**Baseline Report**

# La lucha contra la influencia de los intereses ilegales en los procesos políticos del Perú

# DCHA/DRG/Learning

**November 2015**

# Executive Summary

**BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

This document serves as the baseline report for the impact evaluation of USAID/Peru’s program, *La lucha contra la influencia de los intereses ilegales en los procesos políticos del Perú.* The impact evaluation is conducted through USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG Center) in Washington, D.C. This program, which targets activities in the regions of Loreto and Ucayali, provides citizens with information about corruption in elections, specifically illegal campaign finances from illegal industries (mining, logging, and narcotrafficking). Better-informed citizens are expected to be more likely to monitor and sanction politicians linked to corrupt practices. This evaluation tests these expectations.

In addition to measuring how information about this kind of political corruption affects citizen attitudes, this evaluation attempts to address how different frames about the dangers of corrupt candidates as well as the mode by which people receive information affect people’s beliefs and political behaviors. The program and evaluation will run through the general elections in Peru in April 2016.

**Interventions**

The two interventions assessed in this impact evaluation are community mobilization events, or fairs, before the election and household information dissemination. The fairs are public events where community artists and actors provide information about the local candidates as well as messages about the dangers of illegal campaign financing. These fairs will take place in 20 communities in the weeks leading up to the April 2016 election.

The second activity entails disseminating a flyer with one of three types of messages about the consequences of illicit campaign financing: (1) information about corruption, (2) a consequentialist appeal that corruption harms families and voters, or (3) a normative appeal about the ills of political corruption.

**Research Design**

Within Loreto and Ucayali, 40 communities (20 in each region) have been randomly selected and placed into matched pairs with propensity score matching. Within these 20 pairs of communities, one from each pair has been randomly assigned to receive a fair before the election, forming a quasi-experimental design. Within communities, households have been randomly sampled and assigned to a control group or to one of the three household informational messages. Overall, there are 8 experimental conditions (2 by 4 design).

There are three waves of data collection associated with this impact evaluation. The first occurred in June 2015 and serves a broad baseline of knowledge of and attitudes to corruption in politics. The second will occur in February 2016 and will be tied to distributing informational and/or promotional flyers based on treatment assignment. The fairs will take place in March 2016. Immediately following the April 2016 elections, there will be a post-election survey measuring attitudes and asking about vote choice. These first survey wave includes 1,000 individuals, while the second and third waves include 2,000 individuals.

**Main Baseline Findings**

We found that citizens in our sample overwhelmingly believe that public officials and politicians at every level of government engage in some forms of corruption. But they are less aware of cases of corruption surrounding specific political actors at the local level. Citizens also overwhelmingly support government intervention to fight corruption. But they do not necessarily prioritize the fight against corruption.

Our survey suggests that Peruvians in these regions – particularly those worse off economically – are far more concerned with their economic wellbeing than with issue related to political corruption. Moreover, voters seem consistently willing to trade off fighting political corruption for economic gains. When faced with choosing between economic growth and employment on the one hand and fighting corruption on the other, most citizens consistently choose the economy.

Finally, we find that a substantial proportion of our sample has had personal experiences with political corruption, especially in the form of being asked to pay a public official – typically a police officer – a bribe. We also find that this experience makes individuals perceive corruption to be more widespread, less confident in their political institutions, and feel less political efficacy. Everyday experiences of corruption thus also erode important links between citizens and democracy.

# I. Introduction

This document serves as the baseline report for the impact evaluation of USAID/Peru’s program, *La lucha contra la influencia de los intereses ilegales en los procesos políticos del Perú.* The impact evaluation is conducted through USAID’s Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance (DRG Center) in Washington, D.C. This program, which targets activities in the regions of Loreto and Ucayali, provides citizens with information about corruption in elections, specifically illegal campaign finances from illegal industries (mining, logging, and narcotrafficking). Better-informed citizens are expected to be more likely to monitor and sanction politicians linked to corrupt practices. This evaluation tests these expectations.

In addition to measuring how information about this kind of political corruption affects citizen attitudes, this evaluation attempts to address how different frames about the dangers of corrupt candidates as well as the mode by which people receive information affect people’s beliefs and political behaviors. The program and evaluation will run through the general elections in Peru in April 2016.

The evaluation will examine two complementary interventions that target informational deficits among citizens making a voting decision. The first intervention is “social mobilization events,” or fairs. These fairs will be held in the weeks prior to the election in a randomly selected set of 20 communities in Loreto and Ucayali, the two target regions of the *Lucha* program. In the fairs, local artists and actors will provide information about local candidates running for office as well as messages promoting the importance of electing clean politicians who are honest about their financial backing.

The second intervention, which will be co-created by the evaluation team and IDEA International, is a set of household informational flyers that mirror the messages of the fairs. There will be three types of messages to understand how different messages related to political corruption affect attitudes and behaviors. These three messages will help answer the question whether citizens simply lack information about corruption in the regions, or if citizens are unmotivated by that information and require contextualizing messages to sensitize them to corruption as it relates to them.

Prior to the rollout of project activities, a baseline survey was conducted in 40 localities in Loreto and Ucayali. This data collection effort sought to gather information on baseline conditions on the key outcomes of interest and on other important contextual factors that might have an interaction effect with project activities. The primary outcomes of interest include:

* Citizen knowledge about local political corruption
* Citizens’ personal experiences with corruption
* Citizen attitudes toward corruption

The baseline survey analysis has three objectives. The first is to improve our understanding of citizens’ attitudes toward, perceptions of, and experiences with corruption. The second is to provide baseline estimates of indicators of these attitudes and preferences. The third objective is to identify baseline differences across the treatment and control groups that will be used to measure the impact of the project.

The report is organized as follows: in section two, we provide background on the project as well as a brief description of the study design; in section three, we describe the design and implementation of the baseline survey; in section four, we provide baseline descriptive statistics on the key study outcomes. Section five concludes the report.

# II. Project Background and Evaluation Objectives

**Background**

In recent years, high profile scandals have rocked Peru’s political establishment. Of three former presidents, two are under investigation for corruption and the third is in jail. In Congress, a number of members have been publicly linked with narcotrafficking and illegal mining. At the subnational level, the influence of illicit resources in political circles is widely acknowledged. Most recently, in the region of Ancash, there has been a rash of politically motivated killings allegedly spurred by corruption related to the influx of mining revenue.

While Peru has enjoyed three successive peaceful transfers of power since 2002, the country’s institutions and political systems are alarmingly weak. Problems include the absence of a cadre of professional civil servants, the frequent turnover of key officials at the national level, weak to non-existent political parties, personality/scandal-driven politics, widespread corruption, and weak institutional controls. In this context, politicians linked to illegal activities (mining, drug trafficking, logging), have relative freedom to pursue their particularized interests with a short-term horizon (reelection rates for members of Congress was 18 percent in the last elections), undermining good governance and reinforcing citizens’ lack of faith in democratic processes.

Given these risks, USAID/Peru’s program, *La lucha contra la influencia de los intereses ilegales en los procesos politicos del Perú* (hereafter, “*Lucha*”), aims to enhance the capacity of Peruvian civil society and state institutions to monitor and control the selection of candidates for inclusion on party lists, as well as their campaign finance sources and reduce the influence of illegal interests – especially drug trafficking, illegal mining and illegal logging – over elections and political processes in Peru. Hereafter “corruption” will be used to refer to these interests in the broadest sense. The implementer of the *Lucha* program is IDEA.

USAID/Peru will initiate activities under the *Lucha* program during the months prior to Peru’s April 2016 national elections. These activities comprise a multipronged messaging campaign to inform voters about the negative consequences of corruption in politics. These efforts are rooted in the theory that when citizens know negative information about a party or a candidate, they will be less likely to cast their vote for that candidate, and this in turn deters politicians from engaging in corruption.

The Learning Division from USAID’s DRG Center will design and carry out an evaluation of these activities’ impact on voters and electoral processes. Lessons will contribute to broader efforts to understand citizen attitudes toward corruption, to sensitize voters to the risks of illicit interests in political processes across the Andean region.

**Interventions**

The twofold problem at the core of the *Lucha* program are that (1) that voters tend to lack sufficient and accurate information about the role of illicit funds in Peruvian politics, and (2) that voters may remain indifferent toward corruption. As a result, voters may fail to negatively evaluate politicians with ties to illicit networks.

*Lucha*’s primary objective is to “Reduce the influence of illegal interests on Peruvian electoral processes.” To do so, it will equip voters with the information and tools needed to better evaluate their candidates via an “awareness campaign” and “social mobilization events.” The program implementer will produce communication materials and web-based information platforms designed to augment public information about candidates prior to the election.

