mediation to resolve conflicts. Instead, Wade and his allies have relied on divide and rule tactics, clientelism, corruption, intimidation, and repression to manage conflict and silence criticism.

The government's failure to use public resources wisely and equitably to provide for public welfare, especially in times of economic hardship, violates Senegalese traditions and has become another major source of grievance. Rulers and leaders are responsible for the well being of society and obliged to redistribute sources fairly.<sup>27</sup> Senegalese citizens are especially upset about the growing gap between rich and poor, the flaunting of wealth by the elite, and their apparent insensitivity to the impact of deepening poverty on people's living standards. While the government brags about how it spends billions of francs on development projects, the people see little of this money being used to improve their lives. In Kédougou, the president receives an ingot of gold from the foreign mining companies while the local populations receive little in return—e.g. employment for the region's inhabitants. Clientelism is seen to be working as a force for corruption, not as a means for those in power to share their wealth with others. Perceptions that the government is favoring members of the ruling party, who are amassing great wealth at the expense of the people, feed popular discontent. Much of the current dissatisfaction mirrors popular sentiment from the Diouf regime in 1999.

Sharp increases in the cost of living caused by the reduction of government subsidies on the price of basic commodities such as food, gasoline, and electricity are also serious issues. In some instances, the government has been obliged to yield to popular demands by lowering food, gasoline, and electricity prices, and distributing food to the needy.<sup>28</sup> Inadequate educational facilities and health services have also angered many Senegalese who see the government as doing little to remedy these problems.

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<sup>25</sup> In August, 2009 the Supreme Court reversed the Appeal Court's decision and reinstated the new Rural Council officers.

<sup>26</sup> These sentiments were expressed by Senegalese from all walks of life in our interviews. They are also recorded in the media.

<sup>27</sup> For more details, concerning Senegalese traditional political culture and the movement towards more democratic norms, see Sheldon Gellar, *Democracy in Senegal: Tocquevillian Analytics in Africa* (New York: Palgrave-McMillan, 2005) and Frederick Schaeffer, *Democracy in Translation: Understanding Political Culture in an Unfamiliar Culture* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998).

<sup>28</sup> Wade is not totally impervious to Senegalese public opinion. As a shrewd populist politician, Wade often backs off when he sees that public opinion is against him. Moreover, Wade has won a following among many Senegalese because of gestures demonstrating personal generosity in helping out people in debt, paying for medical operations of those in need out of his own pocket, and dropping in to attend funerals, marriages, and other ceremonies of ordinary people. Wade became popular by his appeal to ordinary people rather than to the country's western-educated and better-off middle classes.

Frustrated with the lack of response to traditional modes of communication between the government and the people, more Senegalese are seeking open confrontation. They are taking to protesting publicly as the only way to get the government to hear and respond to their grievances. University students are involved in rock-throwing demonstrations protesting the government's neglect of the university and the lack of employment opportunities, while strikes in many sectors are seen as the only way to resolve differences. In Kédougou, when a demonstration was met with a non-proportional show of force by security personnel, youths rioted and burned down the prefecture and other government buildings. In Saint Louis fishermen complain that the government is not coming to their defense, as they are being denied traditional access to Mauritanian fishing grounds. Some are taking out their frustrations on Mauritians residing in Saint Louis.

In the Casamance, the conditions that provoked the original conflict have not disappeared. The lack of respect for traditional Diola culture by Senegalese elites coming from north of the Gambia River who regarded the Diola as “primitive” offended Diola sensibilities, and these wounds remain unhealed.<sup>29</sup> Allocation of land to Wolof and Toucouleur coming from the north and to the French to set up a luxury Club Med tourist camp also stoked grievances. While the Ziguinchor region had the highest percentage of primary school age children attending school in the country, educational and economic opportunities for primary school graduates were extremely limited. Today, an estimated eighty percent of youth in the region remain unemployed. Many Casamançais still feel marginalized, underrepresented in the halls of power, and handicapped by inadequate infrastructure as well as low quality of health and higher education services.

Moderate elements in the MFDC also feel that the government is not responding to their overtures for a negotiated settlement to the Casamance conflict. Others, however, see the government as offering few incentives for rebels to give up their arms and reintegrate into Casamançais society and worry about increasing levels of banditry.

Many Senegalese interviewed expressed concern that the social fabric is severely stressed and that individual interests are trumping age-old communitarian values. Some stated that their country is about to explode in violence, as we shall see in the next section, but these latter statements may be exaggerated. Since the late 1960s, Senegalese have been predicting a popular explosion that could lead to civil war, military coups, and dictatorship. Before the 2000 presidential elections, it was widely believed that Diouf would not leave power of his own accord and would rig the elections. Widespread violence was predicted. In fact, the elections were relatively peaceful. Diouf handed over power to his long-time rival, Wade, in an orderly and peaceful manner, much to the surprise of Senegalese public opinion. At present, there are very real frustrations over deteriorating economic conditions and services as well as a lack of demonstrable concern from Wade and his government. While these frustrations are tied to rising incidents of violence, if history is to judge they will not result in widespread national instability.

## **Social and Institutional Resiliency**

Deeply ingrained traditions of dialogue, consultation, and negotiation are the preferred instruments for preventing and resolving conflict and can be found at all levels of Senegalese society. They constitute perhaps the most important social and institutional barrier to systemic political violence.

Since independence in 1960, Senegalese rulers have generally resolved political conflict through negotiation rather than repression. During the early 1990's, when the political climate was heating up, the Diouf regime negotiated a consensual reform of the electoral code with the opposition and brought opposition members, including Wade, into his government. While in the opposition, Wade often encouraged his followers to go

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<sup>29</sup> Because of their isolation from Senegal north of the Gambia River and their late integration into the French colony of Senegal towards the end of the nineteenth century, which was inhabited by predominantly Wolof, Halpulaar, and to a lesser extent, Serer populations, Casamançais used to refer to their traveling to Senegal north of the Gambia River as “going to Senegal.”

into the streets and threatened violence over alleged electoral fraud. However, in the end, he negotiated with the Diouf regime and defused the situation.

Senegal's leading Muslim and Catholic religious authorities<sup>30</sup> have frequently intervened to preserve social peace and political stability, resolving conflicts between prominent leaders and deploring political violence. They have obtained the release of political prisoners and brought government and unions together to resolve costly strikes.

At the local level, Senegalese have traditionally resolved conflicts through the mediation of local religious leaders, rural notables, and urban neighborhood customary authorities. They prefer these outlets over administrative mechanisms or the courts. Although local level farmer-herder conflicts have been endemic in many parts of Senegal, conflicts were generally mediated by rural notables and resolved without degenerating into large-scale violence. In the Casamance, elders, traditional authorities, and women play important roles in Diola society as spiritual leaders, mediators, and peacemakers.

Strong patterns of grassroots self-organization and social solidarity to achieve common goals and meet basic needs also indicate social and institutional resilience. These patterns can be seen in most parts of Senegal from the organization of the urban informal economy sector to village development associations, hometown associations, and weekly rural markets. The steady decline of state tutelage over associational life that began in the 1970s has opened up space for thousands of autonomous associations to spring up throughout the country. Youth and women's associations comprise some of the most dynamic groups in Senegalese society. Senegal's vibrant associational life provides a proactive and constructive alternative to violent protest and dependency on government largesse and services.

Despite the continued conflict and insecurity in the Casamance, locally-based youth, women and village-level associations have maintained their social and development activities. They build on traditional Diola norms of solidarity, a strong work ethic, and division of labor along age and gender lines. Most Diola villages have their own hometown associations in which Diola, working in Dakar and abroad, send funds back to their native villages to finance investments in infrastructure and schools.

In areas such as Kédougou, which are experiencing an influx of populations – both Senegalese and foreign – for purposes of natural resource exploitation, traditional associational life and governance is being tested. In order for governance systems to be able to manage they need to have the vested legitimacy of the population. In areas that rely upon a combination of both national political structures and more “informal” traditional structures difficulties are often presented when merging new constituency groups into this hybrid system. The rapidity of social and economic change places additional stress on the system as do different socio-economic realities. In Kédougou, the rapid development of mining has sparked conflicts (mainly non-violent) between indigenous populations and recent arrivals, including foreigners and Senegalese from other areas, who work for the mining companies or in artisanal mining operations.<sup>31</sup> In Kolda, Peulhs and Toucouleur have clashed over land.<sup>32</sup> While there is reason to believe that governance (both formal and informal) structures will be able to manage in these dynamic areas, it would be naïve not to try to understand these threats to the system and focus attention on strengthening it.

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<sup>30</sup> The Catholic Church hierarchy has enjoyed considerable influence in Senegal, thanks to its good relations with Muslim religious authorities and the high quality of its leaders. When Senegal's first African cardinal died, the entire country went into mourning.

<sup>31</sup> See Wula Naafa, *Rapport de l'Atelier Restreint de Concertation des Acteurs Clés sur l'Oropailage traditionnel* (Kédougou: Wula Naafa, November 11-12, 2008) and World Education Zuinchor, *La Région Minière de Kédougou ou une probable 'Seconde Casamance': Les signes avant-coureurs d'un conflit au Sénégal Orientale* Ziguinchor: World Education, 2009).

<sup>32</sup> The Peulh and Toucouleur are Pulaar speaking ethnic groups. Together, they are known as the Halpulaar. The Toucouleur originate in the Senegal River Valley while the Peulh were either original habitants of Kolda or migrated there from Guinea. Conflicts often emerge between sedentary Toucouleur coming from the north encroaching on land and grazing of Peulh pastoralists.

## B. DRIVERS OF CONFLICT AND MITIGATING FACTORS

### Drivers of Conflict

#### Political Drivers

The main drivers of conflict that have the potential to spark political violence revolve primarily around political processes and the government's institutional performance. The absence of clear boundaries between the ruling party coalition and the state creates a situation in which politics and state performance are closely interrelated.

Although the Wade regime came to power through fair and open elections in 2000, the issue of electoral fraud whether perceived or real is likely to come up in the 2012 presidential election no matter who wins. Wade's defeat in the 1988 and 1993 presidential elections was accompanied by cries of electoral fraud and post-election rioting in Dakar and its *banlieu*, the assassination of the vice president of the Constitutional Council, and lynching of police officers in 1993.<sup>33</sup>

Wade's divide and rule tactics within his own party and party coalition, along with efforts to break-up opposition parties, have not only weakened his own party but exacerbated factionalism within all political parties. Inside the PDS, different factions have fought each other in sometimes violent battles to win internal party elections because access to national political office affords opportunities for enrichment.<sup>34</sup> Wade has alienated virtually all of his former lieutenants and allies. While appealing for political dialogue with Wade, BSS leaders, the country's major opposition coalition, are also calling for his resignation. They are urging citizens to take to the streets as the only way of getting Wade to listen to their demands. This strategy has the potential to prod Wade into dialogue. But it could also backfire and exacerbate conflict if Wade refuses to negotiate on the grounds that the opposition is attempting to oust him from office before his term ends.

The government's mismanagement of the Casamance dossier is widely regarded as a major driver of conflict by both the people of the Casamance and the MFDC. The president's divide and rule tactics and disbursement of state funds to favor one faction of the MFDC over another has exacerbated distrust and rivalry within the MFDC. Factionalism and disagreements over future directions have pitted the moderate leadership favoring a negotiated peace settlement against younger more radical elements pushing to resume attacks on the Senegalese army. These "*jeunes gosses*" are accusing the old guard of corruption and ineffectiveness and are believed to be responsible for the murder of Youssof Samboua, an MFDC's officer accused of not fairly distributing government funds.<sup>35</sup> (A full conflict assessment for the Casamance can be found in Annex I.)

Disenfranchised youth from non-Diola groups may also be tempted to join the MFDC and broaden its base. In Gambia, President Jammeh, a Diola, has been recruiting large numbers of Diola into the army. Although probably motivated by the desire to insure army loyalty, an increasingly Diola army in the Gambia could impact the Casamance conflict.

Narco-trafficking could also become a major driver of conflict if the MFDC becomes more deeply involved in the drug trade as a lucrative source of revenue for the movement and good livelihoods for MFDC fighters. Revenues from the drug trade could permit the MFDC to purchase more arms and help finance a renewal of hostilities. Drugs introduced by transnational drug cartels based in Latin America are coming from Guinea-Bissau, some of which are passing through the Casamance, and continuing onto Gambia and elsewhere for shipment to Europe.

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<sup>33</sup> During the 2000 presidential campaign, Wade threatened to take to the streets if he lost and called upon the army to intervene if electoral fraud cost him the election.

<sup>34</sup> The PDS has a long history of engaging in strong-arm tactics and political violence.

<sup>35</sup> The opinion expressed by the majority of interviewees in the Casamance with connections to the MFDC.

## Economic and Social Drivers

The most salient economic drivers of conflict stem from Senegalese reactions to the negative impact of flawed government economic policies, poor institutional performance and declining economic growth. Exploitative government policies like the expropriation and transfer of large tracts of land, significant spending on grandiose projects of limited perceived value to the general public, and failure to prevent the deterioration of public services have placed Wade and his government on tenuous ground with the public. The perception of growing elitism when the government administration has repeatedly promised to assist the average citizen is creating significant animosity and motivating popular discontent. Combined with high government deficits and limited capacity to pay the salaries of state employees the gap between the haves and have-nots is expanding rapidly.

At the local level competition for access and control of natural resources are becoming increasingly significant drivers of conflict, especially in areas like Kédougou and Kolda. Modes of governing access to fishing grounds, forests, bore wells, farm land, and grazing areas are facing extreme pressure as demand increases. Local residents are also becoming more intransigent over government expropriation, and local leaders closely allied with the regime. This phenomenon is occurring all over the country with farmers, pastoralists, fishermen, and religious groups. Internationally management of natural resources, including land, is often at the heart of conflict vulnerability. Where governance systems are legitimate and have buy-in conflicts are generally resolved peacefully. Where these systems weaken under pressure violence is often the result.

Harsh government responses to protest tend to escalate violence, sometimes turning peaceful protests into violent confrontations that make martyrs of peaceful as well as violent protestors. Disaffected youth have been the chief actors heading for the streets to articulate their demands and to express their anger. When these demonstrations are met with repressive attacks by security forces, youth feel compelled to up the ante, thereby contributing to a cycle of violence over issues as innocuous as school desks and cafeteria offerings. This relatively new regular cycle of violent brinksmanship is worrying, although probably not likely to lead to national destabilization.

## Religious Drivers

In many parts of the world contestation for control and supremacy by one religious group over another is a source of conflict. While this is still a relatively isolated phenomenon in Senegal, it could become a significant driver if spurred by the heads of the Brotherhoods or other religious leaders with large followings. In July, members of a group of Mouride Baye Fall attacked Tijanis after accusing them of denigrating the Mourides and asserting Tijani superiority during a conference sponsored by Tijani students. Some opportunistic Sufi religious leaders like Kara Mbacké and Cheikh Béthio Thioune are organizing militias, looking for issues to promote their image, and positioning themselves to sell their support to contending rivals for power and/or to enter the political arena on their own account.<sup>36</sup> Their movements have the potential to stir up inter-religious disputes, which could descend into violence if combined with other facilitating events (like election fraud, etc.).

## Mitigating Factors

For the most part, mitigating factors build upon Senegalese social and institutional resilience, traditions of dialogue, mediation, negotiation, and adhesion to democratic values and practices.

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<sup>36</sup> There is little evidence that this trend is a reflection of religious radicalization towards extremism. It seems to be more a manifestation of opportunistic religious leaders seeking to increase their weight and influence in Senegal's political system.

