The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index
For Sub-Saharan Africa

Developed by:
United States Agency for International Development

Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance
Center of Excellence on Democracy, Human Rights, and Governance

Bureau for Africa
Office of Sustainable Development
CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

2015 CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX

ANGOLA

BENIN

BOTSWANA

BURKINA FASO

BURUNDI

CÔTE D'IVOIRE

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

ETHIOPIA

GABON

THE GAMBIA

GHANA

GUINEA

KENYA

LIBERIA
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MADAGASCAR</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALAWI</td>
<td>121</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALI</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOZAMBIQUE</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAMIBIA</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGER</td>
<td>155</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIGERIA</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RWANDA</td>
<td>171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SENEGAL</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIERRA LEONE</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTH AFRICA</td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUDAN</td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TANZANIA</td>
<td>214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UGANDA</td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZAMBIA</td>
<td>232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ZIMBABWE</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX METHODOLOGY: DIRECTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS | 248

ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA | 264
INTRODUCTION

USAID is pleased to present the seventh edition of the CSO Sustainability Index (CSOSI) for Sub-Saharan Africa. The index describes advances and setbacks in seven key dimensions of sustainability in the civil society sector in 2015—the legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, advocacy, service provision, infrastructure, and public image.

The reports are produced by an expert panel of CSO practitioners and researchers in each country included in this year’s index. The panels assess each dimension of CSO sustainability according to key indicators and agree on a score, which can range from 1 (most developed) to 7 (most challenged). The scores for each dimension are averaged to produce an overall sustainability score for a given country’s CSO sector. An editorial committee composed of technical and regional experts then reviews the scores and corresponding narratives with an eye to ensuring consistent approaches and standards to allow for cross-country comparisons. The scores are grouped into three overarching categories—Sustainability Enhanced (scores from 1 to 3), Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5), and Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7)—which provide additional comparative benchmarks. Further details about the methodology used to calculate scores and produce corresponding narrative reports are provided in Annex A.

The index is a useful source of information for CSOs, governments, donors, academics, and others who want to better understand and monitor key aspects of CSO sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa. It complements similar indices covering countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the Middle East and North Africa, Asia, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.

A publication of this type would not be possible without the contributions of many individuals and organizations. We are particularly grateful to the Aga Khan Foundation, which supported the assessments of Kenya and Mali (as well as the indices for Afghanistan and Pakistan) and our implementing partners in each country, who facilitate the expert panel meetings and write the country reports. We also thank the many CSO representatives and experts, USAID partners, and international donors who participated in the expert panels in each country. Their knowledge, perceptions, ideas, and dedication are the foundation upon which this index is based.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Angola  Allan Cain, Jeanette Dijkstra, and João Domingos Domingos, The Development Workshop
Benin  Leontine Konou Idoho, Reseau pour L'integration des Femmes des Organisations Non Gouvernementales et Associations
Botswana  Monametsi Sokwe and Simon Muchiru, Ngamiland Council of NGOs
Burkina Faso  Siaka Coulibaly and Augustin Go, Reneau des Organisations de la Societe Civile pour le Developpement (RESOCIDE)
Burundi  Melchior Ndayimire and Déocratias Nzunogera, Observatoire de l’Action Gouvernementale (OAG)
Cote d'Ivoire  Moussa Toure and Yaya Traore, Reneau des Educateurs aux Droits de l'Homme, à la Democratie et Genre(REDHG)
DRC  Justin Kangwenyenye Kazige and Danny Boss Singoma, Centre National d'Appui au Developpement et à la Participation Populaire (CENADEP)
Ethiopia  Debebe Hailegebril, Independent Legal Consultant
Gabon  Calisha Navratilova, Protet Judicaël Essono Ondo, and Marc Ona Essangui, NGO Brainforest
The Gambia  Madi Jobarteh, The Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO)
Ghana  Douglas Quartey, Consultant; Joseph Yeboah, Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG)
Guinea  Aboubacar Sylla, Centre Africain de Formation pour le Developpement (CENAFOD)
Kenya  Chrispin Oduor and Miriam Omolo, Institute of Economic Affairs
Liberia  G. Pewu Subah, Guzeh Subah, James Thompson, and Oliver Subah, Subah-Belleh Associates
Madagascar  Razafimandimby Andriamandranto and Razafimandimby Noro-Malala, Plateforme Voahary Salama
Malawi  Christopher Rub Chisoni, Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP)
Mali  Massaman Sinaba, Boureima Allaye Toure, and David Miankenda Watuluzu, Oeuvre Malienne d’Aide à L’Enfance du Sahel (OMAES)
Mozambique  Phillip Machon and Joao Pereira, Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC)
Namibia  Theunis Keulder, Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID)
Niger  Mahaman Adamou, Reneau d'Appui aux Initiatives Locales (RAIL)
Nigeria  Ahmed Mohammed Kwaru and Mohammed Bello, Centre for Research and Documentation (CRD)
Rwanda  Epimack Kwokwo and Cyriaque Ndayisenga, La Ligue des Droits de la Personne dans la Region des Grands Lacs (LDLG)
Senegal  Amacodou Diouf and Ibrahima Kane, Conseil des ONG d’Appui au Developpement (CONGAD)
Sierra Leone  Valnora Edwin, Campaign for Good Governance (CGG)
South Africa  Phiroshaw Camay, Co-operative for Research and Education (CORE)
Sudan  Dr. Hassan Abdel Ati, National Civic Forum
Tanzania  Nasiim Losai, Francis Uhadi, and Edna Chilimo, The Foundation for Civil Society
Uganda  Esther Nakayima, Uganda National NGO Forum (UNNGOF)
Zambia  Krypticus Patrick Nshindano and Muloongo Simuzingili, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR)
Zimbabwe  Memory Kadau and Thulani Mswelanto, Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition
Project Managers

Management Systems International, Inc.
Allison Poyac-Clarkin
Alex Nejadian

The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law
Catherine Shea
Jennifer Stuart
Marilyn Wyatt

Editorial Committee

USAID: Mariam Afrasiabi, Kellie Burk, Tess Mcenery, and Sajda Ouachtouki
MSI: Allison Poyac-Clarkin
ICNL: Stephan Klingelhofer, Catherine Shea, and Marilyn Wyatt
Regional Experts: Joseph Sany and Monica Koep
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

For the seventh year in a row, the 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa offers a snapshot of seven key dimensions affecting the sustainability of CSO sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa. This year’s Index includes six new countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Madagascar, Namibia, and Niger, bringing to thirty the total number of countries covered1.

For the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa included in this volume, the year 2015 had notable highs and lows. Among the bright spots was the victory over the lethal Ebola epidemic. CSO staff and volunteers in Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone showed resilience and courage as they worked as respected partners alongside communities, governments, and international agencies to battle the disease. In Guinea local associations established village and neighborhood Ebola watch committees, while in Liberia CSOs helped the government ensure that a strong new surveillance and response system was put into place. Sierra Leonian CSOs continued several important initiatives to assist women and youth affected by the disease. However, the large influx of donor funds for Ebola-related efforts—amounting to US$1.62 billion by the end of 2015, according to the World Bank—introduced its own challenges. Not only did the fight against Ebola divert money and attention from other urgent needs, forcing some organizations to suspend their activities, but the management of Ebola-related funding itself aroused public concerns, especially in Sierra Leone, where the auditor general identified a number of irregularities in the conduct of both public authorities and donor agencies.

Among the countries holding local or national elections in 2015 were Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, Madagascar, Namibia, Nigeria, Tanzania, and Zambia. CSOs often performed key roles in the election process. For example, in Nigeria CSOs educated communities about the electoral process and the use of readers to authenticate voter cards; in Madagascar CSOs engaged in information campaigns, trainings, and monitoring; and in Tanzania they helped ensure that voting stations had ballots available in Braille or special queues for people with disabilities. However, some CSOs encountered state-sponsored barriers to their election-related activities. For example, in Ethiopia, where the ruling party won 100 percent of the vote, most CSOs were prohibited from engaging in voter education and election monitoring. Tensions over elections ran particularly high in Burundi, where the president’s decision to run for a third term, in apparent violation of the constitution, led to mass demonstrations that resulted in violence and even deaths.

Constitutional reform efforts were also on many countries’ agendas during 2015. Some of these undertakings reinforced democratic structures and processes. For example, the Liberian Constitutional Review Committee conducted consultations with a broad range of stakeholders to gather and consider their views. CSOs engaged

---

1 A report for South Sudan was not filed this year because of the deteriorating security situation in that country.
extensively in the constitutional review process in Sierra Leone, where they submitted more than eighty position papers to the reform committee and educating the public about key issues, and in Benin, where they contributed to a successful effort to prevent the acting president from changing the constitution so that he could remain in power. In other countries, however, constitutional reform concentrated power in the hands of those already in office. Voters in Rwanda overwhelmingly approved an amendment allowing the country’s long-serving president to seek a third term in a referendum that many observers considered neither free nor transparent, and in Sudan the government amended the constitution to expand the authorities of the president, intelligence and security service, and police. In Uganda the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2015 did not include CSOs’ demand to restore presidential term limits, while in Tanzania the government indefinitely postponed a referendum on a controversial draft constitution that included provisions for the separation of powers and greater accountability from elected officials.

A number of countries covered in this year’s Index marked important political and economic gains in 2015. For example, Ethiopia continued to make strides in reducing poverty and child mortality, Botswana achieved a primary school enrollment of 90 percent, and Côte d’Ivoire maintained an average annual GDP growth rate of 8.3 percent. While CSOs have played an important role in these achievements, severe economic decline continued to impose suffering on many populations throughout the region, making the work of CSOs both more vital and more difficult. The global financial crisis that began in 2008 continued to have serious repercussions, and many local currencies experienced steep drops in value, increasing the cost of living and impoverishing communities and organizations. Angolans and Nigerians felt a severe economic pinch as the plunging price of oil strained their oil-export-based economies. Unemployment was high in Ethiopia, and eighty-three of every one hundred young people were without jobs in Uganda. Also contributing to economic distress was widespread food scarcity produced by two years of drought in Zimbabwe and an influx of refugees and migrants in Sudan. Meanwhile, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia struggled to overcome the devastating economic and social impact of the tragic Ebola epidemic. In all of these countries CSOs worked with governments or international partners to deliver essential services to people in need.

Escalating political strife, including violent protests and terrorist attacks, also marked the year 2015 in several countries. Terrorists killed 128 students at Garissa University in northeastern Kenya, and Boko Haram insurgents continued to inflict suffering on villagers in Nigeria. In Sudan armed conflict intensified in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, while in Mali the threat of violent extremism appeared to increase. These and other tensions across the region produced serious strains in the political environment and often impeded the work of both advocacy and service-providing CSOs. Many CSO workers showed great resilience and courage in meeting the needs and defending the rights of target populations despite diverse threats and dangers associated with their work.

Within this dynamic environment, CSO sustainability remained fairly stable in 2015. Only six countries reflect changes in their overall sustainability scores, with two showing an improvement and four a decline. The improvements in Guinea and Senegal were largely the result of CSOs’ productive advocacy work with the government and other partners. Declines in overall sustainability scores had mixed causes, but in three of the four instances (Rwanda, Burundi, and Sudan) they were recorded in a context of intense political tension, which contributed to a difficult operating environment for CSOs. In Ghana a steep drop in donor grantmaking was the main cause of that country’s slide in overall sustainability.

As in previous years, funding was still the most serious challenge facing CSOs throughout the region. Nearly all country reports note that foreign donors continued to withdraw or cut back their assistance, while local support, whether from the government, private sources, or CSOs’ own income-generating activities, was far from sufficient to fill in the gap. Only Zimbabwe reports an improvement in CSO financial sustainability in 2015, thanks largely to partnership programs with businesses and earned income from their own business activities. Despite pervasive financial challenges, however, CSOs (for example, in Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe) continued to provide vital services and adapt to new demands.

CSOs’ advocacy work in Sub-Saharan Africa continued to be impressive. CSOs in Nigeria, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mozambique report that during the year they were better able to work productively with their governments.
In other countries, such as South Africa and Mali, CSOs used well-established platforms for interacting with policy makers and representing their positions in public. But elsewhere CSO advocacy groups were intimidated or silenced by repressive legal frameworks or state-sponsored harassment. Human rights and governance organizations reported particular hostility from authorities in Sudan, Ethiopia, Rwanda, The Gambia, Angola, and Burundi.

Data about the size of CSO sectors in Sub-Saharan Africa is often incomplete. In 2015 South Africa’s sector clearly remained the largest in the region, with more than 130,000 voluntary organizations registered in 2014. Namibia’s CSO sector was perhaps the smallest, with 568 listed organizations. However, it is important to note that in many countries there are inactive or unregistered organizations that can make the actual number of operating CSOs either higher or lower than official numbers. For example, while in most countries the number of registered organizations is officially growing, during this time of economic hardship many smaller CSOs have suspended their activities, making the number of active organizations nearly impossible to ascertain.

Highlights from each dimension of CSO sustainability follow.

**Legal Environment**

As in 2014, the legal environment for many CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa was in flux in 2015. Countries participating in the Index are roughly split between the Sustainability Evolving and Sustainability Impeded categories in this dimension, and in both categories about a third of countries report worsening legal environments in 2015. The main reasons included the introduction of more stringent registration requirements and, often hand in hand with this, the government’s targeting of human rights and other advocacy organizations for harassment or repression. No country reports an improvement in the legal environment for CSOs in 2015.

Rwanda reports the most significant deterioration, because of higher hurdles for organizations seeking to gain legal personality coupled with the government’s use of mandatory re-registration requirements to impede the work of certain advocacy organizations. In Botswana amendments to the Societies Act introduced more stringent registration requirements, such as increasing the minimum number of members from two to 150. In Sudan, where CSOs face one of the most challenging legal environments in the region, changes to the constitution allowed authorities to exert more control over CSOs by suspending registration renewal requests without citing a specific cause. Senegalese CSOs were subject to a decree that allows the government to void registration if they do not submit program proposals within six months of registration; a law was passed that gave the Angolan government significant new control over CSO operations; and Tanzanian CSOs feared that new cybercrime and statistics acts would limit freedoms of expression and access to information. In 2015 in The Gambia, CSOs discovered that a draft act to govern
their operations, which they had reviewed and revised in 2010, was made into law without their knowledge and largely only duplicated the former decree, including many of its flaws. Mozambique and Sierra Leone report little change in the laws governing the sector but recorded a decline in this dimension because of increased state intrusion into their work.

While the legal environment score did not improve in any country, some countries confirmed the existence of an enabling environment in 2015. As in 2014, South African CSOs benefited from the most positive legal environment in Sub-Saharan Africa thanks to a straightforward registration process, favorable tax laws, and allowances for CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services. Joining South Africa at the top of the rankings this year were two newly included countries, Burkina Faso and Namibia, where the governments generally respect constitutional provisions guaranteeing space for civil society. In Ghana, Benin, and Liberia the legal and regulatory environment for CSOs also continued to be favorable in 2015, with fairly easy registration procedures and no instances of harassment. In Zambia, tensions between CSOs and the government abated as the implementation of the 2009 NGO Act was suspended so that both sides could discuss potential reforms.

One striking commonality throughout the region is that CSOs continue to be underserved by the legal profession. Few countries report sufficient access by CSOs to lawyers specialized in CSO law. In many countries CSOs were unable to afford to hire legal counsel and pro bono services were not available.

Organizational Capacity

The organizational capacity of CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa showed little change in 2015. CSOs’ performance in this dimension was highly varied: many reports commend CSOs’ strong relationships with constituencies while singling out poorly implemented internal structures and the rapid turnover of staff. Only Gabon and The Gambia cite improvements in this dimension in 2015, thanks to CSOs’ improved efforts at local outreach. Botswana, Rwanda, and Uganda show declines that were largely attributable to decreased donor funding, which limited contact with constituents and the retention of qualified staff. Ethiopia also reports a poorer performance in this dimension, in part because the 30/70 Directive restricted CSOs’ administrative expenses to 30 percent of their overall budgets and thus impaired their ability to effectively realize nearly all indicators under this dimension. As in previous years, internal governance remained weak at most organizations in the region and the use of strategic plans was patchy at best.

Among the countries reporting strong CSO-constituency relationships, Mozambique, Uganda, The Gambia, and Ghana stand out. Village development organizations in Mozambique built local support for their social auditing work by helping communities find their own solutions to problems. A group of Ugandan CSOs used input from more than 13,000 people to draft the Citizen’s Manifesto issued by the Uganda National NGO Forum. Gambian CSOs’ effectiveness in working with constituencies enabled them to...
mobilize local networks around an array of causes, including child protection and education for girls. CSOs in Ghana met the needs of a broad range of target groups, including young girls, vulnerable women, people with disabilities, and youth. Impressive achievements in this area were also made in Liberia, where CSOs found innovative ways to stay in touch with their beneficiaries during the Ebola epidemic, and in Zambia and Gabon, where CSOs found it easier to build constituencies by working through coalitions and networks. On the other hand, Namibian CSOs struggled to develop close relationships with local communities because of the country’s low population density and the difficulty of organizing rural populations into formal interest groups. In Botswana, too, CSOs’ involvement diminished at the community level as organizations either scaled down or ceased operations because of resource constraints.

In the face of scarce financial resources, many CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa turned to volunteers. Volunteerism levels were already high in Uganda, Tanzania, Sudan, Nigeria, Niger, Mozambique, and Burundi. In Sierra Leone a culture of volunteerism began to grow quickly as unpaid workers augment staff and help cut costs. However, Zambia reports that in a climate of economic hardship the spirit of volunteerism seemed to wane, while Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire note that volunteerism is not a common tradition in those countries. Throughout the region CSOs rarely articulated clear policies or frameworks for engaging volunteers, although in Madagascar CSOs were instrumental in the passage of a new law encouraging volunteerism in 2015.

Financial Viability

As in 2014, financial viability remained the weakest category of CSO sustainability. Twenty-three countries, or three-quarters of those surveyed, are in the Sustainability Impeded category. Of those, eight countries report financial deterioration in 2015. Altogether, more than one-half of all countries surveyed have reported a slide in financial viability since 2013. The decline has been worst in Ghana, which has recorded a significant drop in financial viability since 2009, mainly because of year-on-year decreases in funding for CSOs from international donors. In 2015 CSOs’ financial viability improved only in Zimbabwe.

Since CSOs in Sub-Saharan Africa rely overwhelmingly on donor support, all countries reporting financial difficulties in this year’s Index point to shrinking donor resources as the major cause. Throughout the region domestic funding is insufficient to fill the gap after foreign donors withdraw or cut back their support. For example, Botswana and Namibia both report that their classification as upper-middle-income countries has meant the departure of most external donors. But in Namibia, beyond small individual contributions, local financial support for CSOs is rare and government contracts for CSOs are practically nonexistent, while in Botswana, some government support is available but CSOs must access it on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis that is ultimately unsustainable. As a result, despite the relative wealth in those countries, CSOs felt debilitating financial strains in 2015.

Elsewhere, the closure or suspension of the work of individual grant-making institutions disrupted funding for CSO projects in 2015. More than eighty CSOs in Ghana were affected when the Strengthening Transparency, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR-Ghana) program completed its first phase of funding in April and stopped issuing grants for the rest of the year. Similarly, the conclusion of the Ethiopia Social Accountability Program Phase 2 (ESAP2) and the end of the first phase of funding by the Tilitonse Fund in Malawi had a devastating impact on the funding environment for CSOs in those countries.

Changes in donors’ focus, which continues to pull funds away from some or even all CSOs in some countries, was another significant factor affecting the funding environment. For example, in Uganda some donors shifted their focus to the electoral process in 2015, leaving insufficient funds for CSOs working on other issues and thus forcing them to reduce staffing and scale back activities. In Liberia the so-called Ebola effect limited funding for CSOs not engaged in activities related to the epidemic. Nigeria, Rwanda, and Tanzania report that in the place of traditional service provision, donors increasingly funded programs to develop the public’s ability to advocate for its rights, while Zimbabwe reports that donors have shifted their support to service delivery by the government, thereby reducing the funding directly available to CSOs. Also reducing funding for CSOs in Nigeria is the trend among some donor agencies to work with individual local
consultants rather than domestic organizations. Similarly in Tanzania, some international organizations implemented projects directly in local communities rather than partnering with domestic CSOs.

Limited technical capacity also hindered CSOs’ ability to tap into donor funds. In Botswana, more funding went to biomedical interventions, for example, and less was available for community mobilization and social change, the areas in which Botswana CSOs are most active. Namibia reports that CSOs struggled to meet donors’ growing insistence on extensive project proposals, including risk analysis and monitoring and evaluation plans.

Fortunately, new sources of funding were launched in several countries in 2015. In South Africa, a $25-million fund was established jointly by the Open Society Foundation, Ford Foundation, and Atlantic Philanthropies to advance constitutionalism and enhance the capacity of grantee organizations. In Zimbabwe, the new multi-donor Transparency, Responsiveness, Accountability, and Citizen Engagement (TRACE) mechanism provides important new funds for organizations working in media, elections, gender, access to justice, natural resource exploitation, and the creation of coalitions on public-interest issues. In Mozambique, the Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC) Foundation will support projects in democratization and social justice. In some countries there were encouraging signs that local philanthropy was starting to take root, especially in the corporate sector. For example, in Uganda, a number of corporate institutions have begun corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs that benefit CSOs, and in Tanzania, corporate and individual foundations and trusts are beginning to fund CSOs. Benin also reports that there are a number of corporate foundations, which in 2015 largely gave funds directly to communities.

Advocacy

As in previous years, Sub-Saharan African CSOs achieved an impressive record of advocacy in 2015. Fourteen countries report improvements in the area, far more than for any other dimension. Only four countries record declines in this dimension in 2015.

In a few countries—Nigeria, Mozambique, Côte d’Ivoire, Kenya, and Sierra Leone, for example—CSOs engaged more effectively with their governments during the year. Some of the most impressive advocacy efforts occurred when CSOs succeeded despite legal impediments or government hostility. For example, more than 250 Sudanese organizations came together to hold a nationwide consultation to identify priority areas for discussion with the government and then present a joint statement at a meeting of a parliamentary committee. Zimbabwean CSOs sought consciously to change their advocacy approach from confrontation to dialogue and create neutral, non-partisan spaces in which to engage with government agencies. Even Ethiopian human rights and democracy CSOs, which operate under the most restrictive conditions of countries surveyed, carried out advocacy activities related to access to justice and investigated alleged human rights violations in some parts of the country.
Other notable advocacy successes took place in Guinea, where CSOs played a pivotal role in resolving the political crisis related to the presidential elections, and in Angola, where CSOs hosted the first-ever conference on The Right to Truth and Collective Memory as Human Rights in Building the Democratic Rule of Law, which called on public officials to look at CSOs as contributing to building a just and democratic society. Senegalese organizations participated in the design of the national strategy for social protection, and Kenyan CSOs scored an important advocacy gain when a court ruled in favor of their claim that the management of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF) by members of parliament was illegal.

Two major themes of advocacy efforts throughout the region deserve to be singled out for mention: the rights of women and of the disabled. In these areas CSOs’ achievements were truly exceptional. Despite a tense political atmosphere in The Gambia, CSOs were able to push the government into declaring a countrywide ban on female genital mutilation. South African CSOs persuaded the government to set targets of 2 percent for the employment of disabled people in all government departments and 50 percent for women in senior management. Sudanese CSOs launched a successful campaign to enforce the right of blind law graduates to be employed by the Ministry of Justice. In a significant victory, the Coalition to End Maternal Mortality in Uganda successfully challenged the refusal of the Constitutional Court to hear cases about maternal healthcare. Angola’s Forum of Women Journalists partnered with the Ministry of Family and Women Promotion and Ministry of Social Communication to introduce an SOS system for reporting acts of violence, especially against women; the Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe pressured the government to constitute the Gender Commission and engaged in high-profile lobbying and advocacy at the local and regional levels; and Zambia’s Women’s Lobby worked with the Ministry of Gender on women’s participation in government decision-making processes. In Tanzania, a task force of people with disabilities developed a position paper outlining their needs during the act of voting, which helped ensure that voting stations had ballots available in Braille or special queues for people with disabilities.

Among the four countries recording declines in advocacy in 2015, Burundi and Sudan experienced especially steep deteriorations. Sudanese CSOs suffer from a general lack of capacity because of weak advocacy skills. Increased media censorship and the growing power of the security agency further inhibited their advocacy efforts in 2015. In Burundi political instability, including an assassination threat against a key civil society activist, impeded the ability of CSOs to lead awareness campaigns, organize debates, and conduct analytical work. Rwandan human rights organizations were increasingly targeted by the government as the political space continued to shrink, with the result that CSOs were unable to agree on advocacy priorities. As CSOs in Botswana increasingly depend on the government for funding, it has become nearly impossible for them to hold the government accountable for fear of losing financial support.
Service Provision

Service provision has traditionally been the strongest area of CSO sustainability in Sub-Saharan Africa, and in 2015 this did not change. All but four countries are in the Sustainability Evolving category, and only Burundi, Botswana, and Rwanda recorded declines in this dimension in 2015. In Burundi, the ongoing unrest curtailed the activities of service-providing CSOs except those in humanitarian fields. Botswana reports that CSOs’ service delivery was compromised in part by a lack of funding and inadequate human resources. In Rwanda a decline in funding also weakened many organizations’ overall capacity to deliver services. On the other hand, service delivery improved in Zimbabwe, where CSOs increased their support to vulnerable populations in the wake of the severe drought, and in Sierra Leone, where many CSOs provided life-saving Ebola-related services and then incorporated re-defined priorities for the post-Ebola period as they resumed their normal activities.

Despite the overall stability of this dimension, new demands were made on service-providing CSOs that tested their ability to adapt. Botswana reports that CSOs had to contend with new models and technologies that could change their role in service provision. CSOs were increasingly expected to demonstrate measurable results in their work, and less funding was available for their traditional areas of expertise, such as community mobilization and social change. In Tanzania, a changing aid paradigm has shifted the focus for many CSOs from direct service provision to rights-based approaches. Rather than offer services directly, some organizations began to focus on building the capacities of local communities to press for their rights to receive services in areas such as health and education. In Nigeria, in another transition from traditional service provision, CSOs were increasingly involved in economic empowerment programs.

Few CSOs charged for their services, either because the law does not allow it, beneficiaries are too impoverished to pay for services, or fees for services cut against the grain of the local nonprofit culture. CSOs that generated income from services tended to do so in knowledge-related areas such as research, publications, training, and consulting.

Infrastructure

As in 2014, the infrastructure serving CSOs showed little change in 2015. Among countries showing improvement, there was no obvious common denominator. Guinean organizations were able to develop new, integrated partnerships with government ministries; Senegalese CSOs benefitted from enhanced training opportunities; and Ugandan CSOs enjoyed access to new resource centers and more information sharing online. Neither does a clear cause come to the forefront among countries showing a decline in this dimension. In Sudan, a lack of resources, the worsening legal environment, and donors’ reluctance to support institutional capacity building contributed to weakening the CSO infrastructure. Malawian CSOs suffered
Several countries report on the increased importance of network and umbrella organizations in 2015. Ugandan CSOs increasingly viewed coalitions as critical to civil society’s ability to play an advocacy role and sought to enhance cooperation within the sector. Zimbabwean coalitions helped members struggling to attract funding by training them on fundraising strategies, internal administrative systems, and rebranding. Zambian CSOs found that working through coalitions and networks made it easier to build constituencies and have impact on the ground.

But in other countries the situation with networks and coalitions is more problematic. Botswana reports that while more than 87 percent of CSOs are affiliated with national umbrella or network organizations, staffing and funding shortages have weakened their ability to support affiliates. In Sudan the most effective CSO coalitions cease to operate soon after their goals are achieved, while networks that hang on are weakened by competition among members for resources and visibility. Rwandan networks too often operate as organizations that are separate from their members, which weakens their effectiveness. In Namibia few network organizations exist because a pervasive sense of competition for donor funding limits collaboration among CSOs. In Ethiopia network organizations that receive foreign funds are legally prevented from working on advocacy issues or lobbying.

A number of countries report that partnerships between CSOs and the private sector are slowly but steadily emerging. The private sector in The Gambia recognizes the need for partnerships with CSOs and in 2015 engaged in discussions about strengthening and formalizing their relationship. Mozambican CSOs also cooperated more effectively with the private sector during the year—for example, by joining forces with two business associations to ensure that civil society and the private sector can comment earlier on draft legislation. In Botswana CSOs began to form strategic partnerships with businesses, while in Tanzania CSOs and business groups discussed opportunities for implementing the country’s Sustainable Development Goals.

Public Image

The public image of CSO sectors in many countries was in a state of flux in 2015. Nine countries report new scores in this dimension. In Mozambique, Guinea, Gabon, Uganda, and Ethiopia, CSOs’ public image improved, thanks in part to their effective rebuttal of false allegations about the sector (Uganda), increased media coverage (Mozambique and Gabon), their invaluable contributions to the fight against Ebola (Guinea), and their efforts to improve ties with the media (Ethiopia). However, deteriorations in CSOs’ public image were evident in Rwanda, Malawi, Sudan, and particularly Burundi. In Rwanda the government tarnished the reputations of organizations that did not support its stance on constitutional reforms; in Malawi CSOs struggled to convey positive messages about their work; in Sudan the public was influenced by the
government’s negative statements about CSOs; and in Burundi the closing of independent media outlets deprived CSOs of a means to counter the government’s attitudes and pronouncements towards their human rights work.

As is clear from these examples, throughout the region the public image of CSOs was affected by a unique interplay of factors, including the structure of media ownership and the tenor of government statements about CSOs’ work. Generally speaking, service-providing CSOs working in partnership with the government or in close contact with local communities had a more positive public image in 2015 than advocacy organizations, particularly those working on human rights, which often operate at a distance from people’s day-to-day lives and can be targets of government criticism. Such was the case in, for example, Ghana, Rwanda, Zimbabwe, Sudan, and Sierra Leone. Reports in this year’s Index also suggest that independent media—for example, in Angola, Mozambique, and Gabon—tended to offer more or better coverage than state-controlled media. Many CSOs report that their coverage improved if they were able to offer capacity-building training to journalists (as in The Gambia), develop personal ties with journalists (as in South Africa), or budget for paid ads (as in Sierra Leone). The private sector’s view of CSOs was varied in 2015 but tended to range from positive to indifferent.

Accountability measures remained mostly undeveloped in the countries surveyed in this year’s Index. Only Ethiopia reports major progress in this area during the year, with the sector’s re-adoption of the Code of Conduct for Charities and Societies in Ethiopia and the registration of the Code Observance Panel, which will promote public awareness of the code and take measures when it is violated by signatory CSOs. Elsewhere the use of sector-wide codes has not proved particularly successful. For example, South Africa reports that while some organizations have their own codes of conducts and police them internally, the use of broader sector-wide codes is rare. In Botswana, CSOs adopted a code of conduct in 2001 but its implementation has stumbled because oversight responsibility for monitoring it has never been clearly defined. The Sierra Leone Association of NGOs (SLANGO), which sponsors a code of ethics that member organizations must sign on to, lacks the capacity to monitor their compliance with the code. Mozambican CSOs adopted a sector-wide code of ethics in 2014, but by 2015 only 5 percent of organizations had signed on. In Nigeria and Sudan efforts to implement sector-wide codes of ethics have failed for various reasons, among them CSOs’ desire to avoid feeling controlled, personality issues, and the intermittent nature of such attempts. Most other countries report that the majority of CSOs lack codes of ethics altogether or, if they have adopted them, often fail to adhere to them.

Conclusion

The 2015 CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa reflects a complex, rapidly changing region, where CSOs make vital contributions in areas such as advocacy and service provision but face daunting hurdles,
especially in their financial viability and relations with non-supportive or hostile governments. Thousands of devoted employees, volunteers, funders, community members, and other supporters of civil society allow the CSO sector to maintain a leadership role in realizing prospects for change and development in the region. We hope this Index provides a useful record of the achievements and challenges of the CSO sector in 2015 and provides some reference points for its development in the years to come.
### 2015 CSO Sustainability Index

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The year 2015 introduced fresh economic difficulties into all aspects of life in Angola. Global reductions in the price of oil and poor productivity in other sectors of the economy continued to increase the country's dependency on imports. As a result, the cost of living in Luanda rose more than 12 percent during the year, according to the National Statistics Institute. In the face of widespread scarcity, CSOs turned to emergency service provision to help meet the basic needs of Angolan citizens.

Some incidents suggested a worsening human rights situation in Angola in 2015. In April efforts by security forces to arrest the leader of the Seventh Day in the Light of the World sect on unknown charges resulted in the deaths of eight policemen and, according to the main opposition party, as many as 1,080 sect members.

June seventeen young Angolans taking part in a discussion of nonviolent protest were arrested on charges of plotting a rebellion. Demonstrations mostly in Luanda called for greater freedom of expression, and the European Parliament adopted a resolution denouncing the arrest of the activists. In addition, a prominent journalist was sentenced to prison for defamation of government officials, and other journalists and activists were imprisoned, detained, or questioned. In a speech to the National Assembly the minister of justice and human rights stated that the human rights situation in Angola "is not bad as they would have us believe." Referring to a restrictive new law on CSOs that went into effect in 2015, the minister defended the regulation of national and foreign CSOs, claiming that CSOs’ activities are often contrary to the purposes for which they obtained legal status.

No up-to-date information is available about the number of CSOs operating in Angola. In 2014 228 domestic and 73 international CSOs, or a total of 301 organizations, were reported as registered by the minister of justice and human rights. The accuracy of this number cannot be verified. Many observers believe the actual number of active organizations is a fraction of this total.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.2**

In March 2015 the government issued a new law to govern CSOs, Presidential Decree No. 74/15 on the Regulation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). The decree introduced significant new constrictions on the operations of CSOs in Angola. The Technical Unit for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (UTCAH) under the Ministry of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation (MINARS), which had been the main government body monitoring and supervising CSOs, was renamed the Institute of Promotion and Coordination of Aid Communities (IPROCAC) and given significant new powers to define priority areas for CSO interventions, guide their programs, supervise their operations, and restrict their access to funding. During the year IPROCAC introduced regulations requiring CSOs to update their registrations under penalty of suspension of their activities or even closure. The consensus among CSOs was that the new law contradicts Law 6/12 on Private Associations, the new General Labor Law, and the constitution itself. Moreover, the decree makes the registration process even more bureaucratic than before, since CSOs must now register with the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights and the Ministry of External Affairs as well as IPROCAC.

CSOs felt increasingly intimidated in 2015. After a prominent activist was sentenced to six years in prison for trying to organize a protest against human rights violations and a prominent attorney was arrested for planning a peaceful demonstration against corruption, CSOs refrained from expressing their opinions freely or taking part in public events. There was widespread concern that many organizations were at risk of having their activities frozen by the authorities. The authorities turned down almost every request for permission to organize a public gathering—for example, by the Cacuaco Network, which wished to host a forum on the civil registry—by casting it as an intention to commit acts of vandalism or attack public institutions. CSOs experienced other forms of harassment as well. The headquarters of the human rights group Omunga were attacked twice during the year, and materials and equipment were stolen in what many observers suspect was an effort to stop the group’s activities. The bank account of SOS Habitat was cancelled after many years of operation in Angola, and this incident was similarly viewed as an effort to hamper the organization’s work on land expropriation, forced demolitions, and evictions.
CSOs are not permitted to obtain income from providing services or selling products. To compete for government contracts or receive government grants, CSOs must have public-utility status, which, according to Law No. 14/91 on Associations, confers recognition that they “aim to work with the Administration on the realization of tasks of the State, especially in the context of community development.” Public-utility status is generally difficult to achieve, not so much because of the legal requirements as because connections with the ruling party are expected. Even with public-utility status, CSOs usually find it difficult to obtain government contracts, since the competitive tendering process is unclear and recognition of CSOs’ entitlement to compete is not uniform.

For taxation purposes CSOs must register with the General Tax Administration under the Ministry of Finance. CSOs may import only those items needed for their projects that are not already available in the country. CSOs are supposedly entitled to lower rates, grace periods, and partial payments of taxes on items acquired for project implementation. The state calculates the exemptions and then counts them as its own contribution to CSO projects. No CSOs reported receiving this benefit in 2015.

Legal support for CSOs continues to be weak. Lawyers in Angola do not work for the CSO sector, and only a few lawyers in the country are familiar with CSO law.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8

The year 2015 was very difficult for many organizations. A large number of CSOs did not have funded projects and had to lay off permanent staff. However, the lack of funding spurred some organizations to change their strategies or strengthen their internal financial and management systems to gain the confidence of donors.

CSOs’ ability to relate to constituencies is weak. The capacity of many organizations in this area worsened in 2015 as they did not have funds to pursue projects and could not afford to reach out to constituents.

Few organizations have strategic plans. This is particularly true of smaller organizations, which tend to lack the technical capacity needed to develop plans. Some larger organizations, such as the Network to Fight Against Urban Poverty of Luanda (RLCPUL), Development Workshop (DW), Alliance for the Development of the Commune of Hoji-ya-Henda (APDCH), and Angolan Association for Family Welfare (ANGOBEFA), developed strategic plans in 2015. In addition, the Council of Christian Churches in Angola (CICA) launched a new five-year strategic plan with guidelines and goals for each member church.

Internal management systems of Angolan CSOs remain weak. However, in 2015 some organizations sought to strengthen their management systems. For example, APDCH worked with an Angolan consultant to organize its strategies and elaborate a plan for new projects. Nevertheless, in practice most governing bodies do not fulfill their roles. Many organizations have only a general manager or executive and a person who deals with finances on their permanent staff and hire additional employees when funding for a project is obtained. A large number of organizations, including RLCPUL, Association to Promote the Development of Local Communities (APRODEC), and Association for the Defense of Angolan Health (ADSA), suspended their activities in 2015 because of a lack of funds, which forced staff to leave these organizations. Many organizations have volunteers who stop contributing their labor and time once they find paying jobs.

A few organizations are gradually adopting new technologies in their operations. For example, the Community Water Association, which consists of about forty groups, has begun to use mobile phones to alert municipal governments and the public water company about problems with water delivery.

However, access to the Internet remains a problem for most organizations, especially in peri-urban and rural areas.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3

In 2015 few donors remained in Angola. The European Union (EU), one of the remaining donors still active in the country, issued only one call for proposals during the year. Sixty-four organizations responded to the call and only four received funding. The funded projects focused mostly on capacity building for local administrative staff and citizens councils (CACS), which engage local communities in the democratic process. This focus is typical of most projects funded by donors, which are no longer as interested in service provision, the mission of most organizations.

Because of the shortage of funds, some organizations, such as the recently created Union of Local Associations of Angola (AMANGOLA), have sought to acquire public-utility status to qualify for funding from the national budget. Normally such funding is available only for projects that deal with emergency situations, and support for advocacy projects is difficult to obtain. CSOs are not allowed to earn income from charging for services or selling products, and their fundraising efforts are not significant. Membership organizations were largely unable to collect dues from their members during the year.

The financial systems of most organizations remain weak. Among the few exceptions are some so-called traditional organizations, or prominent CSOs such as DW, Omunga, and Action for Rural Development and the Environment (ADRA) that were founded with accountability practices and an internal participatory culture already in place. Organizations rarely share financial reports with their members or the public. In 2015 a few CSOs adopted better transparency practices. For example, the Association of Women Journalists presented its financial report to workers and associates for the first time.

ADVOCACY: 5.5

In Angola some consultations and coordination take place between government authorities and the communities they govern, including CSOs. Most of these consultations take place on the local level. For example, in July 2015 in the municipality of Andulo, Bié province, the CACS discussed the socio-economic situation and the activities of the local administration. In September the Development Forum of the district of Kilamba Kiaxi brought together local authorities, citizens, and CSOs to discuss waste management, and the district administrator delivered the opening speech to the group. On the national level, a conference on CSOs’ promotion of women took place in June. Joining CSOs at the conference were representatives of the Ministry of the Family and the Promotion of Women (MINFAMU), Ministry of Youth and Sports, Angolan Forum of Non-Governmental Organizations (FONGA), United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and the Embassy of Norway, which supported the project financially.

IADRA, MOSAIKO, ADRA, Association for Justice, Peace, and Democracy (AJPD), and other organizations have adopted a new strategy of joint meetings to discuss the human rights situation. In April 2015 AJPD and the Association Building Communities (ACC), in partnership with the Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa (OSISA), hosted the first-ever conference on The Right to Truth and Collective Memory as Human Rights in Building the Democratic Rule of Law. The meeting’s participants concluded that disrespect for human rights and the politicization of important public institutions are impediments to national reconciliation and the full exercise of citizenship. They agreed that the fundamental freedoms of Angolan citizens guaranteed in the constitution continue to be disrespected and citizens are frequently
intimidated by claims that human rights are a threat to democracy and the country’s hard-won peace. They urged public officials not to look at CSOs, civic activists, and human rights defenders as anti-government enemies of the peace but as groups aiming to contribute to building a just and democratic society.

Other advocacy initiatives during the year included a campaign seeking the release of the seventeen young activists in detention, which was immediately suppressed by the police. Vigil campaigns were also held, but these were strictly individual initiatives and people did not attend in the names of their organizations. A few activists published their opinions on Internet sites such as Rede Angola. There was little funding available for efforts by AJPD and Hands Free to pursue their project to establish the Angolan Platform for the Welfare of the Child. However, AJPD was able to continue work on a child-protection network.

In lobbying activity in 2015, CSOs cooperated with trade unions and political parties on proposals for the new General Law of Work. CSOs were concerned that the new law benefitted employers at the expense of workers. Most CSO proposals were not taken into account in the final text of the new law.

During the year the Forum of Women Journalists and AJPD organized a meeting at which it emerged that there is a lack of knowledge about the laws affecting CSOs, including Law 6/12 on Private Associations, Presidential Decree No. 74/15, and the new regulations. Participants in the meeting agreed on a course of action to address this deficiency. SOS Habitat and the National Advice Center held a workshop in May 2015 to discuss the contradictions of the new regulations, and organizations from all eighteen provinces of the country participated. The organizations sent a letter to the president requesting that the new regulations be harmonized with Law 6/12, the General Labor Law, and the constitution. By the end of the year they had yet to receive a response to their letter.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.3**

Angolan CSOs provide much-needed services in agriculture, water, early childhood, technical and vocational training, and other areas. In 2015, because of the deteriorating financial situation, there were no new calls for proposals for the provision of basic services. Many organizations no longer provide services directly, since funding is generally more available for capacity building in lobbying, advocacy, and similar areas. For example, in 2015 the Angolan Association of Women in Law (AAMCJ), which promotes women’s and children’s rights and works to prevent discrimination in the legal system, provided legal counsel on issues of domestic violence and the registration of children in the municipality of Viana.

Organizations with ongoing projects intervene based on the needs of communities. DW, ADRA, and Poverty Network still provide services that fulfill communities’ primary needs in such areas as agriculture and water. In 2015 ADRA and Poverty Network conducted a workshop on designing projects to meet community needs.

CSOs are not permitted to obtain income from providing services or selling products.

The government does not usually recognize the important role of CSOs in service provision. There are occasionally exceptions, which are usually the result of efforts by individual local administrators. For example, the municipal authorities of Hoji-ya-Henda requested APDCH to provide capacity-building training for CACS members.
CSOs in Angola have access to few resource centers. Libraries hosted by ADRA, DW, and other organizations continued to operate in 2015. During the year the Support to Non-State Actors Program (PAANE), an EU-funded project that promotes the participation of non-state actors in governance and the fight against poverty, created a website with reports, articles, surveys, CSO mapping, and other information about and of interest to the sector.

There are no local grantmaking organizations in Angola. CSOs usually use meetings as opportunities to share information. For example, in 2015 the Political and Social Observatory Angola (OPSA) and the Center for Study and Scientific Research of the Catholic University (CEIC) organized regular meetings with CSOs to discuss Angola’s social and economic situation and ways to combine efforts to influence governmental decision making; the Angolan Network of Education for All held a meeting on the post-2015 education agenda, with twenty-nine CSOs participating; RLCPUL hosted a workshop on fighting poverty; and the National Council for Human and Fundamental Rights (CNDHF-SC) held a seminar on human rights.

Training opportunities are rare. In July 2015 the Financial Services Volunteer Corps conducted a training to help CSOs advocate for budget reform. Thirteen representatives of seven organizations took part.

In 2015 several successful partnerships took place involving CSOs and the government. For example, the Forum of Women Journalists partnered with MINFAMU and the Ministry of Social Communication to publish materials on domestic violence, which led to the introduction of an SOS system for reporting acts of violence, especially against women. In addition, the national director of the Ministry of Planning attended RLCPUL’s workshop on combatting poverty.

Partnerships between CSOs and business in Angola are almost nonexistent. The media are wary of partnering with CSOs and mostly focus on covering government events.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.5

In 2015 CSOs did not benefit from much coverage in either national or local media. Among the few CSOs to receive coverage of their activities were RLCPUL, ADRA, OPSA, and DW. Journalists generally are not well informed about CSOs and usually appear at their activities only if they know a government official will be present. However, the media are gradually learning to appreciate the important role of CSOs, and privately owned media in particular have begun to invite them to participate in radio programs and grant interviews in newspapers. Another factor helping to improve CSO-press relations is that a few former CSO employees have gone on to become journalists, which has facilitated media contacts.

Some ministerial departments and local governments have a positive perception of CSOs, but in general the government continues to view CSOs negatively. In 2015 government officials alleged that some organizations, particularly those engaging in human rights, support terrorism and money laundering. Public and business perceptions of CSOs are difficult to gauge.
Some organizations disseminate information about their activities through newsletters and websites. Other CSOs organize press conferences or community meetings or use Facebook to publicize their events.

Most organizations do not publish annual reports. Some organizations use codes of ethics that address such topics as social media use by staff.
# BENIN

**2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Benin**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving 4.2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Environment</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Capacity</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Viability</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Image</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.2

After its Marxist-Leninist revolution era (1972-1990), Benin, a country located in West Africa, returned to democratic rule in February of 1990. Since then, civil society organizations have flourished. In 2015, the Ministry for Institutional Relationships counted approximately 500 active CSOs with a total of 6,000 being registered. These CSOs operate in diverse domains including but not limited to promoting girls’ education, combatting inequalities (female genital mutilation, lack of political participation of women), promoting citizen action, building capacity of women in legal matters, and protecting the environment. Among CSOs, there are non-governmental organizations, development associations, women and youth groups, sports clubs, traditional chief associations, unions, and other professional associations.