The primary outcomes of interest are that, (1) citizens become equipped with the information and tools needed to better evaluate their candidates, and (2) citizens’ awareness of the negative impact of illicit financing on electoral processes increase.

Standard democratic theory predicts that when citizens know negative information about a candidate, they will be less likely to cast their vote for that candidate and this in turn deters politicians from engaging in illicit activities. The implication is that where elite corruption is rampant, it is because voters are either unaware of it, or that they fail to understand the negative consequences of corruption. Providing information to voters about which politicians engage in corruption, or sensitizing voters to the negative consequences of corruption more broadly, should help voters hold politicians to account for corruption and, in turn, deter elite corruption more generally. Similarly, the *Lucha* program proposes that mobilizing citizen awareness of corruption and its consequences will help reduce the influence of illegal interests on Peruvian political processes. However, in practice, empirical evidence for this Theory of Change is mixed.

The evaluation will examine two complementary interventions that target informational deficits among citizens making a voting decision. The first intervention is “social mobilization events,” or fairs. These fairs will be held in the weeks prior to the election in a randomly selected set of 20 communities in Loreto and Ucayali, the two target regions of the *Lucha* program. In the fairs, local artists and actors will provide information about local candidates running for office as well as messages promoting the importance of electing clean politicians who are honest about their financial backing.

The second intervention, which will be co-created by the evaluation team and IDEA, is a set of household informational flyers that mirror the messages of the fairs. There will be three types of messages to understand how different messages related to political corruption affect attitudes and behaviors:

1. **Informational**: basic facts about political corruption
2. **Consequentialist**: specific costs associated with corruption (e.g., health consequences of illegal mining; environmental effects of logging; violence and security, etc.)
3. **Normative**: normative condemnation through the lens of democratic values/procedure

These three messages will help answer the question whether citizens simply lack information about corruption in the regions, or if citizens are unmotivated by that information and require contextualizing messages to sensitize them to corruption as it relates to them.

**Impact Evaluation Design**

This IE will use a household-based randomization strategy to best attribute outcomes of interest to the program. This decision is due to the relatively small geographic area where the program is occurring as well as the lack of geographically-located sub-constituency precincts, which limits our outcomes of interest to the individual level.

By using household randomization of information as an identification strategy, this impact evaluation can accurately measure outcomes given an environment where many political activities are occurring in a relatively small area. By assigning different treatment groups at the household level, the project increases the potential sample size to allow for the creation of a valid counterfactual control group through statistical sampling.

It is not only possible to separate and identify the *independent effects* of different message content. It is also possible to analyze the relative effectiveness of delivering this information *face-to-face* through neighborhood canvassing vs. delivering this information through *social mobilization* activities.

Both the different informational messages and the social mobilization event will be randomized, the former at the household level and the latter at the community level. The randomized promotion strategy for the mobilization events address this somewhat, by effectively increasing the salience of the event for certain households. However, through work with IDEA, the impact evaluation design uses a quasi-experimental matching strategy to assign one member of a pair of similar towns to receive the mobilization event or not, 20 communities in total. This will help address the urban bias of the events, where politics might differ considerably from more rural communities.

Table 1 outlines the different types of households in our design. Through random assignment of communities and households into these groups, we will be able to address a number of pertinent questions. First, we can measure what type of message generates the most interest in, and sensitization to, the issues associated with political corruption. In other words, which type of information matters most for citizens outcomes, either in the presence of a mobilization event or not? We can do this by comparing C1+C2 vs. T1+T4 vs. T2+T5 vs. T3+T6.

**Table 1**. *Impact evaluation research design*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Household message type** | **Community with fair** | **Community with no fair** |
| Control | C1 | C2 |
| Informational message | T1 | T4 |
| Consequentialist message | T2 | T5 |
| Normative message | T3 | T6 |

We can also study what type of information delivery – what “message platform” – generates the most interest in, and sensitization to, the issues associated with political corruption. Do the social mobilization event promote knowledge and behavioral change in citizens? We can answer this question by comparing C1+T1+T2+T3 vs. C2+T4+T5+T6. Does the mode of engagement (flyer versus fair) affect citizen outcomes? We can study this question by comparing T1+T2+T3 vs. T4+T5+T6.

Finally, this impact evaluation can address the question of spillover effects and the saliency of social mobilization events in urbanized areas through the sampling strategy where enough households are brought into the experiment that are different distances from the site of the event, with distance serving as a proxy for the likelihood of attending an event given no outside encouragement to attend.

Regarding the data collection and dissemination of treatments, a baseline was conducted in June 2015, which forms the basis of this report. The next wave of data collection will be in late February 2016. During that wave which is a panel of this first wave, respondents will be asked a short survey and then be provided with the appropriate flyer if they are to receive one. After this data collection activity, the fairs will be held in March 2016 and the election will occur on April 10, 2016. Immediately after the election, a third and final wave of data collection will take place, also in panel, to measure any changes that can be attributed to the activities.

*Selection of localities*

A matching procedure was used to select the localities for this impact evaluation. Along with the local survey implementer IPSOS, we identified all of the localities in Loreto and Ucayali that, according to Peru’s 2007 census, would have enough households (rural areas) or population (urban areas) to sustain the number of cases needed per locality. IPSOS also selected localities that were within a reasonable distance from the regional capitals and reasonably accessible by car or boat (that is, localities only accessible by plane were excluded).

These localities were then matched into pairs using propensity score matching on the basis of demographic characteristics: population, number of households, urbanization rate, and literacy rate. Within each region, 20 pairs of localities were then randomly selected (these 40 localities are listed in Appendix I). The first wave of the survey conducted 25 interviews in each of these localities. Waves 2 and 3 of the panel survey will conduct 50 interviews in each locality. Within each matched pair, one locality was subsequently randomly selected to receive a community fair in March 2016.

III. Baseline Methodology and Implementation

**Instrument Design**

To meet the objectives of the study, the survey instrument was designed to measure the following key areas:

* Perceptions of corruption across multiple levels of government and types of government actors
* Attitudes about government interventions regarding political corruption
* Personal experiences with corruption (e.g., bribes, clientelism)
* Political preferences
* Political characteristics, including partisanship, participation, interest, and knowledge
* Demographic characteristics including socioeconomic status, media consumption, education, and civic engagement

The IE team designed the baseline surveys using the latest knowledge on question and survey design. Some of the questions were modified in conjunction with local data collection partner IPSOS in order to reflect local realities. The IE team also solicited feedback on the instrument from the Mission and the implementer, IDEA International.

The IE team took several steps to ensure data quality, including:

* The questionnaires were all preprogrammed into SurveyToGo. This eliminated the slow and tedious data-entry process required with paper questionnaires, often introducing errors.
* The use of tablet-based electronic data capture to enter responses by the interviewer and frequent uploading of the data to the cloud ensured that the data was subject to regular diagnostics by IPSOS and the IE team.
* The IE team, IPSOS management, and the field teams were in regular contact in order to address any challenges that arose during fieldwork.

The IE team received Institutional Review Board approval for the survey instruments from NORC in May 2015. Informed consent was received from each participant after reading a statement about the purpose of the research, the content of the survey, any risks or benefits, and the time commitment. Participants were assured their participation was voluntary and could be withdrawn at any point and that their answers would be kept confidential.

**Baseline Implementation**

The first wave of the three-wave survey was conducted between June 19 and July 23, 2015. In this wave, 1,000 interviews were conducted, 25 in each community.

*Sampling*

The target population was adult Peruvian citizens in the 40 communities in Loreto and Ucayali selected for the study (see Appendix 1). Within the urban localities, IPSOS then randomly selected a block, a corner on that block, and a clockwise or counterclockwise direction. Enumerators then proceeded to every third household. Within rural localities, the locality was split into four quadrants and IPSOS randomly selected one quadrant. Since blocks could not be identified, IPSOS identified groups of houses built close to each other. A random group was selected and enumerators were instructed to conduct a random walk until they completed an interview. At that point, they were instructed to move to a different, distant grouping of houses and conduct a new random walk.

Within households, gender and age quotas were used in the selection process. Enumerators asked whether an individual of a certain gender and age range lived in that household and, if so, selected that individual. If more than one individual in a household met the quota, the enumerator selected the one with the most recent birthday.