## Adhesion to Democratic Norms and Reform

The *Assises Nationales* (AN) has called for sweeping institutional reforms designed to reduce the excessive concentration of presidential power and insure the independence of the judiciary.<sup>37</sup> Headed by Ahmadou Mahtar Mbow, former head of UNESCO, the AN has created committees to study and discuss the major issues confronting Senegalese society and to make recommendations for institutional reform. In May, 2009, the AN produced a Good Governance Charter that is now being translated into Senegal's national languages.<sup>38</sup> The AN is currently preparing a campaign to gain broad public support for its recommendations.

The BSS is also advocating good governance reforms and has joined the *Assises Nationales*. As a result Wade perceives the *Assises Nationales* as an instrument of the political opposition to undermine his authority. He has refused to send government representatives or PDS and coalition party officials to participate in its deliberations to date.

Weaknesses within the BSS must also be noted, such as politicians' unwillingness to implement articles in the Democratic Governance Charter calling for full disclosure of their financial and real estate holdings suggest. This suggests that some elements in the BSS may be paying lip service to reform and using their membership in the AN to improve their credibility with the public.

The growth of independent media (press and private radio stations) has helped to disseminate democratic values more widely. The media has documented corruption, government abuse of power, and political violence and intimidation directed against opposition political leaders and journalists critical of the regime. The independent media has refused to cave into intimidation. Instead, they are rallying public opinion to defend freedom of the press.

Progressive religious leaders have emerged. These include independent Imams who champion community interests and prominent Catholic and Sufi Brotherhood religious leaders like Cardinal Sarr and Mansour Sy Djmil, who actively lobby for good governance.

Diaspora Senegalese espousing reformist goals are becoming more involved in politics and lobbying for change. They could constitute an important new pool of political candidates and leaders. Their influence on the 2012 presidential elections remains to be seen. Reformists from civil society are also entering politics and joining or creating their own parties, as was seen in the recent local elections.

Many young people are also interested in reforming the political system. They often look to cultural heroes for guidance. Senegalese rappers, for example, criticize corrupt practices of politicians and promote democratic norms coupled with traditional solidarity values. Senegalese performers like Youssou Ndour serve as role models for Senegalese youth advocating peace and social justice.<sup>39</sup>

## Political Dialogue

The emergence of a broad coalition for political dialogue, respect for democratic values and processes, and institutional reform constitutes a major mitigating factor. It offers an alternative to the potentially violent scenarios emerging from rising levels of confrontation between the government, the political opposition, and civil society. Today, Senegalese public opinion supports political dialogue between the Wade regime and the

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<sup>37</sup> The lack of independence of the judiciary has been a major concern to advocates of democracy during both the Diouf and Wade regimes.

<sup>38</sup> The Charter was elaborated after a year of deliberation and in-depth studies. For more details concerning the contents of the Charter and the A.N's analysis of Senegalese institutions, see Assises Nationales au Sénégal, *Charte de Gouvernance Démocratique* (Dakar: May 2009) and Assises Nationales au Sénégal, Assises Nationales au Sénégal, *Assises Nationales au Sénégal: Résumé* (Dakar: May 23, 2009).

<sup>39</sup> Ndour is currently working on an album protesting frequent power outages.

political opposition as well as a resolution of the Casamance conflict through negotiation.<sup>40</sup> The *Assises Nationales* (AN) has emerged as the most broad-based national level movement lobbying for a political dialogue with the government and a negotiated peace settlement in the Casamance. CONGAD, a national network of NGOs, has held regional meetings around the country to build popular support for peace in the Casamance and has organized a national advocacy campaign to lobby government leaders and to pressure the National Assembly to take action.

The movement for the independence of the Casamance was founded by – among others – a Catholic priest, and during the early years of the rebellion, many traditional and religious authorities supported the insurgency. Animist spiritual leaders held rites in the “sacred forests” in which young men took oaths to fight until victorious. Today, Catholic, Muslim, and traditional religious authorities support a negotiated settlement, and many are working for peace.

Casamançais civil society has also become more actively engaged in peace activities at both the community and regional level. New groups like the *Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance* (APAC) have formed to build a broad based push for peace. It is encouraging dialogue and reconciliation among contending factions within the MFDC and calling for the government to resume negotiations. Women, elders, and traditional authorities who supported the original insurgency are now serving as mediators and peacemakers.

## **A Professional Military**

The Senegalese military is considered one of the most professional in Africa. Well-trained and educated, they view themselves as a Republican force in the service of the state. On a continent overly experienced in military coups d'état, the Senegalese take great pride in their comparatively professional, apolitical military. Were they otherwise inclined, the balance of power between the Army and the Gendarmerie provides an additional internal safeguard against political intervention.

The Senegalese military play an important economic role through their participation in United Nations and other peacekeeping missions. These tours offer development opportunities for Senegalese officers while providing substantial financial returns to the participants and the government. Moreover, Senegal's preeminence in the peacekeeping arena is a source of national and institutional pride.

Although the Senegalese military and police record in the Casamance has been mixed over the last three decades, the recent adoption of a Counter Insurgency (COIN)<sup>41</sup> strategy provides an unprecedented opportunity to enhance the national government of Senegal's relationship with the Casamance population. A limited sampling of popular opinion indicated a corresponding shift in public perception of the military. Notwithstanding its limitations – that it appears to guide the Army but not the Gendarmerie or the police and that it does not appear to have broad-based recognition among Army or national leadership in Dakar – the COIN strategy may help sway local support from the MFDC, especially if the conflict intensifies.

## **Belief in the Efficacy of Elections as Instruments for Change**

A growing belief in the efficacy of elections as a viable instrument for ousting unpopular and ineffective leaders mitigates the likelihood of violent regime change, if all the rules of the game are respected. The 2000 presidential elections marked a watershed in Senegalese history. They proved that regime change could be achieved through the ballot box and that elections could not always be rigged to ensure the victory of the party in power.

The March 2009 local elections demonstrated that the advantages enjoyed by the party in power and clientelist pay-offs were not enough to ensure victory in areas where citizens turned out in large numbers to

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<sup>40</sup> This sentiment has been recorded in Senegal's independent media and expressed in many interviews. The *Assises Nationales* (AN) has been the most important major organization promoting these views.

<sup>41</sup> As per conversations with the Senegalese Zone Commander, Colonel Paul Ndiaye.



express discontent <sup>42</sup> It remains to be seen whether this pattern will persist or whether clientelist politics will make a comeback in the presidential elections. Much depends on the success of reform candidates in improving the delivery of local government services and infrastructure and mobilizing their constituents to participate more actively in public life and decision-making.

The example of good governance reform candidates like Cheikh Bamba Dièye, the new mayor of Saint Louis, could also mitigate conflict by providing successful alternative styles of governance. Dièye has formulated plans to stimulate tourism, protect local fishermen, and improve sanitary conditions. This approach could serve as a model for other towns. Aliou Diack, the newly elected president of the Mbane Rural Council, has demonstrated great political courage in his efforts to reverse massive expropriation of land. He has also successfully contested decisions taken by local and national appeals courts to oust him from office. By going through the system right up to the Supreme Court, which upheld his election, Diack has shown that the Senegalese legal system can work. There are other signs that the judiciary is resisting efforts by the government to influence legal decisions. Over the past two years, Senegalese legal associations and judges have issued public declarations calling for greater independence of the judiciary branch of government.

### **Grass Roots Initiatives to Address Local Problems and Land Use Issues**

With land use issues emerging as a major source of conflict, Senegalese have forged new mechanisms to address this problem in rural areas. Residents in Rural Communes in the Senegal River Delta are collaborating to prevent disputes over access to land and to use land, forests, and water resources more efficiently. For example, the inhabitants of Ross-Béthio, met together over several years to elaborate a land use plan, *Plan d'Occupation et d'Affectation des Sols* (POAS) acceptable to all parties.<sup>43</sup>

While protesting the government's failure to address the problems caused by rainy season flooding, residents of Guédiawaye, Pikine, and Rufisque have recently created *Synergies des Acteurs pour l'Assainissement de la Banlieue* (SAABA). SAABA has organized volunteer neighborhood committees that meet before the rainy season to elaborate a plan to help residents directly affected by flooding and to minimize damage. Local volunteers rescue individuals caught in a flood and use motor pumps to drain water and place sandbags in strategic places. Volunteers come from all walks of life, including locally elected municipal officials, religious authorities, school teachers, and youth.

Even in Kedougou, in artisanal mining areas the assessment team found quite organized structures of governance, including taxation, access rights and work teams. There was no evidence that the rules were biased against foreign workers in these artisanal areas, but rather applied equally across nationalities. That said, in the mining concessions operated by foreign companies the perception of local Senegalese was that they were being excluded from opportunities and exploited<sup>44</sup>. The governance nuances between artisanal and concessional mining is one that ought to be paid significant attention to by USAID.

In transferring more authority and responsibility to local government, the decentralization reforms introduced in the 1990s have brought local government officials and their constituents together to solve local problems.

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<sup>42</sup> Elections in Senegal have become more transparent since the electoral reforms of the mid-1990s. It is increasingly difficult to steal elections on election day. The secret ballot is an accomplished fact. Voter fraud and manipulation are now more likely to occur through rigging voting registration rolls (*fichier electoral*). However, Senegalese political parties, especially those affiliated with the ruling government coalition, still use the distribution of basic commodities and money to influential opinion leaders such as marabouts, village chiefs, and other notables as well as to individual voters to buy their electoral support.

<sup>43</sup> See Conseil Rural de Ross Béthio, *Plan d'occupation et d'affectation des sols de la communauté de Ross Béthio* (Saint Louis: SAED, January 2003).

<sup>44</sup> The assessment team was not able to visit a concession area, hence perceptions are based on conversations with people in town regarding these large mining areas. There is considerable divergence in perceptions regarding benefits to large-scale mining operations versus artisanal mining with potentially serious consequences.

Paradoxically, the failure of the central government to transfer adequate financial and human resources to local government has created incentives for local government officials to work closely with their constituents. The fact that citizens and politicians take local government elections more seriously than in the past indicates that Senegalese no longer see local government primarily an instrument of the state and national-level politicians but as a representative institution that is better placed to understand the daily problems and needs of citizens.

Many young people are also engaged in constructive activities to improve the quality of life in their villages and urban neighborhoods. They provide the labor for local clean-up campaigns in the towns and participate fully in village development associations. Senegalese youth can be agents of violent conflict or agents for reform and peaceful change. Much depends upon the extent to which their grievances are addressed by those in power and the extent to which peaceful mechanisms can be mobilized to give them a greater voice in public life and hope for a better future.

### **Wade's Concern for His Legacy and International Reputation**

Wade's concern for regaining some of his past popularity and to leave office with a positive legacy and untarnished reputation could become a mitigating factor against violence. It is in his power to defuse tensions by engaging in dialogue with the opposition, scaling back extravagant government spending, appointing more competent officials, and renouncing efforts to promote his son as his successor – even if some of these actions may be extremely unlikely. Wade may also be concerned about his declining image internationally as an advocate of democracy. During his first term in office, he received awards for his work in advancing democracy in Africa. His desire to be seen at home and abroad as a peacemaker could prompt him to seek a permanent solution to the Casamance crisis.

Wade could scale back repression and take more vigorous action to address Senegalese grievances or he could continue as in the past and risk exacerbating tensions. The president's choices will have a great impact on Senegal's future.

## **C. WINDOWS OF VULNERABILITY AND WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY**

We have identified five windows of vulnerability that represent critical moments in time when spoilers could most easily turn grievances towards violence, but also moments of opportunity for consolidating resilience to engage and enhance structures of peaceful negotiation as well as political reform.

### **1. Preparations for the 2012 Presidential Elections and the Post-Wade Era**

Different scenarios are possible depending on whether Wade accepts dialogue and reform or whether he digs in and tries to maintain his power and control over his succession.

Because of the high stakes involved in the upcoming presidential election, tensions could rise as different political leaders and political parties position themselves to have their candidate and party coalition win. The government's reluctance to undertake a consensual reform of the electoral code, the doubts about the real independence of the CENA, and concerns of bias within the Ministry of the Interior which is responsible to organize elections all heighten suspicion that the regime is preparing to rig the elections. Efforts by the president and his allies to divide the opposition through cooptation, payoffs, and blackmail could further polarize the Senegalese political class and undermine confidence in the political system. The sudden death of the president, who is well known to be ill and has traveled abroad for medical treatment, would probably touch off a wild scramble for succession within his party and could lead to strife and even violence among contending candidates and factions.

The president could also announce his resignation in an attempt to move his son into the executive. His son would then be responsible for organizing the elections. He could use his position and direct access to state

resources to become the ruling coalition's presidential candidate. Those in power could seek to win the support of some influential religious authorities by offering them tracts of land and money. This could lead to clashes between religious groups supporting the ruling party/coalition's candidate and those supporting his opponent.

A more probable outcome would be if the elections were widely perceived as rigged, this could touch off demonstrations, marches on the presidential palace, and destruction of property. Clashes between demonstrators and rioters and government security forces and possibly party militias and religious militias could become serious. Repression of the demonstrators resulting in many deaths could aggravate the situation and lead to widespread violence and the fall of the regime. If the regime managed to control the protests and remain in power, this could be followed by the establishment of more repressive measures to keep the lid on popular protest.

This window of vulnerability could be transformed into a window of opportunity if the following events transpired. Wade's desire to depart on a more positive note could lead him to open up a political dialogue with the opposition mediated by the *Assises Nationales* and supported by public opinion. Agreement by the president to accept recommendations for revising the voter registration rolls and creating an independent election commission would defuse some of the popular anger directed against him and his regime. At the same time, Wade could heed public opinion and stop promoting his son as his successor.

Wade could also step down before 2012 and make arrangements with his coalition and the opposition to organize a transitional national union government and/or to create mechanisms to ensure fair and open elections. In Senegal's recent history charged political rhetoric has led eventually to peaceful transition rather than large-scale instability. President Wade himself personifies this tendency, with a history of going up to the edge, but not stepping over it. This presents significant cause for optimism, and it is important to support efforts that would encourage a peaceful political transition.

## **2. Deteriorating Living Conditions and Economic Opportunities**

With public anger and demonstrations growing in Dakar and the *banlieu*, widespread violence could erupt if economic conditions deteriorate further before the elections. These conditions could be exacerbated by economic shocks such as the devaluation of the CFA, global food shortages, or insufficient revenues to pay civil servants. If the regime then continues to spend funds on expensive prestige projects, patronage, and trips abroad rather than providing public services and a social safety net, public discontent could erupt into localized demonstrations of violence. People could be tempted to resort to criminal activities to survive, stimulating drug and arms trafficking, money laundering, and a rise in violent street crime. There is already some evidence that street crime is on the rise in metropolitan Dakar, and those we interviewed complained that increased quantities of drugs are circulating in poor neighborhoods. Continued efforts to enforce the expropriation of land, displacement of villages, and the protection of vested interest in rural regions could result in violence directed against government officials and property.

On the other hand, deteriorating living conditions and economic opportunities combined with the government's precarious financial situation could provide opportunities for reform. The government would have fewer resources to support clientelism. Rising popular discontent coupled with shrinking state revenues might force the government to accept financial reforms and cut back on lavish government spending. The government could also reverse some of its more unpopular economic policies such as the GOANA agricultural program. They could increase application of legislation already on the books like the new procurement code that provides safeguards against corruption. Local governments led by reformers could serve as a model for the national government by improving the quality of public services, demonstrating greater transparency and working closely with local groups and the private sector to promote local development and greater economic opportunities. Greater collaboration between government and local communities could defuse tensions and give citizens hope for a better future.

Improved government performance could entice donors to provide greater financial assistance to alleviate suffering and to support political and economic reforms. These reforms could also be supported by religious authorities committed to improving the living conditions of their followers. Finally, the 2012 presidential election could bring a regime to power that would implement political and economic reform and give priority to improving the quality of life and enhancing economic opportunities.