Since 1990, economic growth in Benin never exceeded 6 percent, despite the ambitions for double-digit growth. Thus, unemployment rates remain high. In 2015, the President of Benin stated that two thirds of youth are unemployed. According to government authorities, the poverty rate increased to 40 percent in 2013 and has apparently risen since that time.
It is sometimes out of the need to have an occupation that individuals establish CSOs, which most often benefit from international partner support, rather than direct support from the central state or the communes. This compels CSOs to build their capacity and specialize in specific domains. However, observers find that some CSOs act as extensions of political parties (ruling or opposition), which compromises the credibility of politically neutral CSOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9**

In 2015, the sustainability of the legal context for CSOs is evolving. There is a legal and regulatory framework that is favorable to the registration of CSOs. In addition to the French law of July 1901 that governs CSOs and remains applicable, the Constitution of December 11, 1990 secures the freedom of expression of citizens. Nevertheless, dysfunction with administrative and judicial procedures leads to incomprehensible delays in the issuance of registrations documents, which can take more than the two months. Legally, the government cannot dissolve an association once it is registered, however, the government can restrict certain activities if they are deemed to disturb public order or threaten moral principles. Thus, CSOs are often vocal on political and economic governance issues without fear of reprisal, as long as these are not threatening to public order or morality. Nevertheless, the government can create administrative and fiscal nightmares for CSOs perceived as threatening. The government can also provide host agreements and fiscal exemptions to CSOs that it deems contributing to the public good. However, the formalities required for benefiting from those exemptions are long and complex, which often discourages CSOs.

In cases of disagreement or conflict, CSOs, especially those in large cities, solicit legal services. These services are often at a cost, but they can also be accessed on a pro bono basis. There are no lawyers, however, that specialize in CSO law.

Overall, CSOs, regardless of the nature of the activities, are present in the field and lead activities that contribute to the population’s development and increased awareness on social issues. They are registered with the prefectures or the town halls (for those CSOs who are not in Cotonou where the Ministry of Interior’s headquarters are located). Others solicit agreements with the ministries or agencies relevant to their activities, both at a national or local level.

The government requests for proposals establish criteria such as commercial registration and a tax certificate, which often excludes CSOs from the competition. Nevertheless, the government or its representatives solicit CSOs’ input on specific questions such as awareness campaigns and training. In those circumstances, the government’s conditions are more flexible because the services provided are not commercial. Otherwise, CSOs are excluded from competing on government contracts. When CSOs do become engaged in commercial activities, they pay taxes as a private company would.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.0**

In 2015, the sustainability of CSO organizational capacity was impeded. For several years, some CSOs have looked to mobilize constituencies. However, many people are afraid of inadvertently supporting the entry of CSO directors into politics and many CSOs have trouble convincing the population of their independence and integrity, hindering their ability to solidify constituencies.

CSOs are increasingly attempting to define their mission and strategic plans. However, they have not yet attained the required level of professionalism. When CSOs do have a strategic plan, they often do not implement it, either because of a lack of resources or neglect. Nonetheless, strategic planning is one of the typical capacity-building modules for CSO members. Technical and financial partners encourage CSOs to develop strategic plans and sometimes make it a condition for receiving funds.

While CSOs in Benin have management structures as laid out in their organizational texts, these structures vary significantly. For instance, the CSOs that have a Board of Directors will also have an executive team that will oversee activity implementation. On the other hand, CSOs with fewer resources prefer to have an
executive team that is elected and a general assembly comprised of its members that play the role of a board of directors. In all cases, a formal delineation between both functions can be observed. However, in practice, these structures are not necessarily efficient. At times, directors misunderstand their roles, do not conform to their organizations’ governing texts, or are not accountable to the general assembly or board of directors.

National CSOs will use full-time personnel when externally funded projects require it or when the CSO itself identifies the need and has the internal resources to pay for it. CSOs also have full-time personnel when they receive institutional support from external partners or if they are local branches of international NGOs. Other than these situations, CSOs do not look to have full-time paid personnel. It is only when they have reached a certain size, benefit from external support, or other circumstances require it, that they would look to use full-time professional services.

In all cases, CSOs are subject to national labor laws. With the exception of professional services that are provided on a pro bono basis, CSO labor is not typically documented for tax purposes. In fact, these individuals are often not declared to the social security authority and do not receive benefits that are commensurate with the diplomas they hold.

The office equipment that CSOs have is rarely replenished. It is primarily through the generosity of external partners that CSOs are able to procure this equipment. External partners donate recycled materials or finance new ones through institutional support.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.1**

In 2015, the sustainability of CSO financial viability was impeded. Indeed, national CSOs do not raise money from local sources. Project solicitations are selective as the Civil Society Organizations Supported and Strengthened (OSCAR) and Civil Society and Culture (PSCC) programs demonstrate. CSOs, especially the networks and platforms, rarely call upon volunteers or obtain non-financial support from their constituencies.

CSOs in Benin are largely dependent upon external funds, although some local philanthropic sources exist. These tend to be foundations that large corporations or banks establish, such as the MTN Foundation, Bank of Africa Foundation, Moov, and Ajavon. However, these foundations typically provide small contributions that go directly to communities, rather than to CSOs. Additionally, some directors of companies who have set up foundations have well-known political ambitions, causing the population to question the authenticity of their intentions.

Institutional support to cover CSOs’ operational costs is rare or absent. This hampers financial viability. Informal estimates by CSO experts suggest that as little as 5 percent have the required resources to be financially viable in the short term. Reaching a level of diverse funding is also hampered by a preference of international CSOs for larger CSOs and networks with demonstrated past experience.

Only a limited number of CSOs have management systems in place. Those that do have some minimal systems in place tend to be located in urban areas. Implementing and maintaining robust management systems requires financial sources which most CSOs do not have. Few CSOs carry out financial audits or publish financial reports.

A small minority of CSOs have members that pay organizational dues. CSOs also encourage philanthropic endeavors. For instance, large international organizations like the Lion’s Club, Rotary Club, or large international CSOs help local CSOs and populations by channeling the contribution of their members. At the same time, there are national CSOs that generate revenues based on their activities, notably with publications or with social mediation. One example is the Association for Combatting Racism (ALCRER), which produces a civic education manual that it sells to schools and uses the revenue to support its operations. Similarly, some CSOs have created training departments or provide other services to generate some revenue. For example, this is the case of the Platform of Civil Society Actors in Benin (PASCiB), which has a functional partnership with the Ministry of Agricultural and intervenes in different activities in that sector.
ADVOCACY: 4.0

Community council and national assembly sessions are required by law to be made public. The majority of local authorities have created CSO consultation and dialogue frameworks to promote accountability and citizen participation. At the national level, an opening for dialogue exists with certain ministries and other state institutions, but it is less frequent. Some ministries invite CSOs to participate in periodic reviews of their action plans or provide CSOs with information on their activities.

Several ministries make an effort to collaborate with CSOs. CSOs in the governance sector are involved in election monitoring, combatting corruption, budget transparency, and promoting citizen participation. Parent-teacher associations are active in the education sector. Health center management committees (COGECS) intervene in the health sector. The National Partnership for Water (PNE) and the Consultation Framework for Non-State Actors in Water and Sanitation (CANEAG) operate in the water sector. In the agricultural sector, there are also several CSOs that intervene. Synergie Paysanne is one such CSO made up of young agriculturalists. The Association of Women Lawyers (AFJ), the Network for the Integration of Women of Non-Governmental Organizations and African Associations (RIFONGA), Women in Law and Development (WILDAF), and AFA-Benin are active in the gender and family domains. Those that are most active in the governance field are ALCER, FONAC, Social Watch, and WANEP. These CSOs are often invited to validate government policy documents and also provide direct services to the public sector. They also monitor public action and denounce public procurement fraud and the mismanagement of public resources. Even if the government does not necessarily take any corrective action based on those CSO activities, they do contribute to limiting incidences of corruption and mismanagement of public resources.

Furthermore, CSOs initiate advocacy campaigns when they feel there is a need. With the support of technical and financial partners, they lobby the government and defend their positions concerning specific policies or laws in various sectors: health, agriculture, family, transportation, elections, budget transparency, and access to information. In 2015, CSOs were important players in raising awareness of legislative and communal elections. Specifically, they were active in preventing the acting president from obtaining a majority in the National Assembly and make changes to the constitution that would have allowed him to stay in power.

Other examples of advocacy initiative results include influencing the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, the implementation of the Universal Health Insurance (RAMU), vote on the law on the Digitalized Permanent Electoral List (LEPI), and vote on the anti-corruption law. The majority of campaigns on human rights have been successful. For example, through advocacy, lobbying, and a sit-in at parliament, CSOs contributed to the passing of the Persons and Family Code. There were, however, some campaigns that did not produce their intended results. For example, the parliament rejected the law on gender equity, arguing that it was anti-religious or that there were not enough educated women to implement the law.

CSOs know that an appropriate legal framework is necessary for their growth and development. That is why the European Union and the Center for the Promotion of Civil Society (CPSC) have been working for the past two years on a law that would regulate CSO activities.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1

The sustainability of CSO service delivery was considerable in 2015. CSOs provide products and services that reflect the needs and priorities of their support groups and communities. Nevertheless, some technical and financial partners impose services that do not always reflect community needs, even though CSOs themselves have a better understanding of local contexts. Poverty increases the population’s needs for basic services, placing CSOs in a position of not being able to respond adequately to community needs. In the housing, water, energy, and rural roads sectors, CSOs are barely present because of their limited financial resources. CSOs generally start with common problems that need to be solved or common interests to defend. Thus their products and services always go beyond their own members. Thus CSOs like DHPD, WANEP, and Social Watch produce publications on the state of the nation, workshop reports, thematic publications, which they distribute to other CSOs, the public and even government institutions.
Some CSOs receive payment for their products and services, for example clinics and health centers that CSOs have established. Aware of the low purchasing power of their target populations, CSOs offer products and services at below-market prices. Revenues received are usually used to cover the cost of rent and labor. In other instances, populations will provide in-kind payments, especially when it comes to infrastructure development. Overall, the majority of CSOs provide products and services at no cost to the beneficiary. This is the case with the construction of classrooms, dispensaries, maternal wards, and the provision of medicine.

The government recognizes the value and expertise of CSOs in the provision of basic social services, especially at a local level. CSOs’ construction of classrooms, maternity wards, and boreholes and their capacity-building work supports local development plans. Despite this recognition, national and local authorities do not provide many grants or service contracts to CSOs. There are some exceptions, like the government’s funding since 2008 of CSOs working to support microfinance initiatives.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.3**

In 2015, CSOs in Benin benefited from resource centers. One example is the House for Civil Society (MdSC), which was established in 2008 and offers the following services: access to information, organizational capacity building trainings, thematic studies, political dialogue support, financial support services, and consultancies in organizational strengthening. While expectations are largely satisfied, only a minority of CSOs access these services and they are largely only available in a limited number of regions. The MdSC has decentralized its services towards secondary cities: Bohicon and Parakou, in the center and north of Benin. Its 2013-2020 strategic plan aims for national coverage.

The MdSC provides paid services at standard rates that do not allow it to cover costs. Even more so, its members do not pay their dues consistently. As a result, MdSC does not provide grants to other CSOs, but does provide certain services for free such as tailored training sessions, information sessions, and proposal writing support.

CSOs often share information among each other, especially when they are in the same network. The MdSC is the main CSO that assumes the function of sharing information among CSOs. However, there is no organization or structure by which the civil society sector can communicate its collective needs. The Charter of CSOs includes the establishment of an Observatory to monitor CSO ethics but it is not in place yet.

There are several trainers who work to build the organizational capacity of CSOs. Indeed, between 2009 and 2013, the MdSC trained thirty-six trainers with the goal of increasing the organizational capacity of CSOs. The MdSC has completed trainings for 2,840 individuals during that period. Its new strategic plan emphasizes building the capacity of CSO networks and platforms. Other consultants and specialists intervene at the regional and national level with the PASCIB. The trainings are offered in the twelve provincial capitals, which promotes the participation of CSOs across the national territory. These trainings are focused on specific themes like strategic management, accounting, financial management, and business development. Trainings, however, are not typically provided in national languages.

Partnerships between CSOs and public and private sector are developed in terms of specific objectives, and CSOs are generally aware that these collaborations are necessary to optimize their interventions. For instance, CSOs have partnered with the media to combat the revision of the Constitution and to promote the adoption of an automated permanent voter list for credible elections. Furthermore, the German and Dutch bilateral development agencies have initiated a multi-actor partnership between CSOs and companies for the promotion of solar energy. In 2015, the MdSC signed a partnership agreement with the Ministry for Family and Social Protection to facilitate monitoring of Benin’s commitment to child protection by a CSO platform.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.3**

In general, CSOs benefit from media coverage at the national and local level, but often pay fees to media outlets to receive that coverage. Sometimes, the national television station (ORTB) censures CSOs. This was
the case with the CSO ALCRER, which was censored in 2013 for having denounced attempts to revise the constitution. Conversely, ORTB invites CSOs to express their opinions on current events. For instance, the Social Watch network and the association of consumers are often invited for thematic debates.

Most, but not all, media outlets make the distinction between public-service announcements and advertisements. Overall, media outlets contribute to CSOs’ good visibility and positive image among populations whose interests they support.

The private and public sector have a positive perception of CSOs. The government often invites CSOs to events that it sponsors and will attend CSO launch events. CSOs will also invite media outlets to those events. Some CSOs also have commercials and publications that reinforce their positive image. Others have pamphlets that summarize their activities and can help inform the public about their work. Most have a website and some organize televised debates on their activities.

Some CSOs have signed partnership agreements with press organizations to increase their visibility. Others do capacity building for journalists on the specific themes that they address. At times, journalists will be members of CSOs. Only CSOs that receive capacity-building grants and training such as unions, journalist associations, religious groups, or chieftaincies are more visible in the media. CSOs are increasingly using social media to enhance their visibility. RIFONGA-Benin and ALCRER have Facebook pages, for instance.

CSOs regularly publish annual reports that summarize their activities in conformity with their organizational charter.
Botswana is an upper middle-income country with a fairly well-established democratic government. In 2015 Botswana ranked 106 out of 188 countries in the United Nations (UN) Development Program’s Human Development Index, which positioned the country on the threshold of the high-development group. In recent years Botswana has made significant progress in education, health, and poverty reduction. Poverty levels have declined and primary school enrolment has exceeded 90 percent. The literacy rate has also improved. Botswana has one of the best health-care systems in Africa, with all people living within five kilometers of a health facility. Although employment remains a challenge, the government has instituted various citizen empowerment programs, including financial support schemes, skills training, and mentorship. In 2015 the African Peer Review Mechanism and Transparency International ranked Botswana among the least corrupt countries in the world.

While overall sustainability did not change, deterioration was noted in nearly all dimensions of CSO sustainability. CSOs viewed amendments to the 1972 Societies Act, under which many CSOs register, as impinging on their freedoms of association and assembly. The new act introduces more stringent
requirements for registration, along with penalties for non-compliance. In addition, several international donors that had supported CSOs left the country or reduced their funding, contributing to a decline in CSOs’ financial viability. The visibility of national domestic CSOs diminished at the community level, as organizations either scaled down or ceased operations because of resource constraints. Of all seven dimensions considered in this report, only CSOs’ infrastructure and public image remained stable in 2015.

According to the Registrar of Societies, nearly 7,200 societies were registered in Botswana in 2014. It is not known how many of these organizations are still active.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 3.8**

The constitution of Botswana provides for fundamental rights and freedoms, including freedom of association and assembly. CSOs have the options of registering under the Societies Act, the Companies Act, or by a deed of trust. It is illegal for unregistered CSOs to operate in Botswana. Registration is usually fairly easy. However, in 2015 some CSOs experienced difficulties with registration because of their proposed areas of activity. For example, Lesbians, Gays, and Bisexuals of Botswana (LeGaBiBo), an association supported by the Botswana Network on Ethics, Law, and HIV/AIDS (BONELA), was denied registration because the government considers same-sex sexual relationships immoral and impermissible, although they may not be illegal. LeGaBiBo appealed the decision and the court ruled in its favor in late 2014. In 2015 the government appealed the court’s decision, and the case was still pending at the end of the year.

In 2015 the government completed a review of the Societies Act, which it had begun the previous year. The act was amended to introduce new requirements for the registration of societies, such as having a minimum of 150 members (up from ten members). In addition, a majority of board members must be Botswana citizens, and organizations must show proof that they have premises from which to operate. The revised act sets new penalties for non-compliance, ranging from fines to de-registration, as determined on a case-by-case basis by the presiding magistrate or judge. Although the revisions were intended to improve accountability and transparency, CSOs are concerned that they pose potential barriers to registration and may infringe on their constitutional rights to free association and free assembly. In particular, community-based organizations (CBOs) and community support groups may find compliance difficult because of their lack of capacity and resources. Moreover, many people believe that the new law targets faith-based organizations (FBOs), as they are the only sub-category of civil society that the law explicitly defines. Churches have proliferated in Botswana in recent years, and some have been accused of poor governance, lack of accountability and, in isolated incidents, sexual abuse, which has led to the deportation of some priests and the denial of residency and work permits. After the revised act was implemented in 2015, a number of churches realigned their constitutions to conform with the new requirements.

CSOs in Botswana are exempt from most taxes by virtue of being not for profit. When procuring services or materials to support their projects, CSOs sometimes incur valued-added tax (VAT), which they may later reclaim.

There are no legal restrictions that prevent a CSO from engaging in income-generating activities, as long as earned income is used to advance the objectives of the organization. CSOs may bid on public contracts after registering with the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Board (PPADB). However, registration with the
board is difficult, as the PPABD does not have a category for non-profit organizations. Moreover, registration with the board requires proof of registration with the Botswana Unified Revenue Services (BURS), which does not have a policy for dealing with non-profit-making organizations and VAT.

There are very few lawyers in Botswana with the experience and expertise needed to work with CSOs. CSOs usually obtain legal services from private law firms. A few organizations, such as BONELA, Ditshwanelo, Emang Basadi, and Women Against Rape (WAR), have developed internal legal capacity and sometimes provide legal services to partner organizations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY 4.1**

The organizational capacity of Botswana CSOs deteriorated in 2015, mainly because of a decline in funding. Many organizations did not have the financial resources needed to conduct a full range of outreach activities with constituencies and service beneficiaries. For example, all national umbrella organizations and other national CSOs with countrywide operations scaled down the frequency of outreach activities, including mentorship and project supervision. Specifically, the Botswana Network for AIDS Service Organizations (BONASO) and Botswana Council of Non-Governmental Organizations (BOCONGO) were unable to conduct planned capacity-building workshops, and the Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) network modified its district-based trainings to include more than one district, with fewer CBOs attending. Because of a lack of funding and human resources in the Marang Child Care Network, only about 30 percent of district and village child-protection committees received planned training and orientations.

Some national CSOs and CBOs continued to experience governance and leadership challenges in 2015. In many cases board members were new and inexperienced and did not receive training. A critical challenge is the separation of roles and responsibilities of boards and secretariats. However, the governance and leadership of large CSOs and in particular international CSOs have remained stable.

Because of financial constraints, most organizations faced challenges in retaining qualified and experienced staff in 2015. National CSOs and CBOs are particularly affected by this trend. The lack of funding also affected CSOs’ ability to offer training to employees. At the same time, the instability of CSO staffing was cited as a barrier to accessing funding from government ministries and development partners.

With the exception of CBOs in remote areas, most organizations have Internet access and basic office equipment, including telephones and computers. Large CSOs usually have fairly well-established offices that are adequately equipped. Other CSOs find that maintaining office equipment can be a challenge.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.7**

CSOs’ financial viability deteriorated in 2015. The classification of Botswana as an upper-middle-income country has resulted in the departure of most external donors and development partners. Those that remain have scaled down their financial support, and, in some cases, changed their priorities for Botswana. Among the few donors remaining in the country, the EU and USAID continue to support CSOs. Declining funding has caused competition among CSOs to intensify.
As a result of this trend, many CSOs cut back their operations or stopped working altogether in 2015. For example, Skillshare International scaled back its support to local communities and vocational training centers. A lack of funding prompted some CSOs, such as the Africa Comprehensive HIV/AIDS Partnership (ACHAP), to expand their mandates to include program areas with a greater potential for funding.

With the departure of most donors, the Government of Botswana remains the major source of funding for CSOs. Overall, domestic funding for CSOs declined in 2015. Most organizations that continued to receive some degree of government funding were engaged in social- and health-sector issues such as HIV/AIDS, support to orphans and vulnerable children, community-based natural resource management, and sports. The government also provided funding for poverty alleviation, women and youth empowerment, social protection, and early childhood and primary education. Government funding is not available to CSOs working on human rights issues or with key populations, including lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals.

Although the National NGO Policy states the government’s intention to support CSOs financially, there is no formal mechanism for putting this intention into practice. In the absence of policy guidelines, CSOs are left to access government funding through line ministries and departments on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis that is ultimately not sustainable. ACHAP, a public-private partnership with international donors, is a principal recipient of funds from the Global Fund and channels support to four other CSOs. New initiatives such as the Environmental and Alcohol Levy Funds and the Global Fund offer limited financial support to CSOs.

Funding from domestic private donors and private-sector institutions, such as Debswana, Kgalagadi Breweries, Barclays Bank, and First National Bank, is ad hoc and usually one-off. Private funders mainly support high-profile humanitarian assistance activities that promise extensive corporate visibility. Private-sector philanthropy is not well developed and there are no clearly defined government incentives to encourage private-sector support for communities and CSOs.

CSOs generally do not have sufficient capacity for resource mobilization. In particular, CSO staff lack the skills to develop viable funding proposals.

In general, most CSOs endeavor to be accountable. Financial management systems are usually well developed at national and international CSOs but weak and inadequate at CBOs. The law requires CSOs to conduct annual financial audits and file the reports with their respective registrars. CSOs are also required to make the financial reports available to their membership.

**ADVOCACY: 3.9**

In 2015 CSOs’ advocacy efforts weakened. CSOs’ dependency on government funding made it difficult, if not impossible, for them to hold the government accountable for fear of losing government financial support. The advocacy work of some CSOs was similarly compromised by the presence of government representatives on their boards.

Overall, CSOs’ cooperation with the government remained fragmented and low key, which kept it from having a significant impact on public policy. For example, CSOs participate on planning and coordinating committees related to the government’s Vision 2036 and the latest National Development Plan. They thus have a unique opportunity to engage as strategic partners with the government and ensure their involvement in the country’s socio-economic development over the next ten to twenty years. However, CSOs have not taken advantage of this opportunity, and in the absence of a joint advocacy strategy continue to engage bilaterally with the government or development partners. Similarly, BOCONGO and the Kalahari Conservation Society
take part in the high-level Consultative Council, an advisory board to the president and the government on social, economic, and political issues. Although the council is a good platform for advocacy, CSOs also have not fully taken advantage of this opportunity to influence governmental policy and practice with regard to CSO operations. It is worth noting that CSO representation on the council is by appointment rather than self-selection by CSOs.

In 2015 some CSOs initiated strong advocacy campaigns in support of sub-populations that claimed that their rights were not fulfilled. BONELA was a strong advocate for people with different sexual orientations and won a court case against the government. Ditshwanelo has been a strong advocate for rights of the indigenous San people. Another effective voice is that of organized labor, which lobbied the government for better working conditions.

CSOs and some development partners see the NGO Council as a dysfunctional, inactive, and ineffectual platform for CSO-government dialogue. CSOs have also voiced criticism that there is no clear differentiation of mandate between the council and BOCONGO, the national CSO umbrella organization. Although BOCONGO initiated the process of establishing the council, it did not articulate its own role after the council came into existence. Some people believe that BOCONGO has now become redundant and needs to articulate a new strategic niche if it is to remain relevant.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.8**

Most Botswana CSOs work as service providers in health, social services, education, and community natural resource management. Few CSOs work on human rights and good governance. Service-providing CSOs take diverse forms, ranging from farmers’ and women’s groups, cultural associations, and professional associations to burial associations and groups that support people living with HIV/AIDS.

In 2015 CSOs’ service delivery was compromised by a lack of funding, inadequate human resources, and an inability to keep up with new technological requirements. New service-delivery models and technologies are changing the role of CSOs in service provision, and CSOs are increasingly expected to demonstrate efficiency and measurable results in their work. In addition, more funding is going to biomedical interventions to stem the HIV/AIDS epidemic and less is available for community mobilization and social change, the areas in which Botswana CSOs are most active. These new roles and expectations are prompting new partnerships and redefining CSOs’ modes of engagement. Donors increasingly prefer to work with CSOs with better technical skills over those with general skills, while CSOs with no technical skills are left mainly to focus on community and social mobilization—areas for which funding is dwindling.

CSOs strive to ensure that their services are responsive to the communities and populations that they serve, but their lack of financial, human, and technological resources hinders their use of social accountability tools that would allow communities to hold the government accountable for service delivery. Although CSOs are able to work with communities that government agencies cannot easily reach, their presence in rural and remote areas is growing less visible, mainly because the lack of funding has forced them to scale down community-based interventions. In addition, government and donor funding largely determines where CSOs’ services are offered. For example, the U.S. and Botswana governments prioritize the districts benefitting from activities of the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). CSOs and CBOs wishing to receive PEPFAR funding must move to those districts if they are not already there, and thus they usually withdraw from the districts in which they are already operating if those districts are not a priority.

Nevertheless, some CSOs have managed to strengthen their approaches to service delivery. For example, in 2015 Ditshwanelo improved its paralegal services to make them more user friendly for youth, and the
Botswana Family Welfare Association (BOFWA), in collaboration with the Ministry of Health, ensured that its sexual and reproductive health services were available to marginalized groups, such as sex workers. BONASO’s board of directors agreed to broaden its mandate to include other initiatives besides services related to HIV/AIDS.

CSOs do not engage in cost recovery for their services since they receive grants from the government and development partners to provide services free of charge.

Government ministries recognize the important role that CSOs play in expanding the scope and coverage of service delivery. Line ministries provide CSOs with funding to provide social services (especially social protection, household food security, and community-based income-generating activities), community healthcare (health education, treatment adherence, and patient follow-up), and early childhood education.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

The infrastructure for CSOs in Botswana remained stable in 2015. Currently there are no resource centers serving CSOs. Although BOCONGO offers a limited number of services to CSOs, including advocacy, networking, and (in collaboration with other organizations) training, these have been scaled down significantly because of the lack of funding. In 2015 BONASO resolved to transform itself into a “center of excellence” or resource center for CSOs working in health and particularly HIV/AIDS.

Most intermediary service organizations (ISOs) have essentially turned into sub-granting organizations and after receiving large grants from a development partner sub-grant funds to CBOs. For example, the Global Fund works with ACHAP to channel funding for HIV/AIDS programs to four implementing organizations, and USAID works with one or two ISOs to support community implementation of PEPFAR-funded programs. Skillshare International channels grants from the European Commission to community-based sustainable livelihoods projects.

More than 87 percent of CSOs in Botswana are affiliated with national umbrella or network organizations. These organizations normally focus on information sharing. Staff and funding shortages have weakened their ability to support affiliates with financial and capacity-building support, such as mentorship, and to promote collective action and coordinated positions among member organizations. The inability of these networks to work effectively has triggered the emergence of new network organizations, especially regional coalitions. For example, strong regional coalitions now exist in Maun and Chobe, and BONASO works through six regional coalitions across the country. These regional coalitions are changing the landscape for CSOs. On the one hand, many organizations have welcomed their emergence, as they are seen as offering expanded opportunities for affiliations. But on the other hand, the proliferation of so many coalitions and networks has complicated coordination among CSOs. For example, at the national level the multitude of network organizations is creating confusion over “who does what” because of overlapping activities and memberships. Moreover, networks compete against each other for members and resources, even though 50 percent of affiliated members fail to attend networks’ annual general meetings because of funding constraints. A further problem is that some organizations include the term “network” in their officially registered names even though they do not really function as umbrella or network organizations. This trend contributes to widespread confusion about the identity and purpose of network organizations.

While the government and development partners recognize CSOs’ contributions to the country’s development, they invest very little in strengthening their capacity for service delivery. However several organizations, including the CBNRM, FHI360, and Project Concern International (PCI), offered skills training and mentorship in 2015. CBNRM strengthened the capacity of CBOs involved in natural resource management, using standardized modules created with support from the Department of Wildlife and
National Parks. FHI360 supported capacity building for CSOs working on HIV/AIDS through USAID’s PEPFAR-funded Maatla project. PCI strengthened CBOs’ capacity in community development, women’s empowerment, youth employment, and income-generating activities. BONASO’s planned CSO capacity-development strategy was not implemented in 2015 because of a lack of funding.

Traditionally, CSOs have not created strategic partnerships with the government or private sector. They are important to the government and businesses largely as vehicles for service delivery—a role that ends once services are delivered. However, this relationship seems to be gradually changing. For example, CSOs are beginning to engage in strategic partnerships with Barclays Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, First National Bank of Botswana, Debswana, and MASCOM, a mobile-phone service provider, on community-based development projects targeting women and youth. These partnerships may help CSOs leverage new resources, technical assistance, and training.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.4

CSOs receive little coverage in local television, radio, and print media. When the media do cover CSOs, they tend to focus on negative events, such as accusations of financial mismanagement, poor governance, and, in some instances, court cases. Some media have provided positive coverage highlighting CSOs’ and CBOs’ achievements, such as the support CSOs provide to orphans and vulnerable children and conservation efforts of the Kalahari Conservation Society and Mokolodi Game Reserve. Media coverage of CSOs is often premised on personal relationships.

The overall public image of CSOs in Botswana is generally positive. Communities appreciate the work of CSOs while understanding that their lack of financial and technical capacity sometimes prevents efficient and effective service delivery. At the same time, the public is sometimes skeptical of CSOs, especially when there has been negative publicity, usually associated with the poor management of financial resources or a lack of accountability.

The government’s attitude towards CSOs oscillates and varies from department to department. Private-sector perceptions of CSOs are usually positive but can also be mixed, especially when there has been negative publicity in the media. When accusations against CSOs emerge, even if they are unsubstantiated, the private sector is quick to withdraw its support.

Most CSOs have underdeveloped public-relations programs, although some organizations have incorporated publicity efforts into their ongoing activities.

Botswana CSOs adopted a code of conduct in 2001. Individual organizations’ adoption and adherence to the code are voluntary and self-regulating. CSOs tend to assume that BOCONGO has oversight responsibility for monitoring implementation of the code, but BOCONGO has never assumed this role and it is still unclear whose responsibility it actually is. As part of their legal obligations, CSOs are expected to publish annual reports and present them to their membership, constituencies, and the government. The reports primarily focus on the implementation of planned activities and funding.
BURKINA FASO

The popular uprising of October 30, 2014, that led to the fall of Blaise Compaore and his 27-year old regime was an important event that characterized 2015. In November 2014, Blaise Compaore was to reach the limit of his constitutional right to be president. With his supporters, he conceived a plan to modify the constitution to remove Article 37 on the limitation of the presidential term. This initiative was established on October 21, 2014, in a volatile socio-political climate where the political opposition had support and was ready to prevent the ex-President’s assault on democratic principles. Protests and meetings took place mobilizing large crowds. On October 30, 2014, the day to vote on the constitution modification question, the crowd took over the parliament, setting it and other buildings on fire, resulting in the President’s resignation and exile.

This event was important for civil society organizations as new types of actors and new roles in the defense of human rights and democratic principles emerged. Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in 1991, the number of CSOs increased dramatically due in large part to the liberal legal framework. Since 2013, there have been 2,000 additional associations per year. Overall, traditional CSOs working on human rights and
development participated in the promotion of democracy and the rule of law and were on the front line in promoting political change in 2015. Some CSOs supported the transition government in establishing institutions such as the National Council for the Transition and the Commission for National Reconciliation and Reforms.

Compared to the regime that fell, the transition government changed its relationship with CSOs. The old regime had complex relations with CSOs defined by a favorable legal framework, rather opaque activities, and a paternalistic relationship with some CSOs who acted as mouthpieces of the government. Conversely, some government officials of the transition used CSOs to carry their slogans against the old regime. The new CSOs that emerged from this climate were in direct opposition to these traditional CSOs.

The transition in Burkina Faso was characterized by relative instability and social tension, which affected investments in the country and its economy. This in turn affected the funding available for CSOs, compromising their ability to survive. Financing for the CSO sector is already constrained by the large share of development assistance that goes to the state in the form of budgetary support and does not benefit CSOs.

In Burkina Faso, CSOs intervene in all domains. They are also represented in all regions of the country, with a particularly strong presence in the urban areas. The Ministry of Territorial Administration, Decentralization, and Domestic Security (MATDSI) in charge of citizen and associative rights set out to enumerate CSOs and create a database in 2010. That operation estimated that there were 10,000 CSOs nationwide. This effort’s success was in its simplification of the declaration procedure and the existence of reliable but partial national-level statistics for the sector. The MATDSI only has data for the CSOs registered in Ouagadougou, without being able to map those at a local level.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3**

The legal environment is favorable to CSOs. First, Article 2 of the Constitution of Burkina Faso (1991) guarantees the freedom of association, which includes the freedom to create an association and to participate freely in associative activities. Law 10/92 of December 15, 1992, and Law No. 064 – 2015/CNT of October 20, 2015, on the liberty of association reinforce Article 2 of the Constitution and provides for the creation of associations. Specifically, the first sentence of this law’s Article 4 reads: “Associations are created freely and without any administration approval.” As a result, many CSOs exist. However, to obtain legal status, the supervisory authority must recognize that CSO. During the political transition of 2015, Law 064-2015 of October 30, 2015, was adopted to modify Law 10/92, which had governed CSOs since 1992.

There are legal distinctions among associations, CSOs, and NGOs. As stated above, organizations may be created and lead activities legally without prior government approval. However, this results in a range of formal and informal organizations. For example, the Alliance for the Defense of the Homeland and the Citizen Collective of Bobo Dioulasso are CSOs but not associations given their lack of a formal registration. Nevertheless, despite the lack of legal recognition these groups played an important role in the popular uprising in 2014 and the political transition in 2015. Associations are CSOs that have obtained legal recognition from the government. NGOs are associations that have an agreement with the government, which grants them tax exemption. Law 064-2015 of October 30, 2015, did not fundamentally change these distinctions, and it outlines the following three categories: associations, NGOs, and unions.

Public financing both at the federal and local level is not broadly accessible to associations. There are specific frameworks in which public funds are granted to specialized associations, notably in the areas of education, health, and water. NGOs implement contracts with line ministries, for which they are considered as private enterprises for tax purposes. Those contracts help CSOs finance their operational expenses. The CIVICUS and Civil Society Organizations for Development Network (RESOCIDE) 2014 report on the civil society sector in Burkina Faso found that there was no formal taxation system for CSOs. No specific legal instrument governs CSO taxation, although CSOs do receive some tax exemptions in practice for certain procurements and activities.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2

The majority of CSOs in Burkina Faso have weak organizational capacity in terms of structure and functional aspects such as personnel, office space, and logistics. Some humanitarian and development CSOs, especially international ones, have stronger organizational capacity, allowing them to more consistently achieve their objectives.

There is a difference in the level of organizational capacity between NGOs and associations. While NGOs upon being established in Burkina Faso enjoy considerable resources, associations typically consist of groups of citizens united around a common objective. In general, they have few resources and rely on volunteer labor and the commitment of a small number of members. These types of organizations regularly encounter leadership crises, which lead frequently to dissolution. Most CSOs, whether or not they have formal government recognition, operate in a sporadic manner, responding to the context instead of a long-term strategic plan. Few CSOs have a stable organizational structure allowing them to function with active bodies, permanent personnel, adequate office materials, and a home office.

Governance in associations is characterized by the lack of rotation in leadership. The volunteer model privileges the role of individuals over organizational structures and functions. Therefore many CSOs depend on the individuals who have been leading the organization for a long period of time. Changes in CSO leadership have often led to the disappearance of CSOs.

Communication methods are nascent in the civil society sector in Burkina Faso. Few associations have the means to communicate effectively using tools such as the Internet or social media.

A large portion of the CSO sector in Burkina Faso is characterized by insufficient professionalization and specialization. Despite defining clear goals when a CSO is created, most CSOs find themselves pursuing financing wherever they can find it, regardless of the nature of the funding. Indeed, CSOs pursue donors’ priorities and objectives at the expense of their organizational purpose. For example, in election cycles there is considerable funding for election monitoring. As a result, CSOs who focus on unrelated issues such as children’s rights or agriculture become involved in election monitoring in order to access available funding.

In 2015, there was a polarization in the CSO sector between traditional CSOs that have existed for decades and new ones that emerged in the specific political context of 2015 surrounding the contentious elections. The popular uprising of October 2014 witnessed specific movements to occupy the public scene. These new CSOs were most often affiliated with political groups and some were leading efforts to overthrow President Blaise Compaore. New CSO coalitions were created, especially those acting in direct support of the transition. Many of these received funding for monitoring the elections without having a strategic plan.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8

Very few CSOs have systems that are financially sustainable. The majority of CSOs are therefore not financially viable. They survive from grants from international donors such as embassies and international institutions. Without those funds, CSOs would have to considerably reduce or halt their activities.

Local sources of funding are practically non-existent and are far from enough to sustain CSOs. Since 2009, CSOs have pushed for public financing to be allocated to the civil society sector. These efforts resulted in the government’s recognition during the April 2013 Annual Review of the National Strategy for Accelerated Economic Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) that it should allocate public funds to the civil society sector. However, this recognition has not yet materialized, as such a fund or policy does not exist to date.

Philanthropy is restricted and limited in Burkina Faso. In the old regime, companies would provide grants to CSOs that were de facto representatives of the government. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, which could formalize and promote corporate support to CSOs, remain nascent and are only found in the...
mining sector. Partnership between CSOs and the private sector can also present risks to the autonomy of CSOs. For example, companies provide financial support to CSOs in exchange for publicity or support for policies that the company leads (e.g., cigarette or alcohol companies).

Mechanisms to increase the financial sustainability of CSOs are rare. Few CSOs generate stable revenue from their intellectual or artistic productions, which would allow them to finance their operations. They are in effect totally dependent on international funding sources. In addition, few members of CSOs actually pay fees. CSOs who implement donor-funded programs are subject to financial audits. CSOs do not publish financial reports.

**ADVOCACY: 3.1**

There is political will to engage civil society in political decision-making processes. The Government of Burkina Faso’s partnerships with international actors have compelled it to adopt participatory practices within its structures. There is a strong legal foundation supporting civil society participation, such as the Constitution, the General Local Authorities Code, and the provisions in the SCADD.

CSOs in Burkina Faso have demonstrated their ability to respond to the needs and interests of communities through advocacy campaigns. However, this dimension still contains considerable deficiencies. Government authorities perceive CSO advocacy as a tool of the political opposition, which impacts the number of people who engage in advocacy. Another issue is the lack of knowledge of advocacy techniques by many actors within the CSO sector. Advocacy remains highly dependent on financial means, which are limited as described above. The result is that the organizations with stronger financial resources are also the ones more capable and active in leading advocacy efforts. An additional constraint is the weak connection between research institutions and advocacy groups. Due to their reliance on volunteer labor, many CSOs cannot mobilize the resources to support their advocacy initiatives with evidence-based research.

CSOs able to lead advocacy campaigns are those with sufficient operating means and planning tools. Advocacy requires financial resources for conferences, communications using media, and sometimes experts to prepare documents. There were several examples of such campaigns in 2015. The Coalition for Monitoring Elections and Transition (COSTE) held six press conferences on diverse subjects on the political transition, such as the national commission for reconciliation and reforms, the revision of the constitution, and others. In 2015, CSOs were able to come together around common interests, including the creation of CSO platforms for monitoring the political transition and elections. RESOCIDE was an initiative of some of these groupings such as COSTE and the Citizen Initiatives for Election Monitoring (ICODE). Several initiatives united over one hundred CSOs to monitor the election process. For example, through support from the National Democratic Institution, the National Endowment for Democracy, and the United States Agency for International Development, ICODE carried out an observation mission of the presidential and legislative elections on November 29, 2015. RESOCIDE also launched COSTE, which during the first months led an important advocacy campaign. Advocacy work has also improved in terms of citizen monitoring of policies developed through the Center for Citizen Monitoring of Public Policies (CDCAP), which was been promoting citizen engagement for several years.

Advocacy in a formal context produces greater results. CSOs are represented at the SCADD’s annual review, where they are allowed to express their opinions and concerns. Through this presence CSOs have gained government recognition of their need for public-sector funding, as well as the integration of CSO results into the government’s performance reports. Within this formal political process, there are pressures and mechanisms for accountability that encourage political leaders to take action.

Another advocacy initiative worth noting is the work of the Center for Democratic Governance and the Tocsin Association to promote the right to vote for Burkina Faso’s diaspora community, which began in 2012. The right to vote for the diaspora has not yet been achieved, but these groups continue to advocate for its realization. The Permanent Secretariat of Non-Government Organizations (SPONG) has advocated for a
universal health care law in 2015. Advocating for independent candidates in the municipal and legislative elections was a long campaign conducted by several CSOs, including the Burkina Movement for Human Rights (MBDHP). It mobilized different CSO actors and resulted in a new electoral law that was passed on April 7, 2015.

CSOs specializing in water and sanitation succeeded in having these issues featured in Article 18 of the new constitution, which has yet to be validated by the constitutional council. The 2009 law on gender equity was included in the electoral code of 2015 as a result of CSO advocacy. The Land Tenure Research and Action Group and women’s associations supported by traditional authorities advocated for the right of women to access and own lands.

International donors are the main funders of advocacy initiatives. Some collective movements do exist, such as SPONG, Citizen Center for the Analysis of Public Policy (CDCAP), Africa Youth Network (RAJ), and the National Council of CSOs (CNOSC) regarding the revisiting of the Freedom of Association Law (2013). In 2015, the National Council for the Transition and the interim parliament reviewed and adopted the Freedom of Association Law. The Committee on General Affairs and human rights invited CSOs to review the draft law, which reiterated demands civil society have been expressing since 2009.

The important role that CSOs played during the political transition in Burkina Faso has allowed them to have a privileged relationship with the transition authorities, which provided them with opportunities to influence decision making in 2015.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9**

Product and service delivery is a core mission of the CSO sector, especially within humanitarian and development NGOs. International humanitarian NGOs and charities also play a role in providing services to the most vulnerable populations. Conversely, CSOs working on human rights, due to insufficient resources, are not able to achieve their objectives of rights promotion and protection. Providing legal assistance to citizens is one of the essential components of CSOs’ work in Burkina Faso.

An evidence base is lacking to determine the efficiency or effectiveness of CSO service delivery to the public. However, their actions have great significance for the promotion of solidarity. In many remote areas, CSOs are the primary source of support for populations in precarious and extreme situations (famines, floods, and drought). For example, populations living in the north regularly receive basic necessities from United Nations agencies. School feeding programs, which Catholic Relief Services or the Red Cross lead in these areas, are also regularly operating.

Member organizations to SPONG are humanitarian in nature, which provide services to vulnerable people. There is also the Catholic Organization for Social Development (OCADES), which distributes food and agricultural inputs to farmers during periods of famine. Micro-credit organizations actively support revenue-generating activities for rural women. The Nahouri Development Association specialized in accompanying rural women in these activities.

CSOs have demonstrated some capacity to assist populations in adapting to the volatility of the weather and socio-economic conditions. These organizations have raised the population’s awareness on family planning and agricultural practices so that they are better able to mitigate the consequences of environmental or economic shocks. Communities are aware of and appreciate the support CSOs provide. The Red Cross is known for its early response and humanitarian aid (tents, grains, tea) in the aftermath of natural disasters. Water Aid is well regarded for its support in building latrines and bringing potable water. Community-based committees exist to manage the community’s relations with CSOs and NGOs.

Some CSOs disseminate publications such as results from workshops on the analysis of the Strategy for Accelerated Economic Growth and Sustainable Development. These publications, however, do not often generate profits for CSOs.
The government recognizes the value of CSOs in service delivery, especially at the local level. The Government of Burkina Faso gave awards to several CSOs in late 2015 for their support to communities. Many of these were to CSOs active during the transition, such as Citizen Advocates and the Red Movement.

There is some public financial support for CSO service delivery. However, contract modalities are often not appropriate. For example, these contracts are similar to those that companies may receive from the government. Revenue from these contracts is subject to taxation and is often delayed.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6**

The civil society of Burkina Faso is large with thousands of associations and NGOs unevenly distributed across the country. Three quarters of CSOs are based in the major cities of Ouagadougou and Bobo Dioulasso. NGOs are typically more present in rural areas, where they are able to provide services directly to populations.

The CSO sector is composed of more individual associations than groupings (coalitions, platforms, and cooperatives). Collective actions are rare. There are, however, a few solid networks and cooperatives, such as SPONG and the Farmer’s Confederation, which represent farmers in the agriculture and development sectors. The main effort to establish a unifying organization for CSOs has had mixed results. The National Council of CSOs (CNOSC) was established in 2010, but its representativeness remains a challenge. There have also been other National Coordination groups created in 2015, which creates confusion within the CSO sector.

Local organizations providing grants to CSOs are rare. Companies are slowly becoming involved in corporate social responsibility. When they do exist, CSR initiatives tend to be for publicity and communications purposes, with funds going directly to beneficiaries instead of through CSOs. CSR in the mining sector has become increasingly dynamic over the past two years. CSOs with the means train local CSOs in non-profit governance to improve their performance, but that expertise is limited compared to the needs.

In 2015, there was no interface among the government, CSOs, and the private sector. This type of consultative framework existed in the past with the Capacity Building Project (PARECAP) and had a significant impact on increasing the understanding of diverse actors of each other’s role in the country’s development. The African Capacity Building Fund financed this project, providing grants to African governments upon request. Burkina Faso after the first phase of PARECAP did not renew its request, and so the project has since closed.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.3**

In 2015, the public image of CSOs was mixed. CSOs were credited for ending the twenty-seven-year old regime through its efforts to end the former president’s attempt at modifying the constitution. The civil society sector in Burkina Faso came out victorious from the political crisis as the defenders of democracy. The image of CSOs as defenders of justice was reinforced when they successfully denounced the presence of old regime leaders in the transition government. CSOs received awards from the authorities and the regional organizations such as the West African Human Rights Defenders Network. However, shortly after, CSO participation in the transition government harmed their credibility and tarnished their image as impartial arbiters. The controversy over the National Transition Council’s fees was another important moment in the decline of the credibility of CSOs, which were perceived to be engaging in political affairs. The new deputies gave themselves excessive salaries. As a result, media reports and even protests forced the National Transitional Council to decrease the salary levels seen as too high by the public.