*Implementation challenges*

Two of the selected municipalities needed to be replaced during the fieldwork due to unforeseen circumstances:

* In Loreto, the village of Grau in the Nauta district became flooded and lost access to electricity. Residents had left their homes and moved temporarily to nearby localities. IPSOS suggested replacing this locality with the demographically similar village of 13 de Febrero in the San Juan Bautista district of Loreto.
* In Ucayali, the village of 2 de Mayo in the Yarinacocha district turned out only to have 25 dwellings, in contrast to the over 100 indicated by the 2007 census. IPSOS suggested replacing this locality with the demographically similar locality of San Lorenzo, which is in the same district.

IV. Baseline Population Characteristics

In this section we provide a review of central findings from the household baseline survey. We organize the presentation into four sections, one summarizing the descriptive characteristics of the respondents and the following three corresponding to each of our outcomes of interest: citizens’ perception of, experiences with, and attitudes toward corruption.

**Respondent Characteristics**

The household survey was administered using quotas to achieve gender balance among the 1,000 respondents. Table 2 shows that the surveying procedure was successful in this respect; balance is near 50/50 within the entire sample as well as within each of the two regions, Loreto and Ucayali. As a check to assess the representativeness of this sample, we compare this gender balance with data collected in Peru’s 2007 census within the Loreto and Ucayali districts. Indeed, the survey results match very closely with census data.

**Table 2**. *Gender Balance*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Loreto** | **Ucayali** | **Total** | **2007 Census** |
| Male | 249 | 246 | 495 | 51% |
| Female | 251 | 254 | 505 | 49% |
| Total Respondents | 500 | 500 | 1000 | -- |

The average age of respondents in the sample is 37, and ranges from 18 to 70. Age differences are negligible across the two regions. However, male respondents are slightly older, with an average age of 38.6 compared to 36.6 for female respondents.

The vast majority of respondents have received some level of formal education. Table 3 shows that 83 percent of respondents have completed, at a minimum, primary education. Approximately half (49%) of the respondents have completed secondary school, and another 21 percent had received at least some secondary education without finishing. Approximately 17 percent of respondents had completed non-university post-secondary degree, and 4 percent completed a university degree. Male respondents in our survey hold higher rates of educational attainment at each level, with differences as high as 16 percentage points in the case of secondary education. Comparing these results to the 2007 census suggests that survey respondents have a slightly higher rate of post-secondary education. However, the educational attainment rates in this sample appear quite normal.

**Table 3**. *Educational attainment*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Men (%)** | **Women (%)** | **Total (%)** | **2007 Census** |
| Primary | 87 | 79 | 83 | 87 |
| Secondary | 57 | 41 | 49 | 47 |
| Post-secondary | 20 | 13 | 17 | 10 |
| University | 5 | 3 | 4 | 4 |

In terms of household income, we observe that the average monthly household income is 661-860 soles, equivalent to US$208-271.[[1]](#footnote-1) The modal response, however, is 461 to 660 soles per month (USD$145-208), reflecting the fact that the data are skewed right. Figure 1 (below) presents the full income distribution. Approximately 75 percent of the respondents have household incomes at or below 1060 Peruvian soles per month, equivalent to about US$335. For comparison, the current minimum wage in Peru is 750 soles per month. As would be expected for these regions, these figures suggest that respondents are relatively poor by national standards.

**Figure 1**. *Monthly household income*

Chart showing monthly household income distribution in Peru. THe majority fall into the 461-660 Peruvian soles range per month. 

In addition to household income level, we asked respondents to place themselves on a 10-point scale in which 1 represents the poorest Peruvians and 10 represents the richest. The results, shown in Figure 2, suggest that the respondents generally perceive themselves to be very poor; in fact, 39 percent placed themselves in the lowest category, and less than 1 percent of respondents placed themselves in any of the categories within the upper half of the distribution.

**Figure 2**. *Subjective respondent wealth*

Subjective respondent wealth. Respondents generally perceive themselves to be very poor; in fact, 39 percent placed themselves in the lowest category, and less than 1 percent of respondents placed themselves in any of the categories within the upper half of the distribution

In terms of household assets, the majority of respondents have televisions, cell phones, and safe drinking water (see Table 4). Notably, however, respondents have very low rates of internet service – just 7 percent – within their homes. Motorized transportation is also noticeably low; only 2 percent of households have a car, and just 30 percent have a motorcycle. A comparison of these ownership rates with the 2007 census data suggests that the respondents have higher rates of asset ownership than is typical. However, this might also be a product of the census data being outdated at the time of the survey.

**Table 4**. *Household assets*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Asset** | **% with Asset** | **2007 Census** |
| Television | 77 | 48 |
| Cellular phone | 68 | 24 |
| Potable water inside house | 50 | -- |
| Refrigerator | 41 | 20 |
| Motorcycle | 30 | -- |
| Bathroom | 26 | -- |
| Flat-screen television | 23 | -- |
| Landline phone | 13 | 20 |
| Computer | 12 | 7 |
| Washing machine | 11 | 6 |
| Internet service | 7 | 2 |
| Microwave | 7 | -- |
| Car | 2 | -- |

To better understand political attitudes within our target population, we asked respondents a series of questions regarding their evaluations of the government and the economy. The results in Table 5 show that despite Peru’s strong national economic growth in recent years, respondents hold mixed but moderate views about government performance. The most noticeable trend is that across all the evaluations, virtually none of the respondents assess performance as very good. Second, for each evaluation, the quantity of respondents who view performance as bad is similar to those who view it as good, with strong clustering in the middle. Third, respondents’ views are less moderate when assessing the performance of specific political leaders: in the evaluations of President Ollanta Humala and the respondent’s mayor, 11 and 12 percent of respondents view their performance as very bad.

**Table 5**. *Government and economic evaluations*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|  | **Performance of President Humala (%)** | **Performance of mayor (%)** | **Current economic situation in Peru (%)** | **Personal economic situation (%)** |
| Very Bad | 11 | 12 | 5 | 4 |
| Bad | 22 | 29 | 22 | 18 |
| Average | 48 | 35 | 53 | 59 |
| Good | 18 | 23 | 19 | 19 |
| Very Good | 1 | 3 | 1 | 1 |

We also asked respondents about their evaluations of changes in the national economy and their own personal economic situation. Table 6 shows that approximately half of the respondents have not noticed any change in economic conditions, either nationally or in their own situations. The other half is split between better and worse, with very few respondents taking a position an extreme view.

**Table 6**. *Evaluations of economic change*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
|  | **National economy (%)** | **Personal economic situation (%)** |
| Much Worse | 3 | 3 |
| Worse | 24 | 20 |
| Neither worse nor better | 50 | 47 |
| Better | 23 | 27 |
| Much Better | 0 | 3 |

Another key area of interest within this survey concerns the level of political knowledge of respondents. Prior political knowledge may condition the effects of the interventions in this project. We measured political knowledge in two ways. First, we asked respondents to answer a series of four questions regarding local, national, and international politics in Peru. In particular, we asked: (1) the year in which the current Peruvian Constitution was enacted, (2) the name of Brazil’s current president, (3) the cabinet position of Alonso Segura Vasi, (4) the number of seats in Peru’s Chamber of Deputies, and (5) whether the regional president has been investigated for corruption. Following standard practice in the field, we summed the total correct answers for each respondent to create a score of political knowledge. Second, each enumerator was also asked upon completion of the survey to assess the level of political knowledge of the respondent. Both measures are complementary, and allow us to assess the political knowledge of this sample of respondents. The distribution of respondents is reported in Table 7.

Although we do not have prior data on these questions to compare our results to, we are still able to draw some conclusions. As Table 7 shows, roughly a quarter of respondents fell in the very low category of political knowledge. In the next two categories – low and average levels of political knowledge – the two measures differ, but 60 percent of respondents fall into these two categories combined regardless of the type of measure. Finally, roughly 15 percent of respondents fall into the two highest levels of political knowledge – high and very high.