### **3. Tensions in Kédougou and other Peripheral Regions**

While artisanal mining has been prevalent in Kedougou for some time, large-scale commercial mining concessions are relatively new. Whereas conditions in many of the artisanal mining areas are dismal, including severe health and safety concerns, the governance structures in place do appear to hold legitimacy for the miners involved. That said many artisanal miners perceive that the infusion of big business will improve their conditions and bring “development” to the area. In an artisanal mine visited by the assessment team, nearly all the miners were hoping that foreign companies would come to their areas and exploit the mineral wealth.

However, the team also met with several individuals who had experience working in one of the commercial mining areas, and perceptions were very different. Complaints of exploitation, prejudice, lack of payment, and injustice were heard. One foreign employee of a large mine mentioned casually his contempt for the “ignorant” and “lazy” workers he’d experienced in south-eastern Senegal, reinforcing these perceptions of prejudice<sup>45</sup>. This wide differential in perceptions could have significant impact on the region as there continues to be an increase in commercial mines. When expectations are high and not met by reality this could lead to violent responses, particularly when traditional artisanal access is no longer available and livelihoods are threatened.

Given USAID’s experience in working with the private sector in extractive industries, there is a critical moment of opportunity to engage communities and business leaders in discussions to mitigate against any eventuality of violence. Legislation already on the books like ECOWAS’ new mining code designed to promote local development could be applied and an increase in transparency over existing mineral company social funds should be immediately attended to. Working now to address problems in Kedougou can help to ensure a strong, robust and revenue-enhancing mining industry in Senegal. It would be faulty to ignore the experience of many other countries that have experienced similar violence around extractives when communities are excluded or abused.

### **4. The Casamance**

The security and socioeconomic development of the Casamance, the return of refugees, and the reintegration of the combatants all require a negotiated political settlement. Indications suggest that while tensions in the Casamance are currently rising, the moderate leadership of the MFDC, still nominally in control, is looking for a face-saving means of settling the conflict. Various windows of vulnerability and opportunity are converging, making this a critical time to act. They can be summarized as follows.

The prolonged status quo has generated explosive conditions where younger combatants, impatient with the lack of access to war dividends and a lack of progress in dialogue/negotiations to end the conflict, are challenging the legitimacy of moderate leaders, whom they deem corrupt and ineffective. These young dissidents threaten mutiny and a return to hostilities with the Senegalese Army, as evidenced by the murder last May of a senior commander, Yousof Sambou, and recent attacks on army convoys. There is increasing potential for radicalization among these fighters and a more entrenched insistence on independence. If these dissidents unite across camps, break from the current leadership, and possibly ally with elements of Salif Sadio’s faction (the MFDC’s most radical element), negotiations will become more difficult and a resumption of hostilities likely. While the population at large has lost its appetite for war, disenfranchised youth may be tempted to join, broadening the MFDC base. Some Peulh youth, angered at perceived land encroachment by the Toucouleur, have reportedly also created their own MFDC camp in the eastern part of the region.

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<sup>45</sup> Informal conversation between assessment team member and an ex-patriot employee of a large mine. Kedougou.

Potential MFDC permeation by narco-traffickers could destabilize the region, further criminalize the movement, and ignite the conflict through resource enrichment.

On the other hand, the moderate MFDC leadership, motivated by fear, is highly amenable to negotiations and likely open to face-saving alternatives to independence. During a recent discussion, MFDC military commander César Badiate told the assessment team he would support an intra-MFDC *assise* (large meeting) in which all factions would be invited to work on bridging divides and developing common platforms for negotiations. César would welcome the inclusion of civil society leaders as well as Salif Sadio. César suggests that such a meeting take place in Guinea Bissau with international guarantees for security. The Senegalese Ambassador to Guinea Bissau told the assessment team that he would be prepared to offer logistic support. The new army chief of Guinea Bissau is an old ally of Salif from the days of the Guinea Bissau civil war, raising the possibility that Salif might actually attend such an *assise* for the first time in years. This could lead to enough resolution of intra-MFDC rivalries to proceed with negotiations.

Other trends would also support a renewal of the peace process. An increasingly vocal and organized civil society is more actively advocating for a negotiated settlement, and villagers speaking at recent forums express readiness to receive ex-combatants back into their communities. The army counterinsurgency strategy is serving as a confidence-building measure for the population, increasing their sense of security and demonstrating that an organ of the state can be a positive force.

Some believe that Wade's government is hoping that the Casamance crisis will wither away without a negotiated settlement, that perhaps promises of socioeconomic development will win the allegiance of the population. However, recent events<sup>46</sup> suggest that the conflict is still very much alive, and it is doubtful that a successful Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) program could be developed without a definitive peace. (Please see Annex1 for an in depth discussion of the current situation in the Casamance.)

## 5. Regional Dynamics

Current regional dynamics also present some critical windows of vulnerability and opportunity.

**Politics.** A key determinant of the conflict dynamics within Senegal is its location in a politically volatile region. The presence of Islamic militants in Mauritania and Mali, instability in and Guinea and Guinea Bissau, and an increasingly autocratic Gambia challenge Senegal on all fronts. As articulated below, spillover effects already have threatened Senegal's national security and stability.

**Crime.** Cross-border crime – particularly the marked increase in narco-trafficking – presents an additional challenge to Senegal's sovereignty. Long established routes for the illegal trafficking of people and commodities are being utilized to move cocaine across the continent to European embarking points. Gambian court records and seizures at formal crossing points into Senegal corroborate a steady flow of drugs from Guinea Bissau through Senegal to Gambia. Senegalese armed forces (military or police) do not appear to patrol borders between the formal crossings. With indications of Bissauan military involvement and the limited capacity of the judicial police to investigate narco-trafficking outside of Bissau, the environment remains highly hospitable to trafficking. Although there appeared to be a lull in the amount of cocaine transiting West Africa during the assessment period, trafficking is likely to continue unabated, facilitated by high levels of corruption and limited institutional capacity.

**Conflict.** Both Guinea Bissau and Gambia have been directly implicated in the Casamance conflict since its inception. The dual assassinations of Bissauan President Nino Vieira and Army Chief of Staff Tagme Na Wai potentially undermine the status quo by removing key supporters of Dakar's Casamance policy. In fact, their deaths coincide with numerous incidents, including an attack on military convoy, that threaten to abrogate the 2004 cease fire accords. It is unclear how the existing political alliances between the new army leadership and

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
<sup>46</sup> See IRIN news analysis: "Closer to war than peace in Casamance?" 9/18/09, <http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/52e9779cdf7b3a5bcb6c487df56e16a7.htm>.

the rival MFDC leaders Salif Sadio and Cesar Badiate will play out. Reports of an increasingly close relationship between Gambian President Jammeh and MFDC splinter leader, Salif Sadio, also suggest a rebalancing of power in the otherwise stalemated situation. Some reports suggest that Sadio's allies have not only taken refuge in the Gambia, but have also been recruited into the Gambian military to shore up the numbers of Jollah, which would, in turn, strengthen President Jammeh's power base.

**The Conflict-Crime Nexus.** Although evidence linking the MFDC to South American or West African drug cartels (or their intermediaries) is scant, the MFDC's ongoing need for resources, coupled with its strategic location along the borders with the Gambia and Guinea Bissau, suggest individual and/or group engagement in trafficking. MFDC members are already involved in marijuana trade with counterparts in Dakar and Banjul. Cocaine profits (or the promise of them) are already replacing diamonds as a major conflict resource in the region, particularly in Guinea and Guinea Bissau.

## **D. MAPPING THE ANALYTIC NARRATIVE**

From the dynamic interactions of the various ICAF findings, including grievances and resiliencies; conflict drivers and mitigators; and windows of vulnerability and opportunity, several storylines emerges with important implications for USAID/Senegal strategy and program planning. These are illustrated by the systems maps in Figures 2 and 3 and discussed below. Figure 2 offers a snapshot of the core political, social, and economic dynamics that influence conflict vulnerability for Senegal as a whole, and Figure 3 provides a similar analysis for the Casamance. Both maps suggest critical points of entry for USAID programming that could leverage mechanisms for conflict mitigation, strengthen democratic norms, and promote good governance. To help guide the reader through the maps, references to the text boxes on the maps are italicized in the narrative. We suggest that you have the maps in front of you as you read these sections.



## Senegal Systems Map

The upper left hand oval (shaded in yellow) depicts the Senegalese version of an idealized social compact, one that has never quite existed in reality, but informs how Senegalese citizens think their government *ought* to operate. This expectation led to Wade's victory in 2000 and explains current levels of dissatisfaction. The Senegalese people expect their president and other political leaders to be *strong and benevolent* and to provide adequate *public goods* through policies that are responsive to the needs of the "*people*." The people should have access to their leaders and channels of communication that ensure concerns will be appropriately addressed. The compact can be seen as a hybrid political system that incorporates elements of age-old patron/client modes of operation, but also includes democratic norms of public participation in government.


President Wade was elected to end the rampant clientilism of the former regime and to promote broad democratic reform that would lead to more responsive governance, in other words to move the country closer to the idealized social compact. Wade's victory in a free and fair election thus led to high *public expectations of government* (brown box, top and center). Moving to the upper right hand side of the map, we see that Wade's policies have not opened space for public reform but have instead further emphasized *patron/client politics*, focusing on the *distribution of "rents"* (be they appropriations of land or plum political positions) to gain favor with *selected elites*, who in turn support the president. This cycle of increased clientilism and favoritism (the promotion of Wade's son Karim as successor being the most blatant recent example) has led in two important directions: increasing *public opposition* and the perception that the government is producing more *public "bads"* than public goods. Public "bads" include the already enumerated ways that public services are not effectively delivered as well as blatant misappropriation of government funds, which (moving towards the center of the map) have led to *defeated public expectations of government* and heightened *levels of grievance*. These problems are contributing to what many describe as a *fraying of society* (highlighted in the center of the map). Interviewees complained that Senegalese society is losing some of its core communitarian values, as individuals push to get what they can for themselves. The rich are flaunting their wealth, as the middle class struggles with rising costs, and the poor go hungry. There is a growing sentiment that "enough is enough." Strikes are becoming more frequent and more violent. A new kind of brinkmanship is emerging where issues are pushed to the edge as exemplified by recent hunger strikes or renewed attacks on the Senegalese army in the Casamance, as though a show of force is the only way to get a government response. Unfortunately, these behaviors are met by harsh *government reprisals*, as in the case of Kédougou, leading to a negatively reinforcing cycle (indicated by the symbol (R)) that increases *public "bads,"* further stresses the social fabric, and likely leads to more violent forms of dissent.

Given Senegalese pride in democratic norms and the presence of a highly professional army well controlled by the state, this tendency towards increased brinkmanship is unlikely to threaten the regime or lead to widespread civil unrest, but it may well lead to a heightened culture of violence. In peripheral regions like Kédougou, where representative structures may be weaker and exploitation more hidden from the national consciousness, dialogue of the sort that is needed for people to feel their concerns are being heard will be critical to reducing risk of violent conflict.

Starting in the lower portion of the map, we find a positive trend towards more virtuous balancing cycles (indicated by the symbol (B)). Concerns about the breakdown of social values along with more active opposition by *disaffected elites* are leading to important *new social patterns*. Among elites there are calls for *national dialogue* and a push for *government reform*, most notably by the Assise Nationale, which has engaged a variety of stakeholders in broad thematic discussions on critical issues and produced the previously described charter for good governance. Concerns over the lack of definitive peace in the Casamance have led to a peace advocacy campaign by the national network of NGOs, CONGAD. While these efforts may mostly affect urban elites, at the local level we found ample evidence of communities organizing to meet their own needs. In the process they are developing new structures of civic organization, such as the previously described volunteer associations created to address problems of flood damage in the suburbs of Dakar. This spirit of community engagement has also led to more *vibrant local politics* as displayed in the March 2009 elections and in creative initiatives by new leaders, such as the mayor of Saint Louis' efforts to improve sanitation, attract



tourism, and protect the rights of fishermen. These activities may have some mitigating influence on *levels of grievance* and the overall *fraying of society* and should be supported by USAID programming. However, they are unlikely in of themselves to address the rising levels of popular tension. Broad *support for government reform*, particularly in the areas of electoral law, land tenure, resource management, and anti-corruption legislation should also be strengthened. Appropriate inroads will have to be carefully assessed, as the Assise Nationale is regarded by the current administration as a political ploy of the opposition.



## The Casamance Sub-system

Figure 3 examines the Casamance sub-system in some detail. The area shaded in pink at the lower left depicts the legacy of the Casamance conflict. *Grievances* over discriminatory practices and *exploitation* by the North led to *popular anger* and initial widespread support for the MFDC *insurgency*. During the 1990's *violent* attacks against the Senegalese army resulted in harsh *government reprisals* and state inflicted human rights abuses. As in many internal conflicts, villagers were caught in the crossfire, accused and often punished by both the MFDC and the army as collaborators. They were also subject to *MFDC predatory practices*, including highway robbery and the theft of harvests and farm animals by insurgents hungry for resources. These factors resulted in a kind of *popular resignation* to a low intensity conflict that seemed to have no end and no solution as well as a growing *gap between the MFDC and a population* more interested in socioeconomic development than independence.

The rest of the map addresses more recent dynamics. Wade promised a peaceful resolution to the Casamance crisis in the first 100 days of his administration. Instead the Casamance (as indicated in the upper middle section of the map) has suffered from the same heightened clientelism, *distribution of rents* and *public "bads"* as the rest of Senegal, leading to increased *levels of insecurity and grievance*. More specifically the *distribution of rents* to MFDC leaders as part of the government's apparent *divide and rule strategy* has led to further *fracturing of the MFDC*. The resulting gap in MFDC leadership has recently led to the *emergence of "Young Turks."* Impatient with the status quo, accusing the old guard of corruption, hoarding of government funds, ineffective leadership, and inability to pressure the government into negotiations, these young dissidents from several different MFDC camps are threatening mutiny and a return to full hostilities with the Senegalese army. They are responsible for the rise in *current violence* that has included attacks on army convoys and increased banditry, which in a reinforcing cycle (R) has increased *current levels of insecurity and grievance*.

These new *threats to MFDC traditional leadership* (by the "Young Turks") has led to greater *MFDC willingness to negotiate*, as the old guard seeks to maintain its power (see right side of map). However, contested leadership, a *lack of negotiating skills*, and the relationship *gap* with the population (purple box) on whose behalf they propose to negotiate hamper *MFDC capacity* for meaningful negotiations. In another reinforcing cycle, these factors have contributed to the *lack of peace talks, lack of progress on the ground, and current levels of insecurity and grievance*.

In the upper left portion of the map we note that *current levels of insecurity* and renewed violence have increased *popular support for a negotiated settlement*. This can lead in two directions. The population's inability to influence the MFDC to halt their aggression and banditry, along with their long standing *frustration* over Wade's mishandling of the Casamance dossier and lack of progress towards peace, could build on feelings of *resignation* and powerlessness. These *frustrations* reinforce ongoing *grievances* as well as the previously mentioned "defeated expectations of government" and "fraying of society." On the other hand, through the activities of APAC and various CBOs, there are signs of *new grassroots mobilization* (top left of map), as communities and traditional leaders appear ready to reach out to rebel groups and actively advocate for peace. These efforts could support MFDC cohesion around pushing for negotiations and could mitigate current trends towards increased violence.

In the upper right corner of the map a new danger looms, the region's boom in the *narco-trafficking* (blue box). Enormous profits can be made by carrying South American cocaine from Guinea Bissau up to Banjul and other West African ports from which it can be more easily shipped to Europe. Both the "Young Turks" and the *threatened MFDC moderate leadership* are sorely in need of resources. Familiar with the backcountry and skilled in averting authorities, they could easily be drawn into trafficking if they are not already. The resulting dynamic could greatly exacerbate the Casamance conflict and heighten regional criminality.