The political transition and the role that CSOs played also shed light on their important role in promoting democracy and the rule of law. As a result, more and more people are becoming involved in associative life and the establishment of local CSO committees in neighborhoods has multiplied.
The transition government had a well-defined perception of civil society, which it saw as an important political actor supporting its goals. There was a group of CSOs that offered direct and explicit support to the transition government. The government did not pay much attention to other CSOs that did not take such a partisan stance.

The private sector is rarely involved in supporting CSOs. A CSO advocacy group on corporate social responsibility in mining launched a competition, which was open to mining companies.

Self-regulation of CSOs exists in two ways. There is a code of good conduct that CSOs adopted in 2010. It serves as a moral guide for civil society action. The second mechanism is each organization’s internal regulations, which it establishes upon creation.
CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.4

The controversial electoral process that was especially violent in the capital, Bujumbura, characterized Burundi’s political climate in 2015. The elections eventually took place on July 21, 2015. The cause of the crisis was the diverging interpretations among Burundian citizens regarding the Constitution and its implications on the legality of Pierre Nkurunziza’s candidacy for a third presidential term. Opposition parties and candidates boycotted the elections. Along with some international partners, they denounced irregularities in the election process. The political climate was also marked by the resignation of the Vice President of the Constitutional Court and two commissioners of the Independent Electoral Commission (CENI), as well as declarations from the party in power’s founders opposing Nkurunziza’s candidacy. The irreconcilable disagreement over Nkurunziza’s third term hampered political dialogue considerably, despite the efforts of international partners.

Protests followed the announcement that Nkurunziza would run for a third term, which escalated into violence with the emergence of armed groups. There were fatalities among the protesters, peaceful bystanders, and the police. The President of the Burundian Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODH), a key figure in Burundi’s civil society sector, was the victim of an
assassination attempt and had to be evacuated to receive medical care. Other CSO leaders left the country fearing for their lives.

There was also a failed coup d’état attempt, which resulted in 200 Burundians seeking refuge in other countries. There was also an increasing use of fire arms against civilians and armed robberies on banks. A group of young people affiliated with the party in power calling themselves *Imbonerakure* committed violent acts with total impunity. In 2015, the legislative term ended and was replaced with a set of new institutions within a context of protest, repression, and deficient political dialogue.

In 2015, the dismantling of independent media outlets and the government’s mistrust of CSOs working in good governance and human rights also affected the civil society sector.

The new law for non-profit organizations announced in 2013 has yet to be established. In addition, the president's announcement regarding the overhaul of the legal framework for nonprofit organizations has created fears around a possible restriction of civil liberties, especially regarding the right to register and manage these organizations without interference from government authorities.

The organizational capacity and financial viability of CSOs has not changed considerably and remains a daily challenge for civil society. However, CSOs continue to offer products and services that respond to the needs of local populations. Some civil society organizations have participated in election monitoring. Others have worked in the fields of human rights protection, advocacy, and development. The number of CSOs has increased with the creation of new CSOs. In 2015 there were approximately 6,700 CSOs in Burundi, which included both formally registered and informal organizations. Overall, CSOs have maintained a positive public image, but some have been branded as serving the opposition parties. A dozen associations were suspended temporarily by the Ministry of Interior and Patriotic Education for their involvement in the April 2015 protests. Other CSOs have had their bank accounts frozen.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

The legal context for CSOs in Burundi has not changed dramatically since 2014. However, given the government’s documented interference in CSO activities, the legal environment remains constrained for CSOs. For example, the Attorney General froze the accounts of seventeen CSOs without any formal judgment. In addition, the Minister of the Interior suspended ten organizations without any legal backing for its decision.

Aside from these events, the legal context remains inadequate regarding CSO coalitions, platforms, collectives, and networks. The Law/Decree No. 1/11 of April 18, 1992, remains the main document governing CSO activities. The president has threatened to change the law considerably in such a manner that will be detrimental to CSOs. He made those statements after the failed coup d’état on May 13, 2015, as well as during his message to the nation on December 31, 2015. Since 2014, Law No. 01/31 of December 31, 2014, provides the legal framework for churches and other religious associations in Burundi.

In terms of operations, it is easy for CSOs to obtain a legal status and operate legally in less than two months, even though there is no specific legal text regarding CSO registration. Decree No. 1/11 of April 18, 1992, does not limit what activities CSOs can conduct. Each organization has its own action plan and mobilizes resources to implement it. Nevertheless, in the current climate, public debate is restricted. Some organizations...
that are active in the areas of good governance and human rights have been suspended by the Ministry of the Interior and Patriotic Education. These organizations included the Association for the Protection of Human Rights and Detained Persons (APRODH), Forum for Consciousness and Development (FOCODE), Forum for Civil Society Strengthening (FORSC), Christian Action for the Abolition of Torture (ACAT), Partners’ Synergy for Women's Rights Promotion (SPPDF), Association of Non-Active Military (AMINA), Fontaine Isoko, Word and Action for the Awakening of Consciences and Evolution of Mentalities (PARCEM), Network of Honest Citizens (RCP), Shalom House (Maison Shaloom), League Iteka, Association for Research on the Environment, Democracy, and Human Rights (AREDDHO), Biraturaba, Association of Catholic Lawyers (AJC), Teacher’s Union of Burundi (STEB), Observatory of Governmental Action (OAG), and African Public Radio Association (RPA). In fact, operational independence has been disrupted. The suspension of the above organizations constitutes a considerable interference by the Ministry of the Interior in the activities of CSOs. At the same time, this ministry continues to interfere in the affairs of political opposition parties.

Some CSO organizations have had difficulty operating within the climate of political instability, which began in April 2015. Some organizations have been harassed by state authorities. However, CSOs remain protected from being dissolved by the government. Only a decision from the Administrative Court can dissolve a CSO. However, the Ministry of the Interior and Patriotic Education and the president have expressed publicly their intent to dissolve CSOs even though any action supporting such statements would violate current laws governing CSOs. In general, CSOs fear the government’s recent tendency of making decisions unilaterally and modifying or creating laws without debate or consultation with the concerned actors.

Law No. 1/28 of December 5, 2013, governing public demonstrations remains a considerable burden on civil liberties. It requires a formal request from those organizing a public demonstration and authorization from the government, which can reject the request without a valid reason. Before this law, CSOs only needed to notify the government rather than seek their approval.

CSOs are allowed to generate revenues and publish their revenue sources, including contributions from members, donations, and fees for services. CSOs can compete to win work both at the local and national level. However, to do so they must be registered at the Ministry of Commerce. CSOs may receive grants from water and sanitation programs, in which they act as implementing agents.

CSOs pay taxes on the revenues they earn and do not benefit from tax exemptions. They must also pay payroll taxes and sales tax like any other institution.

Regarding local legal capacity, there have not been any considerable changes since 2014. There are a number of lawyers who have firms within Burundi and some provide pro bono services to CSOs. However, the majority of these are located in Bujumbura, the capital. Legal counsel remains rare in rural areas and CSOs must go to the capital to receive those services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.9**

Organizational capacity of CSOs has not changed considerably in 2015. Not all CSOs have made realizing their missions a priority. A certain number of associations with the support of personnel at the provincial and communal levels were able to mobilize support among the base populations.

In 2015, CSO efforts to develop local constituencies and implement action plans were significantly constrained by the confrontational political climate regarding the presidential elections and the violation of the Constitution and the Arusha Accords for peace and reconciliation.
Many CSOs have five-year strategic plans to guide their interventions, as well as one-year action plans. These strategic tools help CSOs raise funds from technical and financial partners. Similarly, the process of establishing a strategic plan is one that is recommended and supported by international donors as a way of establishing a sustainable partnership.

Some CSOs have management bodies and financial and administrative management tools. These tools clarify administrative and management procedures, as well as the role of organizational units and their relationships among each other and with personnel. Furthermore, these tools allow organizations to monitor and control financial flows and to produce technical and financial reports. This has also facilitated the realization of external financial audits. With support from international partners, some CSOs have been able to hire long-term personnel.

Even though it is required by law, few CSOs hold regular meetings of their boards of directors or steering committees. CSOs also do not submit required reports to the Ministry of Interior. However, CSOs with greater organizational and financial resources hold regular meetings and submit the minutes to their general assemblies and activity reports to the Ministry of Interior within the required timeframes.

As in 2014, some CSOs have succeeded in maintaining full-time qualified personnel and work spaces. However, with limited resources, few CSOs are able to recruit and retain competent and experienced personnel. Many CSOs do not practice good organizational governance practices and do not rotate their leadership. Few CSOs look to hire professional services externally. Insufficient financial resources prevent many CSOs from having stable and qualified personnel. CSOs will hire technical experts as needed if they have the resources to do so. Most CSOs use volunteers who often have other employment to be able to operate continuously.

Few organizations have sufficient financial resources to acquire and maintain modern office equipment and technology, even though that equipment would increase their efficiency. Overall, the organizational capacity of CSOs in Burundi has not improved considerably in 2015.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.1**

In 2015, the financial viability of CSOs declined. The majority of CSOs did not have financial resources allowing them to operate for more than a year without external support. As in 2014, the financial autonomy of CSOs remained precarious. The expert panel estimated that approximately 5 percent of associations have sufficient funds to support their operations year after year. CSOs do not benefit from local funding or grants from the government, with the exception of a few CSOs that have acted as implementing agents for health and agriculture projects. Local philanthropy is not a common practice in Burundi.

CSO capacity to mobilize resources has not changed considerably since 2014. The political instability beginning in April 2015 reduced the funding for many CSOs. International donors suspended their support to CSOs whose accounts had been frozen. Overall, CSOs have been affected by the decline in funding from international sources.

CSOs lack strategies to diversify funding sources and do not have personnel with experience in writing proposals. The financial management capacity of CSOs varies greatly and influences their ability to hire and retain full-time personnel. CSOs with more resources have labor contracts, job descriptions, and salary grids, while others do not. Some CSOs occasionally use professional services such as lawyers, web designers, accountants, and planners.
CSOs in the health sector have received considerable funds from international donors, such as the World Bank and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. CSOs benefiting from international support have received funds from the European Union, International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), USAID, Care International, Oxfam Novib, and embassies. The Government of Burundi does not budget for grants to CSOs. Some CSOs in the health sector received funds under the government’s results-based financing approach. However, that was an exception and not the norm. Even in that example, reimbursement to CSOs was sometimes delayed.

Poor communities expect to receive support from the government and CSOs, which are known colloquially as abagiraneza (benefactors). Given that CSOs serve the most vulnerable populations, it is rare for their beneficiaries to provide CSOs with individual or community donations.

CSOs’ resources and revenues are restricted to contributions from members, which are extremely limited. CSOs survive on the financial support from technical and financial partners both within and outside of Burundi. The global financial crisis and the country’s political instability threaten the long-term viability of CSOs. Furthermore, the amount and timing of funding is often unpredictable, which makes financial planning difficult. CSOs have not made it a priority to establish a strategy for diversifying their funding sources or to establish long-term relationships with financial partners.

Only a few CSOs have established sustainable partnerships with technical and financial partners through formal agreements, usually for one to two years. Despite its objective to support the capacity of CSOs, the European Union project on CSO capacity building (OSCAR), which ended on September 30, 2015, has not had any visible impact in the field.

CSOs may submit proposals to international donors such as the European Union. However, donor requirements are prohibitive and CSOs in general have not yet achieved the required level of professionalism to respond to international donors’ call for proposals for specialized services.

As in 2014, some CSOs have tools and systems that respond to international standards and norms for effective management. They are generally subject to external and independent audits and publish annual reports. CSOs generally promote an atmosphere of transparency, good governance, and empowerment. However, only CSOs with international partners have systematic controls.

### ADVOCACY: 4.6

Advocacy declined considerably in 2015. The instability borne from the electoral process affected the ability of CSOs to lead awareness campaigns, to organize debates and consultations, and to conduct analytical work. The overall climate has made it difficult to lead these sorts of advocacy activities. It has contributed to a growing divide between the government and some CSOs working in good governance or human rights and the independent media outlets. As a result of threats and assassination attempts in some cases, CSO leaders deeply engaged in advocacy had to flee the country. A well-known person in the protection of human rights was nearly assassinated and had to seek medical help abroad. With the closing of independent media, CSOs do not have the freedom to organize public debates on television or radio so that their messages can reach the general population.

The current climate has not disrupted CSOs working with the government on development projects in the areas of health, education, agriculture, micro-finance, environment, justice, natural resource management, and election monitoring. Advocacy campaigns on the electoral process have focused on the importance of free and open elections and the important role of CSOs in monitoring elections. While some CSOs have asked...
political parties to be transparent with their programs, there are no CSOs that specialize in advocating for specific policies.

Lobbying is not common in Burundi. This concept is not understood by many and thus it is difficult to appreciate whether groups are successful in that regard. In 2015, advocacy for legal reform did not experience any significant progress despite some pending projects, including the revision of the law on cooperatives and the drafting of a law on gender-based violence.

Existing networks and coalitions have led joint activities and awareness campaigns, such as the campaign against the rising cost of living, the campaign supporting education for all, and the “Don’t Change the Arusha Convention” campaign focusing on political handover and respect for the Constitution. More recently, a campaign to prevent President Nkurunziza from running for a third term emerged. This influenced the overall environment for advocacy as violence ensued and activists were exiled.

The government is weary of CSO advocacy. It perceives those actions as related to or the equivalent of coup d’état attempts. The majority of CSO leaders live in hiding or have fled the country.

CSO capacity in advocacy techniques and managing advocacy campaigns remains a challenge. CSOs do not have sufficient resources to monitor government decision-making processes and policies. Also, some CSO actors do not distinguish advocacy from activism. Some CSOs perceived as pro-governmental act in opposition to other CSO advocacy efforts either by contradicting them or by attacking them directly.

CSOs are well aware that a more favorable legal and regulatory environment would enhance their viability and efficiency. Since 2013, CSOs have advocated for the CSO law’s revision to provide official nonprofit status to organizations demonstrating professionalism. Specifically, if the law gave CSOs the possibility of obtaining nonprofit organization status, it would allow them to implement international or government-funded projects, which could contribute to their long-term viability.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.7**

Although the type of services that CSOs provide in Burundi did not change considerably in 2015, the political instability and crisis described above impinged on the quantity of services provided after April 2015. The exception was humanitarian services that organizations such as the Red Cross of Burundi provided to victims of the political crisis. Their services included transporting wounded people, first aid, and evacuation to hospitals.

CSOs with relatively more financial resources continued to provide services in diverse fields including health, education, family planning, combatting gender-based violence, human rights, peace and reconciliation education, social services, hygiene, environment, and good governance. In the economic field, CSOs support farmers, breeders, fishers, service providers, and artisans. Some associations provide entrepreneurship trainings or stocking/packaging of food products.

CSOs provide a wide range of services to communities in the areas of local governance, health, environmental protection, establishing local producer groups and networks, community development, and other social services. Some organizations focusing on crisis management and response played an important role in assisting victims during the protests.

CSOs provide services that respond to the needs and priorities of the population. However, the overwhelming majority of CSOs do not have the organizational and operational capacity required to adequately address community needs. Overall, within the current political crisis, there are few initiatives to involve communities in designing, implementing, and evaluating community projects. Citizens are represented
in community councils and committees. However, since April 2015, these types of community gatherings are rarely held, given the tense political and security climate that prevailed in all regions of the country.

As in 2014, CSOs manage health centers, schools, orphanages, senior-living homes, centers for the disabled, psychiatric institutions, community health insurance, and micro-finance institutions. CSOs contribute to the provision of health services and increasing school enrollment. They are especially involved in establishing policies for distributing medicines for children under the age of five and in promoting maternal health. However, CSOs are not subsidized by the government and rely on foreign funds to finance their programs.

CSO activities serve a larger population than their members. CSOs also provide services to other groups. For example, CSOs produce publications, which they distribute for free. Similarly, CSOs share studies and analyses with other CSOs, universities, and government agencies. For example, the Organization for Governmental Action (OAG) shared its publications with American universities. There is no cost recovery for publications, since they are distributed for free.

The government recognizes the important role of CSOs in providing basic services to communities in health, education and natural resource management, mainly because of its own lack of capacity to address the population's needs. In health, CSOs have contracts with the Ministry of Public Health and fight against HIV/AIDS within the framework of results-based financing. However, the government mistrusts CSOs working on governance and human rights issues.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.7**

CSO infrastructure deteriorated in 2015 largely because of the security crisis that emerged in April. Most notably, the crisis slowed down the activities of partners, some of whom have relocated their teams to neighboring countries or suspended all activities.

In 2015, international partners such as the Belgian Cooperation Agency (BTC), the Netherlands, European Union, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), and USAID supported CSOs in diverse sectors, such as health, justice, education, governance, local governance, and decentralization through different support mechanisms and agencies.

Several partners are involved in sectors such as health, justice, education, governance, local development, and decentralization through various forms of support and multiple agencies. However, as in 2014, ISOs or resource centers for CSOs are still lacking, as are community foundations able to award grants.

CSOs continue to share information with each other. Collectives, networks, and platforms exist, although they operate in an unclear legal framework and precarious security situation. Journalists are organized in a press association. The Burundian Association for Radio Broadcasters was negatively affected by the destruction of independent media outlets and the restrictions placed on the Maison de la Presse. Blogs were created to overcome these new challenges.

CSOs come together in various partnerships to address certain problems, including inter-sectoral partnerships. The closing of independent media outlets harmed the partnerships between them and CSOs. CSOs share information through coalitions (education sector), networks (e.g., network of disabled people, network of people living with HIV/AIDS, youth networks), platforms, and collectives (e.g., women's collectives and youth development collectives). There are no known existing partnerships between CSOs and the private sector.
The availability of training for CSOs has not changed considerably since 2014, although elections diverted attention and resources away from trainings. Training opportunities that were realized were offered in French, Kirundi, and Kiswahili.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.6**

The public image of CSOs suffered a significant setback in 2015. The positioning of some CSOs during the electoral process has changed the image that the government holds of CSOs. Informed citizens generally have a positive perception of CSOs, but those less informed are easily manipulated by authorities to mistrust CSOs. The government has demonstrated a suspicious and threatening attitude towards CSOs promoting human rights and denouncing the country’s poor governance and President Nkurunziza’s third mandate. Those CSOs are equated with being the instigators of the coup.

CSOs that were critical of the government were excluded from political decision-making processes. The government had a negative perception and mistrusted them. CSOs considered as pro-government have benefited from a positive image in the media either for their support of the government or their opposition to other CSOs.

Content on the National Radio and Television of Burundi is censured, which limits its ability to cover news objectively. It is unable to support CSO advocacy initiatives or denounce abuses of power under penalty of being accused of supporting the coup. Overall, freedom of expression is constrained by the suspension of independent media outlets and CSOs working in advocacy. Some independent media outlets have been blocked by the government, which accuses them of supporting the coup d’état attempts. Five private media outlets were dismantled with no indication that they would reopen in the foreseeable future.

Since April 2015, the public has been listening increasingly to international media outlets, such as Voice of America, BBC, and Radio France Internationale. It is mainly through those outlets that populations maintain an appreciation for the work of CSOs. Public opinion is against the closing of independent media outlets and citizens complain about the government’s refusal to reopen them. However, the public’s understanding of the concept of civil society tends to be limited to organizations promoting human rights and good governance.

Relations between businesses and CSOs are cautious, especially regarding public procurements. For instance, CSOs tend to speak out about irregularities in access to public procurements, particularly when businesses are awarded contracts in what some CSOs consider a biased contract award process.

The different channels that CSOs use to reach the public have been reduced with the closing of independent media outlets. CSOs use information communication technologies to share information among CSOs. CSOs have taken a specific liking to social media tools such as Twitter, WhatsApp, Facebook, and Viber. Also, many CSOs have websites that they update regularly.

CSOs have a code of ethics originally developed by the Forum for the Strengthening of Civil Society (FORSC). However, it is not widely known or implemented. Some CSOs produce and publish activity reports. CSOs benefiting from international donor support submit to internal audits (as required by their organizational by-laws) and external audits. These audits are used to improve organizational governance and reinforce their credibility vis-à-vis international donors.
CÔTE D’IVOIRE

Elections and a strong year of economic growth characterized 2015. After decades of political and security crises, Côte d’Ivoire has averaged an annual GDP growth rate of 8.3 percent since 2011. The return of the African Development Bank’s headquarters to Abidjan was a major event symbolizing the country’s return to stability. The government’s attempts to promote national reconciliation and social cohesion to heal the wounds of repeated crises were defining features of the 2015 political and social context. Notably, the National Commission for Reconciliation and Victim Compensation (CONARIV) replaced the Commission on Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation (CDVR) to establish a definitive list of victims to receive compensation.

Regarding the legal and institutional environment, Côte d’Ivoire hopes to renew its membership with the Human Rights Council in the council’s 2015 elections. Also, after its first Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2010, the Ivorian government is preparing for its second review planned for 2017. Finally, Côte d’Ivoire is the only African country to have adopted a law related to the protection of human rights defenders, which for many African countries has become an exemplary law, as it gives the country a strong legal foundation to
implement mechanisms protecting human rights defenders. However, the law’s implementing decree has yet to be issued.

Concerning political and civil rights, in March 2015, the Human Rights Commission in Geneva evaluated Côte d’Ivoire for the first time. This year, there was also the first annual report of the new National Commission for Human Rights (CNDH-CI), which was reformed in September 2015 to be in compliance with the Paris principles.

There are no reliable, up-to-date, and comprehensive data on the number of CSOs in Côte d’Ivoire, their location, and organizational structure. Most CSOs operate informally in Côte d’Ivoire. Furthermore, there is a lack of documentation of registered CSOs, the majority of which are in Abidjan or its suburbs or in other major cities such as Bouaké, Korhogo, and Daloa. There is also a lack of clear distinction between the different types of CSOs: NGOs, unions, charity organizations, service clubs, and others. A single Law on Associations (No. 60-315 of September 21, 1960) governs all of these structures. Fifty years after its adoption and enactment, this law lacks an implementing decree.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.3**

The 1960 Law on Associations (No. 60-315) continues to define the legal framework for CSOs to this day. It was written to apply to all political parties, non-governmental organizations, unions, cooperatives, clubs, and any other non-state actors, without addressing the specificities of each type of organization. Over time, political parties and unions have departed from this law’s jurisdiction. However, the law was never modified to reflect the evolving realities of national and international NGOs, to which it continues to apply.

In theory, it is easy to create an association in Côte d’Ivoire, as Article 2 of the Law on Associations states that “associations of people can form without prior authorization.” The law upholds the principle that a declaration is sufficient to create an organization. That declaration is delivered to the prefects and sub-prefects, which are under the Ministry of Interior and Security. Specifically, this principle is articulated in Article 8, paragraph 1, which states, that “the declaration is made in writing on plain paper by the organization’s founding members.” This declaration must “include the name and purpose of the association…the names, professions, and addresses of those who are responsible for its administration or management.” Paragraph 3 of the same Article 8 states that once the declaration is made, a proof of filing shall be issued.

However, in practice, the current and previous regimes have made the issuance of the proof of filing dependent on an investigation of morality (enquête de moralité) of the leaders of the association to make sure that they have the integrity necessary to lead that association. It is only then that the organization is entered into the government gazette. This procedure is not instituted or regulated by law and causes delays and hurdles in issuing the proof of filing and acceptance of the declaration documents. The result is that many associations that have requested this administrative document without having obtained it operate without being able to justify their legal existence. This is especially problematic since the government and international donors require those administrative documents as a prerequisite to entering into any type of agreement.

Regarding operations, the 1960 Law on Associations provides that CSOs and their representatives can freely conduct all activities planned in their organizational texts. Nevertheless, Article 4 states that associations are null and void if they are founded on or seek to achieve illicit goals that are contrary to “good custom.” The law does not define this concept, which the Ivorian administration uses to refuse registration to certain associations. This was the case recently with the NGO Lesbian Life Association Côte d’Ivoire (LLACI), whose objective of protecting the rights of sexual minorities was judged to be contrary to “good custom” by the administration.

Furthermore, while CSOs are generally able to express their opinions freely, some human rights defenders have reported being summoned to the Investigation Unit of the Gendarmerie or Police, as a result of public declarations they had made. Other CSOs, such as the Action for the Protection of Human Rights (PADH)
and the Ivorian Movement for Human Rights (MIDH), declared publically that their headquarters had been burglarized. These facts were reported to the police and covered in the media. However, these remain open investigations without any resolution at the time of this report. Finally, CSOs reported receiving anonymous threats in the mail. That was the case of the president of Transparency Justice, whose organization had taken some unpopular positions. Despite the adoption of Law 2014-388 of June 20, 2014, pertaining to the promotion and protection of human rights defenders, acts of aggression or intimidation towards the directors of CSOs are periodically denounced by CSOs and communicated in the press. The state has not made any official declarations condemning these acts. CSOs hope that the implementing decree of the new law will establish appropriate and efficient mechanisms to better protect human rights defenders.

In Côte d'Ivoire, there are no lawyers specializing in CSO law. Some CSOs have lawyers on staff. However, the majority of CSOs do not have access to legal representation, because they lack the financial means to pay for legal advice.

Law 60-315 of September 21, 1960, does not contain any provisions on the taxation of CSOs. CSOs in Côte d'Ivoire do not pay taxes like for-profit companies. There are no tax incentives for donations to CSOs, which could encourage local business to support CSOs.

There are no laws in Côte d'Ivoire that prevent CSOs from generating revenues from the supply of goods and services. There are neither regulations nor examples of CSOs responding to request for proposals from the decentralized collectivities or government for the provision of services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs in Côte d'Ivoire try to establish sustainable relationships with local constituencies and working relationships with local authorities. This is especially true of unions and cooperatives, which protect the rights and interests of their members.

In accordance with their statutes, most CSOs define their management structures and regularly hold general assembly and board meetings. Some national CSOs have strategic plans. Examples include the Ivorian Movement for Human Rights (MIDH), the Network of Educators in Human Rights, Democracy, and Gender (REDHG), West Africa Network for Peace (WANEP.CI), or the Group of Ivorian Human Rights Actors (RAIDH). Nevertheless, other than these and a few other organizations, CSOs operating in Côte d'Ivoire do not rely on strategic plans.

The majority of CSOs do not have boards of directors. Typically the CSO director assumes the role and responsibilities that a board would assume. Without the necessary financial resources, the overwhelming majority of CSOs do not have permanent staff.

CSOs often face difficulty in retaining qualified personnel and in hiring short-term consultants based on project needs. CSOs have begun to hire lawyers and IT experts when they benefit from international donor support requiring this expertise. CSOs rarely use pro bono legal, accounting, or IT services. In general, organizations known to benefit from this type of pro bono support will have on average one or two people providing that support. Local community members compete to be involved with CSO activities and contribute their labor as volunteers. This is the case for the community-based Organization for the Development of Women-Led Activities (ODAFEM). However, in some cases, the local populations expect financial gains from their voluntary participation. The volunteering spirit is not widespread. This is manifest in the attitudes of CSO members, who would prefer long-term, stable, and paid employment. CSOs are therefore subject to the constant mobility of their members, especially those with more experience in international organizations.

Only a handful of CSOs have the necessary resources to keep modern basic office equipment. The majority of them operate with limited financial resources and no permanent office or office equipment. All have access to a mobile phone, but because of the high price of Internet services, only a few have access to permanent Internet connections.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.1

There are few CSOs such as unions, cooperatives, and charitable NGOs that raise funds from their members or charitable individuals. Philanthropic organizations in Côte d’Ivoire exist, but provide support directly to beneficiaries and do not fund CSOs directly. For example, the Kalou Foundation has provided hemodialysis machines to the hospital in Bouaké.

The majority of CSOs depend on foreign funds coming from organizations such as the Canadian Fund for Local Initiatives (FCIL), United Nations Operations in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), National Endowment for Democracy (NED), Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and European Union. Some donors such as the European Fund for Development (FED) deal directly with the government. In fact, when the FED provides funds to the government, it recommends that it uses a portion of those funds for CSOs. While this could constitute a source of local funding for CSOs, it does not come from regular governmental budgetary allocations.

Only large CSOs, such as Association of Female Lawyers (AFJCI), Consortium of Ivorian Human Rights Actors (RAIDH), Ivorian League for Human Rights (LIDHO), and Cavoequiva, have approaches to business development and diversifying financial partners. Other CSOs tend to have one or two financial partners, and their operations are closely tied to requests for proposals. Without external financing, these CSOs are unable to pay out salaries. CSOs have stated that international partners prefer to work with CSOs that are already known. Because of trust issues, international partners require that CSOs provide a moral guarantee before project agreements are executed. This was the case with an access to information project that the APDH implemented and OSIWA funded. In this example, OSIWA required the moral approval from the Ivorian Human Rights League (LIDHO) before formally agreeing to provide financial support.

Overall, CSO financial management is deficient. Financial audits of CSOs are rarely conducted, given their cost. An audit service in Côte d’Ivoire costs at least 1.5 million FCFA or approximately $2,500. In addition, some directors who are solely responsible for overseeing the accounting have been known to mismanage funds. There are exceptional organizations like WANEP-CI, which has regular audits and reports that are made public. This positive example, however, is closely linked to the terms of reference and guidelines of international donors.

Many CSOs benefit from the trust and confidence of diverse donors, with whom they have established stable relationships based on loyalty. These CSOs are a minority, however. The majority of CSOs do not have communication plans aimed at raising awareness of donors towards their activities.

In Côte d’Ivoire, there is no law prohibiting CSOs from having income-generating activities. However, most CSOs do not have any. One rare exception is Cavoequiva, which sells gas cylinders and uses the profit to support itself. For others, income-generating activities are limited to the sale of promotional merchandise such as t-shirts, hats, pins, and bracelets that their members produce. There are also instances where CSO members sell their expertise to the government or to companies. This could be in the form of a consultancy, the production of a study, or awareness-raising services (CIDDH). The expertise that CSOs provided to the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI) in raising awareness about elections to base communities is another example.

Finally, in terms of earned income, membership fees are provided in the statutes and internal regulations of CSOs, but the actual payment of these by members is not guaranteed. Even more so, the total amounts of these contributions are insufficient for financing the recurring administrative and operating costs of CSOs.

ADVOCACY: 4.7

Communication channels exist between CSOs and government decision makers. Therefore, some CSOs and government representatives work together under diverse projects. One example is the collaboration between CSOs and the government in establishing a platform for addressing gender-based violence. This was made
specifically with the Ministry of Solidarity, Family, Woman, and Child, in the context of the elaboration of the National Development Plan (2016-2020). Also, the government consulted CSOs before its submission of the Universal Periodic Review evaluation report to the UN’s Human Rights Commission. Therefore, there is noticeable progress in CSO-government relations, as also evidenced by the frequent invitations and participation in each other’s activities (conferences, round tables, workshops). Nevertheless, there is still much progress to be seen in the relations between CSOs, the government, and the local collectivities (e.g., city and regional councils). In many instances CSO-government relationships are formed based on the requests of international development partners, which require cooperation when implementing donor-funded projects. One example of this is the public-private partnership that the contract for Debt Reduction and Development (C2D) requires under the World Bank's Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative.

Advocacy initiatives are relatively rare with a few noteworthy exceptions. The collaboration between the LIDHO, MIDH, and the Ivorian Human Rights Observatory (OIDH) to form the observatory of transitional justice is one. These organizations proposed recommendations that were taken into consideration by the Dialogue, Truth, and Reconciliation Commission. Currently, the Program for National Social Cohesion that the Ministry for Planning and Development is leading regularly consults with a CSO Working Group on Transition Initiatives. These advocacy initiatives are promising. However, due to a lack of organizational capacity, these initiatives are difficult to sustain.

Furthermore, as a result of their advocacy, CSOs have obtained representative seats in organizations regulating the press, such as the National Press Council (CNP), the High Authority for Audiovisual Communication (HACA), and other government institutions such as the CNDH-CI and the Economic and Social Council. CSOs are officially on these different councils and organizations thanks to relevant laws and decrees seeking to promote their role in conducting outreach to populations.

CSOs will also periodically create advocacy groups to get the attention of decision makers on specific situations of general interest. Within the context of electoral reforms, CSOs formed the Civil Society Coalition for Electoral Reform (COREF-CEI), which prepared and submitted legal texts and decrees with the aim of improving the legal and regulatory framework for elections. However, the actual impact of this effort was underwhelming. Other CSOs such as the Association of Christians Against Torture (ACAT) and the Ivorian Movement for Human Rights (MIDH) are actively advocating for the ratification of certain international conventions, such as the Convention Against Torture, the CEDEF, and the Maputo protocol, or other causes such as the implementation of recommendations from the Human Rights Committee on the international pact pertaining to civil and political rights.

Lobbying is rare among CSO activities in Côte d'Ivoire. CSOs lack organizational capacity to influence politics. Some CSOs also depend on political leaders for support, which can make it difficult to distinguish between political groups and CSOs.

Very few CSOs are aware of the legal and regulatory frameworks that govern CSOs, as a result there are almost no initiatives calling for their reform. Advocacy initiatives for an implementing decree on the law for human rights defenders and the modification of the Law No. 60-315 on Associations are two rare exceptions.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.7**

Several CSOs are well known for their provision of social service delivery, such as the Support Association for Self-Promotion in Urban Sanitation (ASAPSU), which provides public health services. Other organizations, such as service clubs (Rotary Club, Lion’s Club, CARITAS, and others) and associations for women or disadvantaged groups (e.g., Handicap Associations or SOS Village), also provide services that largely benefit the most vulnerable people. The services they provide are diverse, which in some instances has led to lack of CSO specialization.

CSO services are generally recognized and appreciated among populations in certain localities. For some CSOs, the services reflect the needs and priorities of local communities, especially in health, education, and
There are very few products or services other than basic social services that CSOs provide. In exceptional instances, these often include publications, workshops, and expert analyses that one CSO provides to another organization or group. In addition to the CERAP and Club UNESCO, which provide this type of service, private health clinics participate in raising awareness about vaccination campaigns, HIV/AIDS, and local diseases.

Few CSOs charge for the products and services they provide to communities. The services are free when they are done within the context of a project such as the Leadership and Initiative of Non-State Actors project (LIANE). External partners usually provide funding.

The government recognizes the value that CSOs can bring to the provision and monitoring of basic social services. Contracts and partnership agreements between the government and registered organizations to execute projects in education, health, and land tenure make this recognition formal. This recognition, however, does not allow CSOs to submit proposals to the government for projects in which they could generate a profit. The government has also given cash prizes to certain CSOs. For instance, during a national holiday, the government gave a Prize of Excellence of XOF 10 million (approximately $16,300) to the scouts for being the best youth association in Côte d'Ivoire. However, the judging process was not transparent.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.4

Resource centers have been established with the LIANE project in five regions of Côte d'Ivoire (Bouaké, Bondoukou, Korhogo, Man, and San Pedro). These centers are insufficient and far removed from rural populations. They provide support to CSOs according to their areas of competence, but they need more financial support from donors and the government to better respond to the needs of CSOs.

There are several private foundations (Orange, MTN, and others) and sponsors (SORO K, Drogba, Donwahi, Kalou, PETROCI, Fondation DJIGUI) that provide donations, but their areas of intervention, the amount of resources mobilized and distributed, and selection criteria remain confidential. There are no community-based organizations or CSOs that provide grants to other CSOs.

Information is shared among CSOs especially when they are in networks or coalitions, such as WANEP-CI, the West African Action Network on Small and Light Weapons (RASALAO-CI), or the Ivorian Human Rights Coalition (CIDDH). Smaller CSOs are more likely to develop in isolation and not to benefit from those information channels. The reality is that information is often not shared between larger CSOs either, because they tend to see each other as competitors rather than a group of actors working towards a common good.

There is no organization that is capable of strengthening the operational capacities of CSOs, with the exception of CERAP based in Abidjan. However, there are sporadic opportunities for capacity building created through donor-funded projects such as the (LIANE) project that the EU executed in 2014 with CERAP. This project strengthened the technical, institutional, and organizational capacity of 547 CSOs. CERAP has competent trainers who deliver modules on organizational and project management, conflict management, human rights, and other topics. Private organizations also facilitate management trainings but they are often too expensive for CSOs. The daily cost of a consultant is XOF 200,000 (approximately $327). More specialized trainings in strategic management are extremely rare. If available, these would be provided exclusively in Abidjan.

There are several examples of partnerships between CSOs and public entities around common goals. One example is the partnership between the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Côte d'Ivoire (EITI-CI) and the NGO Publish What You Pay, which promotes transparency in the extractive industries. Other examples include the partnership between ASAPSU and the Ministry of Health or between the NGO Côte
d'Ivoire Ecology with the government's Ecology Research Center. These examples are still limited. There are no partnerships between CSOs and companies.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

The media often covers CSO activities. Unfortunately, the press and media charge CSOs to get coverage, which is problematic given the limited budgets of CSOs. In Côte d'Ivoire, media are much more interested in activities of political parties. The way information is delivered is not fair and balanced. Media outlets are closely tied to political parties. When the news is critical to the government, it will be opposition media outlets that make sure it is publicized. The opposite is true when the news is supportive of the government.

The public wants CSOs to be neutral. The public is generally supportive of CSOs but recognizes their political affiliations. The same could be said about the political class, which generally distrusts CSOs working in the domain of human rights and good governance. The political class perceives these CSOs as instruments of the opposition parties or unions. During the time of single-party rule when the liberty of association was closely monitored, there was an example of an NGO that served as a refuge for opinion leaders only to later come out as an opposition party. The opinion leaders then became political opponents while denying their past as human rights defenders. As a result, today the government can at times perceive CSOs as community resources that they can exploit for their own political motives. The private sector has a positive perception of CSOs, which results in collaboration usually within the framework of corporate social responsibility. For example, Mobile Telecommunication Networks (MTN Global) and Atlantic Bank collaborate with the NGO SOS Villages to provide donations to orphan children.

There is currently no code of ethics for CSOs in Côte d'Ivoire. However, a project on ethics is being prepared under the National Program for Capacity Building (PPRC), which the government’s National Secretariat on Good Governance and Capacity Building (SNBG) is leading. The World Bank supports PPRC (2012-17). The expected adoption of the code being developed could contribute to giving the Ivorian CSO sector a much needed moral grounding.

Some umbrella organizations, coalitions, and networks use the media and publish annual reports. However, these reports are not widely disseminated and often remain confidential. Other than these CSO groupings, the majority of CSOs do not publish annual reports, with the exception of the end of project reports that donors typically finance. Finally, without proper financial resources and strategic plans, the majority of CSOs do not have programs or means of communication to maintain the visibility of their activities.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Côte d’Ivoire

- Legal Environment
- Public Image
- Organizational Capacity
- Infrastructure
- Financial Viability
- Service Provision
- Advocacy

Côte d’Ivoire

4.9

Sustainability

- Enhanced
- Evolving
- Impeded
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Democratic Republic of Congo

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Sustainability Impeded 5.1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Environment</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Capacity</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Viability</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Image</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.1

Between 2014 and 2015, the situation of CSOs in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has not evolved significantly in terms of the legal environment, organizational capacity, financial viability, infrastructure, service delivery, or the public image of CSOs. Nevertheless, there have been several advances in the advocacy dimension that had a positive impact on the overall status of CSO sustainability in 2015. Specifically, the National Commission for Human Rights and the Social and Economic Council were established; voting on the law on public demonstrations took place; and the senate adopted a law on freedom of information and enacted a law on the hydrocarbon regime.

The total number and composition of CSOs in DRC is difficult to determine. However, in 2015, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights reported 23,823 requests for legal status, of which 15,123 came from nonprofit organizations and public institutions and 8,700 came from religious associations. While these came from all regions of the DRC, it is likely that there were relatively more requests from Kinshasa given its proximity to the ministry. There are several organizations that operate with only a provisional registration issued by the
second directorate of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights rather than a formal recognition of their legal status.

In 2015, there were several important political, social, economic, and environmental factors that affected the CSO sector. On the political front, the public and CSOs questioned the viability of the government’s re-zoning of certain provinces, especially as it relates to the law on equalization of funds, handing over responsibilities to the districts and assigning special commissioners in the place of governors. The revision of the electoral code, which made local elections contingent on conducting a national census in January 2015, led to riots, arrests of human rights activists, and fatalities. Seven political parties were removed from the presidential majority coalition (“G7”). Distrust between the Government and the Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) increased over the disarmament and repatriation of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda. The president called for a political dialogue moderated by a representative of his majority party and the opposition and facilitated by the international community. This decision has elicited diverse reactions. Some see it as necessary to deal with the political impasse, while others see it as being inopportune.

On the socio-economic level, the erosion of purchasing power and the lack of social services for many layers of the population have not changed since 2014. This is in spite of an approximate 9 percent GDP growth. Nevertheless, there have been some positive events affecting the national economy. The airport in Goma re-opened for international flights. Congo Airways opened for business. The agribusiness park, Bukangalonzo, had its first harvest.

The decline in commodity prices during the second half of 2015, especially for copper, oil, and cobalt, had a significant impact in DRC, leading to the suspension of Glencore’s copper and cobalt production for eighteen months. This was expected to cause Glencore’s revenues to decline by 0.7 percent and the layoff of 1,000 workers. CSOs and unions joined together to negotiate with Glencore for a voluntary departure of workers on the condition of receiving an adequate severance.

Finally, in 2015, both the government and CSOs mobilized for the Paris Climate Conference (COP21) around the polluter-pays principle.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

Several noteworthy events affected the legal environment for CSOs in the DRC. In April 2015, the members of the National Commission for Human Rights were assigned. Also, the Senate voted on a public demonstrations law and it adopted an access to information law. CSOs played an active role in those reforms, which is explained further in the advocacy section.

In the DRC, Law 004/2001 of July 20, 2001, contains the main legal provisions applicable to nonprofit organizations and public interest organizations. This law encourages CSOs to register with the second Directorate of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights.

The process for obtaining legal status is cumbersome and costly. It takes longer than it should, which causes many organizations to operate with a F92, a provisional registration that is valid for six months, at the end of which the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights should make a decision as to whether to grant formal legal
status. In addition to the F92, organizations must receive the approval of the relevant line ministry and the governor. For example, in 2015 the Ministry of Planning received 392 applications for registration, of which only 260 were approved.

Obtaining legal status usually takes longer than six months for CSOs operating in the provinces. The Ministry of Justice and Human Rights based in Kinshasa must investigate the organization’s viability, and the organization bears the cost of this investigation. Since the beginning of 2015, the Second Directorate of the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights received 23,823 applications for legal status, of which 15,123 were for nonprofit organizations and public institutions and 8,700 were from religious associations. As in 2014, the Ministry of Justice and Human Rights did not approve the legal status of any organization. The ministry states this is because of its desire to ensure the viability and effectiveness of registered organizations—an explanation not accepted by many organizations.

Law 004/2001 of July 20, 2001, provides details on what must be included for a CSO to receive legal status. This includes details on the organizational structure and decision-making processes, the field of activities, the individuals with power to handle the organization’s finances, and the modalities of dissolution. Nevertheless, this law does not have implementation measures such as bylaws, regulations, and circulars from the ministries, which causes misunderstandings between CSOs and the government.

Articles 24 through 37 of the Congolese Constitution guarantee freedom of association, opinion, religion, and expression. However, government agents target CSOs working to promote human rights, democracy, transparency, and anti-corruption, as well as some media outlets. For example, a staff member of the CSO Synergy for Congo and Human Rights was arrested in Kinshasa on January 21, 2015, which was confirmed in the UN’s High Commissioner for Human Rights report of July 27, 2015. Also, a staff member of the Katanga NGO was arrested on September 29, 2015, which the Congolese Association for the Access to Justice reported on November 2, 2015.

Article 40 of Law 004/2001 states that the government should support CSOs and not interfere in CSOs’ internal management.

According to Articles 19 and 20 of Law 004/2001, a CSO can be dissolved by its members, any interested party, and the Ministry of Public Affairs in the district court for any of the following reasons: non-conformity with the law, disruption of public order, or violation of standards of good behavior. There is no evidence suggesting that any CSOs were dissolved in 2015.

There are law firms in all of the regions, which allow lawyers to engage in different localities. Some CSOs provide free legal assistance. This is the case for the Toges Noires, Lawyers without Borders, African Association for the Promotion of Human Rights (ASADHO), and Voices for the Voiceless (VSV). While these legal services can be accessed easily and rapidly in urban centers, it is not the case in rural areas.

Article 39 of Law 004/2001 provides CSOs with certain administrative and fiscal privileges. This includes tax exemptions, customs exemptions for goods related to the organization’s mission, assistance in obtaining work visas for foreigners and their families, rights to use state-owned radio equipment and frequencies, and application of simplified procedures at the Congolese Control Office (OCC) under the Ministry of Trade. The Ministry of Planning determines these privileges after an organization receives its legal status. The approval of all relevant line ministries is required for the Ministry of Planning’s granting of any administrative or financial privileges to a CSO. Neither individual nor organizational donors benefit from tax deductions.

While CSOs are not-for-profit organizations, it is common for them to be involved in revenue-generating activities such as leasing conference space, cars, or Internet service. They also provide catering services. CSOs pay taxes on this revenue, unless they have an exemption.

CSOs respond to the government’s request for proposals. The Central Coordination Bureau (BCECO) and the Republic’s Social Fund (FSRDC) call upon the expertise of CSOs that act as local implementing agents, especially on construction or rehabilitation projects for roads, health centers, or schools. In 2015, the FSRDC
contracted 171 CSOs for construction activities. Of these, 27 CSOs were Category A (large-size), 60 were Category B (medium-size), and 84 were Category C (small-size).

Although there are no legal restrictions on CSOs implementing government contracts, CSOs face difficulties in competing for such opportunities due to their lack of understanding of procurement processes and public-private partnerships.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1

CSOs work mostly with target beneficiary groups. The majority of CSOs have not established local constituencies that support their activities, even though these groups do exist like the women’s, youth, or student associations. Only religious associations have truly established constituencies thanks to their greater credibility compared to secular organizations.

National-level CSOs receiving international donor funding have strategic plans, which include a vision, mission, and activity timetables. The purpose of these is to support their achievement of project and program objectives.