**Table 7**.*Political knowledge*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Knowledge scale** | **Factual questions (%)** | **Enumerator evaluation (%)** |
| Very low (0 correct) | 27 | 19 |
| Low (1 correct) | 42 | 29 |
| Average (2 correct) | 18 | 37 |
| High (3 correct) | 9 | 13 |
| Very high (4-5 correct) | 4 | 2 |

**PerceptionS of Corruption**

Among our sample, there is an overwhelming perception that corruption pervades all levels of politics – consistent, in many ways, with political reality in Peru. We asked respondents whether different types of political actors and government personnel use their positions for personal gain (see Figure 3). In the best case – that of public employees in the health sector – 75% of respondents thought they did. In the worst case – the police – that rate went up to just over 91%. An overwhelming majority of our respondents thought that public employees and officials abuse their office.[[2]](#footnote-2)

**Figure 3**. *Overall perceptions of corruption*

Although our respondents generally perceived a high level of corruption in general, they perceived quite a bit less corruption in specific cases. We asked respondents whether their current regional president of Loreto and Ucayali – Fernando Meléndez Celiz and Gambini Rupay, respectively – has been investigated for corruption. Both regional presidents have recently been investigated, although the case of the Ucayali president received more national media attention. As Figure 4 demonstrates, a vast majority of Ucayali residents were aware of this investigation. But fully a quarter of Ucayali residents in our sample were not aware of corruption charges against their regional president. In Loreto, nearly half of our sample were unaware of this particular case. Although respondents in our sample generally think that public officials engage in corruption, many seem uninformed about particular politicians’ corrupt practices.

**Figure 4**. *Perceptions of specific cases of corruption*

**EXPERIENCES WITH CORRUPTION**

The second citizen outcome we sought to measure was individuals’ experiences with corruption. We explored two possible ways in which individuals might come into contact with political corruption: (1) through paying bribes to public officials and (2) through selling their vote to parties or political candidates.

Regarding bribery, we asked respondents in our sample directly whether they had been asked by a public official to pay a bribe in the last 12 months. As Figure 5 shows, 14 percent of respondents said they had been asked to pay a bribe in that time period. Since bribery is illegal, this may be an underestimate of the actual level of bribe-paying that takes place. But it gives us at least a lower bound on citizens’ experiences with this type of corruption. Note that while 14 percent seems like a small number, this only measures these experiences in the last 12 months (under the assumption that recall beyond this is unreliable). Compounded over time, this means that very many citizens are asked by public officials to pay bribes.

**Figure 5**. *Experiences with bribery, by class*

Of those who said they had been asked to pay a bribe, 77 percent were asked to do so by police. That is, the vast majority of bribe requests from public officials come from police officers.

Figure 5 also shows that these experiences with corruption are disproportionately distributed across socioeconomic groups (as measure by household wealth). The rate at which the wealthiest quintile of respondents is asked to pay a bribe is twice the average, whereas the rate for the poorest quintile is less than half the average. In other words, the rich are much more likely to be asked to pay a bribe by a public official. It is perhaps unsurprising that public officials looking for a bribe are more likely to seek one from those who have more means.

We also examined individual respondents’ experience with clientelism. We asked individuals directly whether they had, in the prior 12 months, received “material assistance like food, clothing, or personal favors from some political candidate or representative.” As Figure 6 shows, nine percent of our sample said they had received goods or favors from a politician in the prior 12 months. Again, Figure 6 finds these experiences disproportionately distributed among social classes, except that the poorest quintile of respondents is more likely to participate in clientelism and the richest less likely. The fact that politicians seem to target poorer voters is consistent with scholarship on clientelism.

**Figure 6**. *Experiences with clientelism, by class*

These experiences with corruption affect how citizens think about corruption more generally. As Table 8 shows, individuals who were asked to pay a bribe have less confidence in political institutions,[[3]](#footnote-3) are more likely to think that corruption is widespread, and felt less political efficacy. On the other hand, participation in clientelism seems to have none of these effects.

**Table 8**. *Correlates of experiences with corruption*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Dependent variable** | **Bribery** | **Clientelism** |
| Confidence in political institutions | -1.10\* | 1.26 |
|  | (0.28) | (0.78) |
| Perception of corruption | 21.79\* | 2.41 |
|  | (3.28) | (8.82) |
| Political efficacy | -2.67\* | -1.31 |
|  | (1.22) | (1.92) |
| Standard errors in parentheses, \* *p<0.05* | | |

In sum, individual experiences with corruption are fairly widespread among the target population of this project in Loreto and Ucayali. And these experiences – being asked to pay a bribe, often by police officers – affect a host of political perceptions and attitudes that are important for democracy.

**Attitudes toward Corruption**

Our final outcome of interest is citizens’ attitudes about corruption. Here we examine how strongly citizens feel about the problems associated with corruption and the kinds of tradeoffs they are willing to make when it comes to fighting corruption.

To begin, we asked respondents in our sample general questions about whether the government should do more to combat corruption. As Figure 7 shows, citizens in Loreto and Ucayali overwhelmingly support more government intervention in fighting corruption – whether it is corruption within the private sector, among public employees, or among politicians. In all three cases, 90 percent or more of our respondents agreed that the government should do more. Of course, such responses may simply reflect social desirability. In the absence of any real costs or tradeoffs, it is unsurprising to find such overwhelming support.

**Figure 7**. *Support for government intervention to fight corruption*

To examine some of these potential tradeoffs, we presented respondents with forced choices between two policy priorities and asked which they would prioritize. As Table 9 shows, when respondents were forced to choose between protecting the environment and combating corruption, 74 percent chose to combat corruption. However, that proportion declines significantly when combating corruption is pitted against promoting economic growth. In that tradeoff, only 47 percent of respondents preferred combating corruption.

**Table 9**. *Tradeoffs in government intervention*

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Issue** | | **Choice (%)** |
| Tradeoff 1 | Protect the Environment | 26 |
| Combat Corruption | 74 |
| Tradeoff 2 | Combat Corruption | 47 |
| Promote Economic Growth | 53 |

We presented our respondents with a similar forced choice, this time with reference to a choice regarding what kinds of politicians should be prosecuted for corrupt practices. As Figure 8 indicates, respondents were asked whether the government should “always prosecute corrupt public officials, even if they help to improve the economy and provide employment” or “prosecute corrupt public officials only if they do not help to improve the economy and do not provide employment opportunities.” Despite the potential for social desirability in these responses, 46 percent of respondents chose the second statement – that is, that public officials who improve the economy should be allowed to engage in corruption.

**Figure 8**. *Tradeoff between fighting corruption and promoting the economy, by class*

Figure 8 also shows that respondents’ willingness to make these tradeoffs between corruption and economic wellbeing are substantially conditioned by their own socioeconomic status. The wealthiest 20 percent of our sample (based on household wealth) was far less willing to allow corrupt politicians to evade prosecution when they perform well economically than the sample average and the poorest 20 percent of our sample.

These forced-choice questions are merely hypothetical exercises, but they nevertheless reflect a perceived reality. Nearly one third of our respondents failed to disagree with the normative statement, “we must accept some corruption in order to promote economic growth.” We also asked respondents about the more specific, well-known corruption of Alberto Fujimori’s intelligence chief, Vladimiro Montesinos. In that case, an even larger 47 percent of our sample agreed with the statement, “The corruption employed by Vladimiro Montesinos during the presidency of Alberto Fujimori was justified because it improved the economy.”

Another way of examining citizens’ willingness to live with corruption is by the weight they place on corruption relative to other issues. We asked respondents what the most important issue facing the country is. As Figure 9 shows, the modal issue for citizens in our sample is crime or personal security. After that, various types of economic issues – the economy in general, unemployment, or poverty – are primary concerns. Only 12 percent of our respondents identified corruption as the main problem facing the country.[[4]](#footnote-4)

**Figure 9**. *Political priorities, by class*

Again, these results are conditioned by the respondent’s socioeconomic situation. As Figure 9 shows, among the most affluent quintile of respondents, corruption is a higher priority and economic issues are lower priority. In contrast, economic issues are far more important for the poorest quintile of respondents than on average. And corruption for these poorer respondents is a far less pressing issue. Once again, citizens with greater economic needs are most willing to accept corruption in exchange for economic gains.

In all of these questions, however, respondents are asked, directly or indirectly, to make a conscious choice between fighting corruption and economic performance. A final way to examine the tradeoff citizens are willing to make is to do so implicitly with between-subjects comparisons rather than direct or indirect questions. We did this by presenting respondents with a hypothetical incumbent candidate for mayor and randomly assigning whether that candidate (a) engaged in corruption and/or (2) oversaw economic expansion. Then we asked respondents how likely they would be to vote for the candidate on a 1-4 scale.

**Figure 10**. *Tradeoff between corruption and economy in a survey experiment*

Unsurprisingly, the incumbent mayor who was send to have improved the economy consistently garnered more support than the incumbent mayor said to have overseen a worsening economy. Similarly unsurprising is the fact that the mayor who was said to be corrupt consistently attracted less support than the one who was said not to be corrupt. What is striking, however, is that even a mayor known to be corrupt is likely to get the vote of most of our sample, so long as she also improved the local economy. Again, the individuals in our sample were willing to look the other way on corruption so long as a politician delivers economic gains.