This picture also indicates several important points of entry and levers for positive change. As indicated in the shaded purple boxes, the growing gap between a fractured MFDC leadership and the broader Casamançais population is a major block to successful negotiations. While many Casamançais feel that the grievances that led to the conflict remain, they have little faith in the capacity of the MFDC to represent their interests.

Support for community efforts to reach out to the rebels could rebuild relationships in a manner that would have a moderating influence on the demands of the MFDC, encourage the MFDC to include civil society at the negotiating table, and prepare the population to reintegrate former combatants once a settlement has been reached. Capacity building for the MFDC in negotiating skills and in resolving their internal disputes will also be critical. It will also be important to find appropriate diplomatic means to encourage Wade's government to pursue a negotiated settlement. These issues are discussed in more detail in Annex V.

### III. IMPLICATIONS FOR PROGRAMMING AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The analysis contained in the Senegal sub-regional conflict assessment has implications for USAID/Senegal's overall strategy and sectoral programs. It can provide guidance for changes in existing programs and suggestions for new ones. The addition of a new DG program offers opportunities to address some of the issues raised by the report and to complement cross-cutting DG elements in the sectoral programs. Recommendations for USAID/Senegal to manage and mitigate conflict address six major areas of intervention:

#### 1. Strengthening linkages in all sectoral programs to mitigate conflict<sup>47</sup>

- By reinforcing the communication loop that has been so frayed under Wade's government, USAID can build on society's natural source of resilience to help prevent violence from occurring, strengthening both sector-specific gains and nation-wide stability. All of USAID/Senegal's sectoral programs should consult with and involve local communities, civil society, religious leaders, and traditional mediators in project design, implementation and evaluation.
- Sectoral programs should provide training for select appropriate civil society partner organizations – particularly in peripheral regions – to identify structural risks of conflict and develop avenues of recourse. Networks should be established and reinforced between these groups, government interlocutors and third party entities, such as USAID. It is of critical importance that this training be done by experts in structural causes of conflict, as right now there appears to be more focus on events-based attention to violence, which does little to focus on prevention.
- Sectoral programs should appeal to and work with a wide range of community groups and officials rather than only those directly involved in their sectoral programs. For example, education programs should not only target *Associations des Parent-Elèves* (APE), school teachers, and principals, but also involve other community groups addressing local problems.

#### 2. Peace building Programs in the Casamance

- USAID/Senegal in partnership with the US Embassy should reinvigorate a USG (and possibly international) strategy for peacebuilding that takes advantage of the current political window. In addition to advancing the peace process, the strategy and approach should seek to make the region inhospitable to narco-traffickers and other criminal elements. The strategy could include increased diplomatic pressure, intensified negotiation support (with agreed upon benchmarks by both sides),

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<sup>47</sup> Given the short period of time in the field and its focus on conflict, the assessment did not have the time to develop more details and specific recommendations concerning the mission's DG and sectoral programs. However, growing homophobia and attacks on homosexual organizations might make their participation in USAID health programs designed to combat HIV-AIDs problematic. USAID programs in the health and education sectors should be aware of the impact of conflict and violence in all regions in which the programs are operating.

and conflict-sensitive technical assistance to specific government and civil society counterparts. It could also include a strategic communications effort focused both on building peace and reducing crime/trafficking.

- USAID should continue – and intensify – its technical assistance to create opportunities for negotiations to occur.
  - Programs should intensify advocacy for civil society participation in the negotiations process, as anticipated in the 2004 agreements.
  - Program should provide technical assistance and training to APAC and other potential civil society intermediaries to develop a civilian platform for negotiations in partnership with MFDC.
  - Programs should provide technical assistance to MFDC to help plan intra-MFDC meetings and prepare for negotiations.
- Expand programs that engage at-risk youth. Casamance youth are at increased risk for involvement in marijuana production, recruitment into the macquis and, potentially, regional cocaine trafficking. Food for work programs that target youth to support community-determined development projects (such as local infrastructure projects, road repair, forest protection, etc.) are already having a positive effect on a small scale. Expanding these would build on community dynamism, engage youth constructively, help the communities meet their own needs, and develop a framework for eventual community-focused reintegration of combatants.

USAID/Senegal should avoid large expenditures on infrastructure and development in the Casamance before the conflict is definitively settled, so as not to collude with GOS beliefs that a negotiated settlement may not be necessary.

### **3. Interventions concerning land use and natural resource management (NRM)**

- USAID/Senegal’s Wula Naafa and NRM programs should integrate conflict management mechanisms as an indispensable complement to local governance components to encourage community participation not only in decision-making but also in resolving conflicts. (See bullet #2 in recommendation #1 above.)
- Wula Naafa programs should increase their understanding of local land tenure regimes and the coherency and impact of government policies (e.g. GOANA) on land use. Direct access to decision making within GOANA via Wula Naafa networks could make significant progress in confronting popular perceptions that GOANA is no more than a government scheme to steal land and reduce farmer profitability.
- Wula Naafa should also continue its strong focus on artisanal miners in the Kédougou region, analyzing how and to what extent mining activities are and could in the future drive conflict and affect Wula Naafa programs.
- Wula Naafa should look at the participatory processes used in elaborating POAS land use plans and the extent to which they provide effective blueprints for managing natural resources and diminishing conflicts between pastoralists, farmers, artisanal miners, and other NRM users. If effective, these techniques could be adapted to Wula Naafa programs and priorities.
- USAID/Senegal should explore opportunities opened up by MCC investments in northern Senegal, ECOWAS mining codes in Kédougou, and the Eastern Senegal National Park’s preservation program in elaborating future NRM programs. Direct engagement with MCC on land use planning is an urgent priority as it appears to otherwise not be critically enough factored into the discourse.

#### **4. DG Interventions**

Design DG interventions to support political dialogue, elaboration of a consensual electoral code, and a peaceful election campaign. Programs should attempt to consult with and involve all key actors. Some support could be given to *the Assises Nationales* to carry out its goal of moving beyond the Greater Dakar region and receiving support for the Democratic Governance Charter throughout the country.

Develop special programs to work with local government, civil society, religious leaders, and grassroots associations in Guédiawaye and Pikine, which have been hotbeds of protest. Programs should focus on improving service delivery and support citizen's involvement in co-producing with local government goods and services that are not provided by the state. Other programs could focus on channeling popular grievances into peaceful forms of protest. One component of the program could be training programs in community organizing. Maintaining a constant rhetoric of reform is necessary and has considerable historical grounding. Monitoring language to ensure calls for violence are kept in check is a necessary parallel track to this.

The DG program could also compliment Wula Naafa efforts to introduce a local governance component in its NRM program in Kédougou by analyzing the dynamics of political processes, political links with Dakar, and the degree of citizen involvement in public life. The DG program could then bring citizens and local government together to address the region's main problems.

Working with institutions and all parties to strengthen their utilization of political avenues for discourse and decision making can help to prevent the opposition fracturing that contributed to Wade's re-election in 2007.

#### **5. Regional Programming**

Regardless of whether the Mission assumes formal responsibilities for regional programming, it would be useful to consider regional factors in program design and management. Establishing a Peace and Security office or designating a point person on the DG or Program teams to incorporate a regional perspective into Mission programming would be an ideal first step. This person could also serve as a liaison officer to the US Embassy and international partners engaged in transnational crime.

#### **6. Synergy within USG agencies**

Though not directly related to USAID/Senegal's portfolio, the following recommendations deal with process issues and call for greater collaboration between USAID/Senegal, the Embassy, and other USG agencies.

USAID/Senegal should increase contacts, collaboration, and synergy between USAID/Senegal, the Embassy and other USG agencies like DoJ (and its subordinate agencies, such as DEA) and DoD in strategic planning. This will be particularly important in light of the State Department's new Counternarcotics Strategy for West Africa. Information and advice from the DEA on transnational criminal activities like drug trafficking, the arms trade, and money laundering in Senegal and the sub-region could assist with the design and delivery of more appropriate development programs. Joint civil affairs programs with DoD have been useful in counter-terrorism and could potentially be leveraged as a tool for peacebuilding in the Casamance.

USAID/Senegal should also enlist the support of the Embassy, when appropriate, to pressure the government to adopt and implement policies necessary for the successful implementation of the Mission's DG and development programs—e.g. a consensual electoral code, abandonment of expropriation of large tracts of land in the name of GOANA, and implementation of the recent procurement code.

USAID/Senegal and the DG program should also work with the Embassy to elaborate diplomatic and development strategies to reduce the Casamance region's isolation from the rest of the country.

## Conclusions

Although an increase in conflict and violence is a clear and present danger that must be addressed, the assessment concludes that Senegal is a resilient society that has the capacity to avoid widespread violent conflict and to bring about significant political and economic reforms in a peaceful manner, as it has done in the past. Based on historical and present day analysis, the recommendations above are meant to respond to current factors, be reasoned and measured, and focus on a strategy of prevention rather than wishful thinking. The assessment team does have real concern about rising violence in Casamance and potential for structural violence in Kedougou and other peripheral areas. Immediate and thoughtful engagement in both these categories is called for and should be considered urgent Mission priorities.

# ANNEX I. ICAF ANALYSIS OF THE CASAMANCE

## Background

Though widely considered a “low intensity” conflict, as compared with some of the region’s more lethal wars, the twenty-seven year struggle for the independence of the Casamance by the MFDC (*Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de la Casamance*) has become West Africa’s oldest unresolved conflict. Deaths from the conflict have been relatively low at 3,000-5,000, but the humanitarian, economic and psychological toll has been considerable. An estimated 2,000-2,500 armed combatants remain in MFDC camps scattered about the region, border villages in the south are riddled with land mines, refugees in Guinea Bissau and the Gambia are afraid to return home, banditry persists, and socio-economic development has been stagnant. Over the years, peace accords have been signed and broken, the process hampered by the extreme fractionalization within the MFDC and the lack of a consistent, coherent strategy on the part of the government. The conflict has fueled regional instability as well: notably, MFDC involvement in the 1999 civil war in Guinea Bissau brought the Senegalese army into the fray, and the MFDC’s most radical commander, Salif Sadio, remains in the Gambia under the protection of President Jammeh.

President Wade, who had been active in some of the negotiation efforts of the 1990’s, began his presidency promising to make definitive peace a hallmark of his administration. An accord was signed in the Casamance capital of Ziguinchor in 2004, calling for demobilization and reintegration of combatants, de-mining, economic reconstruction, and a conference to diagnose and propose solutions for the root causes of the conflict. Unfortunately, there has been almost no visible progress on the agreement’s implementation, and the accord lacks credibility. Most elements of the MFDC claim the accord was drafted without their participation, and there have been no government responses to overtures from the MFDC to resume negotiations. Nevertheless, from 2004 until this spring relative calm prevailed, and despite an internecine fight between MFDC factions in 2006 as well as minor skirmishes and some continued banditry, refugees have begun returning to the area, as have tourists, drawn to the fine beaches, interesting scenery, and vibrant traditional culture.

In recent months, however, violence in the Casamance has grown significantly, and the level of anxiety among many of those we interviewed—from Ziguinchor elite to rural farmers—was notable. Banditry on roads and in villages has risen markedly, and several attacks have been launched on military patrols and posts, including a rocket-propelled grenade attack that destroyed a military vehicle. In June an MFDC commander was assassinated by rival elements, and young dissidents within the MFDC, impatient with the status quo, are reportedly challenging the MFDC leadership to resume hostilities with the Senegalese army.

## Context

The region bears many symptoms of protracted conflict. It is rich in agricultural and marine resources and attractive for tourism, but development has been stymied, and substantial economic investment is unlikely without a definitive peace. Over 6,000 documented refugees remain in the Gambia, and over 5,000 in Guinea Bissau.<sup>48</sup> Most live with relatives and, despite some international assistance, strain local resources. International Red Cross assistance to refugees in Gambia will end in December 2009, creating further hardship. Ninety-three border villages in the south remain contaminated by mines, and most cannot be

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<sup>48</sup> The International Red Cross reports 6,456 registered refugees in Gambia as of June 2009. They have stopped registering to discourage further flows, as their funding ends in December. UNHR reports approximately 5,250 refugees living in Guinea Bissau, and their implementing organization, ADRA (Adventist Agency for pour Resource Assistance), estimates over 1,000 more unregistered refugees. Many live in villages deemed to insecure to visit.



effectively cleared until the MFDC is fully demobilized.<sup>49</sup> In Ziguinchor, the number of IDPs has pushed youth unemployment to 57% (as compared with 47% in the rest of Senegal). Young people report widespread abuse of cheap cashew wine among their peers as well as rising promiscuity. The HIV/AIDS rate in the Casamance is now the highest in the country. The combination of easy access to arms and general lack of security fosters criminal activity in the region, whether or not it is linked to the MFDC. The vast majority of the population is weary of the conflict, far more interested in development than independence, and frustrated by the “no war-no peace” status quo.

Like many rebel groups, the MFDC has also relied on illegal activity to supplement dwindling public support from their families and communities. Rebels engage in cattle rustling, armed robbery, forced appropriation of cashew harvests and other crops, and production and trade in marijuana. By these means, they have preyed upon very population they swore, with solemn oath and sacred rite, to liberate. Insecurity and lawlessness is on the rise and is resulting in undermining traditional bonds and the social fabric of Diola society. Marijuana has now become the major cash crop in northern Casamance among MFDC and villagers alike. One local development leader estimates that 60 % of refugees in the Gambia fled and fear return, not because of the conflict, but to escape arrest and the mandatory two-year prison sentence for marijuana cultivation. There have been few efforts to introduce viable alternatives.

## Grievances and Resiliencies

The Casamançais are suffering from the same cost of living increases as the rest of Senegal and share the perception that the central government is mismanaging its power and failing to provide adequate services or effective policies. In addition, the core grievances that launched the struggle for independence in 1982 (domination and exploitation by the North and blocked access to national resources and power in the government) continue to be felt, exacerbating overall frustration. The perennial problem of “*enclavement*,” the physical separation of the Casamance from the rest of Senegal, was somewhat eased this past year by renewed ferry service to Dakar, but the ticket cost is high and capacity insufficient. The recent collapse of Air Senegal further restricts business and tourist travel, and the long overland routes are once again dangerous after dark. The Casamançais have always felt inadequately represented in the central government, and, in June 2009 ministerial reshuffle, the only two ministers from the region lost their posts. Division of the Casamance into first two and now three administrative units by the Senegalese government since the 1980s is perceived as a divide and rule tactic that weakens regional identity. The major hospital in the region is considered grossly inadequate, and the new (and only) university is ill equipped and poorly staffed. The Casamançais continue to feel marginalized. They experience little interest and respect for their rich indigenous cultures and fear “Wolofization,” especially among the young. Most importantly, the population is tired of living with ongoing insecurity and blames the government, more than the MFDC for lacking the political will to resolve the conflict once and for all.

Despite the deleterious effects of protracted conflict, the resilience of the local population is also evident. The non-hierarchical, loosely networked traditional structures of the Diola people (who comprise 65% of the population and more in the conflict affected areas) encourage individual initiative and adaptation. Local NGOs working in border regions report that many refugees self-organize for return, exhibiting considerable resourcefulness and concern for their children’s education and future well being. As the intensity of the conflict has decreased over the last decade, civil society has become actively engaged in peace related activities at both the community and regional levels, though these efforts are hampered by lack of coordination and competitive funding structures. Traditional culture and spiritual practices continue to provide a deep sense of belonging and meaning, and seem remarkably unaffected by the conflict, though some fear waning interest among the younger generation. The robust regional identity that sparked the war remains a strength, anchored in pride of place and culture and buoyed by a sense of promise and potential.

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<sup>49</sup> The Senegalese Centre National d'Actions Anti Mine reports 751 mine victims to date: 554 civilians and 197 military.