However, many local organizations are unable to draft proper strategic plans or activity timetables because they lack the financial means to do so.

There are several unions registered in the DRC with the Ministry of Labor and Social Security. Among these, there are trade and independent unions. Trade unions receive 2 percent of employee salaries, while independent unions receive voluntary contributions from members. Trade unions have an executive committee whose members are elected by workers. Independent unions operate as federations at the provincial and national levels with an executive body (Executive Office), a legislative body (National Council), and a general assembly (Members’ Congress). Unions and NGOs differ regarding organizational capacity. Only the main unions have permanent personnel and clear management structures, strategic plans, annual reports, and audits. Examples of such unions include the Confederation of Congolese Unions (CSC), the National Union of Congolese Workers (OTUC), the Organization of United Congolese Workers, the Teachers’ Union of Congo (SYECO), the Doctors’ Union, and the Judges’ Union (Synamag).

Roles and responsibilities are well delineated in the organizational statutes of CSOs, as required by law. These internal structures function well in national-level CSOs, but some local organizations fail to implement them. They include the general assembly (strategic direction and adopting reports), the board of directors (delegates power to the executive office and reports to the general assembly), the oversight committee (verification of transparency and accountability), and the executive office (day-to-day management and reports to the board of directors).

In general, CSOs have difficulties in modernizing their office equipment due to insufficient financial resources. However, international donor funded programs provide an opportunity for CSOs to receive some support in this regard.

Only CSOs that receive sufficient support from international donor are able to benefit from full-time paid personnel. This includes program managers, accountants, assistants, logisticians, IT specialists, and others. These individuals receive contracts that clearly lay out their scope of work and benefits. Usually, CSOs do not hire volunteers, even though their members work without compensation at times.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6

The majority of funding for CSOs comes from external sources. Nevertheless, at the local level, CSOs work through the government’s implementing agencies such as BCECO, the FSRDC, and the National Fund for
Basic Service Provision. In these cases CSOs provide services like resurfacing rural roads, rehabilitating rural infrastructure (schools and health centers), and water and sanitation in the cities.

Overall, CSOs are not sufficiently active in establishing support groups. There is no culture of paying membership fees among CSOs. Very few receive membership fees. This type of effort is more prevalent in religious associations that have developed systems to communicate their philanthropic activities with their members. Unlike other CSOs, religious associations such as the Catholic Church, Kimbanguist Church, the Protestant Church, and the Muslim Community of Congo have support groups that can provide labor for different projects in areas like construction, basic social service delivery, and water and sanitation.

There are a few local philanthropic sources. However, they fund beneficiaries directly rather than CSOs. For example, the Bralima Foundation funds the Operation Smile campaign, which provides free treatment for children in Kinshasa or Lubumbashi who have a cleft palate. There is also the Serge Ibaka Foundation, which distributed 20,000 textbooks to ten schools in Kinshasa, and the Rachel Forrest Foundation, which donated books to a high school in Lubumbashi.

CSOs do not have diverse and numerous funding sources. Generally, they depend exclusively on external financial sources. These are embassies; international foundations such as the National Endowment for Democracy and Open Society; development agencies such as USAID, the Department for International Development (DfID), and the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA); and international CSOs. The consequence is that the majority of CSOs do not have the internal resources necessary to ensure their financial viability.

Only national-level CSOs have internal management systems and reliable accounting systems. These organizations include the National Council for Development NGOs (CNONGD), Caritas Congo, and National Center for Development and Citizen Participation (CENADEP). It is also only these organizations that succeed in producing annual reports, including financial statements, and can respond to regular audits. Donor requirements are the primary driving force behind these systems.

Some CSOs have minor revenue-generating activities that provide some support to their operations. Common examples are leasing conference rooms, vehicles, chairs, or Internet time. These are far from being sufficient for supporting operations.

**ADVOCACY: 4.2**

Advocacy actions and initiatives by CSOs notably increased in 2015. At the national and provincial level in the DRC, there are many collaboration frameworks between the government and CSOs. There is the CSO consultation framework, about twenty thematic groups that the government established (e.g., economic governance or security sector reform), the Economic and Social Council, the Executive Committee for the Extractive Industries Extraction Initiative, the Kimberley Process on blood diamonds, the National Commission for Human Rights, and the National Independent Electoral Commission.

Increasingly, the Congolese government works with CSOs in developing national policy, especially through budget conferences and extractive-industry policy review (e.g., hydrocarbons, mining code, and agriculture). More recently, the government, CSOs, and the private sector also work together on the Inga Facilitation Committee, which addresses questions related to the construction of the Inga 3 dam. The government
engages CSOs on the evaluation of achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and now the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

CSOs participate in the government-led reform of the security and justice sectors and the civil service within the context of the Addis-Ababa Accord. CSOs also participate in decentralization processes and the qualification process for mining sites. For example, Governance and Peace Observatory (OGP) and CENDADEP are members of the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations in the African Great Lakes Region against the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources (COSOC-GL).

In 2015, CSOs established support groups and organized advocacy campaigns. The 24 Collective advocated for the freedom of information law, which the High Chamber of the Parliament adopted in October. There was a multi-stakeholder working group supporting the conception of the national social protection policy. A natural resources working group supported the enactment of a law related to the Hydrocarbon Regime of August 2015. Finally, a CSO working group led to the establishment of the Social and Economic Council and the National Commission for Human Rights.

There are an increasing number of mechanisms allowing CSOs to participate in the political process, notably the National Commission for Land Tenure Reform, the National Independent Electoral Commission, and the tri-partite thematic groups. In 2015, we can note the newly established National Commission on Human Rights and Social and Economic Council.

In addition to these formal spaces allowing CSOs to have contact with decision makers, CSOs lobbied parliament, which led to results like the adoption by both chambers of the parliament of the law on the Hydrocarbon Regime, as well as the freedom of information law by the Senate.

CSOs are aware that an enabling legal environment can enhance their effectiveness and sustainability. Accordingly, CSOs have been advocating for several years for the revision of the law on nonprofit organizations and public interest groups, the freedom of information law, and the freedom of press law. However, local advocacy movements targeting philanthropy itself are rare.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

Some CSOs provide services to local communities. These typically include charitable organizations, religious associations, health mutuals, youth associations, and associations promoting quality basic social services. These types of CSOs have been involved in the following activities: school construction, distribution of plots and fertilizer to female farmers, renting conference rooms, rehabilitating rural roads, transporting agricultural produce for farmers’ associations, hosting cyber cafes, and organizing trainings (sewing, literacy, and social assistance).

Most CSOs provide products and services that reflect the needs and priorities of their support groups and beneficiaries. Some CSOs provide services to community groups beyond their own members. CSOs share publications, activity and workshop reports, information bulletins, and journals with each other. However, due to the difficulty of accessing reliable Internet connections, some CSOs have difficulties disseminating information to a wider public, such as churches and universities.
Products and services that CSOs provide through donor-funded projects are free to users. These products and services are diverse and include rooms equipped with computers and Internet access or support services to victims of gender-based violence. For paid services, CSOs do not typically recover costs.

Increasingly, the government recognizes CSOs’ capability in providing social services for local communities. Accordingly, government agencies, such as the Central Coordinating Committee of the Ministry of Finance (BCECO) and the Armed Forces (FSRDC), sign contracts with CSOs for them to act as local implementing agents.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

The presence of resource centers and intermediary support organizations (ISOs) has not changed compared to 2014. These organizations are largely based in urban locations. However, they also interact with CSOs operating in more rural locales. These ISOs offer numerous types of support (for example, access to information, technology, training, and technical assistance). ISOs such as the Center for Studies, Documentation, and Civic Action in South Kivu, UMOJA, the African Institute for Economic and Social Development, Center of Studies for Social Action (CEAS), and Training and Research Bureau for Complete Development offer training and assistance to CSOs. The CEAS has a library that is open to the public. It also facilitates trainings and rents conference rooms. The ISOs Hakizabinadam and Aprofem are focused on the promotion and defense of human rights. Maendeleo (Community Radio) and Justice and Peace work towards the promotion of peace and democracy. There is also the Central African School for Electoral Training (EFEAC), which also has a public library and a master’s degree program in election monitoring. ISOs earn revenue from selling services to customers and receive financial support from external partners as well.

Generally, community foundations are not well developed in the DRC. However, larger CSOs receiving international donor support provide grants to community-based organizations that implement small projects responding to the needs of local populations. Examples of these larger CSOs include Caritas Congo, National Center for Development and Citizen Participation (CENADEP), the Diobass platform, and the Committee for the Awakening and Support of Farmers (CRAFOP).

Member organizations of civil society platforms and networks share information with each other through information bulletins, pamphlets, workshops, open houses, forums, websites, and social media such as Facebook and Twitter. For example, the CENADEP disseminates information through several publications, including Training and Support for the Vitality of Community-Based Organizations (FADOC), Infos and the Congolese Peasant Voice, and the Election Chronical.

There are many qualified trainers and a few training organizations, although these are mostly found in urban centers. The trainings themselves are mostly delivered in French. They cover a wide array of topics, including strategic management, accountability, financial management, fundraising, and general CSO management. The African Institute for Socio-Economic Development (INADES) is known for delivering trainings on internal governance, advocacy and lobbying, social mobilization, fundraising, and project management tools. The Action Center for Congolese Business Leaders (CADICEC) and the Research and Civic Action Center (CEDAC) also provide trainings.

CSOs are also increasingly working in partnership with local businesses, the government, or the media to achieve common objectives. Caritas Congo supports the Congolese Ministry of Education by paying teachers in zones where there are no banks or other financial institutions. The Congolese Anti-Corruption League (LICOCO) partners with private media to disseminate its messages.
In the DRC, the national media diffuses information as it is provided to them. As such, it is difficult to say whether their coverage is positive or negative. They may summarize information, but they do not typically adopt a critical lens (positive or negative) on CSO activities. Nevertheless, international media outlets cover CSO activities and present them according to certain themes they develop, more or less objectively.

Commercials are billed in the same way, regardless of their source. Nevertheless, CSOs usually issue public-service announcements, which cost less than commercials.

The general public does not have a favorable opinion of CSOs, because it perceives CSOs as working in their own self-interest. They are not adequately informed of the missions of CSOs and what they actually do. As a consequence, only those directly benefiting from CSO activities have that appreciation.

Overall, the private sector and the central government have a positive opinion of development CSOs because they rely on their help, especially for service delivery. These CSOs are also seen as a credible source of information and expertise. Conversely, the private sector and the central government have an unfavorable view of human rights CSOs, which are frequently denouncing the government and companies for their human rights record.

In most cases, CSOs focus on promoting their activities that are implemented within the framework of donor-funded projects. Besides that, they do not work on their public image. There are exceptions where some CSOs have established relationships with journalists whereby their activities are covered for a fee. As in 2014, community radio stations broadcast information from other organizations at a reduced cost and cover the activities of CSOs. There is also an increased use of social media tools such as Facebook and Twitter, which present the potential for CSOs to capture an even larger audience.

Development CSOs have a code of ethics, but it is not applied in practice.

Some CSO leaders produce annual reports, which are sent to their members and donors. However, many do not, despite Article 45 of Law 004, which requires CSOs to regularly publish reports.
Country Facts

- **Capital:** Addis Ababa
- **Government Type:** Federal Republic
- **Population:** 99,465,819
- **GDP per capita (PPP):** $1,800
- **Human Development Index:** 174

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 5.6

In October 2015 the Ethiopian Government presented its report on achieving its Millennium Development Goals (MDG), which showed both progress and setbacks. According to the report, Ethiopia has made strides in reducing poverty and child mortality, increasing access to safe drinking water, and reducing the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis. However, the country still grapples with urban unemployment, sub-standard education, weak empowerment of women, poor maternal health, and a lack of medical supplies and skilled health professionals. Although Ethiopia has one of the fastest growing non-oil producing economies in Africa, per capita income is among the lowest in the world. About 80 percent of the population lives in rural areas, where literacy rates are low.

The country conducted its fourth national elections in May 2015. The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Party (EPRDF) and its allies won 100 percent of the vote, without a single seat in parliament or the regional councils going to any of more than fifty opposition parties. Unlike previous elections, no independent international election observers took part other than the African Union (AU), which sent only nine long-term and ninety short-term observers to cover more than 41,000 polling stations across the
country. The European Union (EU) explained its decision not to send an observer mission by citing the failure of the government to consider its recommendations after the previous elections. At the conclusion of the elections, the AU stated that the elections had been conducted in a constitutional and legal manner but did not cite the internationally accepted benchmark of “free and fair” elections. Opposition parties called the credibility of the AU mission into question.

Toward the end of 2015 tensions in Ethiopia’s Oromia and Amhara regional states led to significant political unrest. In a series of protests in Oromia Regional State, the Oromo, who constitute 35 percent of the country’s population, opposed the Addis Ababa Integrated Master Plan, which seeks to integrate economic activities of outlying towns in Oromia Regional State into the capital city. This controversy quickly grew to include other historical grievances. In Amhara Regional State, clashes between the Kimants and Amhara ethnic groups were sparked by the Kimants’ effort to assert administrative independence and eventually included protests against the government. Altogether scores of people were killed and many more wounded in the unrest.

Between July 2015, shortly before the visit of U.S. President Barack Obama, and October 2015, the government released nine bloggers and journalists who had been detained for more than a year on charges of terrorism, and government officials commended the role of CSOs in poverty reduction and economic development. Nevertheless, according to Freedom House, Ethiopia remained in the “not free” category in 2015, and the World Justice Project demoted Ethiopia from eighty-eighth to ninety-first place in its Rule of Law Index 2015.

By the end of 2015, 3,079 CSOs had registered with the Charities and Societies Agency (CSA) since the adoption of the Charities and Societies Proclamation (CSP) in 2009. This figure includes 369 foreign charities, 332 Ethiopian societies, 94 residents’ societies, 2,070 Ethiopian residents’ charities, 106 Ethiopian charities, 52 consortiums (networks), and 56 foreign adoption agencies. Only 100 CSOs registered in 2015, a decline of 79 from the previous year. Of the total number of registered CSOs, no more than 30 percent are operational.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.4**

The CSP governs the registration and operation of CSOs working in Addis Ababa and Diredawa, foreign CSOs, CSOs operating in more than one regional state, and CSOs receiving funds from outside of the country. Except for Amhara Regional State, which has its own legislation, all regional states employ provisions of the 1960 Civil Code to administer CSOs operating in their territories. The CSP divides the CSO sector into three main categories: Ethiopian charities and societies, Ethiopian residents’ charities and societies, and foreign charities. The first group comprises CSOs that are registered in Ethiopia and have Ethiopian members. They are not restricted in their areas of operation but must generate at least 90 percent of their funding from local sources. Organizations working on human rights and good governance must register as Ethiopian charities. CSOs in the second group may generate more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources and are allowed to work only on service and development projects. CSOs in the third group, foreign charities, are expected to raise their funds from foreign sources. Charities work for the benefit of others while societies work mainly to promote and protect the interests of their members. For all CSOs, funding from anonymous sources is strictly forbidden.

CSO registration is mandatory. The law’s ambiguous terminology allows the CSA to impose arbitrary and repressive conditions on registration, turning it into a difficult process for many organizations. The law also
confers sweeping, subjective powers on the CSA to deny registration. For example, the CSA recently declined for no stated reason to register CSOs as Ethiopian residents’ societies and then after a while resumed their registration. CSOs are expected to renew their licenses every three years. In 2015 the CSA suspended the renewal of nine CSOs on the grounds that they did not meet certain formalities, such as having project agreements with line ministries.

Each year the CSA dissolves a significant number of CSOs, usually because they lack funds. In 2015 ninety-two CSOs were closed, sixty-eight by the CSA and twenty-four at their own request. Another sixty CSOs received first warning letters and twenty organizations received final warning letters about their impending closure. The total number of CSOs closed since 2010 totaled 377 as of December 2015, according to the CSA. Although the number of organizations closed in 2015 was smaller than in the previous year, CSA sources have suggested that a large number of CSOs may face closure in 2016 because they do not have funding, have failed to implement projects, or are not meeting the requirements of the 30/70 Directive (see below).

The law stipulates detailed requirements for the internal management, permissible activities, financial reporting, and dissolution of CSOs. For example, CSOs are prohibited from engaging in voter education and election monitoring unless they obtain permission from the National Election Board. Organizations working in service delivery must have project agreements with government institutions before the CSA will approve any of their project activities. The 2011 Directive for the Administration of Project and Administrative Cost Utilization (known as the 30/70 Directive) classifies many CSO expenses as administrative in nature, and their aggregate cost may not be greater than 30 percent of the organization’s overall budget. In 2014 the 30/70 Directive was amended so that some expenses, such as project staff salaries and vehicles, could be classified as project rather than administrative costs for organizations working on HIV/AIDS, environmental protection, and several other issues. Nevertheless, the 30/70 Directive continues to impose severe restrictions on the operations of many organizations.

The CSA sometimes relies on unwritten government policy rather than clearly stipulated legal provisions to dictate the kinds of projects that CSOs may implement. For instance, while there is no legal restriction on foreign charities partnering with or awarding grants to Ethiopian residents’ charities, several foreign charities received letters in 2015 warning them against such arrangements. The Hunger Project was among the international organizations closed by the CSA in 2015 on the grounds that it had failed to observe CSA rules. CSOs receiving funds from foreign sources are not allowed to engage in public debate or express criticism of the government, and CSOs receiving more than 10 percent of their funding from outside the country do not have the right to judicial recourse against administrative decisions of the CSA, including dissolution.

There were no reports suggesting that the unrest in Ethiopia in 2015 impinged on CSO operations or that the state specifically targeted or harassed CSO workers.

Most CSOs do not receive tax exemptions when purchasing goods and services or engaging in income-generating activities. However, they do not have to pay taxes on grants and donations.

A CSO may earn income from the provision of goods and services and through government contracts provided it has a business license and permission from the CSA. On a practical level, securing a business license is not easy. CSOs may engage in cost-recovery arrangements provided certain conditions are met. For example, beneficiaries’ contributions may not be greater than 25 percent of the overall cost of the provided service or product, and organizations must give freely to individuals who cannot afford to pay contributions.

Though the situation is improving, there are few lawyers in Ethiopia who are familiar with CSO law or can meet most organizations’ legal needs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3**

CSOs’ organizational capacity declined in 2015. Establishing strong links with constituencies, particularly beneficiaries, is still a challenge for most CSOs. Organizations do not often include constituencies in the
design, implementation, monitoring, or evaluation of their projects and other activities. The 30/70 Directive exacerbates this situation by classifying the costs associated with participatory approaches, such as needs assessments, baseline surveys, and monitoring and evaluation, as administrative costs, which by law may not amount to more than 30 percent of an organization’s total budget.

Most Ethiopian CSOs do not have long-term strategic plans, mainly because such plans typically require a stable resource base, and most organizations receive donor funding on a project-by-project basis. For the same reason, most organizations tend to be donor rather than mission driven.

The law requires all CSOs to have basic internal structures, such as general assemblies, boards of directors, and treasurers. However, the ability of these bodies to ensure organizational transparency and accountability is doubtful. They are usually established only to meet legal requirements and often consist of a collection of colleagues. In practice, most boards do not actively engage in governing their organizations and instead allow management to take governance decisions.

Because of restrictions on administrative costs, including salaries and benefits, Ethiopian CSOs face serious challenges in attracting and retaining competent employees. Smaller and local CSOs do not have the financial capacity to train their staff. Professional services from accountants, lawyers, technology specialists, and other consultants are classified as administrative costs and thus discouraged. The use of volunteers is also limited.

Most CSOs have access to the Internet and use it mainly for email. However, costs related to CSOs’ technical capacity are administrative and therefore usually kept to a minimum. In addition, most donors are not willing to cover such costs.

### FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3

The financial situation of CSOs operating in Ethiopia grew worse in 2015. Research conducted by the EU-funded Civil Society Fund II (EU-CSF II) in 2015 suggests that most Ethiopian CSOs do not have adequate funds to carry out their activities. Many domestic organizations, including the Ethiopian Young Professionals Association, Madiba Children Outreach, and Addis Ababa University Women Students Association, were forced to close during the year because of a lack of funds.

Most organizations raise almost all of their funding from foreign sources. Major donors include USAID, UK Department for International Development (DFID), EU, World Bank, United Nations (UN), Irish Aid, and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). The annual report of the National Bank of Ethiopia for 2014-15 indicated that $1.1 billion was transferred to CSOs from foreign donors during this period. This amount represented an increase of $34.7 million over the previous year. However, of this amount the largest share went to foreign CSOs.

The Ethiopia Social Accountability Program Phase 2 (ESAP2) concluded in 2015, and a “bridging” phase was initiated until the next phase of the program begins. The two remaining major grant-making institutions operating in Ethiopia were EU-CSF II and the Civil Society Support Program (CSSP). EU-CSF II is a joint initiative of the EU and the Ethiopian government. It is considered a domestic fund, which allows human rights organizations that are otherwise not permitted to receive more than 10 percent of their funding from foreign sources to access its funds. The EU-CSF II seeks to improve CSOs’ dialogue with their constituencies, the Ethiopian government, and among themselves and to build non-state actors’ capacity to
play a role in the national development process. CSSP is a five-year, multi-donor capacity-building program, which extends support to organizations working in service and development, particularly for projects helping people affected by social marginalization, geographic remoteness, under-resourcing, and neglected development. The program winds down in 2016 and its future thereafter is uncertain.

The majority of Ethiopian CSOs do not have a diversified or stable funding base. There is no local tradition of philanthropy, including in the business community, and the law discourages the mobilization of local resources. For example, a directive issued by the CSA in 2011 states that local fundraising should be considered a last resort for organizations. Income generation by CSOs is also minimal. The amount of money that CSOs earn from their constituencies is insignificant. Most Ethiopian CSOs charge membership fees, but they are usually symbolic amounts and insufficient to sustain an organization. Very few CSOs try to earn income from selling their services and products, mainly because of cumbersome legal requirements, and in any case the CSA often turns down CSOs’ requests to engage in income generation. The practice of private and governmental institutions contracting with CSOs for their services and products is unknown.

It is mandatory for CSOs to have sound financial management systems. CSOs are legally required to have independent external auditors assess their financial performance each year. The CSA provides an approved list of professionally licensed auditors. Only a few CSOs make their financial reports available to the public.

**ADVOCACY: 6.1**

Because only Ethiopian charities are permitted to work on governance, democracy, and human rights, and they may not generate more than 10 percent of their income from foreign sources, the number of CSOs working in these areas is very limited. However, with the support of EU-CSF II, which is considered a domestic fund, some human rights CSOs were able to pursue activities in 2015. For example, the Human Rights Council (HRCO) investigated alleged human rights violations in some parts of Ethiopia, including Oromia and Amhara, and held a press conference on the human rights situation. Similarly, the Ethiopian Lawyers Association carried out advocacy activities related to access to justice. CSOs did not make any visible advocacy efforts regarding the government’s rejection of several key recommendations by the UN Human Rights Council during Ethiopia’s Universal Periodic Review in September 2014.

No formal mechanism exists for consultation between the government and CSOs. The Charities and Societies Sector Working Group (CSSWG) has brought together government officials, CSOs, and donors to discuss issues of common concern. The government occasionally invites CSOs to take part in discussions about policy documents, and an ad hoc forum called GO-NGO was established by the government and CSOs in 2009 with the goal of facilitating partnerships between CSOs and the government at the federal and regional levels. However, as the forum is not based on an equal partnership, its meetings are not as productive as expected, and the government uses them mainly to channel its own positions without paying attention to concerns raised by CSOs.

Fifty-two network organizations are registered by the CSA. But since network organizations receiving foreign funds are not allowed to work on advocacy issues or lobby, all but one of these organizations are focused on development and service provision. Since the adoption of the CSP in 2009, there is no record of any campaign about policy issues undertaken by networks or coalitions.

The Ethiopian Federal Charities and Societies Forum (EFCSF) was established by a group of network organizations with the support of the CSA in 2013 to represent the CSO sector; initiate constructive dialogue between GO-NGO, its members, and government bodies; and improve the legal environment for CSO operations. In 2015 the forum worked on revising the Code of Conduct for Charities and Societies in
Ethiopia. Otherwise, there was no organized effort by CSOs to change the legal framework for their work, mainly because of the government's restrictive policy towards advocacy.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.9**

The vast majority of Ethiopian CSOs work in social services and development. CSOs throughout the country actively work in health, education, relief, water, renewable energy, and environmental protection.

As costs related to needs assessments and baseline surveys are considered administrative in nature, smaller CSOs find it difficult to conduct these activities to identify the needs and priorities of their constituents. To get around this constraint, CSOs sometimes rely on other strategies, such as research through secondary sources and focus-group discussions.

Some CSOs, mostly international organizations, publish and disseminate materials related to their activities.

According to the 2013 Cost Recovery Directive issued by the CSA, CSOs may charge fees for goods and services to recover up to 25 percent of their costs. However, only a small number of CSOs do so because of capacity limitations.

The government sometimes relies on CSOs to provide expertise and knowledge, particularly in the areas of health, education, agriculture, and livelihoods.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

There are few resource centers supporting CSOs in Ethiopia. Those that do exist are largely international organizations located in Addis Ababa, which provide technical and financial support to domestic CSOs. Organizations based outside of the capital find it difficult to access these centers, although some regional network organizations offer comparable services. In addition, a number of intermediary support organizations (ISOs), such as Consortium of Christian Relief and Development (CCRDA), and programs targeting CSOs, including Tracking Trends in Ethiopia’s Civil Society (TECS) and CSSP, provide capacity-building support. However, the law provides little protection for ISOs, and as a result their relationship with the CSA is not always smooth. In 2015 several ISOs received letters from the CSA warning them that all of their grants to Ethiopian CSOs would be regarded as administrative expenses, thus implying that they would be shut down if they did not comply with the 30/70 Directive.

The only central network for CSOs is the EFCSF. The forum played an important role in helping amend the 30/70 Directive in 2014 and establishing the Code Observance Panel for monitoring compliance with the national code of conduct in 2015. Various network organizations, including EFCSF, Ethiopian Center for Education Information (COHRA), and Poverty Action Network in Ethiopia (PANE), facilitate information sharing among their members. Most network organizations have their own websites and databases of their members. The CSA sometimes works through network organizations to reach out to individual organizations. In March 2015 a network organization called the Union of Ethiopian Civil Society Organizations was closed by the CSA for failing to implement any project for more than two years. The closure suggests that more CSOs will be forced to close because of a lack of funding and legal restrictions on raising and utilizing funds.
Not all CSOs have access to training because of its cost or membership requirements. Several organizations provide customized training on CSO management, usually only to their own members. Training is conducted in English and Amharic. Some grant-making programs such as CSSP provide training on their funding mechanisms, and USAID has a capacity-building program for selected CSOs. There is no organization providing specialized training to CSOs on a permanent basis.

Insofar as CSOs are required to have project agreements with line government institutions and work in accordance with the government’s development plan, CSOs and the government can have a productive working relationship. The relationship between the business community and CSOs is not strong. Some businesses, including Ethiopian Airlines, Great Run, and Dashen Bank, provide support to a few Ethiopian CSOs. In the absence of regulations governing corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs, CSOs play a crucial role in creating awareness about their work in the business community. The relationship between the media and CSOs is also not strong, and their efforts do not complement each other. CCRDA implemented a few activities during the year to raise journalists’ awareness of the work of CSOs.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9**

Although CSOs do not have strong relationships with the media and individual journalists, they made efforts to improve these ties in 2015. For example, CCRDA organized training for journalists and concluded an agreement for airtime with Radio Fana Broadcasting Corporation. The Women Self-Help Group hosted a program on Sheger FM radio, and Afro-FM radio broadcast a program focused on CSO activities. However, with the exception of Afro-FM, CSOs pay high fees for these programs. TV and radio broadcasters at the national level are still under the sole ownership of the government, and censorship limits CSOs’ use of these media.

The public is generally supportive of CSO activities, although its perceptions are not entirely positive. The public tends to see CSOs as foreign aid institutions, and while they expect to receive money and material support from CSOs, they are highly reluctant to provide them with financial and in-kind support.

The government’s perception of service-providing CSOs seemed to improve in 2015. In November the president attended CCRDA’s NGOs Good Practice Day and publicly noted that “this kind of event will strengthen the relationship between the government and the NGO/CSO sector by creating an opportunity to understand each other and share knowledge and experiences.” In a radio discussion about the GO-NGO partnership, the vice director of the CSA acknowledged the role of CSOs in implementing the country plan and stated that “as efforts are being exerted by both the CSA and NGO networks to solve various challenges, the future will be brighter for the sector.” The government’s perceptions of advocacy organizations remained overwhelmingly negative.

The business community usually associates CSOs with ample foreign funding and wealth for their leaders. It tends not to appreciate CSOs’ role in strengthening democratization and fostering economic growth.

CSOs still lack the capacity to promote their public image. The NGOs Good Practice Day brought positive attention to the CSO sector with an exhibition that showcased CSO activities. However, most organizations do not keep their websites up to date and are not adept at using social media to promote their activities.

The re-adoption of the Code of Conduct for Charities and Societies in Ethiopia in 2015 was a landmark achievement for CSO self-regulation in Ethiopia. The code had been previously adopted in October 2011 but at the time could not be implemented because of restrictions set by the CSP on establishing a body to promote and oversee the code’s implementation. With the help of EFCSF, the CSA agreed in 2015 to register the Code Observance Panel, which is in charge of promoting public awareness of the code and taking
measures when it is violated by signatory CSOs. The code calls on CSOs to observe standards such as accountability, transparency, gender equity, environmental protection, and the efficient utilization of resources. Signatories must submit regular reports to the panel on the implementation of the code in their organizations. In December 2015 the code was re-adopted by a group of network organizations, including EFCSF, Pastoralist Forum, and Network of Ethiopian Women Associations.
The sustainability of CSOs in Gabon in 2015 has not considerably changed during the last five years. The legal environment remains the same despite numerous actors calling for a revision of the law on the creation of associations. A national economic crisis in Gabon has led to unprecedented social vulnerabilities, which CSOs were among the first to signal. Major construction sites were suspended and numerous strikes and layoffs took place in most sectors. Government budgets were approved but not implemented. This has had a widespread impact on local economic and political actors, as well as the capacity of CSOs to benefit from support from international partners. Diminishing financial resources for CSOs challenges their viability. Without a minimum of resources, CSOs cannot satisfy basic organizational needs such as office space, supplies, and Internet access.

Despite these obstacles, CSOs persist and carry out activities with varying degrees of success. Faced with structural and organizational challenges, CSOs have organized themselves in platforms and networks. Through these arrangements, CSOs have been capable of advocating for specific causes. Furthermore, recognizing the importance of improving their public image, CSOs have partnered with private media organizations to lead communication efforts that highlight the work they do in the field.
CSOs operate in the formal sector, with the exception of those waiting for the formal registration process to be complete. There is no official count of CSOs, because the Ministry of Interior does not keep track of these statistics. However, general estimates by the ministry suggest a total of 1,000 registered CSOs exist. However, the Gabonese Network of Associations (ROPAGA), in collaboration with the French Embassy, created a CSO directory based on consultations with the Ministry of Interior and other ministries, which listed 1,200 CSOs in Gabon. It is not clear how many of those are actually operational. The CSO directory that ROPAGA is developing will allow CSOs to enter and manage information about their organization. Most CSOs are based in the capital, Libreville, and the CSO sector is composed mostly of NGOs, labor unions, religious groups, and neighborhood associations.

In 2015, several events had a significant impact on the civil society sector. Labor unions played an increasingly active role leading strikes, which paralyzed several public and para-public sectors. There was also the first national conference for CSOs. Private newspapers were suspended. Finally, for the first time in Gabon's history, certain religious figures challenged government abuses, denouncing arbitrary arrests, assassinations, and violence as well as the terrible living conditions of many Gabonese. This is particularly significant because in Gabon religious groups have traditionally had a reputation of being at the service of political power.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.1**

In 2015, the question of revising Law 35-62 on the creation and operation of associations remains. This law is favorable to registering CSOs. To obtain provisional registration, the CSO must only produce three copies of its registration request and organizational statute, which then appears in the official journal. However, this law from 1962 is not adapted to the current context for CSOs, as it does not reflect distinctions among the different types of CSOs. For example, its provisions do not address CSO's revenue generation. It also raises the problem of different ministry competencies. In Gabon, the Ministry of Interior delivers the provisional and final registration documents. However, between the issuance of those two documents, the different relevant sectoral ministries also need to authorize CSO activities, which is problematic given that CSO activities often pertain to numerous ministries. In order to increase transparency and efficiency, it would be best if the authorization process was centralized and overseen by the Ministry of Interior. Thus, while its provisions for registration and acquisition of the provisional registration certificate are simple, Law 35-62 creates administrative burdens that make registration difficult for CSOs. This is especially the case for CSOs whose activities the government perceives to be sensitive or threatening.

Law 35-62 does not allow government control of the internal management and financial reporting of CSOs, with the exception of public-interest organizations that receive government grants. Law 35-62 establishes which activities are non-authorized for CSOs, as does Law 3-94 for unions. Nevertheless, the Ministry of Interior and the president have the right to dissolve any CSO that does not respect the conditions in Law 35-62 or disturbs the public order. In 2015, no CSO was dissolved on those grounds. From a legal standpoint, the Gabonese Constitution establishes the freedom of expression and freedom of press for all Gabonese citizens. This means that CSOs are free to operate and their leaders can express themselves freely. However, in practice, these rights are restrained according to a CSO's pro- or anti-government stance.
The government of Gabon has systematically forbidden all public demonstrations by CSOs considered to be close to the opposition. In November 2015, the Minister of the Interior prohibited a peaceful march to commemorate the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women, as well as one demanding that light be shed on the assassination of a Gabonese student in December 2014, who still has not been buried according to Gabonese customs and traditions.

The availability of government grants for CSOs remains an issue in 2015. Indeed, Law 35-62 only contains clear provisions regarding government grants for public-interest CSOs, which is problematic given that “public-interest” recognition is not given according to objective criteria. Some CSOs without this recognition have received small government grants, but once again, recipients tend to be pro-government CSOs. In 2015, the enduring economic crisis has affected the government’s capacity to provide grants to CSOs. Overall, only a minority of CSOs have benefited from government grants.

Recognizing their nonprofit status, the government does not tax CSOs. While Law 35-62 does not address this question specifically, the Tax Code states that CSOs are exempt from paying customs duties and taxes on donations and grants that they receive.

According to Law 35-62, CSOs in Gabon are not permitted to generate a profit from the services they provide. However, some of the more professional CSOs provided paid services such as consultancies and studies, which allow them to partially cover operational costs and compensate personnel. The revenue from these activities cannot exceed costs and expenses, and cannot be shared among CSO representatives.

In 2015, despite the significant needs, very few lawyers provided legal support to CSOs. There were also no lawyers specialized in CSO matters.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

In 2015, CSO organization capacity has increased, most notably with regards to CSO capacity to organize themselves in networks and platforms. Most often, these are formed around specific domains of intervention. For instance, there is the Gabon My Land My Right for land tenure and the Network of Free Civil Society Organizations for Good Governance (ROLBG) for governance issues. Conscious of their own organizational and structural challenges, CSOs have chosen to adopt new operational structures so they can lead activities with the desire of enhancing efficiency. In 2015, the first online CSO directory was launched with the goal of reinforcing a CSO network. The political and economic climate in 2015 led to a rise in the role of unions under the “Dynamique Unitaire” banner, a multi-sectoral coalition promoting the voice of civil servants. Nevertheless, CSO networks, similar to individual CSOs, continued to face financial difficulties that hampered their actions, as well as their long-term viability.

International donor-funded projects have aimed to support CSO capacity. For example, ROPAGA, with support from the French Cultural Institute, organized trainings on network facilitation for NGO directors and on website management for communications officers.

All CSOs are legally required to have an organizational mission that serves as foundation for strategic planning. However, while unions have clearly defined missions belonging to a well-defined professional category, many CSOs do not benefit from such clarity of mission. This leads to discrepancies between CSO missions and the nature of the activities they lead. Lack of strategic planning weakens many CSOs. With the exception of some CSOs that benefit from international funding requiring integration of strategic planning in decision making, most CSOs do not integrate planning at all. The result is that CSOs adopt opportunistic strategies dependent on the type of funding available.
Each CSO is legally required to have a well-defined internal management structure as provided in its organizational statute. However, this requirement is not realized in practice. In 2015, very few CSOs have an executive board that is operational, open, and transparent. The main reason for this is lack of financial resources, as well as a tendency of CSO founders to see the CSO as their personal property. In fact, CSOs usually do not have the resources to pay for full-time personnel, instead depending on two or three unpaid staff members who have other professional responsibilities. Lack of resources also prevents CSOs from owning basic office equipment.

To overcome these organizational challenges, CSOs have come together to share resources, which not only includes human resources but also offices, equipment, and utilities (electricity, water, and the Internet). For example, Brainforest shares its offices and the cost of utilities with Conservation Justice and Alisei, an Italian CSO.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.2**

Financial viability is a critical component of CSO sustainability. The numerous capacity-building trainings that international partners provided in 2015 has somewhat improved the capacity of CSOs to raise funds. However, CSOs continue to be confronted with declining funding both at the local and international levels. While most funding for CSOs comes from international partners, local sources for funding do exist but are rare. Small grants to CSOs are consistently included in the government’s budget. However, these are inconsistently disbursed with very few CSOs receiving grants in 2015. Furthermore, these grants do now allow CSOs to cover operating and project-related costs.

The major international donors such as the European Union, the Food and Agriculture Organization, and the World Bank have also reduced their funding and are releasing fewer requests for proposals. A precarious social, economic, and political climate characterized by labor strikes, large-scale layoffs, bankruptcies, and the radicalization of political parties has contributed to international donor reluctance to fund CSOs in Gabon. In terms of local funding sources, philanthropic organizations such as the Amissa Bongo Foundation, the Omar Bongo Foundation, and the BGFIBank Foundation provide some support to CSOs, however this support appears to have decreased compared to previous years. In addition, foundations tend to give money directly to communities. When they do finance CSOs, it is often with political intentions. The concept of philanthropy is not yet common in Gabon. Many of the current philanthropic initiatives are led by political personalities who use CSOs to gain favor with local populations.

Very few CSOs have the capacity to develop robust financial management systems. These tend to be established within the context of donor-funded projects. The lack of these systems can lead to a lack of transparency. CSOs in Gabon are rarely audited and very few publish annual reports with financial information.

CSOs provide their services to government institutions, private-sector organizations, and other actors to earn additional revenue. However, the clients in these transactions often exercise influence over the services that the CSOs provide, especially as it pertains to the production of reports. Given the lack of funding opportunities, CSOs have difficulty preserving their independence when accepting these income-generating opportunities.

There is a recent trend in which traditional CSOs relying on donor funding and providing free services are progressing to a social-enterprise model. In this mode, CSOs typically provide paid services to cover operational costs and have internal financial systems that more closely resemble a for-profit company. The
Law on Associations does not recognize this new organizational status, which is one reason that CSOs are calling for its revision.

**ADVOCACY: 4.9**

In 2015, we note a slight improvement in the advocacy of CSOs as compared to previous years. Some advocacy initiatives have realized concrete results. For example, in October 2015, an initial forestry agreement among the administration, forest concessionaries, and local communities was signed to better protect community rights. This series of signatures is the result of an advocacy initiative initiated in 2012, which has led to the May 2014 ruling of the Ministry for the Forest, Environment, and Protection of Natural Resources in favor of forestry agreements.

As in 2014, unions led several visible strikes. The National Organization of Oil Sector Workers (ONEP) called for the prime minister to address layoffs of oil-sector workers. This is an ongoing issue in Gabon. There is also an ongoing confrontation between the government and National Teacher’s Conventions (CONASYSED) on issues such as wages and the remuneration system for teachers.

Workshops and meetings between CSOs and decision makers are being used increasingly to achieve those results. CSOs and government also collaborate on specific projects such as the project to Support the Fight against Illegal Logging (ALEFI), where the NGO Conservation Justice works in partnership with the government. The most significant progress relates to CSOs’ increased role in the political decision-making process. Indeed, the government frequently consulted CSOs within the context of legal reforms of the past two years (e.g., Mining Code, Environment Code, Sustainable Development Law, and the Forestry Code). Even though not all of CSOs’ recommendations are considered, the government’s effort to consult CSOs is a sign of progress.

Public authorities are not exclusively responsible for civil society’s increased participation in the decision-making process. In most cases, CSOs have had to exert considerable pressure on the authorities. Nevertheless, participating in public debates requires a certain degree of organization as well as human and financial resources, which is why CSOs set up networks and platforms. While CSOs are increasingly comfortable with advocacy tools, they are less familiar with the concept of lobbying.

Reforming or updating Law 35-62 is necessary for guaranteeing the effectiveness and sustainability of CSOs. Many civil society actors recognize this imperative, but it is not seen as a priority item and reform efforts have not led to any concrete achievements.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1**

Gabonese CSOs provide goods and services in a variety of areas. As much as the needs of populations are diverse, there is also a variety of CSOs that exist to meet those needs. In addition to unions and professional associations, there are CSOs that offer integrated services in health and social services, such as the International Association for Social Action or the Association Against Abortion and for the Protection of Human Rights; the environment, such as NGO Generation Clear Water and NGO Muvissi Environment; and private-sector development and agriculture, such as the African Development Research and Consulting Initiative (IDRC Africa) and the Akamanam Association.
These CSOs typically engage in awareness campaigns, medical campaigns, population assistance, capacity building, and in the defense of labor rights. In addition to products and services that are offered for free through donor-funded projects, CSOs also provide paid services. Some CSOs with a certain level of resources offer their expertise to the government, private-sector organizations, international organizations, or even universities. Examples include impact studies, socio-economic studies, and trainings. For instance, the government paid Brainforest to lead an awareness campaign around forestry issues.

Free products and services are provided to communities, which usually reflect those communities’ needs. However, these depend on the donor requirements, which can create misalignment between what is provided and what is needed.

When CSOs provide free products and services to communities through donor-funded projects, cost recovery is not considered, since CSOs are non-profit entities. In 2015, with the decline in funding, CSOs provided fewer free services.

The Gabonese government has begun to recognize CSOs’ value in providing basic social services. For that reason, in most government-led projects the government collaborates with CSOs that have better knowledge of local dynamics and needs. In these collaborations, the government sometimes provides funding to the CSOs. However, that amount is usually not sufficient to cover costs and CSOs that are not pro-government tend to not receive any such financing at all. In those cases, CSOs partner with the government out of a genuine desire to influence policy and political decisions. Nevertheless, the government does not yet issue grants or contracts to CSOs for social-service provision.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.2**

Infrastructure deficiencies remain a challenge in 2015. According to the CSO directory, there are 1,200 CSOs catalogued, but it is difficult to determine how many are active. Also, very few have basic office infrastructure. With the exception of CSOs that can manage projects and unions, most CSOs do not have headquarters or permanent staff. Internet access is limited to cell phones. As in 2014, CSOs that have the capacity to do so have also made use of websites and social networks.

In 2015, there are several intermediary support organizations (ISOS) that exist. These are the Amissa Bongo, Omar Bongo, and Sylvia Bongo associations, which receive most of their funding from the government. In fact, it is not uncommon to find these grants featured in the country’s budget laws. This shows that these organizations depend on the will of political authorities. Nevertheless, whether they are from national or international sources, there is insufficient transparency in foundation funding. In addition to these types of ISOS, there is another category of ISOS that includes organizations such as the Red Cross and Caritas, which provide funds to CSOs to carry out activities.

For almost two years now, CSOs have gained a better appreciation for working in thematic platforms and networks. This organizational model not only facilitates sharing of information and expertise, but also serves as a framework for implementing collaborative actions. In addition to networks that are already well established, such as the GMTMD on forestry and land tenure issues, there is the ROLBG, which intervenes on governance and democracy issues, and the Gabonese Network of Associations (ROPAGA), which organized a forum for environmental organizations on the theme of sharing experiences and strengthening advocacy.

At the local level, there are several trainings on CSO management that international donors and partners have provided. There are also Gabonese trainers who have the competencies required to deliver management trainings for CSOs. However, CSOs are generally not aware of those individuals. This year, external partners...
have provided project management trainings for CSOs focusing on helping them design projects and raise funds from existing networks. In August 2015, there was a training seminar on managing projects effectively. In October 2015, there was training for environmental CSOs in advocacy tools and donor financing mechanisms. In general, training materials are available in French.

Some CSOs provide services to private-sector organizations. For example, the CSO IDRC Africa supports Olam, an agro-industrial firm, with socio-economic studies and developing income generating activities for communities. Similarly, the CSO Women, Environment, and Development (FENSED) has done community mapping for Olam and Siat Gabon, another agro-industrial firm. In addition, CSOs work increasingly with local collectivities, which have a greater appreciation for their work at the community level. Private-sector organizations are aware of these types of partnerships and solicit the support of CSOs. However, because of concerns of losing their independence and neutrality, some CSOs reject these types of partnerships.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.9

Early 2015 saw the closing of some private journals, such as *Faits Divers* and newspaper columns such as “Taloche” in *Echos du Nord*. This did not influence the overall context of media coverage, which depends on the CSO’s and the media organization’s position vis-à-vis the government. Indeed, CSOs that are considered to be pro-government benefit from both public and private media coverage, while only the private media covers the activities of “activist” CSOs. In 2015 overall, the increase in private media channels (television, radio, and press) has contributed to an improvement in the visibility of CSO actions and in how citizens perceive those actions.

2015 was a decisive year for CSOs in terms of the growing recognition towards their role in providing products and services, defending citizen rights, and in offering a political alternative. In August 2015, the first national civil society conference united citizens and CSOs to elaborate strategies to move out of the country’s crisis. Both national and some international media outlets covered this important event.

Furthermore, populations from Zanangoue, a village in Northern Gabon, solicited several organizations including Brainforest to help them in a land conflict with local authorities over the exploitation of the Kevazingo forest without authorization from the central government. The media barely covered this conflict in the beginning. However, it did cover Brainforest’s investigation and discovery of a vast trafficking network. There were numerous arrests within and outside of the Ministry of Environment, which the media also covered. Recognizing the important role that CSOs play and the expertise they bring, public authorities and private sector actors have often solicited CSO support. In 2015, almost all government led projects and reforms have included CSO consultation, even though CSO recommendations are not always retained.

Very few Gabonese CSOs have their own websites that would allow them to continuously communicate their activities with others. However, CSOs are making greater efforts to have private media organizations cover their interventions in the field.