V. Conclusions

Taken together, these baseline data both offer sobering advice for programming and provide optimism that the *Lucha* project can help shape citizen attitudes about corruption. On the sobering side of the ledger, we find that citizens – particularly those worse off economically – are far more concerned with their economic wellbeing than with issue related to political corruption. This suggests that anti-corruption may be seen as a kind of “luxury good” – something voters can only concern themselves with once they have reached a basic level of economic security.

On the optimistic side of the ledger, we find three potential areas in which the *Lucha* program may be able to change public opinion and sway voter behavior:

* First, we find that while there is general consensus that public officials and politicians are corrupt, information about specific political actors is not as widespread. Information disseminated through the program about specific candidates may therefore provide voters with new information that may change their vote choice.
* Second, voters seemed consistently willing to trade off fighting political corruption for economic gains. In some ways, this is a discouraging finding that provides an avenue of defense for those corrupt political actors who can claim to have contributed to economic wellbeing. In other ways, however, this is an opportunity. The *Lucha* program may be able to convince voters that they need not make this tradeoff, that voters can choose candidates who are both honest and capable of generating good economic outcomes.
* Finally, and relatedly, respondents in our sample – particularly the poorest – did not consider corruption to be a primary concern. There seems to be a great deal of room for the *Lucha* program to make the corruption issue more salient and a great priority for a larger swath of the electorate in these regions.

There seems to be great potential for the *Lucha* program to change public opinion regarding political corruption in Peru.

Appendix I: Surveyed Localities

Table A1 lists the 40 localities that were surveyed in Loreto and Ucayali.

**Table A1**. *Surveyed localities in Loreto and Ucayali*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Region** | **Province** | **District** | **Districts capitals (Urban) Towns / Villages (Rural)** | **Area** |
| Loreto | Maynas | Belen | Belen | Urban |
| Loreto | Maynas | Iquitos | Iquitos | Urban |
| Loreto | Maynas | Punchana | Punchana | Urban |
| Loreto | Maynas | San Juan Bautista | San Juan Bautista | Urban |
| Loreto | Requena | Requena | Requena | Urban |
| Loreto | Alto Amazonas | Yurimaguas | Yurimaguas | Urban |
| Loreto | Maynas | Indiana | Indiana | Urban |
| Loreto | Maynas | Mazan | Mazan | Urban |
| Loreto | Loreto | Nauta | Nauta | Urban |
| Loreto | Ucayali | Vargas Guerra | Orellana | Urban |
| Loreto | Maynas | Fernando Lores | Tamshiyacu | Rural |
| Loreto | Alto Amazonas | Lagunas | Lagunas | Rural |
| Loreto | Requena | Jenaro Herrera | Jenaro Herrera | Rural |
| Loreto | Maynas | San Juan Bautista | Santa Clara | Rural |
| Loreto | Mariscal Ramon Castilla | San Pablo | San Pablo | Rural |
| Loreto | Maynas | San Juan Bautista | Santo Tomas | Rural |
| Loreto | Maynas | Belen | San Jose | Rural |
| Loreto | Loreto | San Juan Bautista | 13 de Febrero | Rural |
| Loreto | Maynas | Iquitos | Manacamiri | Rural |
| Loreto | Maynas | Punchana | Barrio Florida | Rural |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Calleria | Calleria | Urban |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Yarinacocha | Yarinacocha | Urban |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Manantay | Manantay | Urban |
| Ucayali | Padre Abad | Padre Abad | Aguaytia | Urban |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Campoverde | Campoverde | Urban |
| Ucayali | Padre Abad | Irazola | San Alejandro | Urban |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Nueva Requena | Nueva Requena | Urban |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Iparia | Iparia | Urban |
| Ucayali | Padre Abad | Irazola | Alexander von Humboldt | Rural |
| Ucayali | Padre Abad | Irazola | Monte Alegre | Rural |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Yarinacocha | San Jose | Rural |
| Ucayali | Padre Abad | Padre Abad | Boqueron | Rural |
| Ucayali | Padre Abad | Irazola | Nuevo Tahuantinsuyo | Rural |
| Ucayali | Padre Abad | Padre Abad | Previsto | Rural |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Yarinacocha | Nueva Esperanza de Panaillo | Rural |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Campoverde | San Jose | Rural |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Campoverde | La Merced de Neshuya | Rural |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Yarinacocha | San Juan | Rural |
| Ucayali | Padre Abad | Padre Abad | Santa Rosa | Rural |
| Ucayali | Coronel Portillo | Yarinacocha | San Lorenzo | Rural |

Appendix II: Balance Report

To ensure that the randomization was conducted successfully, we tested for differences in key household characteristics across the treatment and control groups. Although we find some imbalances across groups, overall the randomization appears to have been successful. Educational attainment is higher in the treatment group, but the difference, while statistically significant, is so small that it is not significant in practical terms. The difference in household income is the most striking, and suggests that the treatment group is slightly better off than the control group. However, this may be partially attributable to the imprecision of the income ranges. We also tested for differences in 13 household assets. Of these, ownership rates are similar across the groups for 11 of the assets. However, refrigerators and potable water are found at slightly higher rates within the treatment group.

To further assess balance, we tested for differences across the treatment and control groups using 2007 census data aggregated at the locality level. In particular, we tested 9 measures of population and socioeconomic status: total population, urban population, rural population, total households, urbanity, education rate, employment rate, literacy rate, and primary language spoken. We did not find any statistically significant differences across treatment status for any of these variables, again suggesting that the randomization procedure was successful.

**Table A1**. *Balance tests for key demographic variables*

|  |  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Variable** | **N** | **Control** | **Treatment** | **Significance**  **(p-value)** |
| Age | 1000 | 37.90  (.61) | 37.31  (.59) | 0.487 |
| Sex | 1000 | 0.492  (.022) | 0.498  (.022) | 0.850 |
| Education | 1000 | 5.36  (.09) | 5.60  (.08) | 0.051 |
| Household size | 1000 | 5.17  (.11) | 5.35  (.20) | 0.432 |
| Household income | 880 | 3.84  (.114) | 4.18  (.111) | 0.033 |
| Employed | 999 | 0.546  (.022) | 0.593  (.022) | 0.132 |
| Political knowledge | 1000 | 1.17  (.047) | 1.24  (.049) | 0.289 |
| Refrigerator | 1000 | 0.384  (.021) | 0.436  (.022) | 0.095 |
| Telephone (landline) | 1000 | 0.128  (.015) | 0.122  (.015) | 0.775 |
| Telephone (cellular) | 999 | 0.667  (.021) | 0.692  (.021) | 0.404 |
| Automobile | 1000 | 0.020  (.006) | 0.014  (.005) | 0.464 |
| Washing machine | 1000 | 0.112  (0.14) | 0.104  (.014) | 0.684 |
| Microwave | 1000 | 0.720  (.012) | 0.066  (.011) | 0.701 |
| Motorcycle | 1000 | 0.306  (.021) | 0.304  (.021) | 0.945 |
| Potable water | 1000 | 0.454  (.022) | 0.538  (.022) | 0.001 |
| Home bathroom | 999 | 0.278  (.020) | 0.234  (.019) | 0.115 |
| Computer | 1000 | 0.112  (.014) | 0.128  (.015) | 0.437 |
| Internet | 1000 | 0.066  (.011) | 0.066  (.011) | 1.000 |
| Television | 1000 | 0.758  (.019) | 0.772  (.019) | 0.602 |
| Flat-screen television | 1000 | 0.230  (.019) | 0.232  (.019) | 0.940 |