## Conflict Drivers

Ironically, the government's management of the Casamance dossier is widely regarded as a major driver of the conflict by both the population and the MFDC themselves. Many believe the President hoped to avoid political negotiations and possible concessions towards decentralization by attempting to appease Casamançais grievances with infrastructure and development projects. But empty promises have backfired. Wade's ongoing dispensation of funds to feed the *maquis* (local term for the guerilla movement) in order to discourage banditry makes little sense in the absence of any concurrent effort to resume negotiations. The Diola culture of equality, self-reliance, and transparency not only renders Wade's patron-client management style ineffective, but makes it inflammatory. Among the Diola, patron-client financial exchanges are considered polluting; respect and social standing are earned not inherited. Given that there is no mechanism to determine just how government funds are spent or distributed within the *maquis*, many blame the President for deliberately sowing mistrust and dissent to push the movement towards self-destruction, by getting some groups in the *maquis* to accept funds that put them in conflict with other groups.

The death of MFDC founder and ideological leader Abbé Diamacoune in 2007 opened new space for ongoing contestations of leadership, and a new radicalism has emerged among young combatants who grew up in the *maquis*. These young dissidents seek a more purist ideology and demand decisive action. They accuse the old guard, led by César Badiate, of ineffective leadership and corruption, of receiving but not fairly distributing government and Diaspora funds. They are believed responsible for the recent attacks on army convoys and for the June murder of Yousouf Sambou (aka Rambo, and brother of César's second in command, Ansoumane Sambou), who was apparently tasked with distributing some of the funds. If these dissidents unite across camps, break from the current leadership, and possibly ally with elements of Salif Sadio's faction, negotiations will become more difficult and a resumption of hostilities likely. While the population at large has lost its appetite for war, disenfranchised youth may be tempted to join, broadening the MFDC base. Some Peulh youth, angered at perceived land encroachment by the Toucouleur, have reportedly also created a new MFDC camp in the eastern part of the region.<sup>50</sup>

Narco-trafficking is strong in the sub-region and could become a major driver of conflict. Guinea Bissau, now a major transit point for South American cocaine on its way to Europe, has already been deeply affected, as manifested in the recent series of high profile political assassinations believed to be drug related. Broken down into smaller shipping units, cocaine is transported from Guinea Bissau through a variety of routes to ports providing easier access to Europe; ample evidence exists that one such corridor runs through the Casamance to Banjul. According the Ziguinchor DEA, human mules are paid 300 Euros per trip to carry swallowed capsules. Twenty-two mules have been arrested on public transportation thus far, and some vehicles have also been seized. There is no patrol of paths neither through the bush nor along the labyrinth of waterways that meander through vast marshlands. While we heard one report by a member of the MFDC that he had seen cocaine at the Kasalol MFDC camp, we were not able to confirm MFDC involvement. However, the MFDC has the advantage of intimate knowledge of the backcountry, and trafficking would be an extremely lucrative source of revenue.

## Conflict Mitigators

Casamançais communities originally gave the rebellion their blessings; sending their sons into the *maquis* was a considered a noble act because their sons were fighting and risking their lives to free their people from northern domination. Now, many feel responsible for helping to bring about a peaceful resolution.

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<sup>50</sup> The Peulh are traditionally known as a herder's group. They speak Pulaar, the same language as the Toucouleur who are sedentarized. Both groups together are called Halpulaar or Pulaar speakers. The Toucouleur come from the Senegal River Region. The Peulhs are indigenous to Kolda and some have come up from Guinea. Disputes are often over land taken over by Toucouleur, who are generally better connected politically and able to be the beneficiaries of land allocated by the government.

Unfortunately, some of their mitigating influence is losing its power. Women and elders have calmed tensions in the past, but fractionalization, dissidence, and banditry create obstacles to their traditional roles. Members of the women's peace organization, Kobunkator, previously active in the *maquis*, report that they no longer know who is in charge, while a respected well-known elder, also accustomed to easy access, found that combatants from his own village would no longer receive him. Villagers in one conflict-affected region told us they are becoming fearful of their own sons and complained that visiting combatants would no longer look them in the eye. On the other hand, we heard from a number of people who were encouraged by the increased activity of APAC (Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance), a USAID-supported civil society alliance that has been holding widely attended community forums to strategize approaches for accelerating the peace process. APAC is also sending village delegations into the *maquis* to encourage MFDC unity and a move towards negotiations. Most importantly, the new Senegalese Army Zone Commander has adopted an effective counterinsurgency strategy, ordering his troops to engage with the population, to prioritize their security, and to help where possible with humanitarian needs. Villagers and local NGOs report that the population feels protected by the army for the first time.

The MFDC military leadership is more eager than ever to negotiate. In a meeting with members of the assessment team, they indicated some flexibility on the issue of independence and readiness to hold an intra-MFDC *assise* (large meeting) in which all factions could participate in the election of new political leadership that can develop negotiating platforms. The current leaders still feel beholden to the wishes of the Casamance people and are prepared to have civil society fully participate in the negotiation process. Changed conditions make Guinea Bissau a reasonable venue for such an *assise*, and the Senegalese Ambassador expressed willingness to support the effort. Salif Sadio was chased from Guinea Bissau and nearly killed by Tagme Na Wai, the former head of the Guinea Bissau army, who was assassinated in March. The new army chief is an old ally of Salif from the days of the Guinea Bissau civil war, raising the possibility that Salif might actually attend such an *assise* for the first time in years. Hopefully, this could lead to enough resolution of intra-MFDC rivalries to proceed with negotiations.

## Windows of Vulnerability and Opportunity

The security and socioeconomic development of the region, return of refugees, and the reintegration of the *maquis* require a negotiated political settlement. All indications suggest that the moderate leadership of the MFDC, still nominally in control, is looking for a face-saving means of settling the conflict. Various windows of vulnerability and opportunity are currently converging, making this a critical time to act. They can be summarized as follows:

The prolonged status quo has generated explosive conditions in the *maquis*.

Young combatants, impatient with the progress of negotiations, are challenging the legitimacy of the leadership, whom they deem corrupt and ineffective.

Dissidents threaten mutiny and a return to hostilities with the Senegalese Army, as evidenced by the murder of a senior commander (Rambo) and attacks on army convoys.

There is increasing potential for radicalization among these fighters and a more entrenched insistence on independence.

Potential MFDC permeation by narco-traffickers could destabilize the region, further criminalize the movement, and ignite the conflict through resource enrichment.

The moderate MFDC leadership, motivated by fear, is highly amenable to negotiations and likely open to face-saving alternatives to independence.

An increasingly vocal and organized civil society is more actively advocating for a negotiated peace settlement.

The army counterinsurgency strategy is serving as a confidence-building measure for the population, demonstrating that an organ of the state can be a positive force.

The Senegalese Ambassador to Guinea Bissau voices support for an intra-MFDC meeting in Guinea Bissau (deemed essential by MFDC leadership as a first step towards negotiations).

## Responses

An effective USG response to the current situation could include:

Demarche to Wade using the discourse of border security and narco-trafficking threat as an entree to discussion about the need for political settlement.

Diplomatic engagement in a manner non-threatening to Wade with bilateral and multilateral donors to promote plans for post-settlement DDR and development, and with ECOWAS and neighboring countries for regional support for the peace process.

Advocacy for civil society participation in the negotiations, as anticipated in the 2004 accords.

Technical assistance to APAC and other potential civil society intermediaries to develop a civilian platform for negotiations in partnership with MFDC.

Technical assistance to MFDC to help plan intra-MFDC meetings and prepare for negotiations.

Encourage the Senegalese military to maintain its counterinsurgency strategy.

## USAID Strategy for the Region

Large-scale development activities should await a political settlement of the conflict to avoid collusion with the government's approach of problem solving through the disbursement of funds. However, ongoing support for negotiations, as well as an increased focus on youth, is appropriate. Alternative livelihood development and natural resource management would also be well received and would have the potential for significant impact. Given the current political and economic environment, Casamance youth are at increased risk for involvement in marijuana production, recruitment into the *maquis* and, potentially, regional cocaine trafficking. Food-for-work programs that target youth to support community-driven development projects (such as local infrastructure projects, road repair, forest protection, etc.) are already having a positive effect on a small scale. Expanding these would build on community dynamism, engage youth constructively, help the communities meet their own needs, and develop a framework for eventual community-focused reintegration of combatants.

## ANNEX II. IPS FRAMEWORK APPLIED TO THE CASAMANCE

### Illicit Power Structures Analysis of the MFDC

The interagency conflict assessment framework (ICAF) addresses factors that incite or mitigate violent conflict. The illicit power structures framework (IPS) focuses specifically on actors who engage in unlawful activity, be they rebels or criminal networks, and whose activities may disrupt peace processes or interfere with post-conflict stabilization. The IPS uses the following five lenses: worldview, motivations, resources, relationships, and internal structure to gain a more nuanced understanding of the often hidden inner life of these structures and to develop strategies that diminish deleterious effects while (where possible) supporting constructive engagement.

The Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance (MFDC) began as a political movement for the independence of the Casamance region of southern Senegal. After several violent crackdowns on political protests, the movement developed a guerilla force, the “maquis,” (also referred to as “attika,” the Diola word for warrior) that trained in the region’s forests in the late 1980’s and began attacks on the Senegalese army in 1990. Originally, the movement was widely supported by the Casamance population, both financially and morally, through rites performed in the sacred forests of the Diola. Over 27 years of struggle, the MFDC has not successfully “liberated” a single village or held any sizeable piece of territory other than their camps deep in the forests. However, 2,000-2,500 armed combatants remain in camps scattered throughout the region, creating ongoing insecurity. From its early years, the movement has suffered from extensive fractionalization in all four of its wings: military, political, civilian, and external (Diaspora). Most factions reject a 2004 peace accord signed between the movement’s founder and General Secretary, Father Diamacoune Senghor, and the government of Senegal. The peace process has been at a standstill ever since. While violence had been sporadic in recent years, there has been a marked increase in the last few months, reportedly due to the activities of younger combatants who, impatient with the status quo, are threatening mutiny and a return to hostilities with the Senegalese army.

### Worldview

The only clearly articulated goal of the MFDC has been the independence of the Casamance. The MFDC believes the region has suffered unfair domination by “nordistes” (northern Senegalese) and was intended by colonial powers to be a separate country, given its ethnic and linguistic differences. While notably lacking in a more specific political agenda, the MFDC claims to support democratic values and are quick to describe themselves as separatists not rebels, as they have no wish to overthrow the government of Senegal. One member of the political wing, Jean Marie Biagui, has put forward a federalist solution to the crisis, but his legitimacy is largely rejected, and most actors in both the military and political wings state that a specific political agenda cannot be developed without the election of new political leadership to fill the void left by the 2007 death of Father Diamacoune Senghor. Divisions and intense rivalries within the movement have made such elections thus far impossible.

While the movement had peaceful origins, armed struggle was viewed as a legitimate response to government repression and was sanctified by solemn oaths and rites. Most of the violence has been directed towards the Senegalese army, but villagers have also been executed as collaborators. The worldview and behavior of the movement appear full of contradictions. While demanding independence, the MFDC blames the Senegalese government for not responding to requests for negotiations and continues to accept government financial support. Armed robbery and harvest seizures are condoned as means of collecting revenue despite harmful effects on the very population the MFDC has fought to liberate.

For the current moderate leadership, the demand for independence appears to be only an opening negotiating position. The assistant commander even referred in a recent meeting to “independence or whatever else is arrived at.” Indications suggest that these moderates would be open to a face-saving negotiated solution to the crisis that enables them to leave the *maquis* having achieved some gains for the Casamance. In 2008, César Badiate, the MFDC military commander released a statement asking the population of the Casamance for forgiveness of MFDC crimes and a peaceful reconciliation. However, a new radicalism is emerging among the younger combatants who regard the current leadership as corrupt and ineffective, complaining that there is no evidence of forthcoming negotiations. These young dissidents are demanding that the old leadership step down if they are unwilling to resume active fighting.

## Motivations

This IPS lens looks at need, greed, or creed as possible sources of motivation. The MFDC movement developed out of some combination of need and creed, including grievances over land seizures by Northerners, a lack of state services and political representation, as well as an historic and cultural sense of separateness. Younger combatants may be joining the movement for more varied motives, including economic hardship, frustration, a cover for engaging in criminal behavior, or the romance of being a “*maquisard*,” (widely used term for members of the *maquis*). Significantly, once in the *maquis*, it is hard to leave. *Maquisards* take a mystical oath when joining, which can only be undone by the same priestess who performed the initial rites. Many *maquisards* strongly believe that unauthorized departure can result in illness and a particularly painful death.

*Maquisards* live a challenging and primitive life style in the bush. The temptation to engage in narco-trafficking could cause the MFDC to shift motivation from need to greed. The Casamance has become an important drug corridor for moving South American cocaine from Guinea Bissau to the Gambia and Northern Senegal, from where it is more easily exported to Europe. The MFDC is well acquainted with secluded pathways through bush and marsh and could become a valued partner.

## Resources

In its early years, the MFDC was supported through voluntary collections from villages throughout the Casamance, which felt responsible for their sons fighting on the region’s behalf. Community support dwindled during the 1990’s, as the Senegalese army severely punished suspected collaborators. Arrests were made, houses and crops burnt, the number of disappearances grew, and the population grew frightened. Some funds have come in through the Diaspora, though these too appear to have shrunk over time. From the beginning of his administration, President Wade has sent funds to the *maquis*, supposedly to reduce the need for banditry until a settlement is reached. There has also been state support from neighboring countries in so far as it serves their own political interests. The MFDC was supplied with arms and used as a militia in the Guinea Bissau civil war, and President Jammeh of Gambia has protected the MFDC’s most radical faction, that of Salif Sadio, presumably as a potential bargaining chip (or weapon) against Senegal.

The MFDC’s “diversified funding portfolio” includes armed robbery, stolen cattle, illegal timbering, marijuana production and trade, seizure of cashew forests, and theft of village harvests. The region is awash in inexpensive small arms. The 12-year liberation war in Guinea Bissau left especially large stockpiles of Soviet weaponry, notably AK47s and landmines. The MFDC also relies on a lush natural environment, teeming with game, wild fruits, and fish.

## Relationships

Over the years the *maquis* have become more and more isolated from the population on whose behalf they fight. In an anachronistic fashion, they cling to the assumption that the population is still behind them, proud of their sacrifice. In fact, the Casamançais are disillusioned with the struggle, tired of insecurity, and interested in development not independence. If progress is made towards negotiations, it will be important to appeal to

MFDC's original idealism and remind them of their commitment to act on the behalf of the population. There does not appear to be active recruitment into the MFDC at this time, though disenfranchised youth still join.

The MFDC has a complex relationship with the state, which funnels its funds to various factions, seemingly to divide and rule, maintain the status quo, or perhaps to deliberately sow seeds of contention, pushing the movement towards self-destruction. The state has also ignored recent requests for negotiations, perhaps to avoid political concessions and/or fuel countrywide interest in decentralization. The MFDC has historically enjoyed mostly supportive relationships with neighboring states (though Salif Sadie's faction is no longer welcome in Guinea Bissau) and freely crosses borders in areas not patrolled by the GOS army. Alliances with political forces in neighboring countries have been shifting and complex. The new political landscape in Guinea Bissau might lead to new dynamics, as the new army chief has an old alliance with Salif Sadio from the days of the Guinea Bissau civil war, and the head of the Northern Command an old friendship with César Badiate. The MFDC is not affiliated with any international revolutionary movements. Their life in the *maquis* leaves them quite out of touch with their families, changing conditions in the Casamance, and the world at large.

### **Internal Structure**

The MFDC is organized into four wings: military, political, civilian, and external (those in the Diaspora). Internal divisions and rivalries have plagued each of these wings, rendering the overall movement without structure or cohesion. Major decisions and elections are intended to be made large gatherings known as "assises," but internal splits have made it difficult to gather a sufficient quorum for decisions or for appointments to be generally accepted. All agree that there has been an even greater leadership vacuum since the death in 2007 of the charismatic founder of the movement, Father Diamacoune Senghor. While he was not immune to rifts and rivalries, he maintained a unifying influence.