In 2015, few CSOs produced annual reports, contributing to a lack of transparency. There is no recognized code of ethics for CSOs.
THE GAMBIA

In 2015 The Gambia experienced severe socio-economic and political challenges as the regime adopted an increasingly intolerant stance. In December 2014 dissidents who the president claim were supported by foreign interests tried to topple the regime by launching an armed attack on the state house in Banjul. Several dissidents and soldiers were killed, and the government kept the bodies of the dissidents and refused to allow their families to see or bury them. A number of people, including parents, children, and spouses of the attackers, were still in detention one year later. This incident caused serious strains on the political environment. On many occasions opposition members were denied permits to hold political rallies or were arrested, detained, or harassed. Restrictive provisions in laws such as the Public Order Act and Elections Act were also used to tamp down the opposition. The space for the open and free participation of citizens in public affairs continued to shrink, and policymaking processes were constrained.

As in 2014, human rights organizations reported numerous cases of the arbitrary arrest and detention of public servants, political opponents, journalists, and religious leaders, many of whom were still detained and incommunicado at the end of the year. Following intense pressure by the United Nations (UN) and...
international human rights organizations, in November 2014 The Gambia invited the UN’s special rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary, or arbitrary executions and the special rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment to conduct investigations in the country. In a spring 2015 report to the UN Human Rights Council, the special rapporteur on extrajudicial executions found that there had been a “resumption of executions, the use of force by law enforcement agencies, impunity for extrajudicial executions, the use of force during demonstrations, lack of accountability for human rights violations, groups at risk, and fear of reprisals.” The special rapporteur on torture noted that his visit “was compromised due to the government’s unwillingness to grant freedom of movement and inquiry to all areas of detention facilities, despite its initial acceptance of the terms of reference for all country visits by mandate holders.”

The UN has classified The Gambia as a least-developed country, and as in previous years poverty and unemployment remained high. In June 2015 the government drastically devalued the dalasi and reduced foreign-exchange rates. Public-service delivery remained erratic, expensive, and not available to all citizens. In these dire conditions, service-delivery CSOs made an immense contribution to improving the quality of life and enhancing the livelihoods of Gambians. They continued to collaborate effectively with government agencies and other stakeholders on delivering goods and services. However, because of the restricted political space and fear of reprisals, CSOs did not openly engage the government on human rights, corruption, or governance. However, Gambian CSOs were able to push the government into declaring a countrywide ban on female genital mutilation (FGM) in November 2015.

Funding is still the main challenge for CSOs. No new foreign donors appeared to fill in the gap after the gradual departure of donors in 2013 and 2014, and local resource mobilization remained insignificant. Nevertheless, during the year CSOs continued to upgrade their management systems in an effort to become more transparent, efficient, and responsive.

The overall number of registered CSOs is unknown but probably totals more than 1,000. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are a distinct legal form, and 125 NGOs were registered with the NGO Affairs Agency in 2015.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.2**

CSOs in The Gambia are governed by the NGO Act, which appeared in the 2009 Revised Edition of the Laws of the Gambia. The act is based on NGO Decree 81, which was issued in 1996. CSOs had reviewed and revised a draft of the new act in 2010 under the auspices of the Association on Non-Governmental Organizations (TANGO), with the expectation that a revised bill would be submitted to parliament. However, there was never any reported announcement that such a submission took place, and it now appears that at the time that CSOs reviewed the draft act it had already been adopted as law. Since the official publication of laws is obtainable only through purchase and is not readily available to the public, CSOs did not become aware that the act existed until late 2015. The NGO Act is essentially a copy of the old decree without major changes. Although technically the act governs only registered NGOs, in practice any CSO that breaches its provisions is open to sanctions.

To operate as CSOs, organizations first register with the Ministry of Justice. The registration process is simple, as it requires only the submission of basic institutional documents and the payment of a fee. Although there is limited scrutiny of applicants, delays in the registration process are common, mainly because of an
inefficient bureaucracy. Registered CSOs may become NGOs by registering with the NGO Affairs Agency, which requires evidence that the organization has been in operation for at least two years. The number of NGOs remains relatively small, as the status conveys no real benefit.

The NGO Act specifies certain administrative requirements, such as the need for organizations to have constitutions, conform to various rules and policies, and report annually to the NGO Affairs Agency. The act states that an NGO is expected not to “undermine” the government, and it empowers the NGO Affairs Agency and the minister of the interior to close down NGOs. Article 14(2) of the act allows the government to “use any conciliatory measure it deems appropriate to remedy any breach of the Code of Conduct by a non-governmental organization.” The Code of Conduct is included in the NGO Act and sets terms and guidelines for an NGO’s operations and management. It also sets guidelines for the kind of relationship an NGO must cultivate with other stakeholders, including communities, beneficiaries, other NGOs, and government departments. If the government believes a CSO has violated this code, then it can suspend or close the organization. The law does not provide any form of defense or appeal that would allow an affected NGO to seek redress against government’s “conciliatory measures.”

Although the government targeted political opponents and others in 2015, there were no reported cases of direct government harassment of CSOs. CSOs generally refrained from openly criticizing the central government, especially the presidency, for fear of harassment or closure.

The NGO Act provides for tax exemptions on grants from foreign donors and income-generating activities and for duty waivers on goods and materials imported by CSOs for their work. The law allows expatriate staff to obtain tax exemptions on their salaries and other benefits. Although CSO vehicles are exempt from taxation under Article 5 of the NGO Act, CSOs continue to pay a road tax. Individual and corporate donors do not receive tax benefits for their donations to CSOs.

CSOs are allowed under the NGO Act to engage in income-generating activities to raise funds for their programs and operations. Although CSOs cannot usually compete for government contracts, some CSOs have been given government contracts to provide services such as the construction of schools or training for parliamentarians.

Lawyers in The Gambia are familiar with the NGO Act, which is similar to the older NGO Decree 81. Legal services for CSOs are generally available only in the capital city, Banjul, and the largest city, Kanifing. Lawyers usually charge for their services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.7**

Gambian CSOs working in local communities have traditionally sought to build strong relationships with their constituencies. CSOs’ effectiveness in working with constituencies has enabled them to continue to mobilize local networks around an array of causes. In 2015 ActionAid International The Gambia (AAITG) continued to work with farmers’ associations to help agricultural communities take charge of their livelihoods. In addition, The Gambia Committee Against Harmful Traditional Practices (GAMCOTRAP) provided ongoing support to a network of former female circumcisers who have abandoned the practice. The Child Protection Association (CPA) worked with child protection committees in local communities, and the Forum for African Women Educationalists Gambia (FAWEGAM) promoted mothers’ clubs in nearly every school to improve the enrollment, retention, and performance of girls in school. CSOs working at the local level often obtain non-monetary support from their communities, including labor, land, farm produce, or other locally produced materials. For example, constituencies may help a CSO such as the Mbolo Association in the coastal town of Tujereng build a community center or school by providing sand, gravel, timber, thatch, and other
construction materials. In 2015 the association established a training center for young girls who have dropped out of school. The land on which the center stands as well as its construction were both the result of local support.

CSOs normally have constitutions, as this is a legal requirement for registration. Many CSOs develop strategic plans, which they review and update periodically. These plans are informed by CSOs’ missions and play a central role in decision making geared towards fulfilling organizational objectives. When they are shared with donors, the plans can also aid in raising resources. Smaller, more informal CSOs are increasingly realizing the value of strategic plans and have begun to develop them as a means of convincing donors, partners, and beneficiaries of their legitimacy, professionalism, and ability to raise resources.

Larger CSOs, including NGOs, have management manuals or staff service rules as well as manuals for the board. Although some boards make a major contribution to staff recruitment, asset management, and their organizations’ public image, many CSOs are challenged by boards that lack the capacity to raise resources or interfere in daily operations. Boards can also be weakened or overshadowed by executive directors. CSOs sometimes lack sufficient funding to conduct general meetings at which new board members can be elected.

Larger, well-funded CSOs usually have a full complement of staff, including professional accountants and information technology managers. They may retain lawyers on a permanent basis or in association with specific projects. Staff members usually have job descriptions and employment contracts that spell out the terms of employment. Many CSOs recruit volunteers, who are usually young graduates from the University of The Gambia or vocational training institutes. Some CSOs work with interns from abroad, mainly the United States and Europe. Many smaller CSOs do not have all necessary staff members because of a lack of funding to hire them. These smaller CSOs typically have only an executive director, one or two program officers, and an accounts clerk.

Bigger and more established CSOs have modern basic office equipment, including computers. Internet access is growing rapidly as the number of Internet service providers in the country increases. However, many CSOs do not have software for tasks such as accounting and project management and still perform these jobs manually. While better-resourced CSOs often have a fleet of vehicles, many smaller organizations have only a single vehicle or none at all.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

Funding is the major challenge for Gambian CSOs. Opportunities for local fundraising are minimal, as the private sector and individual philanthropists donate little to CSOs. Consequently, Gambian CSOs obtain almost all of their funding from foreign donors. For example, CSOs that deliver social services in areas such as agriculture and healthcare obtain grants from the Global Environment Fund (GEF), which is administered by the National Environment Agency (NEA) and funded by the UN Industrial Development Organization, Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria, and several other agencies located mainly in Europe and the United States. The European Commission (EC) in The Gambia also provides limited funding to CSOs, especially in the areas of local governance and women’s rights. However, the gradual withdrawal of foreign donors in 2013 and 2014 has left a funding gap that has yet to be filled.

More established CSOs may have multiple sources of funding lasting from one to five years. Such organizations, including AAITG, Concern Universal (CU), and ChildFund (CF), are usually foreign CSOs or their affiliates and have sufficient institutional capacity, including highly professional staff, to meet the funding requirements of major international donors. Since smaller CSOs lack this capacity, they remain
financially precarious. In many cases these smaller CSOs become sub-partners of larger organizations in the search for funding.

As The Gambia does not have a core group of donors that provide CSOs with consistent financial support, organizations increasingly scan the Internet for funding opportunities. There have been several reports of successful fundraising in this manner.

A number of CSO networks, including TANGO, CPA, Network Against Gender-Based Violence (NGBV), and the Gambia National AIDS Support Societies (GAMNASS), require member organizations to make small annual subscriptions, usually amounting to no more than $100. In the case of TANGO, international NGO members pay about $300 annually. Other organizations receive dues from individual or organizational members, but these contributions are minimal and members do not regularly pay.

The NGO Act allows CSOs to engage in income-generating activities if the revenue is invested back into programs and services. Some CSOs earn income by renting conference halls or chairs, providing photocopying services, or selling publications. However, these activities do not provide substantial amounts of income. A few CSOs raise resources from constituencies. For example, FAWEGAM and The Gambia Federation for the Disabled (GFD) organize gala dinners to raise funds. Other CSOs sponsor street walks or social work activities. A few specialized CSOs occasionally obtain government contracts to build structures, train government officials, or provide policy reviews. In 2015 the organization Future In Our Hands (FIOH) continued to construct classrooms under contracts from the Ministry of Education.

Large CSOs usually have sound financial management systems managed by competent staff. Their financial management resources often include manuals with guidelines on the procurement, disbursement, and recording of assets. As a result, these organizations tend to be more transparent than smaller organizations, and they often conduct annual audits with certified independent audit firms and generate annual reports with financial statements. Smaller CSOs do not have sophisticated financial management systems and as a result receive fewer funds, which in turn limits their ability to conduct financial audits and produce annual reports.

**ADVOCACY: 4.9**

At both the central and local levels, The Gambia’s government engages frequently with CSOs on social issues and community development. CSOs also sit as members on many government project steering committees, sometimes as vice chairs. For example, in 2015 TANGO served as vice chair of the National Social Protection Steering Committee. The government and CSOs also work together on project steering committees to develop proposals and oversee project implementation and evaluation. TANGO was a member of the steering committee of the Enhanced Integrated Framework at the Ministry of Trade, which develops proposals promoting local industries to submit to the World Bank. CSO employees generally enjoy cordial working and personal relationships with government officials.

In contrast, there is very little CSO participation in policy-making processes related to the economy, security, or foreign affairs. Given the constrained legal and political environment, Gambian CSOs tend to conduct policy advocacy in these areas in a non-confrontational manner, such as by inviting government leaders to seminars or paying them courtesy calls. Organizations are reluctant to engage on issues involving state accountability, corruption, or governmental ineffectiveness or excess out of fear of reprisals.

Nevertheless, CSOs at both the national and local level are increasingly involved in advocating for the rights of women, children, and persons with disabilities. For example, in 2015, Think Young Women launched a campaign to abolish FGM through radio talk shows, community meetings, and seminars designed to engage
stakeholders and raise public awareness. At the same time, the National Youth Parliament embarked on a major civic engagement campaign to make local governments more effective and enhance public participation through radio shows and community meetings. Thanks to the efforts of these organizations, the government declared a countrywide ban on FGM in November 2015.

To promote CSO participation in the policy process, TANGO has sponsored open bi-monthly forums with lawmakers, regulators, service providers, academia, and other actors since 2012. In 2015 only one policy forum—on “Directing Corporate Social Responsibility to Development Organizations”—took place because of funding constraints.

Understanding of the concept of lobbying is limited in the CSO community. It is likely to remain weak because of the constrained legal and political environment.

Although CSOs understand the value of a favorable legal and policy environment, they made no effort in this area in 2015. Notably, CSOs were not aware of the existence of the new NGO Act until late in the year.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.0**

CSOs provide a diverse range of goods and services throughout The Gambia. They are heavily involved in all sectors of development, including health, education, and community development, and provide basic social goods and services as well as capacity-building support. CSOs are also leading actors in environmental protection, job creation, women’s empowerment, and youth development. In 2015 there were indications that service delivery was contracting because of reduced funding. For example, AAITG used to have regional offices in all five regions of the country but now operates two regional offices.

CSOs’ service interventions fully reflect the needs of communities and constituents. Their impact is significant because of the high rate of poverty, limited access to public services, and minimal government presence in poor and rural communities. Without the contributions of CSOs, many communities would not have access to education or healthcare services. CSOs in poor and rural communities also provide relief and food aid and help farmers adopt new methods of farming adapted to climate change and environmental preservation goals. Ongoing programs include those of the Agency for the Development of Women and Children (ADWAC), which is a key player in community development in the North Bank Region of the country. The Wuli and Sandu Development Association (WASDA) in the Upper River Region also operates valuable horticulture and animal husbandry programs geared towards poverty reduction.

Many CSOs offer their goods and services to the public, including other CSOs, academia, media, mosques and churches, and government and development agencies. CSOs sometimes raise revenue through such means as selling publications or renting facilities, but income from such efforts is small. Overall, cost recovery is limited, as CSOs are not profit-making entities and generally sell their products at a discount rather than at market prices or offer them free of charge.

Both the central and local governments in The Gambia recognize the contribution of CSOs to the provision and monitoring of social services. Their appreciation is evident in the scope and quality of CSO-government engagement. In the social sectors, CSOs usually sign memoranda of understanding with government agencies to formalize and strengthen their partnerships. Moreover, many CSOs have helped build the capacity of government officials in management, governance, and development areas. In 2015, for example, TANGO trained lawmakers and law enforcement officers on human rights issues, CPA conducted workshops with local government authorities on child protection, and NGBV provided training on sexual violence to health and social workers and security officers. In addition, AAITG supported local councils by improving their
ability to manage local development and community participation as a means of promoting good governance and accountability.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.4**

There are no CSO resource centers in The Gambia, other than several informal centers operated by CSOs at their offices. Such centers usually offer informational materials or serve as meeting places. For information and research, CSOs also rely on the Internet or a small number of libraries at institutions of higher learning, provided they are open to users other than students and faculty. There are also no intermediary support organizations (ISOs) providing CSOs with training or grants.

While a few foundations in The Gambia, such as the President Jammeh Foundation for Peace, Deyda Hydara Trust, and Rotary Club, provide direct support to communities, hospitals, schools, and individuals, they do not provide grants to CSOs. Government agencies occasionally re-grant funds from international donors. An example of this arrangement is the GEF project administered by the NEA. Funds for re-granting usually come from the World Bank, UN, and EC.

CSOs share information about funding opportunities, partnerships, and international and local news reports and sometimes conduct joint programs. Networks that facilitate information sharing include those sponsored by CPA, TANGO, NGBV, and West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP Gambia). In 2015 the Public Health Research and Development Center (CIAM) and Health Promotion and Development Organization (HEPDO) collaborated on a health research and sensitization project under the auspices of TANGO. In addition, AAITG, CPA, and FAWEGAM collaborated on a child-protection project funded by Save the Children Sweden.

Some employees in the CSO community offer high-quality training on management, governance, operations, and development issues. CSOs also rely on other sources of CSO-specific training, such as individual consultants, private training institutes, and the University of The Gambia. Training is generally available only in the greater Banjul area, where these institutes and consultants are located. However, CSOs sometimes go out to towns and villages to conduct trainings for targeted audiences. Employees of well-funded CSOs sometimes enroll at training institutes abroad. Some training materials are available in local languages in print form.

Both the private sector and CSOs recognize the need for partnerships. In 2015 business, CSO, and government representatives engaged in discussions about strengthening and formalizing their relationship. Participants in the discussions included The Gambia Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Trust Bank, Africell, Qcell, Ministry of Trade and Finance, and The Gambia Revenue Authority. Businesses and CSOs engage in modest informal partnerships when private-sector funding is available. Usually such partnerships take place in conjunction with international commemorative days. For example, on World Blind Day in 2015, The Gambia Federation of the Disabled (GFD) obtained funding for t-shirts and snacks from Africell, a cellphone company.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.0**

CSOs enjoy a cordial working relationship with the media, which generally provide favorable coverage of CSO activities. Journalists are regularly invited to cover CSO events, and many CSOs have weekly radio talk shows hosted by private radio stations. There is only one television station in The Gambia, which provides coverage of CSO activities when invited. To encourage the media to provide better coverage, CSOs have trained journalists on the appropriate coverage of such issues as HIV/AIDS, rape, women’s and children’s
rights, and good governance. In 2015 CPA trained twenty-five journalists and the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (IHRDA) trained thirty journalists on these issues.

The Gambian public continues to view CSOs as useful, relevant, and strategic contributors to improving their lives and livelihoods. Many communities and individuals acknowledge that they are able to obtain decent incomes and lead better lives thanks to CSOs. Communities show their support for CSOs mainly in non-monetary terms, such as the provision of labor, land, and moral support.

Both the government and the private sector have positive views of service-providing CSOs. They consider them competent and effective partners that are making major contributions to the country’s development. For example, many government agencies at both the central and local levels approach CSOs for technical support, capacity building, committee service, and, if they are financially strapped, even funding. On the other hand, the government has an unfavorable view of human rights organizations. For example, in November 2015 the president issued a threat to opposition and human rights organizations that he would not tolerate “any trouble” from them in the run-up to the 2016 presidential elections.

CSOs recognize the importance of promoting their work and improving their public image. Many CSOs have their own websites and social media platforms or produce t-shirts and posters to promote their causes and place themselves in the public view. Some CSOs, such as FAWEGAM and GFD, host annual fundraising gala dinners at which they publicize their activities. CSOs place paid advertisements in print and electronic media to publicize job vacancies, press releases, and events.

Some CSOs, especially larger organizations, have codes of conduct for staff. These codes are generally taken seriously. Larger CSOs publish annual reports, which they often print and distribute to public and private institutions, other CSOs, universities and other tertiary schools, and resource centers and post on their websites.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for The Gambia

The Gambia

CSO Sustainability

Legal Environment

Public Image

Organizational Capacity

Infrastructure

Financial Viability

Service Provision

Advocacy

The Gambia

1 3 5 7

Sustainability Enhanced

Sustainability Evolving

Sustainability Impeded
GHANA

Country Facts
Capital: Accra
Government Type: Constitutional Democracy
Population: 26,327,649
GDP per capita (PPP): $4,300
Human Development Index: 140

The year 2015 was economically, politically, and socially challenging for Ghana. The country’s economy did not show significant improvement despite a bailout from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Ghana’s currency, the cedi, continued to depreciate, and unpredictable electricity supplies frustrated both businesses and consumers. Preparations for the 2016 presidential and parliamentary elections dominated the political space, with party primaries taking place to select candidates to contest parliamentary seats. Opposition parties called for replacing the country’s voter registration system, which they claimed was flawed. A video exposé of judicial corruption by an investigative journalist stirred up widespread public outrage. On June 3 a fire caused by fuel leaking into floodwaters that had inundated the capital city of Accra killed more than 150 people.

Overall, CSO sustainability declined in 2015, largely because the sector’s financial viability deteriorated after the donor-funded program Strengthening Transparency, Accountability, and Responsiveness in Ghana (STAR-Ghana) stopped issuing grants. Given CSOs’ nearly exclusive dependence on foreign support, the cessation of funding by STAR-Ghana drastically affected the work of more than eighty organizations mainly...
working in governance, access to justice, education, oil and gas, and health. As a result of this development, a lack of vibrancy in the CSO sector was noticeable. However, advocacy CSOs were able to tackle a few major issues during the year, including judicial corruption, the electoral process, and the energy crisis, and CSOs continued to provide a broad assortment of services. Occupy-Ghana, which had emerged as a major force for good governance in 2014, maintained a lower profile in 2015.

There is no readily available information on the total number of registered and active CSOs in Ghana. One of the main registering agencies, the Department of Social Welfare (DSW), reported that it registered 429 new CSOs in 2015, an increase of nearly 80 percent over 2014. These new registrations brought the number of organizations registered with the DSW to 6,687. DSW records also showed that 1,680 organizations renewed their operating permits in 2015, representing a dramatic increase over the 515 organizations renewing in 2014 and 805 in 2013. The higher number of registrations and re-registrations in 2015 was largely because of DSW’s stricter enforcement of relevant regulations, coupled with its efforts to educate CSOs about the need to register or renew their licenses each year.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.9**

Ghanaian CSOs continued to enjoy a favorable legal environment in 2015. Registration remained fairly easy. As there is no law specifically governing CSOs, they must register as not-for-profit organizations limited by guarantee with the Registrar General’s Department under the Company Code of 1963 (Act 179). CSOs must also register with the DSW and, through the DSW, obtain social-welfare permits from relevant national, regional, and district offices. However, because of limited information and the DSW’s traditionally lax enforcement of regulations, CSOs have typically failed to register with the DSW after receiving their business certificates from the Registrar General. In 2015 the DSW began to enforce registration requirements more strictly, and some district assemblies began to request social-welfare permits before engaging with CSOs or even accepting invitations to attend their events.

The DSW is charged with direct oversight of CSOs at both the national and local levels. However, the DSW’s weak institutional capacity means that it does not usually enforce CSOs’ compliance with legal requirements, such as the need to submit annual financial reports. Largely because of limited monitoring by the DSW, no CSO was closed down in 2015 on charges of non-compliance.

The Ghanaian government does not harass CSOs. Organizations are generally free to debate, oppose, and offer constructive criticism of government policies without fear of closure or governmental crackdown. This lack of harassment helps create a favorable environment for the establishment and growth of CSOs throughout the country.

CSOs are exempted from some taxes, mainly on imported items. Usually only CSOs engaged in relief and social support services apply for these exemptions, as they import goods and other materials on a regular basis. Other CSOs are reluctant to apply to the DSW because they have failed to register or renew their operating permits. Grants are untaxed, but CSOs must withhold social security, income, and other statutory taxes on behalf of service providers and employees.
As not-for-profit organizations CSOs are generally barred from engaging in commercial activities. However, they may earn revenue from the provision of services and other activities provided the profits go into supporting their operations. CSOs may compete for government contracts.

As there are no regulations specifically governing CSOs, there are no lawyers specialized in CSO law. Well-endowed urban organizations can obtain legal advice from general legal practitioners or specialists in company law, while smaller rural organizations usually rely on free services from a public-service organization that provides pro bono legal services to the poor and indignant. Some urban CSOs have staff lawyers who can offer legal expertise.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

The sector’s organizational capacity did not change significantly during the year. Large and small as well as urban and rural organizations throughout the country continued to mobilize core constituencies to support their work. For example, SEND-Ghana, Gender Center for Women Studies, Voice Ghana, Youth Bridge Foundation, and Integrated Social Development Center (ISODEC) mobilized a broad range of groups, including young girls, vulnerable women, people with disabilities, and in-school and out-of-school youth, as they helped meet their needs and address local and global development issues. ABANTU for Development, a women’s organization, collaborated with Christian Aid on localizing the post-2015 development agenda from a gender perspective.

CSOs usually have clearly articulated mission statements, as they are a requirement for registration. However, CSOs adhere to their mission statements to varying degrees. Larger urban CSOs tend to maintain their organizational focus, while smaller rural CSOs must be more flexible to take advantage of limited funding opportunities. Strategic plans have become a mainstay for most CSOs, including smaller organizations, since they are a major donor requirement. In addition, CSOs find that strategic plans are useful for organizational growth. For instance, despite funding challenges, Voice Ghana, an organization that trains and supports people with disabilities, has taken steps to develop into a major disability research and advocacy organization as part of its new strategic plan.

Management and governance structures vary between larger and smaller organizations. Larger CSOs with qualified professional staff usually have stronger internal structures, with management teams handling day-to-day operations and boards exercising advisory and oversight responsibilities. Most small organizations do not maintain these distinctions because of funding and capacity constraints. The boards of small and rural organizations are usually constituted solely to meet registration or funding requirements and rarely meet regularly.

The recruitment and retention of paid professional staff remains a challenge for both larger and smaller organizations. Most CSOs lack core funding and cover operational costs, including staff salaries, on a project-by-project basis. Remuneration levels vary, and while larger, urban CSOs offer clear job descriptions and contracts, very few small or rural organizations offer contracts to their employees. Smaller organizations are unable to engage qualified professionals for the long term and rely instead on volunteers to support their work. Volunteers are often unemployed individuals who expect some kind of financial incentive in exchange for their contributions, such as stipends to cover transportation costs.

Basic office equipment such as computers, printers, and mobile phones are common at CSOs. Access to Internet services has become fairly widespread, and smartphones are used throughout the country. However, Ghana’s energy crisis has impaired CSO operations. For large urban organizations with power generators, the cost of fuel increases overhead costs, while at smaller organizations without generators, the lack of electricity from the national grid often leads to a halt in work.
The financial situation of Ghanaian CSOs was volatile in 2015. Foreign-sourced grants continued to be the major source of funding. STAR-Ghana, a major multi-donor pooled-funding program supported by the UK Department for International Development (DFID), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), and European Union (EU), completed its first phase of funding in April 2015 and stopped issuing grants for the rest of the year. As a result, the work of more than eighty organizations was drastically affected. CSOs that had received financial and technical support from STAR-Ghana for work in health, education, oil and gas, governance, justice, and other sectors had to cut back on the volume of their projects and the size of their workforce. For instance, while in 2014 grants from STAR-Ghana made up about 36 percent of the total income of Voice Ghana, in 2015 the cessation of funding meant that Voice Ghana had to discontinue certain projects. Similarly, grants from STAR-Ghana had constituted nearly 30 percent of the total income of the Institute for Democratic Governance (IDEG) in 2014, but with no income from STAR-Ghana in 2015 IDEG had to curtail its activities. In northern Ghana, the Northern Sector Action on Awareness Center (NORSACC) lost about 23 percent of its budget for work in governance, education, and health when STAR-Ghana stopped issuing grants.

With the absence of STAR-Ghana funding, competition for funding from other sources was intense. Targeted opportunities for funding ranged from foreign calls for proposals in particular sectors to small grants awarded by international and domestic entities for in-country projects. The Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA), World Bank, USAID, DFID, African Women’s Development Fund, and EU awarded notable grants. Most smaller, less well-endowed organizations lacked the capacity to develop effective grant proposals and therefore had to scale back their activities and operations. Some non-monetary support—for example, access to meeting venues—was available, but this was generally inadequate to enable organizations with little funding to pursue their core mandates effectively.

Local philanthropy is not well developed in Ghana. Some large, multi-national telecommunications, mining, and financial companies have set up grant-making foundations. For example, MTN and Vodafone have established foundations that fund projects in health and education. But their grants are usually small in comparison to those offered by foreign donors.

Large urban organizations tend to have diversified sources of funding to support their activities. However, they usually lack a core group of funders that provides support for overhead costs. Thus the financial viability of all CSOs continues to be weak for both the short and medium terms.

Very few CSOs have products and services they can sell to raise revenue. Some CSOs market publications, but they do not receive returns substantial enough to support their operations in the absence of external funding. Income from consultancies is occasionally possible but is not a viable prospect for most organizations. The collection of dues by member-based organizations in both urban and rural areas is increasingly difficult because of the general economic slump. Some rural CSOs have set up social enterprises to earn income to support their operations.

The government’s enforcement of rules requiring CSOs to submit audit reports is weak. However, most large and urban organizations use qualified accountants and financial systems. Small rural organizations maintain basic accounts. With the search for funding becoming very competitive and strong financial management systems a major requirement of donors, even some smaller organizations are beginning to seek the services of accountants to help organize their financial reports.
CSOs in Ghana generally have good relations with policy makers at both the national and local levels. CSOs’ work is widely recognized by government agencies. For example, at the national level, the Ministry of Finance requests input from CSOs during its annual budgeting process. Similarly, regional and district budget hearings are usually opened for CSO comments.

Issue-based coalitions continued to pursue advocacy goals in 2015. The Civil Society Platform on IMF Bailout and Occupy Ghana continued to call for the transparent and accountable use of public resources. The Civil Society Platform on the IMF Bailout organized its second national forum and released a communiqué calling on the legislature to pass the Right-to-Information (RTI) Bill, which has been under consideration for nearly a decade. Occupy Ghana met with the Auditor General’s Department to discuss its request for documents related to the department’s efforts to recover funds misapplied by public institutions. The group threatened to sue the Auditor General to retrieve the missing funds, and the Auditor General provided some missing documentation. At the end of the year Occupy Ghana was still pushing to retrieve the lost funds.

Another key advocacy issue was the government’s approach to the country’s energy crisis. The African Center for Energy Policy (ACEP) was at the forefront of calls for greater transparency about the government’s agreements to purchase emergency power barges to alleviate the electricity shortage. Other CSO and media groups, with support from the Ghana Oil and Gas Inclusive Growth (GOGIG) program, a UK-sponsored initiative, hosted public discussions to air citizens’ concerns about the impact of the discovery and commercial exploration of oil deposits in Ghana.

CSOs continued to review and make suggestions about policy and planning documents, budgets, parliamentary bills, and committee reports. For instance, the National Development Planning Commission invited CSOs from across the country to contribute to the development of the forty-year national development plan. As 2016 is an election year, civil society groups such as the Coalition for Domestic Elections Observers issued statements calling on the Electoral Commission to clean the voter registry before the elections.

There are no identifiable CSO lobbying groups in Ghana. Lobbying remains a poorly defined concept, and the term is often used to refer to convoluted political arrangements. Nevertheless, CSOs’ advocacy and publications on key legislation continued to be a major contribution during the year. For instance, the Ghana Integrative Initiative (GII) and the Media Foundation for West Africa were assertive about judicial corruption and called on parliament to pass the RTI bill.

Despite widespread awareness of its potential benefits, CSOs remain unenthusiastic about a new law to provide a comprehensive legal framework for their operations.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.8**

CSOs provide a broad assortment of services in Ghana, ranging from basic services in water, sanitation, health, and education, to research on human rights, public finance, economic management, and security. With citizens’ participation in the country’s democratic processes expanding, CSOs are emerging to support or improve public and private-sector service delivery. However, in 2015 some organizations had to cut back on planned services as a result of the cessation of funding by STAR-Ghana. For instance,
Youth Alliance for Reproductive Order (YARO) in northern Ghana was unable to expand its education of school children about reproductive health issues, and ROHA in the Volta region faced similar challenges in deepening its health education and advocacy campaigns in rural communities.

CSOs generally provide goods and services that reflect the needs of their constituents. In rural communities their services often target infrastructural inadequacies, such as in water and sanitation facilities. CBOs and FBOs in agricultural communities provide education on farming practices and the use of fertilizers and pesticides along with micro-credit funds to support vulnerable and poor citizens. Voice Ghana, for instance, provided seed funds to members of its disability network in the Volta Region to engage in economic activities of their choice. Some urban research and advocacy organizations, such as IDEG, Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), and SEND-Ghana, often offer capacity-building training in rural communities to empower citizens to more effectively interact with public authorities.

Some CSOs’ products, such as publications and training workshops, are marketed beyond their memberships. For instance, a second publication assessing the performance of Ghana’s 216 district assemblies by CDD was widely publicized by the media. The report’s publication spurred intense public discussion about the role of local government bodies in development.

CSOs rarely seek to recover the cost of the goods and services that they provide. Most of their activities are funded by grants, and as not-for-profit organizations they do not usually produce goods and services in sufficient quantities to reap commercial benefits.

The government recognizes the work of CSOs at both the national and local levels. Although there is no institutionalized government funding mechanism for CSOs, they are all allowed to compete for government contracts. They are sometimes successful in obtaining contracts, especially for consulting services in such areas as research and public education. For instance, some CSOs in the health sector were awarded funding by the Ghana AIDS Commission to support outreach and educational programs.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.7**

Ghanaian CSOs’ infrastructure support has remained unchanged in recent years. The World Bank’s Public Information Center and the West African Civil Society Institute (WACSI), both in Accra, offer CSOs access to publications on a range of social, economic, and political topics. WACSI has maintained its position as the main source of customized training, mentoring, and coaching for professional associations, unions, women’s organizations, CBOs, FBOs, youth groups, and other organizations. Participants must pay for WACSI’s training services.

From 2010 to 2015 STAR-Ghana was the country’s most important local grant-making program, re-granting international donor funds to CSOs around the country. The conclusion of its first phase of grant-making in 2015 reduced the scope of activities implemented by more than eighty CSOs. STAR-Ghana was expected to commence a second phase of grant-making in the fourth quarter of 2015, but this did not happen, although the organization did announce that a new grant-making phase would begin in 2016.

As a whole, the CSO sector does not have a unified committee or coalition to promote its interests. Individual CSO coalitions pursue members’ and constituents’ interests, and the scale and vibrancy of their efforts varies from sector to sector. Coalitions focused on water, sanitation, and health services seem more energetic than those engaged in governance. For instance, in 2015 the Coalition of NGOs in Water and Sanitation (CONIWAS) mobilized its members to press the government to address shortfalls in the budget for water services and the eradication of open defecation, both of which contribute to cholera outbreaks in
some parts of the country. The Coalition of NGOs in Health was able to mobilize members to support public education on immunization and Ebola.

Several organizations offer regular courses on proposal writing, project and financial management, monitoring, communications, and other topics. For instance, WACSI, the Ghana Institute for Public Administration (GIMPA), Participatory Development Associates (PDA), and Shawbell Consulting offer trainings for a fee, mostly in Accra. There are currently no known training materials on CSO operations available in local languages.

Intersectoral partnerships between CSOs and government agencies occur at different levels. For instance, after the outbreak of Ebola in West Africa, the Herald Foundation, in collaboration with the Ghana Health Service (GHS), a government agency, provided training to nurses in Ebola infection prevention and control, and GHS, Ghana AIDS Commission, and other governmental bodies, including the Ghana Education Service (GES) and some district assemblies, partnered with CSOs to educate the public and school children about the Ebola disease.

The media remains a major ally of CSOs as a watchdog on issues related to governance and corruption. For instance, an exposé of judicial corruption by a prominent investigative journalist was widely supported by CSOs, most of which pressured the judiciary to act swiftly to redeem its reputation. This effort contributed to decisive actions by both the Judicial Council and the president to dismiss some of the accused judges following a panel hearing.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.1**

CSOs in Ghana continued to enjoy positive media coverage in 2015. CSOs’ activities and advocacy work are considered news, and major media networks, mostly based in Accra, sometimes provide live coverage of CSO events. Some CSOs place paid advertisements publicizing their activities and announcing events.

Media coverage of CSOs’ contribution to policy discussions is helping shape public perceptions of CSOs. Understanding of the concept of CSOs generally varies between urban and rural populations. Typically, CSOs providing services in rural areas have a direct impact on the lives of local citizens, who therefore appreciate their contributions. In contrast, urban organizations engaging in advocacy work do not provide material support to their surrounding communities, and as a result, the public often does not understand what CSOs do and its perceptions of them can be mixed.

The government’s perception of CSOs remains positive, although some government functionaries label CSOs as appendages of opposition political parties. Nevertheless, both central and local governments often rely on CSOs to offer professional services. The business sector also has positive perceptions of CSOs but does not engage often with the sector.

Urban and large CSOs have strong public relations and communications units to support their public branding. The production of newsletters and use of social media platforms to disseminate information has become common.

There is no code of ethics regulating activities in the sector. Annual reports are usually published only by large urban CSOs, as smaller organizations lack the financial and internal capacity to produce them.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Ghana

CSO Sustainability

1 3 5 7

Sustainability Enhanced  Sustainability Evolving  Sustainability Impeded

Ghana

4.3
Guinea

The Guinean civil society sector consists of NGOs, unions, professional associations, community-based groups, and cooperatives. These organizations play an important role in Guinea’s socio-economic development and they intervene in a multitude of sectors. The number of registered CSOs in Guinea is unknown because of their lack of visibility vis-à-vis the public sector institutions that oversee the civil society sector. Despite the lack of reliable statistics, larger CSOs are typically located in Conakry, while smaller and sometimes informal CSOs are based in rural areas. These informal CSOs can be entirely charitable, while others provide paid services. They often partner with larger CSOs or the government to implement development projects.

The October 2015 presidential election was a major event and influenced the general political environment in Guinea. Disagreements between the ruling power and the opposition characterized the electoral process. The particular areas of tension included elections’ scheduling, with the opposition wanting the communal elections to take place before the presidential ones; the renewal of commune councils administered by special...
during this process, the opposition organized protests that led to violence and some fatalities. it is within this context that guinean CSOs such as the national council for civil society organizations (CNOSCG) or the guinea coalition for women and girls in guinea conducted advocacy campaigns and facilitated consultation frameworks to decrease the tension among various actors. these efforts, supported by international partners, led to the signature by both parties of the August 20th accord establishing the rules around the presidential election that was held on October 11, 2015. also noteworthy, some CSOs, such as the african center for international development training (CENAFOD), the guinea chapter of the youth leadership for african peace and development (LEJEPAD-GUINEE), and the guinean chapter of the west africa network for peacebuilding (WANEP-GUINEA), with support from the open society initiative for west africa (OSIWA) and the national democratic institute (NDI), were responsible for monitoring the elections.

the Ebola epidemic was a defining feature of the social climate. in partnership with the government of guinea and international partners, CSOs played an important role in responding to that crisis. through their response, CSOs increased their organizational capacity. they established relationships with United Nations agencies and other international organizations from north america, asia, and europe. also through these relationships, they received computers and other office equipment. the Ebola crisis also had a tremendous impact on the economic environment, with the country entering into an unprecedented recession.

With the exception of CSOs involved in combatting the Ebola epidemic, CSO personnel have not improved their competencies. Nevertheless, 2015 did witness the gradual return of international technical and financial partners. To mitigate the negative impact of the Ebola crisis on the population, the government of guinea partnered with micro-finance institutions to provide affordable credit to CSOs, with a focus on women’s associations.

**Legal Environment: 5.3**

The legal environment for CSOs did not change between 2014 and 2015.

The laws that govern the CSO sector remain the same. These are the law 013 of July 4, 2005, pertaining to NGOs and the law 014 pertaining to cooperatives and associations. These laws are favorable to the registration of CSOs, although in practice, several CSOs have encountered difficulties with registration in 2015. These laws establish the provisions on CSO creation, operation, partnership with the government, scope of competence, management, dissolution, geographic coverage, review procedures in cases of authority abuse, and fiscal exemption. While CSOs belonging to the category of cooperatives and associations were able to obtain legal status through prefects, some NGOs have faced significant difficulties in achieving that status at the national level. For example, the association of private school teachers went as far as requesting the support of the Ministry for Human Rights. Observers note behaviors of government officials as the key contributing factors. These include administrative delays, absenteeism, and attempts at illegally extracting money from those requesting legal status.
Since the country’s government and the parliament have not revised these laws, umbrella organizations and NGOs are governed by the same laws, even though they do not have the same missions.

Guinean CSOs are tax exempt. They do not pay taxes on the grants they receive from financial partners. Additionally, individual and institutional donors recognized by the government benefit from tax deductions. However, there are some difficulties in monitoring CSOs’ tax exemption, especially as it pertains to the procurement of goods such as computers and gasoline.

The laws governing CSOs allow one category to generate revenue and profit from their services (cooperatives and associations in particular), which is not the case for NGOs, which can only generate revenue to maintain a minimal level of operations. As a result, NGOs face challenges hiring and retaining long-term personnel.

In 2015, there were no known instances of government harassment of CSOs. However, a private radio station (Radio Baobab in Kankan in High Guinea) was suspended for three months for failing to respect ethics. This affected its listenership comprised of farmers’ associations. There are no lawyers that specialize in CSO law.

Despite the radio’s suspension, the overall legal framework has been favorable. It has been permissive to CSO’s important role in public debates around the elections through the interventions of CNOSCG, the Platform of United Citizens for Development (PCUD), the Women and Girls’ Coalition of Guinea (COFFIG), and different religious associations.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.8**

The Ebola crisis influenced the organizational capacity of CSOs. Those engaged in addressing the crisis were able to develop competencies in communication for behavior change, managing relations with institutional partners, epidemiology, and resource management (physical, human, and financial).

Several CSOs have bylaws that clearly articulate the separation between the executive board, management, and oversight. However, in practice most of these organizations do not respect their own bylaws, arguing that they do not have adequate resources to hire the necessary full-time personnel. This discrepancy has a damaging effect on the credibility of CSOs. Unfortunately, a large number of them neglect the consequences of this practice.

The inability to identify and establish constituencies is a significant capacity challenge for CSOs. This issue has not improved compared to 2014. CSOs remain dependent on financial and technical support from international donors and partners, which reflects and contributes to their inability to mobilize resources domestically. While donor-funded projects support the technical and financial management capacity of CSOs, they do little to develop CSOs’ capacity for mobilizing resources locally.

Diaspora-led associations investing in health, education, culture, sports, and religion are the most effective CSOs when it comes to mobilizing resources from local actors. Specific examples include the Telimele Prefecture Diaspora Association and the Gaoual Prefecture Diaspora Association. Such diaspora associations are found across the Guinean territory. Other religious associations, such as the Association of African Muslims, are effective in mobilizing resources for the construction of mosques. Traditional NGOs are less capable of mobilizing domestic resources.

The majority of CSOs are familiar with the strategic planning concept, but very few are applying it. The few NGOs that have and regularly update their strategic plans tend to be umbrella organizations, such as the NGOs for Sustainable Development (FONGDD), CNOSCG, and the Citizens’ Platform for Development (PECUD).
In 2015, there was progress made in the updating and modernizing of office equipment that CSOs acquired mostly through partnerships formed with international partners to address the Ebola crisis. However, that progress has not translated in these organizations’ ability to hire and retain full-time long-term staff. In fact, as Guinea got closer to being Ebola-free, the individuals who worked on the response were let go from the organizations that had employed them.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.3**

Overall, Guinean CSO activities are implemented throughout the entire territory, in multiple sectors, and with diverse financial and technical partners. Despite this diversity, Guinean CSOs are faced with the same financial viability issues as in 2014, with some signs of worsening. In 2015, CSOs were not even capable of mobilizing resources required to maintain their short-term viability.

In the absence of relevant statistical data, it is difficult to determine the percentage of funding for CSOs that is from local sources. However, it is clear that CSOs’ local resource mobilization is weak. Local collectivities issue solicitations for community development projects that are funded by international donors such as the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), the World Bank, and USAID. Despite this weakness, CSOs are able to mobilize human resources at a local level. They work through local institutions to access labor for the implementation of collective actions and projects. These efforts are not evaluated, nor do they occur within any particular structure.

Indeed, the overwhelming majority of funding towards CSOs is from international partners (INGOs, international institutions, and bilateral and multilateral donors). CSOs do not have diverse sources of funding. With the exception of the few that were involved in the Ebola response, CSOs were in a financially precarious situation in 2015 because of the negative economic impacts of the Ebola crisis, the lack of a national grant policy, and the lack of philanthropy benefiting CSOs. In addition to these factors, weak cost recovery of CSOs and their lack of sound governance as it pertains to finance and management are challenges. The national-level CSOs and umbrella organizations who have strong financial management and organizational governance include the African Training Center for Development (CENAFOD), Internal Commerce Center for Development (CECIDÉ), CNOSCG, United Citizens’ Platform for Development (PCUD), Women and Girls’ Coalition of Guinea (COFFIG), and labor unions.

Despite this negative outlook, it should be noted that the establishment of microfinance institutions in Conakry and in the rural areas in favor of women’s groups has raised hopes. However, the positive results are yet to be seen.

As in the previous year, an inability to collect membership fees characterized the CSO sector in 2015. This is a perennial issue and is a true barrier to these organizations’ growth and development.

The financial management systems of CSOs in Guinea are weak, which is an important and recurring concern for technical and financial partners. Few CSOs are subject to external audits. Only CSOs receiving high levels of external financial support are audited. Few local and international CSOs publish financial reports.

**ADVOCACY: 5.1**

CSOs played a pivotal role in resolving the political crisis related to the presidential elections. Most umbrella NGOs and religious associations were committed to ensuring that political leaders participated in dialogue. With the support of the international community, CSO engagement culminated in the August 20, 2015, agreement that set the guidelines and timeline for elections.
CSOs were effective in connecting a wide array of social actors and opinion leaders with central and local government (including neighborhood, district, and commune councils) to coordinate their response to the Ebola crisis. For example, starting in 2014 and continuing into 2015, young volunteers went door to door in Forécariah. Village committees to monitor Ebola were established and connected by a telephone fleet. Through consultation frameworks and workshops both at a local and national level, CSOs were involved in the formulation of Guinee Vision 2035, the nation’s long-term development plan.

Another notable example of CSO advocacy and presence in public dialogue is the Guinea African Youth Network (RAJ-GUI), which was featured in radio and televised debates on subjects such as the free movement of people and goods in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). CSOs have also been engaged in the mining code reform process with the organization of information sessions, workshops, and dissemination.