Appendix II: Questionnaire

| **INITIAL FILTER** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| # | QUESTION | RESPONSE CODES |
| F1 | Are you a Peruvian citizen or permanent resident of Peru? | 1- No  2- Yes |
| F2 | How old are you? | [ \_ \_ ] |
| F3 | Sex of respondent (by observation) | 1- Male  2- Female |
| F4 | Type of living space? (by observation) | 1- Independent house  2- Apartment within a building  3- House within housing project  4- Neighborhood dwelling  5- Shack or hut  6- Makeshift dwelling  7- Home unfit for human habitation |

| **SECTION 1: ECONOMIC PREFERENCES** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| # | QUESTION | RESPONSE CODES |
| P1 | In your opinion, what is the largest problem facing this country?  [DO NOT READ; SINGLE RESPONSE] | 1- Water/ electricity (lack of)  2- Corruption of public officials  3- Corruption of politicians  4- Crime, delinquency / Security (lack of)  5- Human rights violations  6- Unemployment  7- Inequality  8- External debt  9- Drugs, drug consumption; narco-trafficking  10- Economy  11- Education  12- Impunity  13- Inflation-  14- Politicians / bad government  15- Environment  16- Poverty  17- Protests (strikes, street closures, etc.)  18- Healthcare  19- Transportation  20- Violence  21- Housing  94- Other  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P2 | What is the second-largest problem facing this country?  [DO NOT READ; SINGLE RESPONSE; MUST BE DIFFERENT THAN P1] | [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P3 | What is the third-largest problem facing this country?  [DO NOT READ. SINGLE RESPONSE; MUST BE DIFFERENT THAN P1 AND P2] | [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P4 | Regarding the current administration, how would you rate the performance of President Ollanta Humala? | 1- Very bad  2- Bad  3- Neither good nor bad  4- Good  5- Very good  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| Randomization 1: Random assignment to Groups A and B. Group A skips to question 6, Group B continues to question 5. | | |
| P5 | Do you think the difference in incomes between the rich and poor in Peru is much larger, larger, the same, smaller, or much smaller than 20 years ago? | 1- Much smaller  2- Smaller  3- The same  4- Larger  5- Much larger  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P6 | Now, talking about the economy… How would you rate Peru’s current economic situation? Would you say that it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad? | 1- Very bad  2- Bad  3- Neither good nor bad  4- Good  5- Very good  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P7 | During the past 12 months, would you say that Peru’s economic situation has improved a lot, that it has improved, that it has remained the same, that it has worsened, or that it has worsened a lot? | 1- It has worsened a lot  2- It has worsened  3- It has remained the same  4- It has improved  5- It has improved a lot  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P8 | How would you rate your personal economic situation? Would you say it is very good, good, neither good nor bad, bad, or very bad? | 1- Very bad  2- Bad  3- Neither good nor bad  4- Good  5- Very good  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P9 | Compared to 12 months ago, would you say your current economic situation is much better, better, the same, worse, or much worse? | 1- Much worse  2- Worse  3- The same  4- Better  5- Much better  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P10 | In general, how would you rate the performance of the mayor of your municipality? | 1- Very bad  2- Bad  3- Neither good nor bad  4- Good  5- Very good  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P11 | In this region many people work in logging and mining. Do you think that the number of jobs in these industries should be increased, remain the same, or be reduced? | 1- They should be reduced  2- They should remain the same  3- They should be increased  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P12 | Do you think that the majority of the people working in these jobs do so legally, or illegally? | 1- Mostly legally  2- Mostly illegally  3- [Do not read] Half and half  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P13 | Do you think the government should do everything possible to limit illegal deforestation and mining? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P14 | Do you think the government should do everything possible to limit drug trafficking in this area? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P15 | Do you think the government should do everything possible to limit the illegal production of coca in this area? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P16 | If the government needed to choose between protecting the environment and promoting economic growth, which option would you prefer that it chose? | 1- Protect the environment  2- Promote economic growth  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P17 | If the government needed to choose between protecting the environment and combating corruption in politics, which option would you prefer that it chose? | 1- Protect the environment  2- Combat corruption  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P18 | If the government needed to choose between combating corruption in politics and promoting economic growth, which option would you prefer that it chose? | 1- Combat corruption  2- Promote economic growth  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P19 | If it were up to you, how would you address the problem of corruption in politics? | 1- Always prosecute corrupt public officials, even if they help to improve the economy and provide employment opportunities  2- Prosecute corrupt public officials only if they do not help to improve the economy and do no provide employment opportunities  3- Never prosecute corrupt public officials  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |

| **SECTION 2: POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AND BELIEFS** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| # | QUESTION | RESPONSE CODES |
| P20: Now I will read a list of groups and organizations. Please tell me if you assisted meeting of these organizations: at least once a week, one or two times a month, one or two times a year, or never. | | |
| P20a | Religious organization meetings | 1- Never  2- One or two times a year  3- One or two times a month  4- Once a week  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P20b | Neighborhood meetings | 1- Never  2- One or two times a year  3- One or two times a month  4- Once a week  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P20c | Professional group meetings | 1- Never  2- One or two times a year  3- One or two times a month  4- Once a week  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P20d | Union meetings | 1- Never  2- One or two times a year  3- One or two times a month  4- Once a week  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P20e | Political party or political organization meetings | 1- Never  2- One or two times a year  3- One or two times a month  4- Once a week  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P20f | Sports group meetings | 1- Never  2- One or two times a year  3- One or two times a month  4- Once a week  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P20g | Agricultural association meetings | 1- Never  2- One or two times a year  3- One or two times a month  4- Once a week  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P21: In the past 12 months, have you participated in any of the following activities? | | |
| P21a | Blocking of streets, avenues, and roads | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P21b | Strikes or stoppages | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P21c | Rallies, demonstrations, or protests | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P21d | Signing of a political petition | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P22 | In politics, people frequently talk about the “left” and “right.” Using a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means LEFT and 10 means RIGHT, where would you place yourself? | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P23 | Did you vote in the first round of the 2011 presidential election? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P24 | [ONLY THOSE WHO ANSWERED “1” IN QUESTION 23]  Who did you vote for in the first round of the 2011 presidential election? | 1- None (voted, but left the ballot blank)  2- None (cast a void vote)  3- Ollanta Humala (Gana Perú)  4- Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza 2011)  5- Pedro Pablo Kuczynski (Alianza por el Gran Cambio)  6- Alejandro Toledo (Perú Posible)  7- Luis Castañeda Lossio (Solidaridad Nacional)  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P25 | [ONLY THOSE WHO RESPONDED “None” (blank or void) IN QUESTION 24]  Why did you vote in blank or void in the first round of the 2011 presidential election?  [SINGLE RESPONSE; SKIP TO QUESTION 27] | 1- I was confused  2- I wanted to demonstrate my discontent with all of the candidates  3- I do not believe in democracy; I wanted to protest the political system  4- I do not believe in elections or elected authorities  5- I am not interested in politics  6- My vote doesn’t make a difference  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P26 | [ONLY THOSE WHO DID NOT VOTE IN THE FIRST ROUND; “2” IN QUESTION 23]  Why didn’t you vote in the first round of the past presidential election? [SINGLE RESPONSE] | 1- I was confused  2- I didn’t like the candidates or the campaigns  3- I do not trust elections or electoral authorities  4- I do not believe in democracy  5- Bureaucratic concerns (registration)  6- Concerns regarding my age  7- I wasn’t in the district/I was on vacation  8- I am not interested in politics  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P27 | Did you vote in the regional and municipal elections in October of 2014? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P28 | Independent of whom you voted for in the past election, or who you plan to vote for in the upcoming election, do you identify with one political party in particular? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P29 | [ONLY THOSE WHO ANSWERED “2” IN QUESTION 28]  Do you identify a little more with one political party more than the others? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P30 | [ONLY THOSE WHO ANSWERED “1” IN QUESTION 28 OR 29]  Which political party? | 1- Acción Popular  2- Alianza Para el Progreso  3- Democracia Directa  4- Esperanza Región Amazónica  5- Fuerza Loretana  6- Fuerza Popular  7- Mov. Amazónico Loreto  8- Mov. Cambio Ucayalino  9- Mov. Fuerza Ucayalina  10- Mov. Integración Loretana  11- Mov. Loreto - Mi Loreto  12- Partido Aprista Peruano- APRA  13- Partido Nacionalista  14- Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)  15- Perú Más  16- Perú Posible  17- Solidaridad Nacional  18- Somos Perú  19- Tierra y Libertad  20- Todos Somos Ucayali  21- Ucayali Región con futuro  22- PPK  23- Mov. Regional Esfuerzos Unidos  24- Movimiento Regional Integrando Ucayali  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P31 | [ONLY THOSE WHO ANSWERED “1” IN QUESTION 28 OR 29]  Do you identify with this party a lot, somewhat, or a little? | 1- A lot  2- Somewhat  3- A little  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P32 | How much are you interested in politics: A lot, somewhat, a little, or not at all? | 1- Not at all  2- A little  3- Somewhat  4- A lot  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33: Now I’m going to ask a series of questions regarding your level of confidence in certain institutions. Using a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means you have no confidence in the institution and 10 means you have a lot of confidence in this institution: What level of confidence do you have in…?  [Note: options were presented to respondents in random ordering] | | |
| P33a | The judiciary | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33b | The National Congress | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33c | The police | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33d | The political parties | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33e | The National Elections Jury (JNE) | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33f | The National Office of Electoral Processes (ONPE) | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33g | The Regional Government | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33h | The Catholic Church | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33i | The media | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33j | National Superintendent of Borders and Tax Administration (SUNAT) | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33k | Office of the Ombudsman | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33l | Office of the Comptroller | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P33m | Your municipality | 1- 10: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34: Now I am going to read a series of statements and I will ask you in each case to tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree: | | |
| P34a | Democracy may have problems, but it better than any other form of government | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34b | The State should take action to reduce differences in levels of income across individuals | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34c | The State, rather than the private sector, should be the owner of the most important businesses and industries | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34d | The State, rather than the private sector, should be primarily responsible for providing public services like electricity and telecommunications | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34e | People like me do not have any influence on what the government does | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34f | At times politics seems so complicated that people like me do not understand much of what happens | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34g | At present, Peru is a democracy | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34h | The 2014 regional elections were clean | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34i | In Peru, everyone is equal before the law | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34j | Candidates are able to finance political campaigns with money obtained from all types of activities | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34k | For the progress of the nation, it is necessary that our presidents limit the voice and the vote of the opposition parties | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34l | The people should govern directly rather than through elected representatives | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P34m | Those who are not in agreement with the majority are a threat to nation | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |

| **SECTION 3: CORRUPTION** | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| # | QUESTION | RESPONSE CODES | |
| Randomization 2: Random assignment to groups C and D. Group C ordering 35, 36, 37; Group D ordering 36, 37, 35. | | | |
| P35: Do you believe that the use of bribes and the abuse of public positions for personal benefit are frequently used by…? | | | |
| P35a | Public education employees | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P35b | Public health employees | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P35c | Public sector employees in charge of contracts and public litigation | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P35d | Public sector employees in general | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P35e | National politicians | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P35f | Local politicians | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P35g | The police | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P35h | Judges and prosecutors | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P36 | During the past 12 months, did anyone ask you for a bribe? | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P37 | [ONLY THOSE WHO ANSWERED “1” FOR QUESTION P36]  Whom?  [DO NOT READ OPTIONS; RECORD ALL RESPONSES] | | 1- Public education employees  2- Public health employees  3- Public sector employees in charge of contracts and public litigation  4- Public sector employees in general  5- National politicians  6- Local politicians  7- The police  8- Judges and prosecutors  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P38 | In general terms, do you believe that voting is kept secret in Peru? | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P39 | Thinking specifically about someone like yourself who votes at a school within your neighborhood… Do you think that neighborhood leaders, political parties, or the government could learn how this person voted? | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| Randomization 3: Random assignment to Groups E and F. Group E is provided 4 response options; Group F is provided 5 response option | | | |
| P40 | Now I am going to show you a list of various activities related to politics. I would like you to tell me HOW MANY of these were done in you neighborhood by political candidates or representatives within the past 12 months. Please do not tell me which ones; only tell me HOW MANY.   1. They placed campaign billboards in your neighborhood 2. They visited your home 3. They publicly transmitted campaign ads over TV and radio 4. They threatened you so that you would vote for them 5. [Only for Group F] They gave you some object, like clothing or food, or a personal favor | | 1- One  2- Two  3- Three  4- Four  5- Five  6- None  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P41 | During the past 12 months, did you have any neighbors that received material assistance like food, clothing, or personal favors from some political candidate or representative? | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P42 | During the past 12 months, did you receive material assistance like food, clothing, or personal favors from some political candidate or representative? | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P43 | [ONLY THOSE WHO ANSWERED “1” FOR QUESTION 42]  Did you know this political candidate or representative? | | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P44 | [ONLY THOSE WHO ANSWERED “1” FOR QUESTION 42]  Which political party did this political candidate or representative belong to? | | 1- Acción Popular  2- Alianza Para el Progreso  3- Democracia Directa  4- Esperanza Región Amazónica  5- Fuerza Loretana  6- Fuerza Popular  7- Mov. Amazónico Loreto  8- Mov. Cambio Ucayalino  9- Mov. Fuerza Ucayalina  10- Mov. Integración Loretana  11- Mov. Loreto - Mi Loreto  12- Partido Aprista Peruano- APRA  13- Partido Nacionalista  14- Partido Popular Cristiano (PPC)  15- Perú Más  16- Perú Posible  17- Solidaridad Nacional  18- Somos Perú  19- Tierra y Libertad  20- Todos Somos Ucayali  21- Ucayali Región con futuro  22- PPK  23- Mov. Regional Esfuerzos Unidos  24- Movimiento Regional Integrando Ucayali  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| Randomization 4: Three conditions within this question are randomly assigned. Each condition is randomized independent of the other randomization results. | | | |
| P45 | Now I am going to describe a scenario. Juan/a [in accordance with sex of the respondent] lives in a neighborhood similar to yours in another city of Peru.  Group 1a: The past month, Juan/a needed to pay a month’s salary to the municipality to accelerate the approval of authorization for his/her business  Group1b: The past month, Juan/a received from the municipality the authorization needed for his/her business without needing to pay bribes  Group2a: Recently, Juan/a heard that various public officials accepted bribes to award public contracts.  Group2b: Recently, Juan/a heard that the mayor of the city fired various municipal officials for accepting bribes to award public contracts.  The mayor is facing reelection. From the time originally elected, the economic conditions within the city and the health and transportation services have [Group3a: improved / Group3b: worsened].  Considering what you know about the mayor, how likely do you think it is that Juan/a votes for him/her? | | 1- Not at all likely  2- Not very likely  3- Somewhat likely  4- Very likely  96- [Not provided] I would refuse to vote, or would cast a null vote  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P46 | Considering what you now about the mayor, how likely is it that he/she has accepted bribes? | | 1- Not at all likely  2- Not very likely  3- Somewhat likely  4- Very likely  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P47: Now I am going to read a series of statements regarding corruption in Peru. I will ask you in each case to tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, or strongly disagree: | | | |
| P47a | The government should do more to confront the problem of corruption in politics | | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P47b | The government should do more the confront the problem of corruption among public employees | | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P47c | The government should do more to confront the problem of corruption in the private sector | | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P47d | It is necessary to accept some corruption in order to be able to promote economic growth | | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P47e | Corruption affects my income | | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P47f | If I were to see an act of corruption within my workplace, I would call the police | | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P47g | The corruption employed by Vladimiro Montesinos during the presidency of Alberto Fujimori was justified because it improved the economy | | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P47h | The corruption employed by Vladimiro Montesinos during the presidency of Alberto Fujimori was justified because he was fighting against terrorism | | 1- Strongly disagree  2- Somewhat disagree  3- Neither agree nor disagree  4- Somewhat agree  5- Strongly agree  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |

| **POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE AND MEDIA** | | |
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| # | QUESTION | RESPONSE CODES |
| P48 | In what year was Peru’s current Constitution enacted? | 1- In 1993  2- In 1979  3- In 2001  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P49 | What is the name of Brazil’s current President? | 1- Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva  2- Dilma Rousseff  3- Fernando Arias  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P50 | What office does Alonso Segura Vasi currently hold? | 1- Minister of Housing, Construction, and Sanitation  2- Minister of Defense  3- Minister of Economics and Finance  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P51 | How many congressmen form the Peruvian Congress? | 1- Between 25 and 100  2- Between 101 and 175  3- Between 176 and 250  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P52 | Do you know if the governor of (Loreto/Ucayali, Fernando Meléndez Celiz/Gambini Rupay) has ever been investigated on charges of corruption? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P53 | Now I would like to ask you about the labor market. What income do you think the manager of a large national business earns in one month in Peru? | [ \_ \_ \_ \_ ] Soles  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P54 | What income do think a factory worker earns in one month? | [ \_ \_ \_ \_ ] Soles  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P55 | What income do think a construction worker earns in one month? | [ \_ \_ \_ \_ ] Soles  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P56: How frequently do you follow information and news regarding electoral campaigns via…? | | |
| P56a | Television | 1- Never  2- Every now and then  3- Once a week  4- Several times a week  5- Daily  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P56b | Radio | 1- Never  2- Every now and then  3- Once a week  4- Several times a week  5- Daily  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P56c | Newspaper | 1- Never  2- Every now and then  3- Once a week  4- Several times a week  5- Daily  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P56d | Internet | 1- Never  2- Every now and then  3- Once a week  4- Several times a week  5- Daily  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P56e | Social networks (Facebook and Twitter) | 1- Never  2- Every now and then  3- Once a week  4- Several times a week  5- Daily  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P57 | [ONLY THOSE WHO INDICATED THAT THEY WATCH TELEVISION; RESPONSE OF 2,3,4, OR 5 IN QUESTION 56a]  What is the primary television channel that you watch to inform yourself about the situation of the nation? | 1- América TV  2- Panamericana TV  3- TV Perú  4- ATV  5- Frecuencia Latina  6- Global TV  7- RPP TV  8- Canal N  9- Canal Pucallpa 51  10- Canal Cultural Visión 47  11- Canal 33 La Ribereña  12- UTV 19  13- Amazónica de Televisón  14- Loreto TV  15- Amazon Channel  16- Amazonia TV  17- UCV Satelital  18- Selva TV  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P58 | [ONLY THOSE WHO INDICATED THAT THEY USE RADIO; RESPONSE OF 2,3,4, OR 5 IN QUESTION 56b]  What is the primary radio station that you read to inform yourself about the situation of the nation? | 1- RPP  2- Radio Pucallpa  3- Radio Estar  4- Producciones Asturia  5- Estereo System  6- Radio Betel  7- Radio A  8- Radio Lider  9- Radio Video Oriente  10- Radio Difusora Aroma  11- Radio Felicidad  12- La Zona  13- Exitosa  14- La Voz de la Selva  15- Radio La Karibeña  16- Radio Nuevo Tiempo  17- Lorecom  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P59 | [ONLY THOSE WHO INDICATED IN THE FILTER THAT THEY READ THE NEWSPAPER; RESPONSE OF 2,3,4, OR 5 IN QUESTION 56c]  What is the primary newspaper that you read to inform yourself about the situation of the nation? | 1- El Comercio  2- La República  3- El Trome  4- Perú 21  5- Correo  6- Ojo  7- Diario La Región  8- Diario El Popular – Edición Loreto  9- Diario Pro & Contra  10- Revista Selva Verde  11- Revista Carta Abierta, de la Amazonía  12- Diario Crónicas  13- Diario A Hora  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P60 | In the previous month, did you use internet service? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P61 | [ONLY THOSE WHO INDICATED THAT THEY USE INTERNET; RESPONSE OF 2,3,4, OR 5 IN QUESTION 56d]  In the previous month, did you use internet…?  [Multiple responses] | 1- At home  2- At the house of a friend or relative  3- At work  4- At a school or educational institution  5- At a public booth  6- Through a cell phone  7- Did not use internet during the past month  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P62 | [ONLY THOSE WHO INDICATED THAT THEY USE INTERNET; RESPONSE OF 2,3,4, OR 5 IN QUESTION 56d]  Do you use internet at least…? | 1- Once a day  2- Once a week  3- Once a month  4- Every two months or more  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P63: [ONLY THOSE WHO INDICATED THAT THEY USE INTERNET; RESPONSE OF 2,3,4, OR 5 IN QUESTION 56d]  Do you use the internet to: | | |
| P63a | Obtain information | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P63b | Communicate with friends | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P63c | Buy products or services | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P63d | Conduct online banking | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P63e | Formal education or training activities | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P63f | Transactions with public officials | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P63g | Entertainment activities | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P64: Are you informed about national political developments…? | | |
| P64a | Through family | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P64b | Through friends | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P64c | Through classmates of coworkers | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P64d | Through the Church | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P64e | Through your teachers | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P64f | Through the internet | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P64g | Through the media | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P64h | Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_ | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P65 | How frequently are you informed about the current politics of the nation? | 1- Frequently  2- Every now and then  3- Only when I am interested in a topic  4- Never  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P66: During the past year, have you… | | |
| P66a | Spoken with someone about politics? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P66b | Seen campaign posters in your neighborhood? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P66c | Seen campaign advertisements on TV or radio? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| 66d | Been a candidate for some public position? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |

| **HOUSEHOLD INFORMATION** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| # | QUESTION | RESPONSE CODES |
| P67 | What is the last year or grade of studies that you passed? | 1- None  2- Preschool  3- Primary, incomplete  4- Primary, complete  5- Secondary, incomplete  6- Secondary, complete  7- Post-secondary, incomplete  8- Post-secondary, complete  9- University, incomplete  10- University, complete  11- Graduate studies, incomplete or complete  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P68 | In total, how many people live in your house at this moment? | [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P69 | How many of the people in your house are less than 18 years of age? | [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P70 | Are you affiliated with a union? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P71 | Is anyone else in your family affiliated with a union? | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P72 | What is your primary occupational activity? Are you…? | 1- Working (full or part time)  2- Actively searching for work  3- A student  4- Performing household chores/maintenance  5- Retired/disabled/unable to work  6- Not working and not searching for work  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P73 | [ONLY THOSE WHO WORK; RESPONSE 1 IN QUESTION 72]  What is your primary occupation? | 1- Farmer  94- Other: [ \_ \_ ]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P74 | [ONLY THOSE WHO WORK AS FARMERS; RESPONSE 1 IN QUESTION 73]  What product or crop do you primarily grow? | 1- Coffee  2- Cacao  3- Bananas  4- Rice  5- Corn  6- Yucca  7- Fruit  8- Soy  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P75 | ONLY THOSE WHO NO LONGER WORK; RESPONSE 5 IN QUESTION 72]  What was your primary occupation? | [\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P76 | In which of the following ranges do you find the monthly household income of this household, including remittances from outside and income from all of the adults and children who work? | 1- 260 soles or less  2- 261 to 460 soles  3- 461to 660 soles  4- 661 to 860 soles  5- 861 to 1060 soles  6- 1061 to 1260 soles  7- 1261 to 1560 soles  8- 1561 to 2060 soles  9- 2061 to 3060 soles  10- More than 3060 soles  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P77 | Imagine a ladder with 10 steps. On the first step are the poorest people and on the tenth step are the richest. Where would you place yourself? | 1-10: [\_ \_]  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P78 | What is your marital status? | 1- Single  2- Married  3- Open union/partnership  4- Divorced  5- Separated  6- Widowed  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P79 | Do you consider yourself Asháninka, Aymara, white, Bora, mestiza, black, oriental, Quechua, Shipibo, or other? | 1- Asháninka  2- Aymara  3- White  4- Bora  5- Mestiza  6- Black  7- Oriental  8- Quechua  9- Shipibo  94- Other: \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P80 | If you are religious, what religion do you most closely identify with? | 1- Catholic  2- Protestant  3- Oriental, non-Christian  4- None  5- Evangelical / Pentecostal  6- Mormon  7- Traditional Religions  8- Jewish  9- Agnostic or atheist  10- Jehova’s witness  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P81 | What language did you first learn as a child? | 1- Ashàaninka  2- Aymara  3- Bora  4- Spanish  5- English  6- Portuguese  7- Shipibo  94- Other \_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82: To finish, would you tell me which of the following items you have in your household? | | |
| P82a | Refrigerator | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82b | Home phone | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82c | Cell phone | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82d | Car | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82e | Washing machine | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82f | Microwave | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82g | Motorcycle | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82h | Safe drinking water | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82i | Home bathroom | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82j | Computer | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82k | Internet service | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82l | Television | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |
| P82m | Flat-screen television | 1- Yes  2- No  88- Does not know  99- Refused to answer |

[END OF SURVEY QUESTIONS]

| **INTERVIEWER QUESTIONS** | | |
| --- | --- | --- |
| # | QUESTION | RESPONSE CODES |
| P83 | How would you rate the respondent’s level of knowledge regarding politics in general? | 1- Very low  2- Low  3- Average  4- High  5- Very high |
| P84 | Was there another adult present during the interview? | 1- Yes  2- No |
| D1 | Region | 1- Loreto  2- Ucayali |
| D2 | Province | 1- Alto Amazonas  2- Loreto  3- Maynas  4- Requena  5- Ucayali  6- Coronel Portillo  7- Padre Abad |
| D3 | District | [\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_] |
| D4 | Zone | [\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_] |
| D5 | Locality | [\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_] |

1. At the time of the survey, the exchange rate was 3.17 Peruvian Nuevo Soles per USD. [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. These proportions are among only the randomly assigned half of the sample who were not asked about their own experiences with corruption just prior to this set of questions. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. This measure is an index that combines the level of confidence (on a scale of 1-10) in the National Congress, the judiciary, the political parties, the regional government, and the municipal government. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Similarly, we asked respondents whether they agreed with the statement, “corruption impacts my income.” Only half of our sample agreed with that statement, suggesting that many respondents do not view corruption as personally costly. [↑](#footnote-ref-4)