The military wing, in theory, has a hierarchical structure with the following levels of command: military chief, commander, lieutenant, chief of companies, chief of sections, chief of groups, and soldiers. However, splits within the *maquis* are no doubt creating new command structures.

### **Recommendations:**

The ultimate goal of analyzing an IPS through these five prisms is to develop strategies that neutralize the subversive or harmful effects of IPS actors on a peace process, by reducing the impact of spoilers and promoting constructive engagement.

For the past three years, USAID has funded *Support to the Casamance Peace Process*, a program designed and implemented by AECOM to support the government, civil society, and the MFDC in coming to a negotiated settlement. AECOM's work with the MFDC has focused on the creation, capacity building, and guidance of the "Groupe de Contact," consisting of members of the political wing and ex-combatants. It was formed after the death of Father Diamacoune to bridge internal divisions so that the MFDC can create a common platform for negotiations. Its long-term goal is to facilitate an intra-MFDC assise, in which a new leadership structure can be determined and a negotiating team established. The group itself is made up of rival factions. Over the last two years, its members have made solid efforts to overcome their own differences and to reach out to other ex-combatants as well as disparate elements of the *maquis*, calling for greater unity in order to move towards negotiations with the State. When MFDC commander, Cesar Badiate, asked the group to bring his request for forgiveness and reconciliation to the Casamancais population, the group held seven regional forums that reportedly led to constructive dialogue and engaged other ex-combatants. Groupe de Contact members have reported changes in their fundamental outlook through their work with AECOM. Notably, they understand that it is essential for the MFDC to re-establish a much closer relationship with the population. Privately, they even admit that an ultimate solution to the crisis will no doubt require modification of MFDC demands for independence. The leader of the group, Louis Tendeng, accompanied

the director of a local NGO, AJAC/APRAN to Geneva in June for a meeting of the “Geneva Call” for humanitarian de-mining. Since his return, Tendeng has been speaking in the maquis of the importance of full cooperation in ongoing de-mining efforts to improve the security of returning refugees. All these developments suggest progress in the constructive engagement of at least some elements of the MFDC. AECOM has not worked directly with the military wing.

Our interviews with military commander Cesar Badiate and his entourage, however, point to limitations on the potential role of the Groupe de Contacte and to the importance of directly engaging the military wing. In the minds of the maquisards, the ex-combatants in the Groupe de Contacte (including the coordinator Mr. Tendeng) are officially deserters and have no right to play a formal role in the MFDC organization. Cesar and his group are very eager to hold an intra-MFDC assise in which all factions can participate in the elections of a new political leadership that can develop a negotiating platform. They see the job of the military wing as mostly limited to combat; negotiations should be the responsibility of the political wing. They recognize that the Groupe de Contacte can play a useful role as an ad hoc liaison with scattered members of the maquis and with the population, but believe they should stop their activities as soon as the new leadership is chosen.

Threats of mutiny on the part of younger impatient members of the MFDC have created a new degree of insecurity, but also a ripe moment to work towards negotiations with the moderate leadership. These moderates are fearful of losing their grip, not to mention their lives. The brother of the second in command was murdered by dissident elements in June, after being accused of pocketing government funds directed to the maquis. Cesar and his entourage requested the support of the “Americans” to guarantee security for an assise, which they deem a necessary precursor to negotiations. They suggest Guinea Bissau as the venue most accessible and secure for the majority of the maquisards. The GOS has a price on Salif Sadio’s head, but if he was given permission to attend, he may feel relatively safe in Guinea Bissau, where the new army chief is a former ally from that country’s civil war. (The old army chief, who was assassinated in March, had chased him from the country.) The Senegalese ambassador to Guinea Bissau also expressed willingness to support the effort. All agree that Salif’s attendance would help secure a durable settlement, and his refusal would provide clear grounds for proceeding without him.

USAID and its implementing partners should make use of the current sense of urgency on the part of the MFDC as a window of opportunity. Recognizing that the Groupe de Contacte does not have the legitimacy to play a convening role, it will be necessary to work more directly with the military wing to create favorable conditions for an assise. The challenge will be to promote maximum participation by disparate elements of the MFDC, a process that could be greatly facilitated by involving respected community leaders. AECOM is currently devising a plan to engage the civil society network it has created known as APAC (Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance), a group that so far is well regarded for its neutrality and could be effective in reaching out to various groups. Given the degree of internal enmity within the MFDC, it is unlikely that there could be full consensus around new leadership. However, the current MFDC leadership expressed willingness to involve civil society, and their participation could have a moderating and unifying influence. A negotiating council could be developed with representatives of different MFDC factions and community leaders. This format would likely have good support among the population of the Casamance, and hardliners who refuse to participate would naturally begin to lose influence.


The approach outlined above could successfully exploit the more moderate, democratically based aspects of the MFDC worldview. Negotiations should address some of the need-based root causes or motives behind the conflict, by supporting economic development of the region, improved infrastructure to reduce geographical isolation, and greater political representation and/or autonomy. The creed-based push for independence is likely to recede with a face saving settlement. The MFDC military leaders affirmed what many other Casamançais said: the MFDC is tired of the harsh living conditions of the maquis and eager to resume civilian life. As mentioned previously, motivation could become one of greed if the MFDC becomes involved in the lucrative regional narco-trafficking, making the importance of a negotiated settlement all the more urgent.









The resource analysis suggests that government funding of the MFDC should be actively discouraged, as this has greatly increased internal dissension, making it more difficult to prepare for negotiations. Other funding of the movement has been marginal and does not lend itself to interruption by outside intervention. However, it should be noted that illegal cultivation and trade in marijuana is now rampant in northern Senegal by both the MFDC and villagers alike. Alternative livelihoods will be an essential component of an eventual DDR program. Our MFDC relationships analysis notes that the MFDC still feels beholden to the wishes of the Casamançais population, a fact that can be broadly exploited to modify demands for independence and to encourage a negotiating platform that actually represents popular interests. The attached map depicts current relationships and conflicts within the MFDC military wing. It can be used to identify strategic points of access to diverse elements and to encourage maximum participation in the anticipated assise, minimizing the number of groups left to become potential spoilers.

President's Wade's government has made no visible effort to resume negotiations since the accord of 2004 and has tended to minimize the ongoing impact of the conflict, possibly hoping that the MFDC movement would die a natural death through internal dissension and waning popular support. However, to ignore the ongoing presence of 2,000- 2,500 combatants seems dangerous. The conflict could rise to new proportions if the dissidents proceed with their threat to mutiny and resume fighting with the Senegalese army, or if the movement becomes heavily engaged in narco-trafficking. In any case, the rebellion has led to banditry and ongoing insecurity, conditions that discourage economic development. The population no longer wants independence, but the core grievances and sense of neglect that sparked the revolt remain. All efforts should be directed towards a negotiated settlement, especially given that the MFDC appears mostly amenable. All major development projects and DDR programs should wait until such an agreement is reached to avoid removing incentives for negotiations or colluding with government propaganda that peace already prevails.

There was almost unanimous opinion by those interviewed that Senegal's neighbors must be involved in resolving the conflict in the Casamance. Regional stability and reduction or continuation of conflict in the Casamance depends on critical alliances between parties on both sides of the border. However, there is no evidence that money or arms are currently being transferred from Guinea Bissau to the Casamance. The role of Gambia is woefully under-reported and needs more analysis, especially in the light of increased recruitment of the Diola into the Gambian military.



## KEY TO MFDC RELATIONSHIPS MAP

	Strong relationship
	Strong relationship and influence
	Weak relationship
	Weak relationship and influence
	Broken relationship
	Conflict

Names in **black**- MFDC military camps or leaders

Names in **blue**- Government of Senegal

Names in **purple**- Civil Society actors

Names in **brown**- Actors in neighboring countries

Names in **green**- MFDC political, civilian, or external wing actor

### Notes:

The major MFDC dissident groups, who are threatening to overthrow Cesar Badiate's leadership, are listed under Kasolole dissident camps, but these are also allied with elements of the Diakaye camp. Salif Sadio's chief of operations is believed to have connections with La Deux, and also with Bamba, who has good relations with Diakaye, making for possible new alliances between Salif and dissident factions.

Members of the Kaureg camp are believed responsible for the murder in June of MFDC commander Yousof Sambou (aka Rambo). He was the younger brother of Lamarana Sambou, chief of Diakaye, and the second in command for Cesar Badiate. The Kaureg camp is also associated with increased acts of banditry.

AJAC/APRAN, and NGO in Ziguinchor, has separate relations with conflicting parties, with La Deux through Lauding Diedhou, and with Kasolole through Demba Keita. They could perhaps be engaged to play a mediating role.

These alliances are constantly shifting, and the map should be continuously revised. It does, however, suggest points of entry for reaching as many disparate elements of the maquis as possible.

## ANNEX III. IPS ANALYSIS OF REGIONAL NARCO-TRAFFICKING

**Note:** The analysis was conducted through reading background materials and by conducting a limited number of interviews with government officials, diplomats, UN agencies, and concerned citizens in the cities of Dakar and Ziguinchor, Senegal; Banjul, Gambia; and Bissau, Guinea Bissau. We did not meet with anyone actually involved in illicit activities, and in the time allotted were only able to get somewhat cursory information. Much more extensive interviewing would be required to triangulate verbal reports and to develop a more reliable in-depth analysis. We also found that the widely decentralized, nodal nature of criminal networks, which can include broad portfolios of both illicit and licit financial enterprises, is quite difficult to analyze with an IPS framework. Different groups have different characteristics, and their inter-relationships and modes of operating are constantly shifting to adapt to changes in markets, transport conditions, and law enforcement strategies.

### Overview

There is a wide variety of illicit trade in the sub-region, involving a number of different criminal networks. Enterprises include the transport and trade of the following goods: Latin America cocaine on its way to Europe, marijuana grown in northern Casamance, black market pharmaceuticals, illegal timber, synthetic drugs manufactured in China and India to sell in West Africa,<sup>51</sup> black market movies, CD's, cigarettes, and small arms. There does not seem to be much human trafficking, though we did hear some accounts of boys brought from Guinea Bissau to participate in begging networks in Senegal. We heard of a number of groups involved in various aspects of these diverse operations, including Latin American drug cartels, Nigerian criminal networks, corrupt government and military officials, and Lebanese business groups who provide front businesses and money laundering services. Individuals are also recruited as mules to carry cocaine from Guinea Bissau to the Gambia and other parts of Senegal, and on planes bound for Europe. According to the DEA in Ziguinchor and court reports in the Gambia, the mules are mostly from the Gambia, Guinea Bissau, and Nigeria.

For a thorough analysis it would be important to analyze the inter-relationship of all these groups, as their diverse operations and networks appear to be quite interdependent. Given our time constraints, we focused our attention on narco-trafficking, which has become a considerable threat to regional stability,

By all accounts, Europe has become the major market for South American cocaine and West Africa the major transit point. A falling dollar, declining use, and increasing law enforcement have made US markets less attractive. According to a recent UNODC report, between 2005- 2008 at least 46 tons of South American cocaine was seized en route to Europe via West Africa, while in previous years no more than a ton per year was seized in the entire continent.<sup>52</sup> Many secluded parts of the West African seacoast as well as abandoned airport strips are used to receive large shipments of cocaine, which are then packaged into smaller units to be carried by boat or human mule to various transit points on the way to Europe. The region is attractive to narco-traffickers for a number of reasons, including proximity to Europe, extensive coastlines, porous borders, established smuggling networks, poverty, government susceptibility to corruption, and a long history of adapting to the exploitive business practices of foreigners. Informants described evidence of trafficking throughout the sub-region, though Guinea Bissau seems to be a major port of entry. Large seizures in Senegal have been few, but this may be due to a lack of political will. In 2007, 2.6 tons were discovered near the seaside resort of Saly, after report of suspicious activity to the local gendarmerie. Some suggest that national level officials would have been less vigilant. The successful movement of drugs across borders requires

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<sup>51</sup> A UNODC official told us that these illegal drugs, many of which are largely fake, comprise 60% of pharmaceuticals sold in West Africa.

<sup>52</sup> UNODC Report. "Drug Trafficking as a Security Threat in West Africa," November 2008.

government collusion to various degrees, and large shipments would invariably engage both the transportation sector as well as other corporate enterprises. We were told that the airport of Banjul is a major port of embarkation and airport security officials are easily bribed. Reports from the Gambia also indicate that some banks are directly engaged in money laundering operations. In fact in 2007 a single large deposit caused the value of the Gambian dalasi to double overnight. Real estate has reportedly become a major venue for money laundering in both Senegal and the Gambia where there are a number of new unoccupied luxury apartment buildings with rents exceeding what the local market could possibly bear. In the Gambia there are several recently constructed luxury hotels, which also remain empty. Other reported sources for money laundering include: stores specializing in luxury goods (which are notably plentiful in the Gambia), car dealerships, informal wholesale markets (especially for fish), and foreign remittances.

There have been numerous articles in the popular press proclaiming Guinea Bissau as Africa's first narco-state. Its numerous islands, poor state control, and corruptible political officials have made it an ideal staging ground. The motives for the recent assassinations of President Nino Viera and Army Chief Tagme Na Wai were apparently related to drug interests. The former chief of the navy, Buba Na Tchuto, was also heavily implicated in facilitating the movement of drugs and became the richest man in the country before he was forced into exile. However, political involvement appears limited to high placed individuals rather than institutions, and the moniker, "narco-state," may be something of an exaggeration. While drug related violence is apparently growing, the city of Bissau remains quite safe, even after dark. Violence could rise as the market becomes more saturated and competition increases, but as of now, there appears to be room for many players. Some suggest that the volume of cocaine passing through Guinea Bissau may have declined, due to the country's recent instability. Narco-traffickers prefer a corruptible state to a failed state. However, our informants in Guinea Bissau, including the Director of Judicial police who heads narcotic investigations, believe that trafficking may be less blatantly visible, but remains considerable.

As part of our overall conflict assessment for the sub-region, we were particularly interested in determining whether the MFDC (Mouvement des Forces Démocratique de la Casamance) rebels of the Casamance region of southern Senegal have become engaged in narco-trafficking, as there is ample evidence that drugs pass through the Casamance on their way to Banjul and points north. The MFDC has 2,000-2,500 armed combatants living in forest camps scattered throughout the area. According the Ziguinchor DEA, human mules are paid 300 Euros per trip to carry swallowed capsules from Bissau to Banjul. Twenty-two mules have been arrested on public transportation thus far, and some vehicles have also been seized. However, there is no patrol of paths through the bush, nor along the labyrinth of waterways that meander through vast marshlands. While we heard one report by a member of the MFDC that he had seen cocaine at the Kasolole MFDC camp close to the Guinea Bissau border, we were not able to confirm MFDC involvement. However, the MFDC has the advantage of intimate knowledge of the backcountry. Trafficking would be an extremely lucrative source of revenue for the financially strapped rebellion and could prolong the conflict. A well-known member of the political/external wing told us that he was approached in France by a member of the Grimaldi crime family and asked to participate in a trafficking operation; he refused.

## **Worldview**

It is next to impossible to delineate a worldview for such a diverse group of actors. For the narco-traffickers themselves we can assume that their goal is maximum profit, that they are fully prepared to engage in a range of illicit means to achieve that end, and that they have no particular interest in the health of democratic institutions in the countries where they operate. To secure trade routes, they often require the cooperation of government officials. As the potential profits are enormous, bribes can be extremely high and are likely to find at least some takers.

## **Motivation**

Greed would appear to be the primary motivation for the prime actors, be they South American cartels or high placed political officials obtaining a substantial commission. Human mules are often recruited from the

poor and unemployed and may be mostly motivated by need. If the MFDC rebels were to become involved, creed, need, and greed may become mixed in a rather dangerous brew.