In 2015, there were no advocacy efforts aimed at reforming the legal framework that governs CSO operations.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 5.1**

Guinean CSOs intervene in several sectors. They provide basic social services in education, health, and water; support good governance, decentralization, and human rights; and intervene in environmental protection as well. CSO activities are disperse and diverse. For example, in 2015 CSOs were involved in combating the Ebola epidemic, and in the Micro-Finance Project with the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Another notable example includes the important intervention of the associations of military women and spouses to clean up of the main streets of the Kaloum commune. It is worth noting that these interventions respond to the needs of populations at the base that local development plans do not effectively address.

The government provides little support to CSOs with the exception of granting approvals and occasional solicitations for CSOs to facilitate discussions on public interest issues.

CSOs find support from resource persons or organizations. This includes local, national, and international experts. CSOs identify and contract these individuals through relationships with state services, private companies, international NGOs, consulting firms, and universities.

In addition, in 2015, a wide range of actors including CSOs coordinated their actions with one another in their response to the Ebola crisis. Guinean universities worked with United Nations agencies to study and analyze why Guineans were not responding positively to interventions to combat the Ebola crisis. Economic actors such as the Organized Group of Business Men (GOHA) worked with the transportation union and the border police to distribute sanitation kits and establish a sanitary control system. Religious associations (mosques and churches) came together to raise awareness on high-risk behaviors.

CSO services are rarely compensated. The amount that CSOs receive for their services is minimal, rarely exceeding 10 percent of a project's total budget. Compensation to CSOs is usually limited to payment for
project personnel. This results in the lack of financial viability of CSOs and their dependence on external funds.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

With the increasing availability of information and communication technologies, CSOs have grouped together in coalitions, unions, federations, or councils as a way of sharing information more effectively. CSO groups also organize sessions to share information and take a position on issues affecting national life such as public health, access to markets, and education system issues.

In 2014, UNICEF initiated a partnership with CSOs, which was consolidated in 2015. Through UNICEF funds for communications pertaining to the fight against Ebola, CSOs developed integrated partnerships with several implementing agents including government ministries (transportation, security, youth, and communication), private sector actors, and the Scouts of Guinea. That partnership established unprecedented cooperation between CSOs and certain ministries. These different actors realized the advantages of implementing social programs with an integrated approach.

Several larger NGOs have acted as intermediary support organizations. Examples of umbrella organizations include CNOSC, Forum of Non-governmental Organizations for Sustainability (FONGDD), National Confederation of Farmer’s Organizations, and United Citizens’ Platform for Development (PCUD). The NGOs include the African Training Center for Development (CENAFOD), the French CSO Guinea 44, the International Commerce and Studies Center for Development (CECIDE), and the Guinean Association for Transparency (AGT). They have provided capacity building in organizational structure and management and created linkages between/within associations (groups, cooperatives, and associations). They have also linked donor funds to community-level structures. However, they do not mobilize funds at a local level. Training approaches consist of training workshops, coordination meetings, national and sub-regional meetings, and the provision of basic social services (information and awareness campaigns, distribution of sanitary kits). The subjects of trainings are diverse and include water, sanitation, and hygiene, nursing, birth spacing, and girls’ education.

The ISOs continue to train community-based organizations, facilitate their access to information, and publish reports and journals (e.g., the journal of the National Confederation of Farmers Groups in Guinea).

Through the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), USAID established information centers in the country’s four natural regions in 2012, which were functional in 2015 despite some financial and operational challenges. National NGOs use these centers to lead information and education campaigns on diverse social subjects.

In 2015, several foundations, such as the Diênê Kaba Condé Foundation, the Coalition of Women Leaders, the Business Mens’ Group, the Rio Tinto Foundation, and diaspora associations, contributed significantly to local associations’ efforts to combat the Ebola crisis. They provided sanitary kits, funds to CSOs to raise awareness of Ebola, as well as material and financial support for establishing and maintaining village and neighborhood Ebola watch committees.

With the exception of a few organizations, such as CENAFOD, Optima Formation, and Guine44, there are few CSOs specialized in training on operational topics for CSOs. Nevertheless, there are individuals with strong competencies in areas related to project design and management, such as diagnostic analysis, planning, resource mobilization, implementation, monitoring and evaluation, and learning.
In 2015 CSO and media relations were largely unchanged. A major issue continued to be CSOs’ complaint about the high cost of media services. Nevertheless, government and international partners involved in the country’s development had a positive perception of the role of CSOs in responding to the Ebola crisis and supporting the resolution of the political crisis.

Through UNICEF funding, CSOs and media organizations established partnerships in 2015. The Guinean Free Radio and Television Union (URTEL-GUI) and CSOs helped disseminate messages on high-risk behaviors related to contracting Ebola. Search for Common Ground, an American NGO, facilitated relationships between CSOs and private radio stations for public service messages. The national radio station also developed programming for CSOs involved in combatting Ebola.

CSO leaders believe that they have a positive image vis-à-vis the government. It is thanks to their communication and awareness-raising efforts that the presidential elections in 2015 were held without any major issues. This event improved the government’s perception of CSOs. However, many government leaders and civil services are uncomfortable with CSOs monitoring their decision-making processes and implementation of sectoral policies.

Conversely, CSOs do not face difficulties collaborating with private-sector organizations, although there are few opportunities to do so. The private sector has a positive perception of CSOs.

Even though there is a code of ethics for NGOs, sound organizational governance remains a problem for CSOs. The result is that many CSOs only exist in name. It is also worth noting that there is little awareness around this code of ethics with most organizations being entirely unaware of its existence. This harms the public perception of CSOs.

Besides annual reports and some journals, CSOs do not share information among themselves effectively. Very few have websites. CSOs that communicate regularly with one another use email.

As in 2014, Guinean CSOs are increasingly developing partnerships with the public and private sectors. In addition, to increase coverage of their activities, CSOs have established partnerships with various media outlets (print, radio, TV).
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Guinea

CSO Sustainability

Sustainability Enhanced  Sustainability Evolving  Sustainability Impeded

Guinea

5.4
KENYA

2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Kenya

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Environment</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Capacity</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Viability</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Image</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On April 2, 2015, terrorists attacked Garissa University in northeastern Kenya, killing 128 students and injuring seventy-nine others. The attack was one of the worst tragedies ever to take place in the country. It followed parliament’s passage of the Security Laws (Amendment) Act in December 2014, which, according to President Uhuru Kenyatta, would improve Kenya’s capacity to “detect, deter, and disrupt any threats to national security.”

In September 2015, the International Criminal Court (ICC) prosecutor announced the conclusion of her presentation of evidence in the case against Deputy President William Ruto. The deputy president and a local radio journalist were on trial for crimes against humanity following massive post-election violence in 2007-08. The trial, which started in 2013, was closely followed in Kenya, where opinion about the ICC’s authority to bring the case was intensely divided. The case was still underway at the end of the year.

Corruption in the public sector continued to be a controversial topic in 2015. At center stage was the Eurobond scandal, which implicated public officials in the disappearance of more than $1 billion of public...
funds. After county governments took over new responsibilities with the devolution of governance in 2013, they, too, had to grapple with managing public resources appropriately. CSOs helped enhance governance and improve the delivery of public services by offering capacity-building training to county governments and local communities.

Overall, the sustainability of CSOs in Kenya did not change in 2015. While there was growing appreciation for CSOs’ role at the national and county levels, thanks to the impact of their service provision and advocacy work, funding for CSOs remained a challenge, especially for organizations advocating for human rights.

The main regulatory body for CSOs, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Coordination Board, has not released figures on the number of registered NGOs, a distinct type of organization, since 2013. At that time there were approximately 7,200 registered NGOs in Kenya, along with about 30,000 registered societies, non-profit companies limited by guarantee, and trusts, in addition to more than 300,000 community-based organizations (CBOs).

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.1**

Several laws govern CSOs in Kenya, depending on the form of the organization. CSOs may register under the Non-Governmental Organization (NGO) Coordination Act, the Societies Act, or the Companies Act. The Companies and Insolvency Legislation (Consequential Amendments) Act passed in 2015 eased the process of registration under the Companies Act. Nevertheless, registration remains a lengthy undertaking, particularly since the government requires a security check on all organizations seeking to register. In addition, the Companies Act still requires company directors to provide personal information so that the Kenya Revenue Authority can ensure that they are tax compliant.

The government attempted to provide an overarching legal framework for CSOs with the Public Benefit Organizations (PBO) Act, which was signed into law in 2013 but has never been implemented because the Cabinet Secretary for Devolution and Planning has yet to issue a date for its commencement. In 2015, parliamentarians and others in government attempted to amend the act to remove provisions that would improve public access to information. Earlier in 2014 members of parliament had also proposed amendments that would cap foreign funding to CSOs at 15 percent and more strictly control charitable institutions that are meant to serve as domestic sources of CSO funding. These proposals were withdrawn in 2015 following a campaign by multiple stakeholders, including the CSO Reference Group, an umbrella body representing Kenyan CSOs.

In 2015, several CSOs working on governance and human rights faced obstacles in implementing their activities. The inspector general of police published a “List of Entities Suspected to be Associated with Al-Shabaab” in the official *Kenya Gazette* in April. Among these organizations were Muslims for Human Rights (Muhuri) and Haki Africa in Mombasa, which seek to counter terrorism through constitutional means. The government attempted to deregister these organizations and froze their bank accounts on suspicions that they fund terrorist activities. In November the high court in Mombasa ordered the freeze on the bank accounts to be lifted so that the organizations could resume their normal activities. The court also nullified a notice in the gazette that linked the two organizations to terrorism. In October the government withdrew a notification by the NGO Coordination Board that it intended to cancel the registration certificates of 959 NGOs on allegations that they had failed to account for donor funding or supported terrorist activities.
CSOs may apply for tax exemptions, which the Ministry of Finance considers on a case-by-case basis. In practice the process of obtaining exemptions is cumbersome, which discourages many qualified CSOs from applying. A further disincentive is that applications for tax exemptions may trigger checks on the compliance with tax laws of CSO directors. Donors often mistakenly assume that CSOs receive tax benefits and therefore are unwilling to provide funding to cover tax payments.

CSOs registered as companies limited by guarantee may bid for government service contracts. Other CSOs may compete for government contracts at the national and county levels provided they have tax exemption certificates. The Kenya Revenue Authority generates these certificates online to organizations it deems are tax compliant.

Finding legal representation for CSOs can be a challenge, as few lawyers in Kenya work with the CSO sector. Although some lawyers deal with specific issues of interest to CSOs, the sector is not lucrative enough for lawyers to make a living solely on representing CSOs. There are a few public-minded lawyers who work on human rights issues with CSOs. CSOs usually pay lawyers for services rendered.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

In 2015, many Kenyan CSOs continued to focus on grassroots work, especially at the county level. Organizations such as the Center for Human Rights and Civic Education in Mwingi County developed closer relationships with county officers, community interest groups, and ordinary citizens by offering capacity-building training and implementing social accountability projects. At the national level many CSOs working on policy issues do not engage directly with their constituents, mainly because they work through advocacy platforms and do not hold events that would bring them together with the public.

Well-established CSOs with defined internal structures usually have strategic plans, especially because donors typically require them as part of funding proposals. However, such plans can be shaped by donor expectations, and a number of organizations seek to engage on issues in which they lack expertise, such as climate change or budget literacy, simply because funding is readily available in those areas.

CSOs operating at the national level tend to have board members who are well known and take part effectively in the governance of their organizations. It is relatively common for smaller CSOs to lack boards or to have boards that do not actively take part in the organization’s governance. These smaller organizations are often led by single individuals and lack functioning management structures. Funding constraints can lead to tensions between an organization’s management and its board. There is a high level of attrition from CSO boards, with some members leaving because of their organizations’ perceived stance vis-à-vis the government. CSO employees sometimes leave when they feel constrained by their boards.

CSO staffing is based on the availability of funds. More established CSOs with long legacies, established relationships with donors, and positive reputations are often able to retain permanent staff, as their ongoing funding seems assured. Smaller CSOs tend to have thin staffing, and the majority of them struggle to retain permanent employees. Some CSOs do not have professional managers. Few organizations have staff development policies or offer their employees training or career development opportunities. The human resource function is unfulfilled at many organizations or is handled by financial or administrative staff. Otherwise vibrant CSOs sometimes close following the departure of a key employee, since some donors tie the award of resources to the employment of specific individuals. A culture of volunteerism is not common in Kenya, and CSOs rarely articulate clear policies or frameworks for engaging volunteers.
CSOs have limited technological capacity. Staff often are not fully computer literate or do not use technology effectively for communication, publicity, and monitoring and evaluation. Some organizations have acquired laptops but staff members often use them only to generate reports. Funders such as Uraia Trust help CSOs acquire equipment such as desks and laptops for use during funded projects. Although this equipment usually remains the property of the donors, CSOs sometimes request and are allowed to keep it after a project ends.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.7**

CSOs in Kenya rely on donors to fund their activities and projects. However, donor funding can be poorly matched to community needs. Some donors have pre-conceived ideas about projects or areas of interest that domestic CSOs must accommodate, which sometimes results in organizations receiving funding for projects that they are not adequately prepared to implement.

There is significant local philanthropy in Kenya, but it often is not formalized and instead is based on giving between individuals or is channeled through religious organizations. The few local philanthropies that exist are wary of supporting organizations that are perceived to be critical of the government. The new PBO Act, once commenced, will offer no incentives for local support and will impose stricter limits on the types of activity that may benefit from local sources of funding. For example, organizations may solicit funds only for activities or organizations situated in Kenya and may not pursue projects that subvert human rights.

Few organizations have independent sources of income. Some CSOs raise funds by hosting donor roundtables or engaging in consultancy work—for example, to develop investment plans for county governments or offer capacity-building training to other CSOs. Membership organizations struggle to attract and retain members. Most members must be pushed to pay their annual subscriptions even when they continue to take advantage of membership benefits.

While financial management systems exist in most organizations, failures in financial management are common. The Companies Act, NGO Act, and Societies Act require organizations to file annual audited financial statements, but many organizations, particularly smaller CSOs, do not comply with this requirement.

**ADVOCACY: 3.2**

The Kenyan government has adopted policies to ensure that it has direct channels of communication with CSOs. An important framework for CSO-government cooperation is the County Government Act 2012, which requires county planning units to engage citizens meaningfully in the planning process. Collaboration between the government and CSOs increased at the county level in 2015. For example, Pastoralist Women for Health and Education, a local CSO in Isiolo County, engaged with the county government through advocacy and social accountability initiatives, and the Center for Transformative Leadership in Kenya, based in Nakuru County, developed community scorecards and worked with frontline service providers in the county health sector.

At the national level, the government’s policy is to bring together government and non-state actors to discuss policy reforms. Most consultations take place at roundtable meetings and joint reviews of draft policy documents and laws. For example, the International Institute of Legislative Affairs (IILA) worked with the government in 2015 to ensure that non-state stakeholders were involved in planning for the health sector. As
a result of IILA’s efforts, a committee that includes CSOs was established as part of the Non-Communicable Diseases Strategy. During the year CSOs also worked on environmental policy, especially issues concerning the emerging extractive sector, as well as freedom-of-information legislation, health rights, and accountability in public-service delivery and the management of public finances. In 2015, CSOs’ relations with the national government were less strained than in the period after the 2013 elections, but organizations advocating for human rights or pushing for more accountable public-resource management were still regarded with suspicion.

In an important advocacy milestone in 2015, CSOs led by the Institute of Social Accountability (TISA) and a Nakuru County-based CSO, the Center for Enhancing Democracy and Good Governance, successfully challenged the constitutionality of the Constituency Development Fund (CDF). The fund was established in 2003 to support local development projects, and CSOs pointed out that members of parliament used the fund to implement projects rather than limiting their role to a supervisory function. After the ruling, agitated politicians publicly criticized CSOs for interfering with the fund and their implementation of development projects.

On the county level, national CSOs worked with county-level organizations to review county legislation and policies and ensure that they were aligned with the constitution and contributed to the realization of county development goals. For example, the Center for Transformational Leadership (CTL) in Nakuru reviewed the Nakuru County Citizen Participation Bill and shared its findings with the public through radio programs. Uraia Trust and the Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA) offered capacity building to county-based CSOs on social accountability, including participatory planning and budgeting. After the training several county-based CSOs, including Transform Empowerment for Action (TEAM) in Kisumu County, mobilized citizens to participate in the county budgeting process. Other organizations also implemented social accountability projects to ensure prudent utilization of public resources and improved service delivery.

CSOs achieved some other notable results in 2015. For example, the Parliamentary Initiative Network (PIN) brought together parliamentarians, professional associations, think tanks, research institutions, and other CSOs to discuss various items on the parliamentary agenda. PIN contributed recommendations to the National Youth Employment and Public Audit Bills, both of which were enacted in 2015, and also pursued public-interest litigation in connection with the Public Audit Bill.

Kenyan CSOs are fully aware of the need for a favorable legal environment. In 2015, more than forty CSOs taking part in a taskforce known as the CSO Reference Group collected views from across the country on the PBO Act. The group called on both parliament and the public to reject the proposed amendments to the act, arguing that they amounted to an effort to weaken civil society. Through their energetic campaign CSOs successfully thwarted plans to amend the law but continued to face challenges when the new act failed to be implemented.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4**

Kenyan CSOs provide services in a wide range of areas. For example, CSOs implement clean water projects, construct classrooms, and fund sanitation facilities and also educate communities about the importance of using these services as a means of reducing disease and eradicating poverty. With the donor community increasingly focused on devolution, many CSOs offered capacity-building services to county government officials in 2015. For example, Muslims for Human Rights offered capacity-building training on social accountability in devolved governance to Kilifi County government officials and citizens.
Kenyan CSOs enjoy commendable responsiveness from their communities. CSOs usually identify community needs during the implementation of projects and at public forums such as budget hearings. In 2015, Bare Kenya, a CSO in Baringo County, mobilized local communities to identify their priorities for inclusion in the county budget. The organization shared these priorities with the county assembly and county budget and appropriations committee.

CSO initiatives often reach constituencies beyond their target audiences. For example, in 2015 the IEA developed publications on social accountability that were shared with policy makers and other CSOs. Local CSOs held forums at the village, ward, and sub-county levels to educate the public about social accountability and its relevance to local development.

Most CSOs do not recover costs from their goods and services. Some organizations working in health care have cost-sharing arrangements and provide services to citizens at subsidized fees.

The government appreciates the role of CSOs in enhancing public participation in devolved governance. County governments often seek to cooperate with CSOs, especially as they have limited resources and welcome any support that will help them mobilize the public to participate in local planning and budgeting processes. They often request capacity-building and technical assistance from CSOs, which is usually facilitated with grants from donors.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.6**

Kenyan CSOs are served by a number of resource centers, including the Kenya Law Resource Center, which offers legal support; Uraia Trust, which offers capacity building to help CSOs improve their fundraising and advocacy skills; and the International Development Research Center (IDRC), which provides affiliated think tanks with access to publications useful in their research. CSOs also have access to government resource centers, such as the Agricultural Information Resource Center of the Ministry of Agriculture, and local resource centers, such as the Ugunja Community Resource Center in Siaya County.

Local grantmaking organizations include Uraia Trust, ActionAid Kenya, and Forum Syd, which sub-grant donor funds to local CSOs for activities involving the public in governance and social accountability. In addition, the Aga Khan Development Network funds work on pluralism, including research and forums; the Kenya Community Development Network promotes the sustainable development of communities for social justice; the Ford Foundation offers grants on social change; and the Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD) supports programs to strengthen the capacity of small-scale farmer and pastoralist organizations in their home counties.

Several coalitions help Kenyan CSOs work together productively, avoid duplication of effort and resources, and enjoy enhanced credibility and influence for their advocacy campaigns. For example, the Constitution and Reform Education Consortium (CRECO) Trust is a network of twenty-three human rights, governance, and democracy CSOs that aids in their coordination and capacity building. The Devolution Forum (TDF) brings together networks, organizations, and individuals focused on devolution and its implementation to raise awareness and promote cooperation.

A number of national-level CSOs offer capacity-building training to county CSOs and community interest groups on issues such as advocacy and participatory performance monitoring. IDRC offers funding for training, including short courses abroad, to researchers working for grantee organizations.

The government seeks partnerships with CSOs to promote the goal of devolved governance. On the national level, the Ministry of Devolution, Transition Authority, Council of Governors, USAID, UNDP, and Uraia
Trust partnered to develop a training curriculum on devolution in 2015. Local CSOs have also built strong relationships with county governments through social accountability and advocacy work. In 2015, administrators in Tharaka-Nithi County forged links with local CSOs to improve public-service delivery and the utilization of public resources.

Although the private sector does not fully appreciate the importance of philanthropy, some businesses have introduced helpful corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. For example, the Wings to Fly program of the Equity Group Foundation provides scholarships to bright and economically disadvantaged students; the Family Bank Foundation works in education, agribusiness, healthcare, and entrepreneurship; and the Safaricom Foundation supports projects in a wide variety of areas.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.2**

CSOs continued to engage fairly effectively with the media in 2015. For example, TEAM in Kisumu worked with Radio Nam Lolwe, a local vernacular station, on a program about county budgets. CSOs’ two main challenges with the media are the quality of coverage and journalists’ lack of impartial engagement. Some journalists expect to be paid to write stories about CSOs, which is an unanticipated expense for most organizations. Most journalists and editors are wary of publishing stories about CSOs that may be politically sensitive, and many media houses want to avoid being blacklisted by advertisers as a result of their coverage of CSOs. As a result of these biases, some CSOs limit their media outreach to particular media houses, journalists, or mainstream media and do not work with local or vernacular radio stations, which have larger audiences but are more careful to avoid politically sensitive topics.

The public seems to appreciate CSOs’ work, especially in the areas of capacity building for participatory governance and service delivery in health and water. The public perceives CSOs as more transparent than the government and the business community. The government’s attitude towards CSOs advocating for human rights or agitating for accountability in the management of public finances remains combative, and government officials often see them as noisemakers and opportunists or accuse them of having a “foreign agenda.” In 2015, some politicians mobilized citizens to speak out against CSOs following the court’s declaration that the use of the CDF by members of parliament was unconstitutional. At the county level, public and government appreciation of the role of CSOs seems to be growing, largely as a result of the efforts of CSOs to help build the capacity of county governments. The business community seems to view CSOs as engaging effectively in the governance process.

CSOs’ strategies for promoting their public image are weak, and their packaging of information is often poor. For example, CSO publications can be voluminous, and journalists seem not to read them thoroughly or digest their messages. Most organizations seek television coverage, usually in the form of interviews on topical issues. They also develop documentaries about their work, although these can be expensive and have limited audiences. Social media remains an untapped resource, and the majority of CSOs have inactive Facebook and Twitter accounts. The IEA is one of the few organizations that uses Twitter effectively to publicize its research and drive traffic to its website. Other CSOs rely on press conferences, roundtables, seminars, and exhibitions to publicize their work.

Some CSOs publish annual reports, including on their websites, usually because of donor requirements. CSOs have yet fully to embrace self-regulation, and they are not committed to adopting codes of ethics to demonstrate transparency in their operations.
After the unprecedented Ebola crisis of 2014, the number of cases in Liberia began to wind down in early 2015. Liberia bore the brunt of the epidemic, with the second highest number of recorded cases and the highest number of deaths of all countries affected. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared the country Ebola-free in May 2015, but this status was subsequently withdrawn on several occasions when new cases of the disease were reported. Much of the year was spent ensuring that a strong surveillance and response system was put in place and working to rebuild the health sector and the economy, both of which were devastated by the disease. Throughout the year businesses suffered massive losses, and Liberia’s people experienced unprecedented social challenges, including the avoidance of normal interactions with family and friends, in the Ebola-affected milieu.

In 2015 the Constitutional Review Committee charged with reviewing the country’s 1986 constitution launched a public-awareness campaign throughout the country. The committee conducted consultations with a broad range of stakeholders to gather their views and hear their concerns, which were then presented at the National Constitutional Conference held in April at Gbarnga City, Bong County. At the conference, delegates from across the country discussed changes to the constitution that would, among other things, shorten the
terms of the president and other political leaders, establish equal social and political rights for women, and recognize the right to education and work of persons with disabilities. Twenty-one areas were approved by the conference and referred to the legislature, which is expected to decide on the amendments to put forward in a national referendum in October 2017.

CSOs continued to suffer constraints during the year because of the Ebola epidemic. Many organizations had to suspend their activities or had difficulty accessing target communities. By late 2015 CSOs began to ease back into their regular work but continued to experience severe funding shortfalls if they did not work in healthcare and other Ebola-related fields. Nevertheless, Liberian CSOs showed great resilience in responding to constituents’ needs, performing as a respected partner of the government, and helping the country recover from the long and difficult Ebola epidemic.

In 2015 Liberia had 842 accredited CSOs, compared to 997 in 2014. The reduction in the overall number of registered CSOs in 2015 can be attributed to the end of the Ebola epidemic. The fight against Ebola had driven up the number of organizations in 2014, and with the end of the epidemic a number of organizations closed. Of the accredited organizations, 713 were national or community-based organizations (CBOs), and 129 were international organizations. About 160 organizations worked actively but were not registered.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

No significant change was recorded in the legal environment in 2015. The constitutional amendments proposed in 2015 did not affect Articles 15 and 17 of the constitution, which ground CSO activity through guarantees of freedom of expression, speech, assembly, and association. The 1977 Associations Law remains the main guide for CSOs’ legal establishment. The standing policy framework for CSOs is the 2008 National Policy on Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), which deals with project implementation, the NGO Council, and other matters, but remains largely unimplemented.

The registration process continued to be easy in 2015. CSOs register at the Liberia Business Registry, which offers one-stop registration services. They are then accredited by the NGO Coordination Unit at the Ministry of Finance and Development Planning and subsequently register with the government ministry or agency with oversight responsibility for the area in which they will work. CSOs register only once in a process that usually takes one to two working days, but they must seek annual accreditation from the NGO Coordination Unit. Technical breakdowns at the Business Registry in 2015 reportedly caused some delays in the registration process, and CSOs found that the NGO Unit was often unable to answer inquiries about the status of their applications because it lacked information from the office of the minister of finance and development planning, which reviews all requests for accreditation. Rural CSOs can find it challenging to register or obtain accreditation because of the need to travel to Monrovia.

CSOs generally operate freely. The tense operating environment in 2014 eased in 2015 as the threat of Ebola receded, and CSOs did not report significant new pressures or constraints. However, organizations engaged in areas related to transparency and accountability sometimes found it difficult to engage effectively with the government, which is increasingly defensive about claims of corruption. For instance, in 2015, despite the existence of a Freedom of Information Act, the government ignored persistent CSO demands for a comprehensive report about the funding that it received during the Ebola outbreak and branded organizations that criticized its lack of accountability as enemies of the country. The government also ignored
CSOs’ requests for full disclosure of the circumstances surrounding the insolvency of the National Oil Company of Liberia. Some CSOs feel increasing pressure to disclose what they are doing and to pull back from certain geographic areas. For example, the Association of Environmental Lawyers of Liberia (Green Advocates), which educates communities about their land rights, was prevented from going to the Golden Veroleum palm-oil concession area in Sinoe County during tense confrontations between local residents and the concession company.

Tax laws continue to favor CSOs. They are exempt from income tax and receive duty-free privileges on imports that support their work, provided they apply to the government, are registered and accredited, and meet certain other requirements. Some organizations do not take advantage of duty exemptions and other tax benefits because they have poor accounting and reporting systems. CSOs are accorded gratis license plates for their vehicles.

Because CSOs are nonprofit organizations they may not engage directly in business activities. They may, however, hold shares in or own business entities provided all income is used to further a CSO’s organizational mission. CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts and must declare all income earned from such contracts in their annual filing with the government.

Although a growing number of lawyers showed interest in CSO legal issues in 2015, Liberia still does not have lawyers specializing in the CSO sector. CSOs generally cannot afford to retain lawyers, but there are few legal cases involving CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1

CSOs continued to build local constituencies and engage communities in their projects in 2015. Although many CSOs found it difficult to maintain contact with constituents because of the Ebola epidemic, some organizations stayed in touch with their target communities by engaging in Ebola-related work, especially education and awareness building. Other organizations found different ways to stay in touch with their communities. The Foundation for International Dignity (FIND) described 2015 as unprecedented because budget shortfalls and the Ebola outbreak allowed it to implement only two rather than the usual five projects. The organization’s strategy for dealing with this challenge was to engage with constituencies in different ways—for example, by becoming involved in Ebola-awareness programs—rather than simply shut down.

CSOs continued to use strategic planning to reposition themselves strategically in a resource-challenged environment. The more established CSOs see strategic planning as key to working with international partners and engage in planning on their own. A number of capacity-building programs help CSOs develop strategic plans or build strategic alliances to enhance their work. For instance, nineteen CSOs developed a unified five-year development plan with the support of the Liberian Community and Governance Program (LCGP). NAYMOTE Partners for Democratic Development also developed a five-year strategic plan in 2015.

Most local CSOs remain dependent on particular individuals and lack the characteristics of viable, self-sustaining institutions. Boards of directors with distinct roles must be specified in articles of incorporation as a requirement for accreditation. Most established and accredited CSOs have functioning boards, although the boards of some national CSOs are inactive if the organization is not membership-based and the boards lack reporting obligations to members. Some CSOs in rural areas have active boards even if they are unregistered or unaccredited, but most CBOs lack functioning boards. Staffing structures in the majority of domestic CSOs are not permanent because their scope and maintenance depend on project-related funding. The reduction of Ebola-related activities in 2015 caused many organizations to reduce staffing. Volunteers are not
widely used in Liberia, mainly because most people cannot afford to work without pay. CSOs have little capacity to organize and manage a professional volunteer program.

Financial constraints and undeveloped public infrastructure continue to limit most CSOs’ access to modern technology, especially if they are located outside of Monrovia. CSOs have limited capacity to acquire and maintain computers, Internet access, office equipment, and vehicles. In most instances equipment is acquired for specific projects, and CSOs are required to return it to funders at the end of the project. Smaller CSOs find it difficult to maintain offices outside of project cycles.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

Liberian CSOs depend on international donors for funding. CSOs’ financial viability declined in 2015 as funding for Ebola-related activities decreased, and normal patterns of funding were extremely slow to resume. During the crisis, donors directed their funds almost solely at combatting Ebola, and support for non-Ebola-related activities was severely reduced on the reasonable grounds that not much else was happening or possible during the crisis. As the epidemic receded, a wait-and-see attitude prevailed among donors, who were reluctant to invest in projects that would have to be abandoned if another outbreak of Ebola occurred. This so-called Ebola effect was particularly hard on CSOs engaged in areas other than health and Ebola-related activities. In addition, CSOs in the natural resource sector—a growing and particularly vocal group of organizations—suffered significant losses in income because of the drop in global commodity prices for Liberia’s major exports—iron ore, gold, and diamonds—and a dramatic reduction in oil exploration in the country. Programs to monitor natural resource industries were cut back, and businesses sharply cut grants for community development projects because of their falling revenues.

Funding from government sources is extremely rare, except for small amounts budgeted for the Students Union, Christian Association of the Blind, and a limited number of other charitable organizations. There is no formalized program for this kind of funding. The government very occasionally provides funding to CSOs from donor funding earmarked for CSO-government collaboration. No CSO is known to have received funding from the government on an open, competitive basis in 2015.

Most CSOs lack the capacity to diversify their funding sources or raise funding locally. Local philanthropy has yet to take off, and fundraising at most organizations is limited to securing projects funded by international CSOs. Because they depend largely on grants for short-term projects, most CSOs do not have sufficient resources to remain viable after funded projects phase out. Moreover, project funding usually does not provide sufficient administrative support to allow CSOs to seed new resource-generating initiatives. Most domestic organizations lack assets that they could use to augment their incomes, such as real estate that could provide rental income. Most CSOs are not membership-based and thus do not generate membership fees. The law bars CSOs from engaging directly in income-generating business activities.

Building effective financial management systems remains a key challenge for Liberian CSOs. In general financial controls are weak, and the majority of organizations seek only to meet the limited reporting requirements of donors and the government. They generally lack written financial management procedures, do not produce annual financial statements, and conduct audits only when funders require it. Some CSOs do not have bank accounts.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

The government and CSOs shared a fairly open line of communication in 2015 and worked together on a number of national issues, including sexual violence, health, water and sanitation, Ebola, the extractive
industry, and peace building. Much of their collaboration focused on planning and policy development. As a result of Liberia’s accession to the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2011, CSOs have been incorporated into decision making on budgeting and resource allocation. In 2015 CSOs continued to take part in OGP initiatives, including the Multi-Stakeholder Group, which is the governing body of the Liberia Extractive Industries and Transparency Initiative (LEITI), and sectoral coordination mechanisms on health, gender, and education. CSOs also collaborated in policy, planning, and advocacy initiatives with bodies such as the Liberia Anti-Corruption Commission (LACC) and the Governance Commission, although these entities sometimes struggle to have an impact because of limited government support.

In 2015 the Liberian International NGO Forum (LINGO) advocated for Liberia’s economic recovery and transition to development with a presentation at the International Ebola Recovery Conference in New York. Among issue-based coalitions, the advocacy networks in the mining and palm-oil sectors have been particularly active in recent years. In southeastern Liberia, Sustainable Development Initiative (SDI) and Green Advocate worked with CBOs in 2015 to realize a moratorium on the expansion of the Golden Veroleum Oil Palm Concession in Sinoe County and involve the local community in negotiating terms with the concession. As a result of this intervention, concession companies are now more cautious in negotiating terms with local communities. A few coalitions, such as the Coalition for Transparency in Education (COTAE), track budgets, expenditures, and school conditions and use this information to advocate for improvements in education.

Lobbying has not gained much traction among Liberian CSOs. However, a notable lobbying effort in 2015 was the much-publicized legislative work of the Coalition to Bring Plenty Cheap Reliable Stable Electricity to Liberia (BRESCELCO). This organization sought passage of a new electricity law that would break the monopoly of the state-owned electricity company and allow private companies to provide cheaper, more plentiful, and reliable energy supplies. The new law was passed in 2015, but CSOs, led by BRESCELCO, argued that a key provision of the law, related to a new regulatory commission, was surreptitiously changed before its passage.

CSOs were not active in legal reform affecting the CSO sector in 2015.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4**

Although the number of organizations engaged in advocacy continues to grow, Liberian CSOs are still predominantly social service providers in such areas as health, education, water and sanitation, and relief. Several CSOs work with farmers in agriculture and food security or engage in farm production activities themselves. Few CSOs have the expertise or resources to engage in large infrastructure projects. Exceptions to this rule are Catalyst, a local CSO that worked on road rehabilitation and bridge repairs in southeastern Liberia in 2015, and the Christian Health Association of Liberia (CHAL), which was involved in the construction of the triage unit at the Curran Hospital in Zorzor in 2015.

CSOs continued to focus on the tremendous needs of communities across the country in 2015. Constituents’ priorities included the aftermath of the Ebola crisis (especially the needs of orphans and survivors, along with prevention education), water and sanitation (especially urban water supplies and solid waste management), community economic empowerment (including life-skills development and cash transfers to the ultra-poor),
and food security. Because donors remained mainly interested in strengthening the health sector and promoting behavioral changes to prevent Ebola, CSOs had difficulty accessing funds for projects other than in health and related areas. For instance, the Sustainable Livelihood Promotion Program (SLPP), an agriculture-sector CSO, had to abandon its Women and Girls Agriculture Empowerment project in 2015 because of a lack of funds. After the Ebola epidemic receded, many CSOs began to return to their regular service-provision work, but the transition was slow because of the delayed resumption of normal funding.

Many CSOs at the community level measure the impact of their work through the use of inexpensive surveys. In contrast to international CSOs, only a few domestic organizations conduct work that reaches a much broader audience than their immediate target groups. Organizations working in the water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) sector are most likely to serve broader audiences, since their research, policies, and guidelines have an impact that cuts across all sectors to reach communities, schools, and health facilities.

Liberian CSOs generally do not have the capacity to develop and implement strategies for cost recovery, since they are heavily donor dependent and may not engage directly in business activities. However, some microfinance schemes run by registered CSOs are beginning to emerge in a new approach to cost recovery.

The Government of Liberia continues to recognize the important role of civil society in national development. Its respect for civil society is manifested in numerous government-CSO partnerships in health, education, and anti-corruption. For example, CSOs and the government work together on the Health Sector Coordinating Committee (HSCC), WASH Consortium for Water and Sanitation (WATSAN) in schools, and the National Integrity Forum. However, CSOs benefit very little from this recognition in terms of grants from the government to facilitate their work and activities.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.8**

Most existing resource centers continued to function in Liberia in 2015. Out of necessity they had converted their services from the usual information-sharing activities to Ebola awareness and, to a lesser extent, disaster preparedness in 2014, and they continued this work in 2015. For example, the resource centers of the New African Research and Development Agency (NARDA) and Development Education Network/Liberia (DEN/L) worked with member organizations to train community leaders and households in Ebola prevention.

In 2015 there were few local grant-making organizations. The Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA) offered financial support to innovative interventions in justice and related areas, while Friends of Liberia (FOL) offered sub-grants in education and health.

Several coalitions and networks based in Monrovia share information, build capacity, foster collaboration on issues-based advocacy, and monitor the funding available in various programmatic areas. Outside of Monrovia, larger Liberian CSOs are mobilizing organizations at the county level to work with them on various issues, and CSOs, including rural organizations, are forming partnerships with each other, thanks in part to improved communications. For example, the Ho Development Education Network-Liberia (DEN-L), a local organization that promotes grassroots empowerment, economic justice, democratic development, and gender equity, offers CSOs training and capacity building in Bong, Nimba, and Lofa counties. However, this type of local cooperation is still very limited.

Donor-funded capacity-building programs for CSOs continued to offer training in 2015. For example, the Strengthening the Capacity of Civil Society to Promote Sustainable Governance program, funded by the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), strengthened the capacity of CSOs to promote a sustained democratic culture; the Participation Realized: Rights and Leadership Enhanced for Gender-
Balanced Democratic Inclusion project, funded by the European Union, trained CSOs in political reform and the defense of human rights; and the Liberia Civil Society Capacity Building program, funded by the European Union and Oxfam, strengthened the ability of CSOs in Bong, Lofa, and Nimba counties and elsewhere to promote an inclusive and empowered society.

Liberian CSOs increasingly partner with media to advance various causes. For example, in 2015 COTAE trained fifteen local journalists to use news programs to advocate for transparency and accountability in education. Some partnerships between CSOs and government are also underway. In 2015 the NGO Education Forum, a network of CSOs in education, cooperated with the government to reopen schools, mainly in rural areas.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.6**

The public image of CSOs continued to be generally positive in 2015. In focusing their coverage on Ebola-related activities, both radio and print media conveyed a favorable image of CSOs as deeply involved in the fight against the disease.

The public is positively impressed by CSOs’ impact on the lives of ordinary people. In particular, local citizens value the work of CSOs in the fight against Ebola and regarded the staff of international medical CSOs and their domestic partners as heroes for their sacrifices and life-saving work. The Liberia National Red Cross was singled out for praise for establishing a dedicated Ebola task force and delivering services such as burials.

The government usually has a favorable perception of CSOs, especially when they are involved in joint activities. The government regards CSOs as its partners, and government functionaries regularly refer to the contributions that CSOs make in various sectors of national development. At the same time, the government disagrees with and is critical of advocacy CSOs that accuse it of corruption and poor governance. The business community tends to have a fairly positive view of CSOs.

Liberian CSOs do not generally have public-relations programs. A few organizations, such as the Liberia Crusaders for Peace, work with the media to promote their activities through songs, jingles, and plays, or create public awareness of sensitive issues, such as the elections or corruption.

As in 2014, there is no evidence that any CSOs published an annual report or publicly disclosed their accounts and activities. Codes of conduct are not common, but most CSOs have policies to guide staff behavior.
The electoral volatility that began with the presidential elections in 2013 was expected to end in 2015 with Madagascar returning to constitutional order. However, the postponement of communal elections initially planned for July 2014 upset the electoral calendar and pushed the regional and provincial elections to the following year. CSOs were engaged in the communal elections through information campaigns, trainings, monitoring, mediation, and early warning. The National Electoral Monitoring Committee (KMF-CNOE), an independent association, used its own resources to deploy 667 observers in 96 of the 114 districts on election day.

The civil society sector in Madagascar is still waiting for international financial and technical support to resume, which had been suspended during the lengthy political transition. Currently, the only funding that has been unfrozen is small amounts through government budgetary support, the United Nations system, and some NGOs.

The funding situation for CSOs has affected the vibrancy of the sector, which is largely still dependent on international donor funds. It has also affected the wellbeing of the most vulnerable people who rely on that...
support. A World Bank 2015 report explains how 80 percent of the Malagasy population lives in a precarious situation. The number of NGOs operating in Madagascar was halved in 2012 compared to 2011 according to central bank data. However, very active in diverse domains, CSOs have multiplied since then. Lack of data on the CSO sector makes it difficult to determine their exact numbers. Nevertheless, a European Union study from 2012 estimated that there were 15,000 CSOs in Madagascar. Over half of CSOs are based in Antananarivo, the capital’s province. Eighty percent of international NGOs are based in this province as well.

The civil society sector encompasses a wide range of organizations. There are both formal and informal associations, such as the fokonolona (community-based organizations), neighborhood associations, parent-teacher associations, journalist groups, women’s groups, youth groups, national-level and international NGOs, foundations, cooperatives, unions, professional associations, and religious associations. There are seven main types of legal categories of CSOs in Madagascar: associations, NGOs, trade unions, foundations, cooperatives, credit and saving groups, and cultural religious associations.

Deeply engaged in examining ways to escape the cycle of socio-political crises in Madagascar, CSOs are increasingly included in dialogues around political, social, and economic affairs. They are also called upon to support the elaboration of sector policies and laws. Their understanding of development challenges and their field experience make them fixtures in national life.

The legal framework is favorable to the registration of CSOs. The CSO sector is vibrant and active at a community level. Nonetheless, CSO capacity to lobby for change remains weak despite occasional successes.

The financial viability of CSOs remains the weakest dimension of CSO sector sustainability. The inconsistency in revenue sources compromises the professionalism and organizational capacity of CSOs. Politicians’ occasional manipulation of CSOs has marred generally positive perceptions of civil society.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

Madagascar does not have a single law that encompasses all types of civil society organizations. CSOs operate in a legal environment that is antiquated and comprises disparate legal texts. Each organizational status is derived from a different law: associations (Ruling 60-133 of October 3, 1960 from the French law of 1901), NGOs (Law 96-030 of August 17, 1997), foundations (Law 95-028 of September 26, 1995), cooperatives (Law 99-004 of April 21, 1999), or the law for unions.

The process for obtaining association status is the least cumbersome. The registration process is relatively quick for the majority of associations. It takes approximately less than three months to register. The law does not stipulate any reporting requirements for associations so there is little, if any, oversight of associations once they have obtained legal status. Donors and more structured associations or NGOs complain that the lack of stringent requirements in the law and the subsequent lack of quality control contributed to credibility concerns and low professionalism of the sector. The provisional registration provided upon receipt of the request for legal recognition serves as a legal authorization to operate. Therefore, to comply with administrative requirements, most CSOs choose to register as associations. The process for registering as an NGO is different, as it requires a formal approval of the request before obtaining legal status. This involves some additional terms and conditions. However, the process still does not take longer than two months.

In comparison, the registration process for international NGOs is long. Those organizations are required to first request a host agreement with the government through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There are multiple levels of reviewers, including the beneficiary communities that review the NGO’s request, which includes eleven documents in ten copies each. Without any law governing the matter, the granting and renewal of the host agreement is at the government’s discretion. In practice, this process can take over one year. For foundations, the process takes around six months. They must request approval to receive nonprofit status.

Some CSOs are not registered legally for a variety of reasons. These include an insufficient understanding of the legal framework and the required administrative steps. Others are located in remote areas where there is
no committee in their region that could grant the necessary approvals. In addition, CSOs have grown accustomed to operating informally and do not see the value in being registered.

The laws provide general provisions on incorporation, operation, and dissolution of associations. Nevertheless, Article 13 of the NGO Law only lists the different internal organizational units without describing their functioning. These are found in CSOs’ internal regulations or bylaws, if at all.

According to the law, the Ministry of Interior can dissolve a CSO. However, it is impossible to confirm if any are dissolved because the ministry does make that information publicly available. A regional representative of the government, after consulting with the regional bi-party committee, can remove an organization’s approval.

Article 140 of the constitution guarantees the freedom of association, as long as it does not infringe upon the freedom of others or threaten public order, national dignity, or state security. CSOs are not harassed by the state, but they sometimes are intimidated. The need to uphold public order and state security is often used as an argument to forbid all public demonstrations. Unions were affected by this in 2015 when the government cracked down on them, imprisoning delegates from two government companies and arresting the president of a students’ association. There were over thirty unions that mobilized to denounce these events and express solidarity with the leader of an aviation company union, who was put under investigation. Also, the National Human Rights Platform (CNPFHD), a confederation of CSOs promoting human rights, spoke out against the arrest of the student who led the strike. The government ended up conceding to some extent by releasing the first individual but giving jail time with probation to the second.

There are CSO representatives who are embedded in government institutions, such as the High Council for the Defense of Democracy and the Rule of Law (HCDDED), the High Judicial Council, and the Committee for the Safeguarding of Integrity. On occasion, the government has interfered in the designation of those CSO representatives. For example, in June 2015, CSOs denounced the government’s interference with the designation of a CSO representative to the High Judicial Council. Some members of CSOs have denounced the interference of the Ministry of Communications and Relations with Institutions (MCRI) with the internal affairs of CSOs and therefore do not recognize the ad hoc committee that MCRI had initiated. The MCRI even asked those associations to justify their existence vis-à-vis the regional government authority. This is why there is a risk of controversy with regards to the election of CSO representatives within the HCDDED.

Lawyers work with some national-level CSOs or are among the CSO’s membership, especially those working in the human rights domain. Nevertheless, there are no law firms that specialize in NGO law. Lawyers are mostly in the major cities and their fees are prohibitive for associations and NGOs, especially the smaller ones.

The tax code’s provisions are vague and imprecise. According to CSOs, this provides tax authorities with too much room for interpretation, which is to the detriment of CSOs.

CSOs in development working under different operational mechanisms, such as “strategic partner,” “intermediary organization,” “implementing agency,” or “service provider,” are technically subject to the tax code for CSOs. However, in some cases, the CSOs are aligned with private-sector organizations (research groups or companies) and therefore have different fiscal obligations that are less advantageous to CSOs. This is the case of the value-added tax.