## Resources

Narco-traffickers deal in an extraordinarily valuable product, which provides ample resources for tackling obstacles and securing optimal business conditions and relationships. They require secluded geographical locations for various staging operations and means of transport that can pass undetected by law enforcement officials or condoned by corrupt officials. They need a variety of human resources and partner organizations for various aspects of the enterprise, including transport, storage, packaging, money laundering, and sales in countries of destination. Front operations are often used at various transit points. We were told that human mules are prepared for their journeys at Nigerian auto parts stores in Bissau and deliver the cocaine at similar stores in Banjul. The number of auto parts stores in both cities outstrips any possible vehicular needs.

## Relationships and Structure

Michael Kenney in his book, *From Pablo to Osama*,<sup>53</sup> argues that the notion of hierarchical drug cartels topped by “kingpins” is largely myth. Most groups operate in a more nodal de-centralized fashion. Groups that succeed are those that can adapt structure and relationships to a continuously changing environment. In the Senegal sub-region, relationships between the traffickers and their assorted partners appear to be similarly multi-faceted and opportunistic, shifting and changing depending on need and circumstance. Groups handling a particular aspect of operations may be semi-autonomous. Minimal coordination supports survival in the case that one node’s activities are disrupted by law enforcement or interference from rival competition. Relationships are based on mutual business interests, and trust is established through financial incentives. Relationships are also trans-border and cross a variety of social classes. South American traffickers apparently came to Guinea Bissau from Columbia, Brazil, and Venezuela, and most left after setting up operations. Lebanese businessmen, who have a long history of operating businesses in West Africa, reportedly finance various aspects of the operation and are especially implicated in money laundering. Nigerian criminal networks appear to be more involved in recruiting and managing human mules.

## Recommendations

An IPS analysis does not shed much new light on useful interventions. These criminal networks are long established and not easily disrupted. However, they are likely to move operations if conditions become less favorable. The government of Guinea Bissau, long dominated by the military, has weak democratic institutions, a dysfunctional judicial system, inadequately trained police, and no prison. Security sector reform, capacity building for drug enforcement, and anti-corruption legislation could make a considerable difference. Coordinated efforts between border officials in Guinea Bissau, Senegal, and the Gambia; better policing of waterways and backcountry routes; and more robust procedures for detection at airports could discourage traffickers by increasing the number of seizures. Programs for poverty reduction and livelihoods creation decrease the likelihood of unemployed youths acting as mules. Most importantly, a strong effort should be made to encourage a negotiated settlement to the Casamance crisis. MFDC rebel involvement in narco-trafficking could be a disaster for the region, as the enormous influx of resources could refuel the conflict. A definitive peace settlement, on the other hand, would increase overall security and allow for more rigorous law enforcement.

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<sup>53</sup> Kenney, Michael, *From Pablo to Osama*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, PA, 2007.

## ANNEX IV. ICAF METHODOLOGY

The main tool of analysis for the study was the ICAF (Interagency Conflict Assessment Framework) methodology<sup>54</sup>, which is grounded in the social sciences and incorporates findings affecting increases or decreases in the likelihood of violent conflict in a particular setting. The ICAF approach is diagnostic rather than normative. It seeks to understand how things actually work rather than how they ought to work.

The ICAF looks at society through a dynamic systems lens based on frameworks developed by the CMM office.<sup>55</sup>

Political systems are subjected to pressures which affect the system –e.g. calls for free elections in one-party states or one man dictatorships which can generate different responses.

The ICAF looks at society through a dynamic systems lens built on the following assumptions:

Political systems are subjected to pressures which affect the system –e.g. calls for free elections in one-party states or one man dictatorships which can generate different responses –e.g., concessions, greater repression, efforts to coop political opponents, woo public opinion, etc.

Pressures can be internal—e.g. growing popular discontent—or external—e.g. consequences of world economic crisis.

Pressure for change and conflict can come from same sources—e.g. political parties demanding transparency, civil society organizations demanding greater consultation in decision-making.

Systems have self-regulatory capabilities that can prevent, manage, mitigate, and resolve conflicts—courts, mediating and arbitration mechanisms, public opinion, etc.

Self-regulation can be adaptive or fragile. Some self-regulatory mechanisms may block change in both a positive or negative fashion. Self-regulatory mechanisms could block violence and/or reform.

Conflicts are not necessarily undesirable. Conflict is sometimes a necessary ingredient for change in a positive direction.

The ICAF diagnostics consists of several steps organized around polarities that can either inflame or dampen conflict:

Step One: Includes Core Grievances which provide the potential for conflict while Social and Institutional Resilience factors embedded in society and its institutions can reduce or effectively manage conflict.

Step Two: Includes Drivers of Conflict often activated by key actors who add fuel or Mitigating Factors also activated by key actors. Thus anger at the growing gap between rich and poor (Core Grievance) can be activated by angry youth. While the tradition of avoiding violence (Social and Institutional Resilience) can be activated by religious authorities.

Step Three: Includes Moments/Events for Increasing Conflict –e.g. repression of a peaceful march, expropriation of land, etc. -- or Moments for Decreasing Conflict—e.g. gesture on part of contending parties calling for dialogue or public shock at loss of life resulting from violent conflict.

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<sup>54</sup> The ICAF methodology builds upon the original ICAF methodology developed by the USAID's Conflict and Mitigation Office. See USAID, *Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development* (Washington, D.C.: April 2005). For a more detailed explanation of the ICAF methodology, see USAID, "ICAF Methodologies," Draft, March 18, 2008 and USAID, "Principles of the Interagency Conflict Assessment," n.d.

Step I of the ICAF methodology also looks at:

**Identify** —e.g., religion, ethnicity, class, and language. Conflict arises when groups' feels identity, security, and recognition are in danger.

**Institutional performance:** Measured by outcomes—e.g. objective poor quality of public services or perceptions of effectiveness and legitimacy—e.g. widespread corruption at highest levels, which lead to a growing gap between rich and poor.

**Societal patterns:** Interactions between Identity Groups and Institutions produce persistent societal patterns – e.g. clientelism, elitism, exclusion, and rent-seeking or accommodation, tolerance, and reconciliation.

Step 2 of ICAF methodology looks at:

**Key Actors**, which can be individuals or organizations, both indigenous and external, related to identified Core Grievances or Resilience Factors

Motivations moving key actors like presidents, Parliament, the military, civil society, etc. to engage.

Means at key actors' disposal – e.g. president as resources of state to use for patronage repression, etc-- to accomplish goals. Means include degree of popular support and legitimacy, organizational capacity, finances, spatial limits of influence, etc.

Step 3 of ICAF then looks Windows of Vulnerability and Opportunity, which can provide moments for increasing or decreasing conflict:

Possible general trajectories—e.g. movement towards greater repression or movement towards political dialogue and negotiation.

Specific moments in time that crystallize grievances—e.g. election fraud, economic shocks, assassination, etc. or a decrease conflict—e.g. a religious holiday used as occasion to call for social peace.

The analytical categories used in the report are derived from the ICAF methodology, which gathers three types of information:

**Facts:** These are objective, verifiable statements. Most of the facts cited in the report are based on literature review and documents.

**Feelings:** These are perceptions, judgments, and evaluations.

**Forecasts:** Expectations as to what will happen.



## ANNEX V. SCOPE OF WORK

### For a Task Order under USAID/DCHA/CMM to Conduct a Conflict Assessment in the Senegal Sub-Region

#### I. PURPOSE

For more than a decade, USAID has invested significant resources in the Casamance region of Senegal with an emphasis on consolidation of peace agreements between the Government of Senegal (GoS) and the *Mouvement des Forces Democratiques de Casamance* (MFDC). With recognition that there are multiple new and emerging sources of conflict within Senegal and in the sub-region, USAID Senegal has requested a conflict assessment to better understand the nature and the scope of the conflict dynamics affecting Senegal.

This Statement of Work (SOW) sets out guidelines for providing technical assistance to USAID Senegal to help the Mission better understand and address the causes and consequences of violence within the country. The purpose of the assessment is to provide an analysis of recent developments in Senegal and the broader sub-region in order to help the Mission (including the Conflict, Democracy and Governance Team) design appropriate interventions.

The assessment team will provide a targeted conflict assessment, mapping trends towards existing or potential violence, including key actors; review the impact of existing sector specific programs on the causes and consequences of violence as defined by the conflict assessment team; and make recommendations about modifications or additions to USAID/Senegal's current portfolio. Another central objective is to work with the Mission to delineate the boundaries of what USAID Senegal can and cannot hope to realistically accomplish in the area of conflict management and mitigation.

While the assessment will analyze sub-regional influences (e.g. The Gambia and Guinea Bissau) including trends towards illicit activity, the primary objective of this technical assistance will be to inform program design and approaches for USAID Senegal. However, it is anticipated that the assessment findings will also be of interest to the Western Africa Regional Program (WARP) and possibly other interagency actors active in the sub-region.

#### I (a) Companion Work

The following work will be funded under a separate funding mechanism from USAID's Democracy and Governance Office. The body of this companion work should **NOT** be included in offeror's proposal. However, the offeror must be aware of this complimentary work and must agree to incorporate the analytics and personnel as described below.

Recent events in Guinea Bissau underscore the influence of new "conflict entrepreneurs" in the sub-region and the context offers a good test case for the Illicit Power Structures (IPS) framework. IPS is an analytic framework under development by USAID's Democracy and Governance office (DG) in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA). The IPS framework is a body of research and analysis examining the networks that go beyond the borders and institutional actors that development agencies traditionally target in programming.

**Through a separately funded mechanism**, one person specializing in the IPS framework will be embedded with the conflict assessment team and will contribute to the conflict assessment fieldwork, analysis and report. The IPS specialist will use the IPS analytical lens as a supplement to the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF - see below). The IPS specialist will be solely responsible for producing a separate report analyzing the utility and compatibility of the IPS framework as a supplement to the CAF.

The successful contractor for this conflict assessment will coordinate with the IPS specialist in order to plan a cohesive, coherent and integrated assessment and to obtain input on the final report from the IPS specialist.

The IPS analysis will be funded separately under a companion contract by USAID's Office of Democracy and Governance (DCHA/DG) MOBIS IPS Task Order.

## II. BACKGROUND

For many years Senegal has been considered a model for stability in a region plagued by corruption, coup d'états, economic stagnation and conflict. President Abdoulaye Wade's electoral victory in 2000 demonstrated a promising and peaceful transition to opposition rule after 40 years of uninterrupted rule by the Socialist Party. More recently, however signs of corruption, political manipulation, government excess and repression of the media exposed familiar but unfortunate regional trends toward instability.<sup>56</sup> Despite the fact that Senegal's economy has grown steadily in recent years (5% GDP growth in 2008) and foreign investors continue to compete for mineral and infrastructure projects, the majority of Senegalese have seen few improvements in their standard of living.

Fifty-seven percent of Senegal's population lives in poverty and a steady stream of the desperate board flimsy boats headed to Europe in search of better opportunities. Public demonstrations and strikes decrying joblessness, high costs of living and frequent power cuts reveal sources of national tension. Senegalese youth are increasingly frustrated by the lack of employment opportunities. Senegal has also witnessed violence around mining concessions in the southeastern region of Kédougou, highlighting the growing competition for access to and control of natural resources including off-shore oil deposits and land.<sup>57</sup>

Political, social and economic instability in the sub-region also puts Senegal at further risk. Perhaps the most poignant example has been the visible decline of Guinea Bissau as an emerging narco-trafficking state and the recent assassinations of its president and army chief within hours of each other. The two countries are intimately linked, with Senegal's southern Casamance region historically serving as a staging ground for insurgency and confrontation with Guinea Bissau.

While no final peace agreement was signed between the Casamance guerilla group, the MFDC and the Government of Senegal (GoS), the area has nevertheless enjoyed a relative level of stability over the past few years. Both Army Chief Na Wai and President João Bernardo Vieira of Guinea Bissau shared an interest in maintaining some stability in Casamance and with their deaths there is new uncertainty about their successors' attitudes toward MFDC hardliners.<sup>58</sup> Although there are signs that the MFDC factions are growing weary of the long-standing conflict, control over valuable agricultural and natural resources provide incentives for continued competition and instability; furthermore, the blossoming drug and arms trade in Guinea Bissau provides additional fuel for financing MFDC rebels and criminalizing them into drug gangs.<sup>59</sup> The increased use of traditional Sahelian trade routes for drug and arms trafficking has placed the West Coast of Africa at the center of a burgeoning illicit economy.

## III. SCOPE OF WORK

**The contractor shall complete the three following activities under this Task Order.**

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<sup>56</sup> 2008 Human Rights Report, U.S. Department of State.

<sup>57</sup> Scores flee town after riot over living conditions, January 13, 2009. IRIN.

<sup>58</sup> While no final peace agreement has been signed, March 5, 2009, IRIN.

<sup>59</sup> SBU Casamance Program, USAID/Senegal, March 2008.

## Task I – Analytic Framework

Using the Conflict Assessment Framework (CAF)<sup>60</sup> developed by USAID’s Office of Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM) in the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), the team will:

1. Through a process of literature review prior to arrival in Senegal followed by consultations in-country, identify the range of conflict vulnerabilities that exist in Senegal. This process should identify dynamics that have contributed to outbreaks of violent conflict in the past as well as those that have a high possibility of contributing to violent conflict in the future and the connections between them (areas of resilience or heightened vulnerability).

The following list identifies some of the dynamics to consider:

- Political representation, rule of law, public dialogue, institutional divisions;
- Leadership, at both national and local levels;
- Security;
- Socio-economic factors - extractive industries (minerals, oil/gas), poverty, unemployment;
- Alienation of youth – unemployment, lack of educational opportunities;
- Regional and international factors;
- Community perceptions.

Prioritize the various issue areas to determine the 2-3 most critical “fault lines” that exist right now in Senegal.

2. For the top 2-3 issues identified in step one, carry out an in-depth and field-based examination of the underlying causes of conflict drivers and how violence does or could manifest itself. This should include a determination of the extent to which root causes or current manifestations are driven by domestic and/or foreign factors or influences; it must also include an examination of the key actors and institutions critical in either furthering conflict or building resilience and working towards peaceful solutions. This in-depth work will necessarily be based not only desk studies, but also be critically informed by fieldwork with key informants and focus group discussions.
3. Throughout all, the assessment team will maintain a focus on USAID’s manageable interests in Senegal. In the final debrief and report, the team must propose programming options to address the assessment’s findings, which must in turn be responsive to Mission needs, opportunities and scope. Recommendations will most specifically be incorporated into the review and development of a new Democracy and Governance strategy. USAID will organize an in-brief for the assessment team with the Mission to articulate these interests upon arrival in-country.

## Task 2. Methodology

The assessment will include two phases:

1. **Washington-based Desk Review/Annotated Outline**

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<sup>60</sup> See “Conducting a Conflict Assessment: A Framework for Strategy and Program Development”: [http://www.usaid.gov/our\\_work/cross-cutting\\_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM\\_ConflAssessFrmwrk\\_May\\_05.pdf](http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_programs/conflict/publications/docs/CMM_ConflAssessFrmwrk_May_05.pdf).

The Desk Review/annotated outline will be completed prior to departing for Senegal and will provide a general overview of the current situation. This phase will help identify areas that merit closer attention once the team begins its fieldwork. The review will also help the team target its geographic areas of focus and select interview subjects.

The team shall review background documents focusing on conflict issues, including:

- Literature search/review of histories of Senegal and the ongoing conflict;
- Recent and historical news media;
- USAID assistance strategies and programs for Senegal;
- USAID Congressional Presentations for Senegal;
- Annual Reports;
- All relevant sectoral assessments done for Senegal; and
- Supplementary country-specific materials as identified by the Desk Officer and by USAID/Senegal.