According to the tax authority, only not-for-profit organizations and associations whose revenues are exclusively used to finance educational, cultural, social, or economic support activities are exempt from paying taxes. They have the responsibility of submitting end-of-activity reports with financial information. Similarly, international NGOs need to submit a tax statement to renew their agreement with the Ministry of Interior.

To the disappointment of CSOs, this exemption does not apply to the business that they may own, even though the revenue they generate helps finance their projects. The legal texts specify that as soon as a CSO is
involved in profitable activities, it must respect the tax code applicable to companies with the exception of the corporate income tax. Many CSOs object to this provision, because the law also allows organizations to work as social enterprises as long as no profits are generated.

Article 20 of Law 96-030 underlines that in all cases CSOs may benefit upon request of tax and customs benefits provided under existing fiscal and customs legislation. However, the tax code provides tax deductions only to donors, individuals, or corporate entities for grants towards organizations with a recognized nonprofit status, which represent a small minority of organizations in Madagascar. Customs exemptions can also be provided to these organizations and INGOs who have a host agreement with the Ministry of Interior. National NGOs making such a request must go through complicated procedures including the review by two ministerial departments. Previously, local CSOs would benefit from tax and other exemptions through the exemption letter of donor-funded projects they supported. However, that is no longer the case.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5

Despite their good intentions, many CSOs are crippled by their structural and organizational weaknesses and the lack of vision or strategy.

With a few exceptions, the majority of CSOs do not have a vision, a strategic framework, or an action plan. Instead, they are aligned with whatever project they are implementing at a given moment. They align with donor strategies so as to be able to meet requirements. They seek to diversify their work in order to seize different opportunities. Most CSOs become service providers.

Over the years, CSOs have shifted their work according to donor trends. There was a time when hundreds if not thousands of CSOs decided to work on HIV/AIDS. Later, they shifted towards environmental preservation and rural development. Now there is a trend towards human rights and good governance.

CSO coalitions and platforms with clear strategic and action plans compensate to some extent the lack of thematic or strategic focus that characterizes the CSO sector. The last few years have seen the multiplication of such platforms including the National CSO Platform for Childhood (PSCE), National CSO Platform for Integrated Health and Vaccinations in Madagascar (COMARESS), and the Alliance Voahary Gasy (AVG). Over eighty platforms, associations, and international and national NGOs have united under the Civil Society Alliance for Scaling Up Nutrition. This demonstrates their motivation to work together, to value one another, to take advantage of best practices, to establish partnerships, and to take advantage of new funding opportunities.

With the exception of some structured NGOs that have a separate board of directors and executive management team, most CSOs operate without such distinctions, even though they are required by the NGO Law 96-030. Indeed, the powers and responsibilities of these administrative structures are typically distributed among the organization’s individual staff members. Even though the law specifically states that no single individual can assume executive and oversight functions, it is not uncommon to see a single individual act as president and treasurer of an organization.

The majority of CSOs do not have the means to pay full-time long-term personnel. CSOs with moderate resources tend to limit their staff size to ten and use short-term contracts as much as possible. Generally, CSOs are using pro bono assistance and volunteers as community agents, especially for the provision of basic social services. These individuals typically receive a tax-exempt stipend in accordance with Article 11 of Law on Volunteering No. 2015-015, dated June 22, 2015. According to a study that the central bank of Madagascar published, the number of unpaid laborers working with CSOs increased 85.3 percent from 10,457 in the first quarter of 2012 compared to 19,380 in the first quarter of 2013.

Expressing strong support for volunteering, CSOs were instrumental in the passing of the law on volunteering. The Lutheran Church of Madagascar (FLM) has launched a new policy of mobilizing talent and engaging its members (known as zanaka loterana) in working for the development of their regions.
CSOs rarely hire lawyers, accountants, or ICT specialists, but do occasionally request their services for short-term and specific needs. One notable exception is the CSO Platform for the Protection of the Environment (AVG), which hired a group of lawyers to support its work.

Most CSOs do not have the financial resources required for obtaining and maintaining office equipment. Nevertheless, with the significant rate of mobile penetration, cellular phones have become a true work tool for many associations operating in zones where there is coverage. Through international donor-funded projects, some CSOs receive office equipment, including computers, and transportation equipment such as 4x4 vehicles, motorcycles, and cars. At the end of the project, this equipment usually either stays with the CSO or is given to another organization.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.2**

The culture of philanthropy is not yet prevalent in Madagascar. Individual donations are extremely rare given the high incidence of poverty. Furthermore, CSOs’ lack of knowledge of fundraising techniques limits their ability to identify and take advantage of potential local funding sources.

Membership fees only represent a small share (less than 1 percent) of CSO budgets, which are generated largely from foreign donors. According to the latest study on NGOs that the central bank published in January 2014, these funds represent 87.2 percent of funding for development operations and activities.

The resources available to CSOs are insufficient to ensure their sustainability, and CSOs remain highly dependent on international donors. The result is that many fail and are unable to sustain their activities. In 2015, fifteen percent of NGOs and associations registered in the capital did not renew their registration and were effectively closed. However, as some NGOs and associations disappear others are created. The overall growth of the number of CSOs was 10 percent in 2015. Most CSOs are financially dependent on their leaders for survival.

CSOs try to earn revenues from products and services. They also try to diversify their funding sources by mobilizing resources from private sources. However, the weak economy also puts pressures on the private sector, making it less inclined to support CSOs. With the development of the corporate social responsibility (CSR) concept, Malagasy companies such as Tropical Soap Works or foreign companies such as the telecommunication companies Telma and Orande have initiated philanthropic initiatives providing material and financial support to CSOs to implement various projects in reintegration, health, sanitation, education, environment, and new technologies. Since 2008, Tropical Soap Works provides the Malagasy Red Cross an annual grant. The Telma Foundation provides logistical and financial support to NY SAHY (the Malagasy word for “dare”) since 2009 to raise awareness around the negative effects of drugs and tobacco. Youth from the grassroots movement for drug-free soccer are among the fifty people selected to be part of the national team for the Under Seventeen African Cup.

Partnering with the private sector is an interesting proposition for CSOs, but it is not within the reach of most, since they do not know how to engage with companies. In addition, very few CSOs can afford independent financial audits or publish annual reports with financial information. Yet transparency and accountability are critical in gaining the trust of philanthropic organizations and criteria for receiving support from them. The perception is that private organizations are receptive to establishing a relationship with CSOs nearly half the time. This would imply that while there is a high potential for collaboration, the path is fraught with risks given the role of private sector networks in Malagasy politics.

A lack of accountability results in fewer CSOs being eligible to respond to international donors’ requests for proposals. The CSOs who actually do meet the conditions compete with large NGOs as well as foreign organizations.
ADVOCACY: 4.0

Most line ministries in health, education, water and sanitation, and the environment work in partnership with CSOs on various projects. These relationships are much more concrete at a decentralized level (regions, communes, and districts). The Platform of Associations for the Education of Malagasy Adolescents (ASAMA), which won the 2015 UNESCO Confucius Prize for Literacy, is an example. It became renowned for its global approach to achieve the Millennium Development Goals through partnerships between national authorities and NGOs.

Although CSOs’ capacity for advocacy and social mobilization remains weak, some CSOs are beginning to have their voices heard on specific issues usually through CSO coalitions and platforms. For example, the media and many CSOs reacted strongly when they discovered that the Cyber-Security Law 2014-006 was passed in secret and contained provisions limiting freedom of speech. Article 20 states that citizens can receive six months in prison if they insult certain government institutions, including the courts. Concerned that this provision would be used to limit the freedom of expression and access to the Internet, CSOs through various media outlets expressed their solidarity with the media. During the course of 2015, they expressed their strong will to protect democratic ideals and the right of CSOs to act freely without the government’s potentially unjustified interference. Due to this pressure, the authorities promised to revise Article 20. This revision will be harmonized with the provisions of the future Communication Code, which had not yet been adopted by the end of 2015.

In September 2015, the Conference of Malagasy Bishops, the Collective for the Protection of Malagasy Lands (TANY), and the Center for Research and Support for Alternative Development, Indian Ocean (CRAAD-OI) united to denounce the hasty revision of the mining code by an informal and closed committee and the government’s decision to sell oil block interests. These actors called for the active and genuine participation of CSOs and communities on investment issues including the conception, negotiation, and ownership of contracts with investors. A month later, the Ministry of Mines initiated a participatory process and organized a meeting with all stakeholders including CSO representatives to receive and consider their comments and suggestions.

In other instances, the government has not adequately respected and considered CSO perspectives. This was the case with the land policy, which was the product of a participatory, multi-sectoral, and transparent process. However, the Council of Ministers unilaterally changed the policy document on August 5, 2015, in such a manner that compromised the rights of those living on the lands for decades but without a formal title. On August 10, 2015, seventy CSOs responded with a joint declaration, which the Solidarity Platform for Land Registration (SIF) initiated. Two months later, SIF and the TANY Collective (the Malagasy word for “earth”) launched a petition obtaining 1,196 signatures. Five hundred twenty-eight thousand members of farmers’ associations asked in a declaration on October 22, 2015, to be considered as signatories to the petition.

In May 2015, the Observatory of Public Opinion (SeFAFI) revolted against the government’s attempt to regulate the civil society sector through a Charter Project that the Ministry of Communications and Institutional Relations had drafted.

While some advocacy campaigns were successful such as the one to forbid smoking in public spaces, others took longer to realize gains such as the one supporting the establishment of a special jurisdiction for the traffic of rosewood. Some have failed completely such as the one on changing the school calendar.

CSOs are not familiar with the lobbying concept. There are not formal sponsorships, spaces for dialogue, or coordination for CSOs to influence political decisions.

NGOs and associations are aware that the legal framework for them is obsolete and limits their growth. This subject is brought up regularly especially during meetings with state actors and CSO platforms. In an attempt to address this, a group of eighty CSO actors in July 2015 led an initiative called ROHY promoting the role of
CSOs in development and government accountability. The movement has emerged as the primary CSO interface with the Ministry of Communications and Institutional Relations, which is charged with drafting the civil society charter.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.2**

CSOs are present in nearly every social sector. They supplement the government’s efforts or support them through basic service provision. CSOs are engaged in the major social challenges in the country, such as eradicating poverty, promoting gender equality, protecting the rights of vulnerable groups, environmental conservation, and promoting the rule of law.

In 2015, the COMARESS platform (Malgache Coalition for the Strengthening of the Vaccination and Health System) succeeded in mobilizing 300 associations and NGOs to raise the public's awareness of the Combating Polio Campaign, which the Global Vaccine Alliance (GAVI) and UNICEF funded.

Most funding for CSO service provision is from international donors. While the government does not provide funding for CSOs, it does provide other resources, such as deploying teachers or medical personnel or granting them government land.

Basic service provision such as infrastructure (schools, health centers, water fountains, and latrines) responds to the needs of people, who in turn provide their labor or materials to realize those projects. However, recognizing the lack of financial independence of CSOs, there are instances where CSOs lead projects that reflect donor priorities instead of those of communities. This also leads CSOs to carry out missions that are beyond their scopes. Some CSOs have taken specific actions to ensure that their actions are aligned with community needs and priorities. In July 2015, the Development Department of the Church of Jesus Christ in Madagascar (SAF/FJKM) identified the threats and opportunities in each region and developed priority and differentiated actions for the following decade to advance food security in these regions.

The availability of the services CSOs provide go beyond the CSOs’ members. Publications, workshop reports, and expert analysis may be shared with other CSOs with lesser financial means. However, the culture of sharing information and knowledge is not yet a reality in the customs of CSOs, which tend to work in isolation from one another. In addition, international donors are increasingly budgeting for dissemination of project results.

Calculating the cost of services to beneficiaries is not feasible given the country’s socio-economic status. Some CSOs begin to apply cost-recovery principles, which may be complete or partial depending on the nature of the services provided or the ability to pay beneficiaries. For example, potable water from wells is provided at a small cost of 1 ariary per liter (less than one U.S. cent) through partner subsidies.

CSO interventions contribute to the goals of government ministries. They are appreciated and encouraged by the government.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.5**

In Madagascar, there are some resource centers for CSOs, but they are limited in numbers and do not cover the entire territory. These include the knowledge management portal Hayzara (http://www.hayzara.org), the Center for Technical and Economic Information (CITE), the Center for Exchange, Documentation, and Institutional Information (CEIDI), the Liaison Office for Rural Training Institutions (BIMTT), the Trano Aro Zo legal clinics, and the press centers. These institutions receive support from international partners. The legal clinics for instance are supported by the United Nations Development Program. Others receive support from the U.S. and French embassies, the World Bank, and the World Wildlife Fund. The BIMTT is an exception as it receives 97 percent of support from churches abroad and the rest from its own revenues from products and services provided and member contributions.
Foundations provide financing to CSOs either through funds collected at the local level or by re-distributing international donor funds. This funding responds to needs and projects identified at a local level. One example is the first environmental foundation serving communities in Madagascar called TANY MEVA (Malagasy word for wonderland), which subsidizes projects and provides grants and loans to community-based organizations or other organizations supporting communities (NGOs, intercommunal organizations, universities, and research institutions). Another example is the Protection of the Environment and Biodiversity of Madagascar (FAPBM), whose goal is sustainable financing for protected areas and biodiversity conservation. That foundation raises money from international donors and the private sector, which it invests in financial markets. Revenue generated is used to finance protected areas.

CSO networks and platforms share information, facilitate training sessions for members, lead information campaigns, and search for funding opportunities. For example, BIMTT hosts trainings, seminars, and workshops. It also produces instructional tools and materials in partnership with other institutions and the government. It informs its members of local and international funding opportunities, while also educating them on local resource mobilization.

For several years now, associations and NGOs have benefited from management trainings resulting in increased competencies. These competencies include but are not limited to project management, knowledge management, technical and organizational support, local development, and microfinance.

A recent study on the role of non-state actors by the European Union delegation to Madagascar revealed the relative weakness of the civil society sector in Madagascar, especially the low level of collaboration among CSOs and with the administration.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

CSOs that intervene in sectors affecting the daily life of citizens receive positive coverage in the media. It is not uncommon for media to cite the research led by CSOs. In 2015, the Voahary Gasy Alliance (platform of environmental CSOs), the National Election Monitoring Committee (KMF-CNOE), the Observatory of Public Life (SeFAFI), project Taratra, and Land Tenure Solidarity (SIF) were often in newspaper, radio, and television headlines.

CSOs are often disappointed when the media fails to cover their work. The dissatisfaction of CSOs with the amount of media exposure they receive has several causes. First, CSOs do not have external relations strategies. Also, media outlets are concentrated in the major cities and towns. In addition, the compensation system for journalists is to the disadvantage of smaller CSOs who do not have the money to pay for media coverage. Nevertheless, in some localities, especially in the provinces, some television and radio stations pay greater attention to their activities. In the city of the Eastern Port, the national radio and television have special programs dedicated to civil society, which have been successful in covering CSO activities and are popular.

CSOs have taken initiative to establish relationships with media such as AVG and the environmental journalists. They have also taken advantage of social media, using Facebook, for example.

The civil society concept remains unclear to the public at large. Thus how the sector is perceived varies greatly. The public has a positive perception of CSOs intervening in communities. Their impact has greater visibility in sectors such as health, education, sanitation, social development, and assistance to vulnerable people. The public also has a positive perception of CSOs that are brave enough to denounce problems to public authorities.

However, when CSOs are established with the sole purpose of realizing financial gains, the public image of the CSO sector suffers. This was the case in the 2000s with the flurry of CSOs being created to combat HIV/AIDS, which disappeared as soon as donor priorities shifted.
In addition, the political manipulation of some CSOs, especially during the political crises of 2002 and 2009, had harmed the image of CSOs. As a result, citizens may refer to CSOs as pro- or anti-regime and see them as a launching pad to obtaining higher positions in the civil service.

The government’s perception of CSOs is also varied. The government appreciates the work that CSOs conduct in the field supporting the government’s policies, such as poverty reduction, improved access to health, strengthening the education sector, and enhancing agricultural production and productivity. However, the government does not appreciate it when CSOs bring up certain controversial topics or focus on government performance, despite these being central to the mission of the CSO sector as a whole.

Public-private partnerships are still in their infancy. Some companies such as Tropical Soap Works and the mining company Ambatovy are increasing their partnerships with CSOs. In 2015, the cooperative Koloharena from the town of Ambatondrazaka signed a contract to produce grains and oil with the British company D1 Oils, which focuses on biodiesels. Similarly, the Telma Foundation renewed its partnership with two projects in 2015: Grassroots and Dance 261.

Very few CSOs have a code of ethics or make deliberate efforts to be transparent. Larger CSOs, such as NGO SAHA (Soa Afafy Hampahomby ny ho Avy, which means “sow a better future”), TANY MEVA, and CARE Madagascar, typically publish annual reports, which can be found on their websites.
In 2015 Malawi struggled to emerge from the state of political polarization that followed the first-ever tripartite election in 2014. Some people believed, although without evidence, that the election had been stolen or rigged by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), while DPP supporters rejoiced over the results of the elections. This widespread division in perceptions of the election results prompted CSOs, faith-based organizations (FBOs), and political parties to propose a federal system of government in place of the existing unitary system, so that portions of the country could not be marginalized.

Malawi’s economic situation was dire during the year. Most communities lost livelihoods and were destitute because of the combination of floods and drought that hit the country during the 2014-15 farming season. Hunger raged in most parts of the country while the instability of the kwacha, the local currency, increased the cost of living. The Malawian government has had to use limited foreign exchange reserves to procure food from neighboring countries, reducing spending on other important sectors, such as health and agriculture.
The funding environment for Malawian CSOs continued to decline significantly in 2015. Although both international and domestic CSOs continued to provide services, many advocacy groups had to draw back from previous levels of engagement because of funding cuts. The “Cashgate” scandal, which involved the embezzlement of huge sums of public money by government officials, continued to undermine trust in the government and other institutions, including CSOs. Public distaste for CSOs was widespread, and CSOs were pressured by their foreign partners to show better financial accountability. In addition, the main governing body for CSOs, the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Board, began to enforce registration requirements more seriously. The networking and coalition-building efforts of previous years were largely stalled in 2015.

It is not easy to determine the total number of CSOs operating in Malawi, mainly because there are multiple government bodies involved in the registration process and they produce multiple sources of information, none of which is easily accessible. The total number of CSOs in the country is probably between 1,500 and 1,700, per the directory of organizations issued by the Council for NGOs of Malawi (CONGOMA). Applications to register increased substantially in 2015 after the NGO Board, established in 2012, became fully operational and publicly called on all CSOs to register or face court action. However, it is likely that many community-based organizations (CBOs) and CSOs in rural parts of Malawi are still not registered.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.4**

Little changed in the legal environment for Malawian CSOs in 2015. The NGO Act of 2000 still governs CSOs and requires them to undergo a cumbersome registration process. For example, CSOs must conclude a memorandum of understanding with the government ministry responsible for their area of intervention before registering with CONGOMA and then the NGO Board. CBOs and FBOs may also register with the office of the president or cabinet offices, and FBOs may additionally register with the registrar of companies. These various possibilities mean that FBOs or CBOs may have multiple registrations—for example, with both the office of president and CONGOMA. Malawian CSOs have not identified this duplication in the registration process as a topic for advocacy.

During the year the NGO Board issued several statements in local newspapers calling on all local and international CSOs to register and otherwise comply with all provisions of the NGO Act. If they did not, the NGO Board threatened to deregister organizations that were already registered and initiate court action against organizations that were operating without registration. The NGO Board publicly singled out many “noisy” CSOs, including the Malawi Economic Justice Network (MEJN), Malawi Health Equity Network (MHEN), and Center for Human Rights Relief and Rehabilitation (CHRR), with largely unsubstantiated claims that they were unregistered and threats of court action if they did not register promptly. The NGO Board also publicly threatened without legal basis to close the Center for the Development of People (CEDEP) and CHRR because of their advocacy on behalf of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people. Some international CSOs that implement activities directly with local communities were also threatened with closure if they continued to contravene their charters, which apparently state that they are expected to work through Malawian CSOs. Despite these threats, no CSO was actually deregistered in 2015 and no court action was taken against any CSO.

Other than threats of closure from the NGO Board, few state impediments were imposed on CSO operations in 2015. Unlike in previous years, when permission for demonstrations was sometimes not granted
by responsible authorities, the leaders of several human rights organizations were able to organize public demonstrations and present petitions to city assembly officials and members of parliament without harassment from the state police or other security organs.

CSOs are obliged to pay all forms of taxes, including income tax, import duties, and value-added tax on goods. CSOs may apply to the Minister of Finance and Economic Planning and Development for tax exemptions on certain goods and services, such as vehicles and hospital equipment. However, the application process is long and unpredictable and does not always end with a positive answer. Individuals and corporations may receive tax benefits for donations to CSOs, but few people are aware of this provision.

CSOs are legally allowed to compete for government contracts and conduct income-generating activities.

There are no lawyers in Malawi specifically trained in CSO law. CSOs depend on lawyers with general legal training, who work only in large cities and are usually inaccessible to organizations in more remote areas. Legal counsel is usually expensive and only a few lawyers work pro bono.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.4**

As in previous years, some CSOs struggled to establish connections with local citizens in 2015. While FBOs such as the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), Evangelical Association of Malawi, and Qadriya Muslim Association of Malawi have properly defined constituencies thanks to their faith-based structures and leadership at the community, district, and national levels, CSOs active in human rights and governance deal largely in policy-focused interventions and have little immediate impact on people’s lives. As such, they often depend on the visibility of their leaders to build up a clear constituency. CSOs providing services in areas such as health and education have constituencies consisting mostly of their beneficiaries.

Some CSOs developed strategic plans in 2015, although many organizations continued to rely on mission and vision statements only. While larger CSOs often develop strategic plans to attract donor funding or meet registration requirements, a habit of true strategic thinking is only starting to emerge. For example, most CSOs in human rights and governance arenas show little evidence of following their strategic plans and instead pursue scattered projects unrelated to their strategic goals if funding for them is available. They may shift from pure human rights issues to HIV/AIDS, then to climate change, on to voter education, and then completely go silent. Such a “nomadic” approach to projects shows opportunistic thinking rather than focused strategic planning based on the original mandate of the institution.

Most large CSOs have functioning boards of directors that provide policy direction to management. Local CBOs often depend on an honorary patron for advice. The roles of boards of directors and management are usually distinct. However, as in previous years, there continues to be a number of CSOs whose boards exist only in name and do not take active part in their organizations.

Most CSOs in Malawi faced increased funding constraints in 2015 and had to make deep cuts in staffing. Many CSOs experienced considerable staff turnover as key qualified staff shifted to international CSOs, where salaries were better and funding was more predictable. Some CSOs lost staff to the private and public sectors. At most domestic CSOs employees tend to be semi-qualified for their positions, since such organizations cannot afford to pay professional-level salaries. With the exception of a few international organizations, nearly all CSOs in Malawi hire staff for the duration of particular projects only. Most CSOs do not easily find volunteers.
Modern equipment and Internet access are common at most urban CSOs, although intermittent electricity supplies and vandalized fiber optic cables impeded their use in 2015. Rural CSOs still lack the resources to purchase computers and access the Internet, and they often obtain equipment through donations only.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.9**

Most CSOs in Malawi obtain funding from foreign donors, although a few organizations also receive local support. As evidenced in the scaling-down of staff and operations at a large number of organizations, total funding levels for CSOs declined in 2015. This decrease was due in part to the end of the first phase of funding by the Tilitonse Fund, a multi–donor pooled local grantmaking facility supporting more accountable governance. Europe Aid, a funding initiative of the European Union (EU) for some sub-Saharan countries, provided funding to Malawian CSOs through international organizations. A few CSOs received funding from the National AIDS Commission (NAC), which re-grants donor funds for projects related to HIV/AIDS and tuberculosis. In 2015 the EU supported two international CSOs and one Malawian CSO for projects on accountability and transparency. The competition for funds was intense, and when local and international CSOs compete against each other for the same funding, Malawian CSOs are usually at a disadvantage since they lack the requisite know-how.

Diversification of funding remained a challenge for most Malawian CSOs. Although many organizations expect to receive funding from their long-time donors, the context for CSO work in Malawi has shifted and donors now seem mainly interested in funding work on issues such as climate change, disaster preparedness, and emergency relief. In addition, in the aftermath of the 2014 election local councils are now in place and local governance is a new and critical area for CSO work. Organizations such as CHRR, CCJP, MEJN, CEDEP, Malawi Electoral Support Network (MESN), ActionAid Malawi, and World Vision received funding for projects on these issues. It was a challenge for local CSOs focused on advocacy and good governance to obtain funding for interventions other than those prioritized by donors.

Domestic fundraising is difficult for Malawian CSOs. Although the NGO Act allows CSOs to mount fundraising campaigns, few domestic CSOs have exploited this possibility, as they are still oriented toward seeking foreign donor support. Several CSOs, such as CHRR and the Center for Social Concern (CFSC), have invested in property to lease out as a source of income, which helps meet operational costs. Some networks, including MEJN, MHEN, Civil Society Agriculture Network (CISANET), and Human Rights Consultative Committee (HRCC), collect annual membership fees, although these were not as forthcoming in 2015, often because many network members feel that the network secretariats should mobilize resources on their behalf rather than the reverse. CSOs running clinics or hospitals or working in other health-related fields sometimes demand small fees for their services.

In the aftermath of the 2013 Cashgate scandal, any serious CSO looking for funding from external donors must have at least basic financial management procedures in place. Most CSOs have adopted improved systems, and they typically employ accountants and use external auditors to prepare financial statements for donors. However, in 2015 many CSOs found it difficult to hire qualified financial experts, as they could not afford their fees.

**ADVOCACY: 4.6**

In 2015 CSO advocacy deteriorated. CSOs continued to engage in consultations with government agencies from the community to the national level. For example, the Ministry of Local Government and Rural Development worked with CSOs to identify better ways for local councilors to interact with members of parliament (MPs), whose roles appeared to be a source of conflict. CSOs and government officials helped
resolve differences between local councilors and MPs who facilitate infrastructural development in communities, which is not, strictly speaking, their role. However, during the year CSO-government consultations did not always bear fruit, since most government agencies were facing acute funding shortages and as a result scaled back their operations. For example, CSOs advocating for better health services sometimes found that the Ministry of Health simply could not deliver because the government’s resource base had drastically shrunk.

A few CSOs, including CCJP, MEJN, MEHN and CISANET, engaged in advocacy campaigns on access to health services (especially the provision of essential drugs in public hospitals), farming adaptations to climate change, and educational reform (including improvement of the teacher/pupil ratio, which is currently 1:120 in most primary schools). CEDEP, CHRR, and the Malawian Network of Religious Men Living with HIV (MANERELA) continued to mount sensitization campaigns on LGBT rights, albeit in the face of increasing resistance and cynicism from the government, FBOs, traditional leaders, and the public.

The loss of funding opportunities coupled with registration difficulties forced many advocacy CSOs to reduce their activities in 2015. In addition, several human rights demonstrations in 2015 were not well attended, especially compared to 2011, when CSO leaders were able effectively to mobilize citizens to demonstrate against the soaring cost of living. The relative lack of success of protests in 2015 may be the result of a divided CSO movement, which is generally unable to agree on the most important advocacy issues or appropriate courses of action, such as sensitizing citizens to issues before attempting to mobilize them.

In 2015 CSOs worked with the Ministry of Energy, Natural Resources, and Environment on drafting a new law to regulate the mining sector, which had not yet been implemented by the end of the year. However, in general CSOs in Malawi engage in limited lobbying work, perhaps because they prefer the higher visibility of public advocacy campaigns that target the media.

There was no advocacy or lobbying initiative to review the 2000 NGO Act in 2015. CSOs are either not conversant with the act or do not know how to tackle regulatory issues.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

CSOs continued to offer diversified services in areas such as health, education, food security, relief and rehabilitation, climate change, and the care of orphans and the elderly. In response to the floods and drought that hit Malawi during the 2014-15 farming season, CSOs provided local communities with desperately needed food and other relief items. In fact, emergency response was the main area of growth for service-providing CSOs during the year. Key players included FBOs, which unfortunately sometimes reached out only to followers of their own faith rather than selecting beneficiaries based on need. This bias brought on a spate of conflicts between Christian and Muslim leaders, which PAC, as an umbrella body of faith organizations in Malawi, was able to sort out by holding national and district-based dialogue sessions with support from UNDP. Otherwise, CSOs usually did not make their own choice of project locations, as their interventions were directly overseen by the executive committees of local councils in district assemblies. Most services were provided to rural and hard-to-reach parts of the country, although there were also urban interventions, especially in water, sanitation, and solid-waste management. CSOs also continued to build the capacity of ordinary citizens to take part in local government and effectively monitor public-service delivery.
Although legally permissible, few CSOs provide services for fees. An exception is health facilities managed by the Catholic Health Commission under the Christian Health Association in Malawi (CHAM), which recover costs for health services but also depend on subsidies from the national government. Generally, since most health facilities serve poor households in rural areas, it is very difficult for them to charge cost-recovery fees. Most CSOs offering trainings in governance and human rights offer their services at no cost. Sometimes targeted groups attend such functions in anticipation of receiving allowances, which have become a fixture in Malawi since CSOs emerged in 1994.

In 2015 the Government of Malawi recognized the efforts of many CSOs and encouraged more organizations to assist it in delivering services to poor people by signing Memoranda of Understanding with them at district levels. The government usually sought to recognize CSOs through networking platforms at the district level, which helped align CSO activities with the government’s development agenda and minimized duplications, waste, and irrelevance in their interventions. These platforms do not hinder CSO operations but rather enhance accountability, accessibility, and collaboration.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.6**

There are relatively few resource centers supporting CSOs in Malawi. Most are linked to the National Initiative for Civic Education (NICE) offices operating in all twenty-eight districts. However, these centers are located in district capitals and do not serve rural areas, where most CBOs are located. In addition, they tend to offer only information and newspapers and do not provide the capacity-building support that most Malawian CSOs need.

Local funding sources backed by international donors include Tilitonse, which is supported by Irish Aid, the UK Department for International Development (DFID), and the Norwegian Embassy; and the National AIDS Commission, a joint government-Global Fund initiative.

In 2015 most CSOs had limited opportunities to build coalitions and alliances. Many coalitions have collapsed or become dysfunctional as questions of survival rather than joint advocacy have become paramount for member organizations. Even with funding partners such as Tilitonse demanding coalitions and alliances as a condition for support, the members of many CSO alliances, once funded, tend to work in isolation and merely submit joint reports to their program lead, often an international NGO, or directly to their donor. The few exceptions to this trend in 2015 included a mining governance campaign organized by FBOs.

Training opportunities for CSOs were limited in 2015. Donors typically offer capacity-building support to their cooperating CSOs but do not extend such support to wider CSO groups. Although after the Cashgate scandal CSOs were urged to improve their financial management, in 2015 no institution offered capacity-building support in this area. Similarly, most domestic CSOs learn from the expertise of international CSOs, but this expertise is generally applied only to specific interventions and never broadened to include training for other CSOs. Both rural and urban CSOs faced limited training opportunities for improving their operations and program design in 2015.

There were limited intersectoral partnerships, except in the mining sector, where government officials, mining investors, and CSO leaders came together to lobby for the accreditation of the Malawi government to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).
The public image of CSOs suffered a decline in 2015. While both print and electronic media provided considerable coverage of CSOs’ work during the year, it generally took the form of news reports and the media did not often request analysis or opinion from CSO leaders.

Public distaste for CSOs was evident in widespread passivity on CSO issues. In 2015 the public still viewed CSOs as having sold out to or been corrupted by government agencies, especially as CSOs did not communicate any unity of purpose or coherent messaging on issues affecting ordinary citizens. CSO groups engaged in LGBT rights were demonized because of the perceived foreignness of the issue in relation to local cultural and religious values. In addition, some CSO leaders working on LGBT rights and health-services delivery appeared in a bad light because of their failure to back up their positions with verifiable evidence. The failure of some CSOs to stage successful demonstrations in 2015 was due in part to the media, which did very little to shape positive perceptions of CSOs or encourage public participation.

The government views CSOs as partners in development and service provision. However, because of differing positions on issues, the relationship can be tense between the government and CSOs dealing with human rights and governance. The business community mostly had a lukewarm view of CSOs in 2015 because of CSOs’ failure to engage on some pressing issues affecting the private sector, including tax reform and the open market.

In 2015 some CSOs used print and electronic media to publicize their activities. A few organizations use Facebook, Twitter, and other social media for publicity.

CONGOMA prescribes a code of conduct for CSOs, and the NGO Act provides for accountability and reporting mechanisms that are meant to ensure transparency and accountability in the sector. In 2015 the newly assertive NGO Board sought to reinforce CSOs’ compliance with the act and their own charters. However, in practice most CSOs struggled to adhere to their own self-regulatory principles, as well as the CONGOMA code of conduct and the NGO Act.
With support from the international community, Mali was emerging from a security crisis in 2015 and the government and armed groups were engaged in a dialogue process to stabilize the country. The signing of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali in May and June 2015 established a framework for dialogue and gradual peacebuilding. However, despite a general respite in violence in the northern regions of Mali, there continued to be two situations that threaten the country’s peace and stability. First, government control and presence in the Kidal region remains elusive. Kidal remains under the administration of armed groups such as the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (commonly known by the French acronym, CMA), which have recently allowed the arrival of the Platform, the pro-government armed groups. Second, Malians living in the North continued to cope with a permanent situation of insecurity threatening their lives and goods. Insecurity and the government’s weak response created considerable uncertainties regarding the country’s future.

The country is slowly emerging from the crisis in terms of its overall governance and its population’s access to basic social services. However, there have been criticisms of the government regarding the delay in
implementing the Peace Agreement, and insufficient political will in combatting corruption. These criticisms have affected national opinion in 2015 and the degree of popular support for national authorities. Despite these critiques, the modest redeployment of government agencies in the North (with the exception of Kidal), the interventions of the United Nations and international non-governmental organizations have created relative stability with the provision of humanitarian assistance and support to economic activities.

Based on small-holder agriculture, the Malian economy grew by an average of 5.5 percent between 2001 and 2011, which is above the 3.9 percent average of countries in the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Following zero growth in 2012 due to the crisis, there was minor growth (1.7 percent) in 2013 and considerable growth (7.2 percent) in 2014. However, even though the macroeconomic indicators are promising, the quality of life for most Malians appears unchanged.

In 2015, Mali has worked towards creating an environment of peace. However, the increase in number and locations of terrorist attacks, the flow of refugees and internally displaced persons, and insufficient inclusivity of the national dialogue threaten stability. The threat of violent extremism appeared to increase in 2015 with attacks being reported in the country’s central and southern regions. There were attacks at the Radisson Blu Hotel and Restaurant La Terasse in Bamako and at Hotel Kanaga in Mopti. These incidents and the overall threat to human security have limited the visibility of CSOs and restricted their ability to operate.

Development remains primarily within the realm of humanitarian relief and resilience efforts.

Overall, the situation of CSOs has not fundamentally changed in 2015. CSOs are spread out across the national territory and intervene in all sectors notably in health, education, water, and environmental protection. The security crisis has compelled CSOs to modify their priorities, strategies, and geographic foci. Indeed, international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs) are slowly returning to the northern regions where development needs are acute and work through formal and informal CSOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.3**

The legal environment has not changed considerably between 2014 and 2015. No new laws have been passed for the CSO sector. Existing laws that regulate associations and NGOs in Mali, notably Law 04-038, are clear concerning requirements for internal management, authorized activities, and financial management. This 2004 law does not constrain the registration of CSOs, which is easily done at each of the decentralized administrative levels in the country. CSOs played an important role in drafting Law 04-038. Therefore, its provisions do not impose any impediments on CSOs allowing them to operate without state interference. Furthermore, in 2015, there were no instances of state harassment of CSOs.

Indeed, community-based organizations are able to establish themselves and receive provisional registration documents at the decentralized levels (prefect and sub-prefect), as well as from town halls. Upon receipt of this status, associations may freely conduct activities. However, to receive certain benefits and support from the government such as tax exemptions, associations must sign a framework agreement with the government. Obtaining that agreement is only possible after three years of operation evidenced by production of reports, copies of board and management meeting minutes, and three certified copies of consolidated financial statements. In general, any association that regularly submits its activity reports will obtain that status. Only
the absence of proof that the CSO is indeed operational may constitute a reason for the state to refuse the granting of the framework agreement.

The current legislative framework favors the participation of CSOs in public life. Laws and official texts even instruct government agents and local authorities to involve CSO representatives in thematic commissions and the different steering, coordinating, and monitoring frameworks overseeing development activities at the communal, local, regional, and national level. This participation is often selective and depends on the willingness of bureaucrats and better monitoring by the heads of umbrella organizations.

The legal framework does not currently address the question of donations to CSOs, including donations from third parties. Donations by Malians are very rare, and no legal texts govern donations at the national level. Nevertheless, there are some local organizations providing grants to CSOs such as the Orange Foundation, banks, mining companies, or religious organizations. CSOs are exempt from certain taxes but must pay property and wage taxes (social security and other social benefits). They also pay a value-added tax on service provision and a tax on importing commercial vehicles.

Self-financing opportunities are not well understood or used by CSOs. The law does not prohibit CSOs from implementing revenue-generating activities (AGR) under the same conditions as the typical private sector firm. However, the law is strict on the use of financial resources generated within the AGR framework, which must be used exclusively to fund the CSO. This dimension of the law is poorly understood by CSOs, which often believe that AGRs are completely prohibited. Other factors that contribute to few CSOs using AGRs include reduced duration and the size of some funding (e.g., for food distribution) and the fact that some financial partners are not open to these opportunities. CSOs can apply for free and open competitive tenders for activities such as awareness campaigns, nutrition, or malaria prevention programs. In this context, they are subject to the same taxes as any market participant.

Foundations function despite the lack of legislative texts and rules to govern them. Telecommunication companies (e.g., the Orange Foundation), certain mining companies, political groups (e.g., the Sharing Foundation and the Foundation for Childhood) and some religious associations (e.g., the Aguib Sosso Foundation) commonly use this structure.

For the time being, no lawyers specialize in CSO support. However, lead CSOs in the sector, such as the Civil Society National Council (CNSC), the Forum of Civil Society Organizations (FORUM), and the Federation of Malian NGOs Coalitions (FECONG), as well as national collectives, thematic groups, and regional associations effectively advocate for and defend CSO rights.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

Organizational capacity of Malian CSOs depends to a large extent on the support of international donors and partners. With the coup in 2012 and the subsequent security crisis, international donors shifted funding to international NGOs providing humanitarian assistance and away from local CSOs more active in providing development assistance.

Through their programs, CSOs attempt to establish support groups such as school management committees, community health associations, water and sanitation committees, and other clubs. These support groups are comprised of local citizens whose legitimacy in the community allows them to engage with local government (mayor and decentralized line ministries), teachers, and health workers. These groups have allowed CSOs to obtain results and promote the sustainability of their efforts.

The capacity of CSOs to form larger support groups decreased in 2015. Larger coalitions such as the NGO Coordinated Action Committee (CCA/ONG) and their thematic groups, the National Civil Society Council (CNSC) and the Civil Society Organization Forum (FOSC), were most active in this regard. However, low
levels of financial resources lead these groups to re-orient their interventions from coordinating action, providing technical support, and lobbying the government on behalf of CSO interests to simply providing advice to CSOs. CSO groups do still exist at the local, regional, and national levels.

Strategic and operational planning among CSOs is a practice threatened by low and volatile funding. Long-term planning is less and less prevalent as CSOs focus their energies on pursuing project solicitations. The result is that strategic plans are obsolete and are infrequently operationalized. The dynamic of dependency leads CSOs to become more responsive to needs of donors than to those expressed by the communities they are meant to serve. This has a negative impact on their overall reputation.

CSOs typically have defined internal management structures and tools, but their application remains insufficient. Recognizing the paucity of resources and the imperative of credibility, CSOs are increasingly subject to internal and external audits. Indeed, to support their proposals, CSOs must often submit financial reports, audit reports, and proof of their legal status, in addition to the relevance of their previous experiences and their organizational capacity.

The administrative bodies of CSOs—namely, the board of directors and the monitoring committee—continue to play roles of guidance, validation, monitoring, and control. However, some boards of directors can impede transparency, particularly when one individual dominates the board. Many CSOs also use external auditors to do audit management of technical teams. These management audits are also planned annually under the Law 04-038.

CSOs use contract staff to support the implementation of projects. These paid personnel are usually employed on fixed-term contracts. CSOs do not have the capacity to keep staff beyond the project life cycle. Moreover, in 2015, national CSOs are increasingly losing their staff to international CSOs that provide better compensation. However, those contracts are usually short-term or between six and twelve months. This situation creates considerable labor mobility in national CSOs and contributes to increased precariousness of salaried personnel. Frequently, CSOs use volunteers to execute various tasks, but the consistency and quality of volunteer services often come up short.

Updating modern office equipment is increasingly difficult for CSOs. This in part explained by the weak financial state of CSOs and the cost-sharing conditions that some international partners require.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.5**

The financial viability of CSOs has not improved in 2015. CSOs in the north have had to rethink their operational models and shift from development to humanitarian activities. Overall, the level of funding appears to have stayed the same compared to 2014. However, funding for CSOs working in development has declined, while it has increased for humanitarian activities. There is a persistent dependence on international funding sources in the emergency relief domains.

CSOs receive funding from tenders from the Malian government, bilateral and multilateral donors, and international NGOs. Tenders are generally for social mobilization activities, capacity building trainings, consulting, and evaluation.

Previously, CSOs were able to finance their operations in part through management and administrative fees gained through the implementation of projects. However, in 2015, international donors such as the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), World Food Program, and Save the Children no longer accepted to pay those indirect costs and even have moved towards asking for cost-share as a condition for partnering. This change has a negative effect not only on CSO capacity to self-finance, but also on their capacity to renew and update their work resources.
Local funding sources are rare and insufficiently diverse. Funding opportunities are usually found within the framework of national-level projects, such as those in training, information sharing, awareness building, social mobilization, and project evaluations.

The diversification of funding sources has deteriorated, because of the exit of many INGOs as a result of the attacks at the Radisson Blu Hotel, the Restaurant La Terasse in Bamako, the Hotel Kanaga in Mopti, and the increasing incidences of violence in the Northern regions of Timbuktu and Gao. The security situation has limited CSOs’ operability and visibility, which has decreased their viability. Several niche philanthropic organizations operate at the local level, such as Muslim associations, non-religious associations (e.g., Lions Club, Rotary, Junior Chamber International), several mining associations, and a few rare businesses. However, their activities receive little media coverage and are not well known.

The overall financial situation of CSOs is one of dependency towards external partners. CSOs have increasing difficulties to be viable even in the short term as programs are suspended with little notice for security reasons.

Malian CSOs for the most part have not adopted or developed financial plans and therefore do not have viable financial strategies. The absence of common norms for determining management costs and the expenses of implementing activities and projects continues to threaten the viability of CSOs who accept any form of partnership as a means of surviving. Therefore, CSOs are less concerned with their intervention strategies than they are with pursuing financing opportunities. Indeed, CSOs can access tender offers from the government/bilateral and multilateral organizations and other sources such as international NGOs, think tanks and community-based organizations (CBOs). These are usually in social mobilization, facilitating capacity-building sessions, consulting, or evaluation. The revenues derived from those activities are not sufficient to support an organization’s financial viability. Also, the services that have declined in 2015 require a higher level of expertise than many CSOs, especially younger ones, have.

The few CSOs that have multi-year contracts have financial management systems and manuals for administrative, financial, and accounting procedures, which are regularly updated. They are subject to frequent internal audits or use external experts to conduct audits, which increases their credibility.

**ADVOCACY: 3.8**

Cooperation between the Government of Mali and civil society remains strong in 2015, with cooperation frameworks and working groups continuing to provide a space for collaboration. The increased interest in this form of collaboration is a result of the political and security situation, which has compelled government authorities to be more inclusive in public policy processes.

Furthermore, cooperation between government authorities and CSOs is structured around different types of action. At the national level, CSOs continued to participate in thematic commissions to monitor the Strategic Framework for Economic Growth and Poverty Reduction (CSCRP). CSOs were involved in the technical and political mid-term review of the CSCRP and its budget review. CSOs also participated in other national programs such as the Government’s Action Plan for Improved Public Financial Management (PAGAM-GF), the Combatting Corruption Program, Fighting HIV/AIDS Program, and the Program for Climate Change Resilience. In addition to these existing cooperation frameworks, 2015 saw the creation of commissions to monitor the implementation of the peace accords.

Regarding protection of CSOs from intimidation, there is a favorable environment with the presence of several human rights protection groups, such as the Malian Association for Human Rights (AMDH), the Women’s Citizenry Group (CNSC), and the Malian Coalition for Children’s Rights (COMADE). AMDH in
particular plays an important role in advocacy, which the umbrella organizations and the thematic groups also support. These organizations are very active and engaged in supporting the human, economic, social, and cultural rights of individuals. These services are primarily delivered in Bamako, but may also be found in areas of instability, social housing construction, or mining zones where people are losing their lands. In Bamako and elsewhere, the activities of AMDH and its partners have allowed over 200 individuals whose rights had been threatened to access justice services.

At the regional level, collaboration exists with the Regional Committees for the Planning, Coordination, and Monitoring of Development Activities (CROCSAD), the regional spatial planning schemes, regional development strategic plans, and the regional technical commissions that the governorate or regional councils have established.

At the community level, CSOs are mostly involved in the context of social, economic, and cultural development plans, annual community budgets, presentation of administrative accounts, and annual review exercises.

In addition to the collaboration between government authorities and CSOs at these three levels, CSOs organize different multi-stakeholder processes to promote good governance in service delivery, which promote the regular facilitation of citizen engagement.

Advocacy initiatives in 2015 were focused on the Peace Agreement both in terms of influencing discourse as well as supporting its dissemination and implementation. There were two consultation meetings with the government, civil society, and political parties, which was presided over by the president of the National Council of CSOs. The meeting’s purpose was to set up a committee to monitor and implement the Peace and Reconciliation Agreement resulting from the Algiers negotiations. The actions taken within this context have been modest due to persistent difficulties for many in understanding and interpreting this agreement.