Prior to departure for Senegal, the team will meet with relevant USAID (e.g. AFR, DCHA) and State Department staff, international organizations (e.g. World Bank) and appropriate NGO and academic institution representatives.

## 2. In-Country Assessment

The assessment team will seek interlocutors through initial contacts made in Dakar, Kédougou, and Ziguinchor (these are the three cities in regions most relevant to this assessment) as well as other possible areas as recommended by the Mission or team experts. USAID will facilitate coordination with other donors in the sub-region, specifically for Guinea Bissau.

During the in-country fieldwork phase, information shall be collected from the following: USAID representatives; DOD/OSC other USG representatives, GOS officials; the World Bank; the African Development Bank; relevant USAID implementing partners; academic institutions; journalists; political party representatives; local and international NGOs; other donors; and through informal discussions with other relevant individuals.

For at least one portion of the in-country assessment, the team will separate into two parts – one to proceed with the CAF in Senegal and the other to gather more information relevant in Guinea Bissau in order to better understand illicit activity networks in the sub-region and their impact on stability in Senegal. The IPS specialist will head the research in Guinea Bissau while the CAF team lead will remain in Senegal throughout. The IPS specialist will be self-funded, but the offeror should include other expenses related to GB fieldwork for one national staff (see below).

### Task 3: Deliverables

**Note, all deliverables shall be provided to the DCHA/CMM CTO for comment and review. All documentation must be submitted via attachment to electronic mail or on disk to the DCHA/CMM CTO. Formatting and cover pages of reports shall comply with DCHA/CMM guidance, so they fit within the CMM Office's communication series and respond to USAID's branding requirements.**

#### 1. Annotated Outline and Fieldwork Methodology

Prior to arrival in Senegal, the team will provide the draft annotated outline based on the desk review to the USAID/DCHA/CMM CTO for comment and consideration. The team lead must also submit a draft fieldwork methodology plan. This should outline in detail the scope of the assessment, geographic areas to be

covered, types of individuals to be interviewed and any logistical issues to be raised prior to the start of the fieldwork. The plan must also contain interview protocols and note how the IPS analytics will be factored in. The IPS Specialist will be responsible for bringing this analysis to the table, but the conflict assessment team must allow for the time for this to happen.

## **2. Orientation for Assessment Team and Mission staff on work plan**

Upon arrival in Senegal, the team shall meet with the appropriate USAID staff/team, which will be coordinated through the USAID/Senegal Democracy and Governance team. The CAF team lead – in cooperation with the DCHA/CMM technical expert – will organize a two day orientation to ensure that all members of the assessment team (including the embedded IPS specialist) are knowledgeable on context, objectives, work plan, and interview protocols.

## **3. Mission Debrief of Summary Findings**

Upon completion of the fieldwork, the assessment team members will present preliminary findings and recommendations to USAID/Senegal staff, U.S. embassy personnel and others, as appropriate. The findings should include main highlights and recommendations and must be presented both in writing and at a debriefing meeting. Information transmitted at this debrief will directly feed into a Democracy and Governance redesign.

## **4. Washington Debriefing**

Upon return from Senegal and completion of a draft report, team members will present the findings of the assessment to relevant USAID/Washington and other interagency staff (e.g. State Department, Department of Defense). DCHA/CMM and DCHA/DG, in coordination with the Senegal Desk Officer, will schedule this meeting to be held in Washington.

## **5. Final Report**

Based on the desk review and in-country assessment, the report will provide a summary of findings and recommendations to USAID/Senegal that will guide the Mission's development of integrated conflict-sensitive programs in the short, medium, and long term. The recommendations should be articulated so as to speak directly to USAID/Senegal's Mission objectives, specifically, but not limited to, Democracy and Governance programming. Recommendations will also take into consideration the influences of the illicit power structures identified in the IPS analysis. Recommendations may also indicate where suggested follow-up actions would be more appropriately undertaken by actors other than USAID.

The Final Report should not exceed 30-pages and should include an executive summary, introduction, background section, discussion of the analysis and identification of risks, recommendations and conclusions. A draft of the final report should be completed within five working days after the completion of field work and submitted to USAID/Senegal as well as DCHA/DG and DCHA/CMM for comment. The final report should be completed within two weeks after receiving comments on the draft from USAID. It is expected that the CAF Conflict Specialist will be the lead author of the draft and final report.

The IPS Specialist will be expected to contribute to the final report for the Conflict Assessment but will not be the lead author. The IPS Specialist will produce a second, separate IPS report focusing specifically on the utility of the analytic framework. The format and purpose of that report will be agreed based on consultation with DCHA/DG, DCHA/CMM and USAID Senegal.

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## **ANNEX VII. CONTACTS**

### **Washington Meetings: June 18-19, 2009**

Eric Beinhart, Criminal Justice Advisor, DG office, United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

Donald Chisholm, Office of Civilian Police and Rule of Law Program, Bureau of Intelligence, Narcotics, and Law Enforcement Affairs, Department of State (DoS)

Phyllis Dininio, DG Specialist, Management Systems International

Leonara Doores-Fendell, Program Analyst, West Africa Bureau for Africa, USAID

Elizabeth Brennan Dorn, Conflict Management and Mitigation (CMM), USAID

Scott Ferry, Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Detailed to Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS), (DoS)

Keira Goldstein, Foreign Affairs Officer, Office of Africa, Asia, and Europe, Bureau of Intelligence, Narcotics, and Law Enforcement Affairs, (DoS)

Kelly Heindel, Intern, CMM, USAID

Cynthia Irmer, ICAF Specialist, S/CRS

Katherine Krynski, Program Analyst, West Africa, Bureau for Africa, USAID

Lyston Lane, Senior Advisor for Warning Office of Conflict Prevention, S/CRS, (DoS)

Keri Lowry, Bureau for Africa, USAID

John Lyle, Program Analyst, Office of Africa, Asia, and Europe, Bureau of Intelligence, Narcotics, and Law Enforcement Affairs, (DoS)

Susan McCarty, Desk Officer, Regional Security Affairs Office, Bureau of African Affairs, (DoS)

Jeff McManus, Regional Director, Sahel and Operation Enduring Freedom-Trans Sahara Defense Policy, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense (DOD)

Larry Mendosa, Chief, Europe/Africa/Asia Section, Office of Global Enforcement, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)

Nils Mueller, Chief, Governance Division, Democracy and Governance Office, USAID

Robert S. Ricigliano, Director, Institute of World Affairs, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

Andrew Silski, Desk Officer, West Africa, Bureau for African Affairs, (DoS)

Susan Snyder, Acting Deputy Director, Office of Africa, Asia, and Europe, Bureau of Intelligence, Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, (DoS)

Valda Vikmanis-Keller, Team Leader, Africa and Middle East Team, Office of Africa, Asia, and Europe, Bureau of Intelligence, Narcotics and Law Enforcement Agency, (DoS)

Jeff Wagner, Europe/Africa/Asia Section, Office of Global Enforcement, DEA, DoJ

Tjip Walker, Senior Conflict Analyst, CMM, USAID

## **Senegal: June 28-July 18, 2009**

### **USAID/Senegal**

Kevin J. Mulally, Mission Director,  
Peter Trenchard, Economic Growth program Director  
Kathryn Lane, Casamance Program Coordinator and DG Advisor  
Abdourahmane Diallo, Program Officer and Sociologist  
Brandy Witthoft, Program Officer  
Nicole Tresch, DG Program Director  
Pape Sow, Education Program Director  
Ousemane Sané, Senior Program Economist  
Sounka Ndiaye, Monitoring & Evaluation specialist

### **Embassy**

Marcia Bernicat, Ambassador  
Jay Thomas Smith, Chargé d'Affaires  
David Mosby, Political Officer  
El Hadj Sarr, Political Analyst  
Major Karl Asmus, Defense Attaché  
Lance Kinner, Political Officer for Guinea Bissau

### **Dakar**

Joachim Diène, AECOM, Program Director  
Kim Mahling, Chief of Party, AECOM  
Mathias Bassene, AECOM  
Antonio, Mazzitelli, Regional Representative, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, UNODOC  
Babacar Ndiaye, Program Officer, UNODOC.  
Penda Mbow, head of *Mouvement Citoyen* MC)  
Ibrahima Famara Sagna, former president of *Conseil Economique et Social*  
Momar Coumba Diop, West Africa Research Program (WARP), political sociologist  
Sidy Sissokho, *Mouvement Citoyen*, Programme de renforcement des capacités des jeunes filles des partis politiques et des organisations de société civiles  
Babacar Kanté, Professor of Law, Gaston Berger University and former member of *Conseil Constitutionnel*  
Madiambal Diagne, Editor of *Le Quotidien*

Saliou Sarr, *Conseil National de Coopération des ruraux du Sénégal* (CNCR)

Mommar Talla Kane, President, Conseil des ONGs d'Appui au Développement (CONGAD)

Serigne Mansour Djamil Sy, Tijani Marabout

Ahmadou Maktar Mbow, President of Assises Nationales

Mansour Cama, President of *Conseil National des Employeurs Sénégalais* (CNES) and *Rapporteur* of Casamance Committee of *Assises Nationale*

Maria Diatta, member of Casamance Committee of *Assises Nationales*

General Mamadou M. Seck, *Assises Nationales* and former Senegalese Ambassador to USA

Gary Engelberg, Director of Africa Consultants International (ACI) and specialist in AIDS education

Pape Badiane, Taxi Driver

Aliou Diack, President du Conseil Rural (PCR) de Mbane

Moussa Mbaye, Coordinator, ENDA DIAPOL, Dakar

Abdoul, Mouhamadou, Coordinator of Inter-Africa ENDA DIAPOL

Colonel Mamadou N'Gom, Director of Département de la Lutte Anti-Subversion-Terrorism, Centre d'Oriération Stratégique, GOS,

Jean Marie Biagui, MFDC political wing, based in France

Alain Dia, Coordinator, Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC)

### **Guédiawaye, Pikine, and Thiès**

Babacar Mbaye Ngaref, leader of SAABA (Synergie des Acteurs pour l'assainissement de la banlieu and president de A.J.E.S. (Association Jeunesse-Education-Santé)

Moustapha Mbaye, member, SAABA, Guédiawaye

Moustapha Ndong, member, SAABA, Guédiawaye

Cheikh Seck, member of SAABA, Guédiawaye

Youssoufou Sarr, Imam, coordinator of Collectifs des residents des quartiers de Guédiawaye

Colonel Tanor Fall, Dakar Regional Inspector of Forestry Service

Ibrahima Guèye, Préfet de Pikine

Adelghani Sourirji, Programme d'Action pour un Développement Rural Juste et Durable (PADER), cooperatives, Pambal, Thiès region

Aminata Samb, Agricultural extension agent, PADER, Thiès region

Mor Diop, Union Démocratiques des Travailleurs du Sénégal (UDTS) and member of SAABA dealing with flood victims

Alioune Dia, SAABA

Village Focus Group, Mebeussine (village of 500 inhabitants), Thiès region. Included village chief, elders, and women

### **Kaolack and Kédougou**

Adama Traoré, Secretary-General, Mayor's office, Kaolack

Samba Ka, CNCR, Kaolack

Ibrahima Fall, Deputy Governor, Kaolack

Mamadou Diaw, *Assises Nationales*, Kaolack

Moustapha Syllah, KOEH, Kédougou NGO

Mbaye Khouma, Sous-Préfet of Bandafassa, Kédougou

Philip Cartelli, Fullbright Scholar, Kédougou

Matthew McLaughlan, Peace Corps Volunteer, Kédougou

Diome, Governor of Kédougou

Sory Diallo, La Lumière, Kédougou NGO

Alghassimou Diallo, La Lumière,

Boubou Diallo, La Lumière

Sidy Sadiakhou, leader of local vegetable growers association and former politician

Youth leaders

### **Saint Louis and Louga**

Mbaye, Cisse, fisherman and activist, Saint Louis

Abdoul Mbodj, Chef de la Station de la Surveillance de la pêche de Saint Louis

Khaly Fall, Chef de division de l'aménagement rural and rural development planner, SAED

Hamady Boubou Diallo, rural Councillor, Mbane

Abdou Dieng, Rural Concillor, Mbane

Mbaye Wade, Rural Councillor, Mbane

Youssoupha Wade, Rural Councillor, Mbane

Samba Yella Sow, Vice President, Mbane Rural Council

Moussa Wade, Municipapl Councillor Ross Bethio

Iba Seck, Municipal Councillor, Ross Bethio

Babacar Diop, Mayor of Ross Bethio, President of *Fédération des ONGs du Sénégal*(FONGS)

Sakoua Diop. Municipal Councillor Ross Bethio

Souleymane Doumbia, Municipapl Councillor, Ross Bethio

Ndiaga Fall, Deputy Mayor, Ross Bethio

Makhmout Fall, Municipal Councillor, Ross Bethio

Abdoulaye Fall, Richard Toll

Djibril Diao, *Plateforme des Initiatives du Nord* (PINORD) Saint-Louis, Ross Bethio

Cheikh Bamba Dièye, Mayor of Saint Louis

Ibrahima Kébé, Director of Cabinet d'Etudes et d'ingénierie pour le Développement (CETIDE Conseils), Louga

Madiaw Diaw, specialist in pastoralist issues, *Cellule d'Appui au Développement Local (CEDL)*, Dahra, Louga Region

### **Casamance, Gambia, and Guinée Bissau**

Lamine Coly, USAID representative in Casamance

Abdoulaye Gassama, Principal, Ziguinchor

Abdou Sarr, World Education, Ziguinchor

Robert Sagna, former mayor of Ziguinchor

Aba Diatta, Alliance pour la Paix en Casamance (APAC and respected elder, Ziguinchor

Noah Cissé, Principal of Lycée, Ziguinchor,

Members of Kabonketour, womens' NGO

Henri Djecki, APAC, youth activist and focus group of Ziguinchor youth

MFDC Groupe de Contact (GDC) focus group

Moussa Djamata, Handicap International

Camille Auberg, Handicap International

Demba Keita, Secretary-General, APRAN

Colonel Paul Ndiaye, Ziguinchor Zone Commander, Senegalese armed forces

Susanne Bieberbach, Program Director, GTZ-Procas, Ziguinchor

Badiana village focus group including elders, Imams, women's groups, farmers, president of Rural Council

Pascal Mané, APAC *Comité d'Action pour le Développement pour la Vallée de Palmier*

César Biadate. MFDC Commander, MFDC, Kasalol, GB

Ansoumane Sambou, Deputy Commander, MFDC, Kasalol, GB

Pamela Kehinde Cole, Gambian National Coordinator, West African Network for Peacebuilding(WANEP)

Samba Dahaba, Project Coordinator, WANEP, Gambia

Michael McDonnell, Director, US Peace Corps, Gambia

Laura Amadori, Program Coordinator, Concern Universal, Gambia

Marcel Badji, St. Joseph's Family Farm, Gambia

Mamdou Bah, Secretary-General, Red Cross, Gambia

Lamine Gassama, Information Coordinator, Red Cross, Gambia

Flavien Fafali Koudawo, Peace Director, Pesquisa Acco para a Consolidação da Paz na Guiné Bissau

General Juan Esteban Verastegui, European Union (EU) Security Sector Reform (SSR) Mission in GB

Miguel Girao da Sousa, Political Advisor, EU SSR Mission in GB

General Abdoulaye Dieng, Senegalese Ambassador to GB

Nuhoum Sanagaré, UN Human Rights Officer, GB

Jorge Gomes, President Mouvement National de la Société Civil pour la Paix et la Démocratie (MNSCP)

Fodé Sanha, Presidente/Consetto Fiscal Juridical, MNSCP

John Blacken, former US Ambassador to Guinea Bissau

Lucinda Barbosa, Director of Judicial Police, GB

Etienne Sambou, WANEP, GB

António Goerge Metá, Adventist Agency for Resource Assistance