CSO advocacy has also focused on identifying needs in terms of post-crisis assistance, poverty reduction, and development in the northern regions with the establishment of the Joint Evaluation Mission in Northern Mali. These contributed to the conception and presentation of the strategy document at the funding appeal conference in Paris, which informs how international partners support development in Mali. CSOs were also engaged in the capacity building of the Armed Forces with the formation of joint forces of the Malian Armed Forces (FAM), the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (CMA), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the Platform of pro-government armed groups, and the French Army in the Sahel.

CSOs were instrumental in the creation of the National Council for Security Sector Reform (CNRSS), which oversees changes in the defense and security forces, as well as the adoption of the Law on Military Programming. While CNRSS was operational in 2015, it did not have considerable visibility with international partners. CSOs contributed to the operationalization of the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Committee. Finally, CSOs were involved in decentralization processes, which is a priority for citizens. They provided support based on the recommendations of the Decentralization Convention and National Conferences on the North by establishing structures for the National Framework for Regional Development and the resulting agreements among the federal government, the regions, and localities.

Advocacy initiatives also addressed the adoption of the consumer protection law and the adoption of the law on gender equality, which established measures to encourage female participation in the public sector.

Although Malian CSOs lead many initiatives on different themes such as good governance, corruption, dialogue, peace and reconciliation, and public expenditure monitoring, the results of those are often underwhelming. For example, CSOs expect that their pressure lead to improved public financial management. However, since 2013, reports from the Office of the Auditor General demonstrate that fraud and mismanagement remain prevalent.
The types of services that CSOs provided in 2015 have not changed significantly as compared to recent years. The types of services include basic social services (infrastructure, water, sanitation, and hygiene, education, health, energy and nutrition), support and capacity building services, and support to revenue generating activities. The services are provided based on solicitations from communities themselves, local authorities, national government, or international donors. Overall, the amount of services provided has decreased in line with decreases in available funding.

In 2015, humanitarian assistance represented a large share of the services that CSOs provided. In Mali, the United Nations Office of the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is the lead coordinating entity. It oversees the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), which calls for $354 million for two million people. As of March 2015, the plan received $27 million in funding. In addition, the Common Emergency Relief Fund (CERF) had a budget of $16 million. OCHA collects and analyzes information on the humanitarian situation. In Mali, the activities of humanitarian actors are followed on a weekly basis.

Just as the overall amount of work for CSOs has declined, INGOs and the United Nations agencies have had a large operational presence. This has been mainly in humanitarian assistance, but also in development as well. These actors are perceived to have greater credibility in their operational and technical abilities to provide assistance. They continue to partner with smaller Malian CSOs. However, only a minority of Malian CSOs is able to establish those types of partnership, because donors channel most of their funding to INGOs that implement projects directly.

Cost recovery of Malian CSOs and associations is more common in sectors oriented towards service provision such as health, clean water, energy, and training. Many CSOs provide training services (e.g. agricultural practices, managing revenue generating activities, and vocational training) and consulting services (e.g. developing and applying management tools and preparing consolidated accounts). Populations themselves request these services, which respond to their needs.

Cost recovery remains a considerable challenge for other services such as consulting support, IT support, and political and human rights monitoring. CSO interventions in human rights and governance respond to the needs of population, but do not fit in current cost recovery strategies.

The Malian government and population recognize the contribution of CSOs. However, this recognition does not translate to financial support for CSOs. In fact, the general population perceives CSOs as donors.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6**

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) continue to benefit from grants or project financing from international partners such as the European Union through its CSO Support Project (PAOS Phase II). Nevertheless, the demand for support from ISOs far exceeds the supply. It is estimated that ISOs only have resources to respond to 15 percent of demand. Furthermore, CSOs receive funding for their programs through USAID, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank.

Associations and religious organizations, such as the Islamic High Council and the High Council of the Sufi Community mobilized and delivered aid to affected populations, either to displaced people in the southern regions or to those stranded in the crisis regions. ISOs, CSO umbrella organizations, and resource centers continue to provide information services and space for knowledge exchange and collaboration among CSOs in all regions of the country. Examples of ISOs include the Malian Organization to Save the Children in the
Sahel (OMAES), Malian Association for the Survival of the Sahel (AMSS), Malian Association for the Protection and Development of the Environment (AMPRODE SAHEL), Research Firm for Increasing Development Actions (CRADE), and the Institute for Popular Education (IEP). CSO umbrella organizations include the National Civil Society Council (CNSC) and the Forum of CSOs (FOSC).

Inter-sectoral partnerships exist in Mali, for example with the USAID Selective Integrated Reading Activity, which is implemented by USAID, Education Development Center, IEP, OMAES, Save the Children, School-to-School International, and CRC Sogema. Another example is the Scaling Up Nutrition movement, which unites governments, CSOs, UN agencies, donors, the private sector, and researchers.

Services offered by ISOs respond generally to the expectations of CSOs, although certain needs, such as access to financing, are not yet addressed. Information and capacity-building services offered by the ISOs are not conducted as fee-for-service. Members of the ISOs pay an annual membership fee, which provides them access to different ISO services.

Training programs are available in local languages such as Bambara. The following organizations provided trainings to CSOs in 2015: Save the Children USA, CARE Mali, Helvetas, AMPRODE SAHEL, OMAES, Research Group for Training and Women’s Empowerment (GREFFA), AMSS, and CRADE.

Information sharing and collaboration exists among NGOs and is often structured around project design and implementation. Some NGOs establish consortia or alliances to respond to requests for proposals. Furthermore, there is an online platform (e-societecivilemali.ml), which CSOs use to share information, dialogue, and create networks and partnerships among themselves and with other development actors. As of December 2014, the Internet penetration rate was 7 percent, according to Internet World Stats. This platform is accessible to all Malian CSOs allowing them to have a dynamic Internet presence. The platform contains a database of all CSOs organized by sector and region; interactive tools; important publications on CSOs and development; information on funding opportunities for CSOs and local government; and a newsletter to update CSOs on new publications and other news.

To strengthen CSO capacity, technical expertise is available throughout the country. However, there is no program to link those competencies with the needs of CSOs especially nascent ones.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.3**

In 2015, CSOs were present in the media through debates, conferences, project start-ups, and especially in taking stances on national interest issues.

Even if some CSOs have communication officers, the media itself is not sufficiently specialized in covering CSO interventions. The media outlets in Mali do not have sufficient knowledge to adequately cover many domains of CSOs, such as in health and education. As a result, their coverage leads to a variety of perceptions of CSOs, which are misinformed and inaccurate. Some of the population, and even the government at times, equate CSOs with donors. However, other members of society have a positive perception of CSOs recognizing the assistance they provide to vulnerable populations such as those affected by the effects of food insecurity, flooding, drought, and war. In contrast, the perception of government partners has notably improved with the security crisis and the recognition that CSOs play an important role in providing emergency relief to
displaced populations. The private sector often perceives CSOs as donors. In some cases, they consider CSOs as competitors when CSOs engage in revenue-generating activities to finance themselves.

Some national CSOs, INGOs and CSO networks have codes of ethics and conflict of interest policies, but these are not consistently applied. Such organizations include OMAES, AMPRODE SAHEL, Malian Association for the Promotion of the Sahel (AMAPROS), AMSS, Save the Children, Education Development Center, Diakonia (Swedish NGO), Interchurch Cooperative for Development Cooperation (ICCO) (Dutch NGO), and the Network for Advocacy and Lobbying (RPL).
In 2015 Mozambique suffered escalating political, economic, and social instability. Political tensions intensified as the main opposition party, the Mozambican National Resistance (RENAMO), reiterated its intention to take power in provinces where it claims to have won the last general elections in 2014. The assassinations of two prominent civil society actors, the harassment of other CSO leaders, the abductions of prominent Mozambican businessmen and their families, and an upsurge in the trafficking of Albino people contributed to increased political and social tensions. Many people feared that these sporadic attacks and the military’s intensifying response put at risk Mozambique’s twenty-three years of peace and stability with the real threat of a return to civil war.

During the year Mozambicans were pinched economically with a rising cost of living, growing public debt, and a steep drop in the value of the local currency, the metical. Nationwide protests continued over the exploitation of natural and mineral resources and recurring power cuts.
There were, however, some positive developments for CSOs in 2015. The new government of the Mozambique Liberation Front (FRELIMO), elected in 2014, displayed a willingness to cooperate with civil society. For example, at the district level the selection of CSO representatives in some local councils was far more participatory and transparent than in previous years, and some CSOs were even able to gain access to local development funds. Many advocacy organizations showed signs of becoming stronger, better coordinated, and politically more savvy about the need to demonstrate not only that problems exist, but that they can also offer viable solutions. The efforts of these organizations contributed to a rise in CSOs’ credibility among government, private sector, and public audiences. On the other hand, some donors continued to reduce their assistance levels, and funding remained the major challenge for the majority of organizations.

The last national survey carried out by the Institute for National Statistics, which remains the only official source of information about the number of CSOs in Mozambique, put the number at 4,853 organizations in 2004. More recent informal mapping exercises at the district level suggest that there may be more than double that number of organizations and possibly as many as 15,000 registered and informally operating CSOs in Mozambique.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

While there was little change in the legal framework for CSOs in 2015, the legal environment worsened as a result of increased state harassment of CSOs. All CSOs register as associations under the Law on Associations (Law 8/91). CSOs acquire legal status at the national level from the Ministry of Justice, at the provincial level from provincial governors, and at the district level from district administrators. Organizations in the provinces of Tete, Inhambane, and Niassa reported that the registration process at the provincial and district levels was far easier and quicker than in previous years and no longer represented a barrier to their operations. However, organizations that focus on sensitive topics can face delays when attempting to register. For example, the Mozambican Association for the Defense of Sexual Minorities (LAMBDA) is still unregistered eight years after submitting its application. Informal groups such as village water and health committees are not required to register.

Mozambican CSOs are generally able to operate free of state control. However, provisions in the Law on Associations describe CSOs as the government’s partner in service provision, which sometimes leads public authorities, particularly at the district level, to expect CSOs to cooperate with and report to them directly. If CSOs do not meet these expectations, district authorities may see them as aligned with the opposition and fail to invite them to key meetings. These assumptions vary significantly from district to district.

The year witnessed several cases of severe harassment of civil society activists, including an assassination. For example, in March 2015 Dr. Gilles Cistac, a prominent constitutional lawyer and professor of law at the University of Eduardo Mondlane, was brutally gunned down in broad daylight as he left a local café. At the time Cistac was playing a key role as an independent expert in contentious discussions initiated by RENAMO about provincial autonomy and the decentralization of power. Many observers viewed Dr. Cistac’s assassination as an effort by the government to weaken RENAMO’s position in the talks. In addition, criminal charges of defaming the head of state were filed against a prominent economist after he posted an open letter on his Facebook page criticizing the president’s leadership and questioning the source of his wealth. The editors of the media outlets MediaFax and Canal de Moçambique were charged with “abusing the
freedom of the press” after they published the economist’s letter. The men were acquitted but the attorney general appealed the rulings and at the end of the year their cases were still pending. Although frightening, the assassinations and harassment did not deter CSOs from carrying out their work.

The situation regarding tax exemptions for CSOs did not change in 2015. To receive tax exemptions a CSO must be approved as a public-utility institution. It is estimated that fewer than 5 percent of organizations manage to obtain this status because of the cumbersome approval process and CSOs’ lack of awareness that the possibility exists.

Law 8/91 allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services. However, very few organizations do so, both because they are unaware of this right and because they assume that CSOs should not be profitable entities. The law allows CSOs to compete for government contracts and procurements provided they have public-utility status, but again, few organizations acquire such status, and in any case they usually lack the funds they must possess to submit a bid.

CSOs continue to have limited access to legal support. Most lawyers are based in Maputo City or Maputo Province, and CSOs are not usually able to afford their fees. Organizations located elsewhere can sometimes access free legal assistance through the Institute for Legal Assistance and Representation (IPAJ) under the Ministry of Justice.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.2**

CSOs implementing community scorecard and social auditing programs in Mozambique have shown that the closer an organization is to its beneficiary group, the more effective it is at building constituencies. For example, village development organizations (VDOs) in the towns of Namuapala, Impire, and Nangua in the northern province of Cabo Delgado have been very successful at building local support for their social auditing work by using community groups, credit programs, and technical support to help communities find their own solutions. CSOs that have head offices in the provincial capitals are often less effective at building constituencies, in part because they do not or cannot make the outlays of time and money needed for travel, which limits their ability to form strong relationships with local communities and government officials.

Many CSOs in Maputo and the provincial capitals have strategic plans, as they are regarded as a key requirement for gaining donor support. However, only a few organizations, including well-established CSOs such as Forum Mulher and the Institute for Social and Economic Studies (IESE), have the fundraising skills needed to implement their plans fully. Local organizations are less likely to have strategic plans, because they lack the means to hire consultants to produce them and there are few qualified professionals available at the district level. These smaller CSOs often ensure their financial survival by following donor funding priorities rather than staying loyal to their stated missions.

Law 8/91 stipulates clearly that a CSO must have a general assembly, fiscal council, board of directors, and executive director. However, at CSOs with limited funding, staff members often carry out multiple roles, thus putting organizational checks and balances at risk. Smaller community-based organizations (CBOs) with little or no funding often do not have an executive director, and their boards of directors play an implementing role. The fiscal council is meant to act as an independent internal auditor but organizations often do not fully understand or follow this mandate. Small and medium-sized CSOs often fail to hold general assembly meetings because of a lack of funding.
Larger, well-established CSOs such as the Center for Civil Society Learning and Capacity Building (CESC) employ permanent staff with contracts and job descriptions, and they usually also have payroll and personnel policies in place. However, some larger organizations had to downsize their staff in 2015 because of declining funding. Smaller district-level organizations and CBOs are often without funding and function with volunteer staff. Very few CSOs tap into the potentially rich source of volunteers in university students, as they do not see universities as natural partners. Professional services from accountants, information technology specialists, and lawyers are generally available only to CSOs with a donor willing to fund them.

Most CSOs have access to modern basic office equipment such as cell phones and basic computers. However, Internet access is limited at the district and community levels.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0**

The main foreign donors in Mozambique are the European Union (EU), Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA), Irish Aid, UK Department for International Development (DFID), Embassy of Sweden, and USAID, along with international organizations such as Diakonia, IBIS, Oxfam Novib, and We Effect. In 2015 DANIDA announced that it would be leaving Mozambique in 2016. Some other donors are gradually reducing their funding and staffing levels in the country, usually because they no longer consider Mozambique a priority, have concerns about financial management, or are facing financial pressures of their own.

Local foundations such as the Civil Society Support Mechanism (MASC) Foundation and Foundation for Community Development (FDC) award grants to Mozambican CSOs. The MASC Foundation is a donor-funded project to support democratization and social justice. FDC, which receives funding from both foreign and domestic sources, supports projects in community development, HIV/AIDS, and children’s rights. The Action Program for Inclusive and Responsible Governance (AGIR), originally slated to wind down in 2014, opened a second phase of the program and will continue to fund projects until 2020.

Because of their dependency on foreign donors, CSOs in Mozambique do little to promote local philanthropy. The public is much more likely to support churches and mosques than CSOs. However, local communities sometimes show unexpected generosity. For example, in 2015 the community radio station in Guvuro District in the northern part of Inhambane Province was threatened with closure because of a lack of funds. The station was saved by community members, who contributed support to keep it open.

The majority of CSOs in Mozambique do not have multiple sources of funding. Only larger CSOs benefit from generous funding from more than one source, which usually brings the added benefit of donor-sponsored technical support and independent audits, contributing to recipients’ organizational strength. Smaller CSOs and CBOs, which typically have limited funding, few qualified staff, and few administrative and financial procedures, can be “used” by larger national and international CSOs as local fundraising partners, although they usually do not share in any eventual funding and are often not paid for the on-the-ground research they perform. Meetings conducted by the MASC Foundation in 2015 with CSOs in ten districts showed that fewer than 20 percent of participating organizations had any funding at all. They continued to carry out basic activities on a volunteer basis because communities relied on their services.

There is no established mechanism for channeling public funds to CSOs. Law 8/91 stipulates that only associations with public-utility status may enter into contracts with the government and thereby access public funds, and there are few such organizations. State funds such as the Fund for Artistic and Cultural Development (FUNDAC) and the National AIDS Council (CNCS) offer grants to CSOs, and the government sometimes also offers grants to service-providing CSOs through local district funds, although
this is the exception rather than the rule. Businesses offer some support to civic-minded projects. For example, as part of its corporate responsibility program, the phone company MCEL signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Institute of Disaster Management that included funding for a free help line to which citizens can phone in reports about floods, droughts, and other natural emergencies. MCEL is also contributing to an initiative to reconstruct public spaces, such as parks.

Few Mozambican CSOs pursue income-generating activities because they lack both the funds and technical assistance needed to pursue interventions. In addition, many organizations assume that the law does not allow profit-making activities. Exceptions include the Nucleus of Friends of Nature and the Environment (NANA) in Zambezia and Akilizetho in Nampula, which rent out office space, and IESE, which sells its annual publication, Mozambique’s Challenges. Ophavela, a local organization that fosters small community savings groups in Nampula, has earned income to build its own facilities. Another form of income generation for larger organizations is the provision of research services to for-profit consultancy companies. For example, CESC, N’weti, and Save the Children have contracts for this type of work with the Citizens Engagement Program (CEP), a project run by a private consultancy firm. Smaller district-level organizations and CBOs earn income teaching, farming, or selling products. The Mozambique Bar Association is one of the few CSOs able to raise significant amounts of money from membership fees. In a novel approach to raising funds from members, the National Farmers Union (UNAC) demands that provincial delegations secure membership fees from district delegates if they want to participate in UNAC’s annual meeting.

CSOs’ lack of funding means that they are often unable to attract highly qualified financial experts to their staff. CSOs still tend to report firstly to donors and secondly to their own members and general assemblies. Few organizations publish their financial accounts publicly, both because of a lack of funding and because they do not think it is important to share this information with the government or the general public.

**ADVOCACY: 4.2**

The relationship between CSOs and policymakers improved in 2015. The new government seemed open to better cooperation with CSOs and made an attempt to open its doors to discussion and coordination on various levels. For example, as a result of advocacy by World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and an alliance of CSO platforms engaged in issues related to natural and mineral resources, the Ministry of Land and Natural Resources worked with WWF on a joint assessment of licenses issued by the Ministry for Forest Exploration. In another important development, the Budget Monitoring Forum (FMO), which consists of CESC, FDC, Center for Public Integrity (CIP), Civil Society Forum for Child Rights (ROSC), and Mozambican Debt Group (GMD), successfully pushed for the release of the state budget prior to its submission to parliament, so that CSOs would have sufficient time to review it and present their recommendations. In addition, the Forum of Community Radios (FORCOM), together with CESC, Center for Studies and Research in Communication (Sekelekani), League of NGOs (JOIN), Forum Mulher, and other organizations, took part in discussions questioning the lack of information about Mozambique’s switch from analog to digital broadcasting, which was scheduled for June 2015 but then postponed. As a result of its efforts, FORCOM was appointed civil society representative on the government’s Digital Migration Commission. Several CSOs provided recommendations for the Right to Information Law, which parliament passed in 2015. Although not all of their proposals were included in the final law, it was a positive step for the government to open the bill to CSOs’ comments.

At the national level, CIP, which is regarded as one of the leading advocacy organizations in Mozambique, has had an occasionally strained relationship with the government because of its focus on corruption. However, at its 2015 high-level conference on the management of oil and petroleum contracts, CIP was able to marshal deep expertise and thereby help create a more fruitful working relationship with the government.
The mechanisms allowing CSO to participate in community and district-level community councils also improved in 2015. In Inhambane and Cabo Delgado, the selection of civil society representatives to serve on local councils was far more participatory and transparent than in the past, and CSOs were also able to tap into the local development fund. The province of Niassa allowed Estamos to restart its monitoring of district governments’ performance, which had been stopped in 2014 because the provincial government considered it a threat.

Also on the local level, the Support Center for Information and Community Communication (CAICC) continued to operate its Face 2 Face project, which involves a network of public platforms aimed at furthering the political inclusion of rural communities through implementation of the Right to Information (RTI) Law. In 2015 CAICC received a grant award for the project from the international program Making All Voices Count.

CSOs continued to emerge as a force in environmental protection and governance in 2015. Organizations specialized in environmental studies and advocacy, such as Justiça Ambiental (JA!), Centro Terra Viva (CTV), and Livaningo, pursued activities ranging from beach-cleaning campaigns to the protection of land and communities threatened by the illegal exploitation of natural resources.

CSOs also cooperated with each other more effectively in 2015, as was seen in their public discussions about Pro-Savanna, a large agriculture project being implemented in the northern provinces of Mozambique. In a public debate about the project, leading CSOs courageously demanded clear answers from the minister of agriculture. When the minister was unwilling to respond to their questions, CSOs abandoned the debate en masse.

In 2015 there was little progress in improving the regulatory framework for CSOs and little sign of groups working together to promote legal reform on behalf of CSOs and local philanthropy.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0**

Mozambican CSOs provide a variety of services in health, education, agriculture, and water and sanitation. In 2015 many service-providing CSOs benefited from the support of the Capable Partners Program (CAP), a USAID-backed initiative implemented by FHI360 that offers funding and capacity building to CSOs and activists that provide basic services at the grassroots level. As in 2014, CSOs were sometimes unable to provide services in areas affected by military tensions. In addition, populations displaced from Mozambique’s Tsangano District into Malawi were unable to access vital services offered by CSOs. In the aftermath of the 2014 floods, CSOs offered shelter, food, health, and educational support to affected populations.

Informal groups such as water and health committees often offer the most effective services at the grassroots level. These are elected by and accountable to the communities themselves and enjoy a clear mandate. They tend also to be closer to and best informed of the needs of the most vulnerable local populations. In addition, they are more sustainable as they do not have the overhead costs of established CSOs.

The goods and services provided by CSOs working in environmental protection and governance often go beyond their immediate target groups to benefit larger communities. In 2015, the ways in which support to individuals in agriculture, credit, and education can result in gains for the larger community was particularly evident in the work of CSOs in Cabo Delgado province, which were supported by Aga Khan Foundation. On behalf of their communities VDOs put together proposals to obtain local government funds and materials for small infrastructure projects such as minor road repairs and extra classrooms. The VDOs also mobilized their communities to offer labor as in-kind contributions to these projects.
CSOs rarely cover the costs of their goods and services through fees, mainly because of their lack of knowledge about market demand.

In 2015 the Mozambique Health Civil Society Platform (PLASOC) signed a memorandum of understanding with the Ministry of Health to improve cooperation between the government and civil society. Among other initiatives they agreed to hold regular meetings, the first of which took place during the year. Local governments recognize the value of CSOs’ use of community scorecards and social audits, although they may not always agree with the results of such exercises.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

There are no intermediary support organizations (ISOs) or CSO resource centers in Mozambique. Community radio stations sometimes offer local organizations access to computers, computer training, the Internet, and photocopying and faxing services at the community multimedia centers that they run. However, these centers operate mostly at the district level, cover a very small percentage of districts, and are accessible by very few organizations.

More than sixty provincial, district, and thematic forums and platforms facilitate information sharing and offer other support to CSOs with varying degrees of success. For example, at the thematic level, N’weti, part of the CEP initiative, hosts a learning network on health that regularly disseminates information, studies, and success stories to CSOs and donors nationwide. In 2015 JOINT, a national forum that promotes information exchange among its members, carried out broad-based research among CSOs for the CIVICUS Enabling Environment National Assessment, which highlighted the challenges that CSOs face in their struggle to achieve an open space for civil society.

Trainers are available at the national and provincial levels but are scarce at the district and community levels. Training provided by donors is usually only available to their grantees. The most common themes of training are financial management, internal governance, and the use of monitoring tools, such as community scorecards and social auditing. A recent analysis by the MASC Foundation showed that no training was available in fundraising and sustainability, which are priorities for CSOs. Organizations that do not receive funding for training often do not have sufficient resources of their own to pay for staff to attend training courses. Given the logistical and language barriers to reaching CSOs on the district and community levels, training support for smaller CSOs is likely to remain a challenge.

CSOs cooperated more effectively with the private sector in 2015. For example, in 2015 the Association of Commerce, Services, and Industry (ACIS) and Confederation of Business Associations of Mozambique (CTA) joined forces with CSOs to ensure that the private sector and civil society are involved at an earlier stage in commenting on draft legislation. Working in cooperation with local organizations, WWF and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) continued to engage with large multi-national companies in public debates about the environment and natural resources. At the beginning of the year, as the Mozambican Red Cross and other CSOs continued to assist victims of the 2014 floods, the private sector contributed to their efforts by allowing citizens to donate funds through banks, phone companies, ATMs, and mobile phone messages. In addition, local shops and supermarkets set aside drop-off zones for donated supplies.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.6**

In 2015 media awareness of the key role played by CSOs improved. CSO representatives were invited to take part in television debates more often than in previous years. Coverage of major CSO conferences and other activities is now common in newspapers and on television and radio. Outside of the capital, the possibilities for CSOs to promote their work in the media are more limited, especially at the district and community
levels, where community radio stations are usually the only media outlets. However, CSOs interact with these stations easily. For example, in Homoine District in Inhambane, the community radio station offered office space and human resources support to a newly formed CSO platform.

Thanks to the increased media coverage, the public’s perception of CSOs has improved, and citizens better understand CSOs’ role as an independent voice defending the most vulnerable. The private sector is similarly more inclined to see civil society as a strong partner in common causes, as evidenced in ACIS and CTA’s cooperation with CSOs on changing the process for reviewing draft legislation. In addition, CSO leaders were invited to participate as speakers and panelists at the Mozambique Economic and Social Forum (MOZEFO), a major conference organized by the business community. Government perceptions of CSOs have similarly improved, as seen, for example, in the government’s decision to take part in the analysis of the health sector carried out by CEPSA.

CSOs do not generally promote their public image and therefore the public does not know about or misunderstands much of their work. Larger organizations often have contacts with one or two journalists, but few have communication strategies and so their efforts in this area tend to be ad hoc. The use of social media is becoming more common.

CSOs across the country adopted a code of ethics in 2014 and continued to encourage donors to support it in 2015. However, the initiative is still at an early stage, and fewer than 5 percent of individual organizations have signed on to the code. Although few CSOs publish their annual reports in the media because of the high cost, a growing number of organizations post their reports online.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Mozambique

Mozambique

Sustainability

Enhanced

Evolving

Impeded
Political stability and sound economic management have helped Namibia achieve economic growth and lower its poverty rate in the years since independence in 1990. Although Namibia has reached upper middle-income status, growth has not led to job creation, and the extreme social and economic inequities inherited from the pre-independence period persist despite generous government spending on social programs. The country has one of the world’s lowest population densities, and poverty is especially persistent in the rural areas, where people live mainly on subsistence agriculture and livestock. Namibia’s development agenda is reflected in its Vision 2030 plan, which was adopted in 2004 and is implemented primarily through five-year National Development Plans (NDPs).

In an important sign of political stability, peaceful elections for regional and local authorities took place in November 2015. Namibia continues to be dominated by a single political party, the South-West Africa People’s Organization (SWAPO), which has the majority in all fourteen regional councils and holds all but one seat in the National Council. The government remains committed to fighting corruption, and a National
Anti-Corruption Strategy was adopted and launched in 2015. Other anti-corruption initiatives, some implemented jointly with CSOs, also intensified in 2015. In Transparency International’s *Corruption Perception Index 2015*, Namibia’s ranking improved by ten places from the previous year, to forty-fifth out of 168 countries.

The legal environment for CSOs in Namibia is generally favorable. Although their organizational capacity is not strong and the infrastructure supporting them is not well developed, CSOs enjoy a range of opportunities to interact with public officials. More than half of CSOs work in the health sector, supported almost exclusively by foreign donors, who are beginning to scale back their funding because of Namibia’s strong economic growth. Public perceptions of CSOs are mixed. They are regarded as elitist but also as offering policy alternatives in place of the weak opposition.

In 2015 there were 568 CSOs in Namibia, per the third edition of the *Guide to Civil Society in Namibia*, compiled by the Namibia Institute for Democracy (NID). This is a relatively large number, given Namibia’s population of only about 2.4 million people. Many of the country’s CSOs are actually very small, operate on a perfunctory level, or are inactive. Even though 47 percent of CSOs indicate that they operate on a national level, there are currently only about thirty national CSOs with active and sustained programs, full-time staff, and functional administrations.

### LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.4

The Constitution of the Republic of Namibia includes provisions guaranteeing space for civil society. Chapter 3 of the constitution expresses a commitment to fundamental rights and freedoms, and Article 131 stipulates that no repeal or amendment of Chapter 3 may detract from or diminish those rights. The Government of Namibia respects these constitutional guarantees.

There is no law specifically regulating CSOs in Namibia. Seventy-three percent of CSOs are voluntary associations, which exist under common law with no formal legal framework, few regulatory requirements, and no registering body to govern them. Voluntary associations are generally organized around a common purpose and are membership based, which must be reflected in their constitutions. They may seek registration with government agencies related to their activities but are not required to do so.

Organizations may register formally as trusts under the Trust Monies Protection Act (Act No. 34 of 1934) or as incorporated associations not for gain under Section 21 of the Companies Act (Act No. 6 of 1973, as amended). Trusts are usually founded to protect assets or advance specific goals. Although a trust may have members, the authority for managing its affairs lies with a board of trustees. Incorporated associations not for gain promote religious, educational, charitable, and other interests. They may make a profit, provided it is applied to organizational objectives rather than the payment of dividends to staff members or directors.

Voluntary associations, trusts, and incorporated associations not for gain may register with the Ministry of Health and Social Services as welfare organizations under the National Welfare Act (Act No. 79 of 1965). To do so they must engage in public-welfare activities and afterwards may request donations from national, regional, and local governments and collect money from the public. Registration as a welfare organization has the benefit of conferring eligibility for government grants and allowing the issuance of certificates to private donors for tax-deduction purposes. There are seventy-two welfare organizations in Namibia.

The registration process for trusts and incorporated associations is costly and thus not always feasible for emerging CSOs. Organizations may operate informally, but this can make fundraising difficult because of the absence of legally prescribed financial controls and reporting requirements. CSOs registered under the Trust or Companies Act are obliged to adhere to detailed legal requirements in such areas as financial reporting and dissolution.

The government has created a favorable climate for CSOs and generally limits itself to verbal criticism of their activities. No incident of harassment of CSOs, including restrictive legislation, arrests, and physical intimidation, was reported in 2015. During the year the government occasionally made immoderate
statements about CSOs, especially with regard to a few groups involved in human rights, press freedom, and opposition political parties. For example, after alleging that the government had committed human rights violations, NamRights was the target of government criticism and accused of undermining its policy of national reconciliation. In recent years the government has proposed regulation to compel any organization or individual wishing to conduct research to obtain permission in advance from the government-appointed National Commission of Research, Science and Technology (NCSRST). Some CSOs, including the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and Legal Assistance Center (LAC), have expressed concerns that the proposed regulation contradicts the constitution and could be used to stifle freedom of expression.

CSOs do not receive tax exemptions of any kind. Individual and corporate donors receive tax deductions only for donations made to registered welfare organizations.

There are no legal limitations on the ability of CSOs to obtain funding from foreign sources. CSOs are legally able to earn income from the provision of goods and services, including through government contracts. However, aside from the funding available to welfare organizations, government funding for CSOs is difficult to obtain, and contracts are usually awarded to private companies.

Legal advice is available to CSOs in both the capital and rural areas. However, it tends to be costly, since it is normally provided by private practitioners. Only LAC provides legal assistance to CSOs free of charge through its practice of public interest law.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0**

CSOs in Namibia have limited organizational capacity. An important reason for this deficiency is the absence of strong relationships with local constituencies. These relationships are difficult to develop, in part because Namibia's large territory and low population density make it logistically difficult for groups to meet. In addition, people residing in rural communal areas are traditionally difficult to organize into formal interest groups, as they often live in very remote areas and suffer from a lack of infrastructure, such as transportation and communications, which would allow them to take part in formally structured activities. Ethnic tensions sometimes also interfere. Nevertheless, community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) groups are beginning to successfully organize rural populations through conservancy mechanisms. In contrast, elite urban-based CSOs that try to represent the interests of marginalized groups tend to speak about, but not always for, disadvantaged communities. These organizations can effectively influence government actions, but because they did not grow out of the grassroots they lack mass appeal and the public sees their goals as removed from everyday socio-economic realities.

Another organizational deficiency is a pervasive weakness in management capacity. This gap cuts across all types of CSOs and affects strategic and operational planning, management, and accounting. It is usually rooted in the absence of established organizational structures, systems, policies, and procedures. Even CSOs that have developed internal policies and manuals—usually in response to donor requirements—often fail to implement them fully.

The role of CSO governing boards is widely misunderstood. Board members often interfere in the day-to-day management of their organizations or are absent and serve in name only. They are typically uninformed about their fiduciary duties, and the election of new board members often fails to bring requisite skills to the board. Similarly, CSO staff members often misunderstand management’s role. Recent research by the European Union (EU) revealed that CSO leaders often see themselves as development workers who labor for the greater good of society rather than as managers skilled in organizational management.

The pool of qualified personnel in Namibia is small, and competition for them among the public, private, and CSO sectors is stiff. CSOs are often not able to attract or retain well-qualified staff because the public and private sectors offer better salaries. The sustainability of many CSOs is dependent upon particular individuals, whose departure may mean that their organizations can no longer function. Staff capacity for absorbing training, the most popular form of capacity building, is limited, because there are few employees to receive
training and most CSOs are so thinly staffed that they cannot afford to let employees be absent for any length of time. Local volunteerism is not widespread, and helpers expect to be paid. Typically CSOs served by unpaid volunteers have recruited them from abroad.

CSOs do not usually operate from well-equipped offices, as they find it difficult to obtain funding for office infrastructure. Communication through social media and information sharing through the Internet is common since it is fairly inexpensive. Many CSO staff use their own cellphones and other equipment in their work activities.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.4**

CSOs rely largely on foreign donor funding to sustain their operations. The main donors include the EU, Finland, Spain, Germany, France, United States, and United Nations (UN). These donors support diverse programs in areas ranging from human rights and socio-economic justice to capacity building, climate change, and HIV/AIDS. However, with the World Bank’s classification of Namibia as an upper middle-income country, donors have begun to phase out their programs, which is a growing concern for the CSO community.

Core funding tends to be scarce, which drives CSOs to pursue multiple short-term projects. As a result, their funding levels fluctuate and their programs tend to be fragmented. Although CSOs are generally adept at implementing projects, they struggle to meet donors’ growing requirements for documentation. For example, CSOs must usually submit extensive project proposals that include risk analyses, detailed monitoring and evaluation plans, and various certifications. Some donors require online applications. Only larger, more established CSOs have the capacity to comply with these requirements, and because of their lack of capacity most voluntary associations are unable to obtain donor funding directly. They sometimes receive sub-grants from local or international intermediary support organizations (ISOs).

Beyond small individual contributions, local financial support for Namibian CSOs is rare. Government funding to CSOs through contracting is practically nonexistent. CSOs that focus on accountability or democracy or promote an independent political space find it particularly difficult, if not impossible, to obtain government support. In 2011 the National Planning Commission (NPC) and the umbrella body for CSOs in Namibia, the Namibian Non-Governmental Organization Forum (NANGOF) Trust, signed a memorandum of understanding to enable the allocation of government funds to CSO projects through the trust. In 2015, however, despite the trust’s submission of several funding proposals, the government did not provide it with any funds. Thirty-five of Namibia’s seventy-two registered welfare organizations receive government grants.

Funding from domestic private-sector sources is limited. There are no tax incentives for corporations to give to CSOs other than registered welfare organizations. Local representatives of South African and multinational firms are reluctant to support Namibian CSOs because they are dependent on the government for work permits, licenses, and tenders and do not want to risk losing the government’s support. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs are small and concentrate mostly on sports and art. In several instances the government has taken over private-sector resources that could have been available to CSOs. For example, in 2015 funds from Engen Namibia, a fuel marketing and distribution company, were put in a government-controlled fund to pay for the construction and renovation of classrooms. Although not explicitly earmarked for CSOs, the government could have incorporated CSOs into the activities covered by these funds but did not.

Although voluntary associations are membership based, members’ fees are typically small and do not generate significant income. The notion that CSOs could charge fees for services is not widely accepted by the Namibian people, who feel that CSOs should focus on social development issues. Some CSOs, such as NID and Women’s Action for Development (WAD), have approached fundraising by splitting into two separate entities, one entity working for gain as consultants and the other entity using the earned income for philanthropic work. Income-generating work mainly consists of contributing research to international studies.
such as the annual Bertelsmann Transformation Index. CSOs typically do not conduct fundraising campaigns through special events or letter-writing campaigns.

Only a few established CSOs have proper financial management systems. They are usually trusts or incorporated associations not for gain, which are required by law to conduct financial audits and meet other financial management requirements. Donors also usually require funding recipients to have functioning financial management systems. Most voluntary associations are unable to afford audits of their financial statements.

ADVOCACY: 4.1

CSOs in Namibia have various opportunities for engaging with elected leaders and government officials on matters of policy. For example, in 2015 the parliament implemented two outreach programs to enhance public understanding of the legislative process, and each of the eight parliamentary standing committees solicited public input for two hours every week. CSOs took advantage of this opportunity to make presentations on rural development and the impact of government policies on local communities. Most collaboration between ministries and CSOs on policy formulation tends to be informal and ad hoc. Although CSOs work hard to maintain cordial relationships with relevant ministries, they are sometimes consulted too early or too late in the policy process to have an effect. They can also find it difficult to present a coherent position. Some CSO leaders believe that CSOs and the government do not engage with each other enough and that CSOs focus too much on service delivery rather than helping people understand their rights, hold leaders accountable, and ensure that they receive quality services.

As Namibian civil society finds its voice, more CSOs are speaking out publicly with varying degrees of assertiveness. However, most organizations are still reluctant to take public positions and instead discuss their concerns with the government in private. At the same time, because of the weakness of opposition groups, the public increasingly looks to CSOs to provide alternatives to government policies. One organization that has responded to this challenge is LAC, which has taken up public interest cases to establish new legal precedents, address discriminatory practices, and draw attention to public problems. CBNRM groups are among the country’s strongest CSOs and engage actively on policy issues, especially the gap between progressive policies and the institutional structures required to carry them out. Their advocacy work in 2015 focused on improving communities’ access to land and resources, as well as issues surrounding leases for conservancies.

IPPR, the only think tank on political and economic issues in Namibia, contributes richly to public debate with independent policy analyses. In 2015, in preparation for regional and local elections in November, IPPR conducted a voter education program in partnership with the Electoral Commission. NID trained 300 election observers and fielded an election observation mission with funding from USAID.

LAC and NamRights are the most vocal organizations working on human rights. In 2015 LAC continued its legal challenge to the government’s proposed regulation that any organization or individual conducting research must apply for permission from NCRST in advance. Other prominent human rights organizations include the Labor Resource and Research Institute (LARRI), which works on labor issues, and Sister Namibia, which works on women’s rights.

Several CSOs focus on corruption, mainly through civic education and technical assistance to the Anti-Corruption Commission. For example, in 2015 NID continued its Zero Tolerance for Corruption campaign and worked with the Anti-Corruption Commission and other national CSOs, including IPPR and LAC, to finalize the national anti-corruption strategy. However, CSOs’ ability to promote transparency and accountability is hampered by the absence of access-to-information legislation. In addition, Namibia’s legal framework promotes secrecy—for example, through apartheid-era legislation that has yet to be repealed, such as the Protection of Information Act of 1982. In 2015 a group of CSOs briefly collaborated under the umbrella group ACTION to push for passage of new access-to-information legislation.
CSOs recognize the need to establish a clear and enabling legal framework for their operations. The Civic Organizations Partnership Policy, which the government drafted in 2005, acknowledges the need for collective responses to development challenges and a clearer policy framework for government-CSO cooperation. The policy proposes that CSOs formally register with the NPC under draft legislation known as the Registration Bill. Under the leadership of the NANGOF Trust, CSOs rejected the “Civic Organizations Partnership Policy” on the ground that they were not involved in its drafting. They have yet to come up with a suitable replacement policy to present to government. In 2015 no progress was made on implementing or amending the policy or enacting the Registration Bill.

SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0

Nearly half of CSOs work in the health sector, with an emphasis on aid to orphans and vulnerable children, home-based care, and HIV/AIDS. The other main areas of service provision are natural resource management, training and education, rural and urban development, gender, economic and social justice, and democracy, governance, and human rights. CSO service delivery complements government initiatives in health, social work, natural resource management, and other sectors. Service delivery in political and policy areas is more challenging for CSOs, since the government sometimes resists their activities. For example, in 2015 the government regularly criticized IPPR's policy analyses.

CSOs infrequently involve their target groups in identifying needed services or evaluating project outcomes. The reason is that international development funds are usually channeled through complex project frameworks that define outcomes prior to the conclusion of contracts, so that consultations with target groups are generally precluded.

Cost recovery is difficult for most CSOs working rural areas since beneficiaries are usually unable to pay for their services. Donors cover the cost of most services.

To a certain extent the government recognizes CSOs as service providers. However, some elected leaders are reluctant to incorporate or even acknowledge CSOs in service delivery, often because they themselves want to be perceived as bringing benefits to their communities and constituencies. Only about 40 percent of CSOs registered as welfare organizations received government grants in 2015—a deficit that the government frequently blames on CSOs' lack of accountability as well as funding shortfalls.

INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.5

There are no formal resource centers serving CSOs in Namibia. A sub-granting organization, the Civil Society Foundation of Namibia (CSFN), was established in 2011 with financial support from the EU. Its purpose is to serve as a platform for the discussion of projects and trends in Namibian civil society and disburse grants, especially to emerging CSOs, under the Namibia Civil Society Support Program. In 2015, in cooperation with the NANGOF Trust, CSFN awarded sub-grants valued at about $50,000 to twenty-eight projects in two regions.

The main umbrella body for CSOs is the NANGOF Trust, which was revived in 2009 after years of dormancy and today is recognized by the government as the representative body of CSOs. The NANGOF Trust acts as a collective voice for CSOs and provides support services to its 122 member organizations. The trust also organizes eight working groups for members. The failure of the trust to come through with funding from the NPC in 2015 has caused dissatisfaction among member organizations, which have openly questioned the trust's effectiveness. Another important network organization is the Namibia Network of AIDS Service Organizations (NANASO), which in addition to a grant program administered jointly with the Ministry of Health and Social Services offers its members training, advocacy support, and library services.

Apart from these initiatives, a pervasive sense of competition for donor funding limits collaboration among CSOs. When collaboration does take place, it is usually ad hoc and not sustained. For example, in 2015, after the umbrella group ACTION held a press conference and set up a website on access-to-information
legislation, participating CSOs began to work on the issue individually. Similarly, the coalition My Constitution My Decision, which was formed in 2014 in response to a proposed constitutional amendment giving the president more power, had trouble sustaining its efforts. After obtaining the support of the Southern African Development Community Council of Non-Governmental Organizations, the campaign dwindled to occasional comments on its Facebook page in 2015.

NID offered training in organizational management under its Fundamentals of NGO Management program in 2015. The training addressed the role of boards, financial management, organizational ethics, monitoring and evaluation, and other topics. Five training manuals have been published in English as part of the program. The NANGOF Trust offers institutional capacity-building training for its members on an ad hoc basis.

Intersectoral partnerships sometimes work effectively. For example, the Namibian Association of CBNRM Support Organizations (NACSO) harnesses the wide range of skills available in government, CSOs, and academia to offer a nationwide CBNRM support service. The service helps communities form their own conservancies and work with private companies to create a tourism market. As of 2015 sixty-four communal conservancies were in operation, with members responsible for protecting their resources, particularly wildlife populations. The Media Institute for Southern Africa (MISA) works with media and academic institutions to conduct advocacy and strengthen pluralistic and independent media in Southern Africa, including Namibia.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.8

The national media routinely report, although not in depth, on CSO activities, including launches of new projects, publications, and CSO policy analysis. Most coverage is favorable. The media do not provide free advertising space or public-service announcements to CSOs. Some organizations such as NID offer training for journalists. CSOs usually attempt to include the media in their civic education and advocacy campaigns.

Public perceptions of CSO are mixed. At the grassroots level the public often sees CSOs as elitist and not representing their interests. At the same time, because of the weak state of the opposition, the public increasingly turns to CSOs to provide alternatives to government policies. The private sector expresses little confidence in CSOs’ ability to deliver services effectively and professionally. Some political leaders do not appreciate CSO advocacy activities and at times publicly attack them. For example, in a speech in 2015 the secretary-general of SWAPO dismissed the work of an international political foundation, adding that “The SWAPO Party will not be told by a foreign foundation what to do.” Otherwise the government sometimes recognizes CSOs as service providers.

CSOs increasingly use social media to promote their activities and conduct civic education and advocacy campaigns. For example, in 2015, as part of its goal of empowering Namibian youth, NID set up an interactive social network that civic educators could use to generate content on topics such as human trafficking, the environment, and the promotion of local products. CSOs also commonly use public marches as a publicity tool. For example, the Women’s Leadership Center, a local CSO advocating for gender equality, organized a peaceful march against gender-based violence on International Women’s Day in 2015.

The NANGOF Trust has developed a code of conduct and code of ethics that each of its member organizations is required to sign. However, few members had done so by the end of 2015, and only a few CSOs have adopted codes of ethics. Established organizations with audited financial statements—amounting to about 10 percent of regularly active CSOs—publish them in their annual reports and post them on their websites.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Namibia

CSO Sustainability

154
THE 2015 CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA
Niger is a large landlocked country with an austere physical environment and climate. Its annual population growth rate is among the world’s highest at 3.9 percent and the majority of the population lives in rural areas. To meet the population’s basic needs in education, health, employment, and nutrition requires an increased investment in those services. However, the national economy is not strong enough to make those investments even with a GDP per capita growth of 7.8 percent between 2012 and 2013. The majority of the economy is informal. Furthermore, there are three strategic frameworks that define the economic context in Niger: Vision Niger 2035 pertaining to the Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth Strategy, the Economic and Social Development Plan 2012-2015, and the 3N Initiative (Nigeriens Feeding Nigeriens). The socio-political climate in Niger is characterized by different types of recurring conflict: political conflict, conflict over natural resources, armed conflict, and terrorist threats (Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and others). These conflicts have considerable repercussions on the foundational values of the Nigerien nation, which are peace, solidarity, democracy, and respect for human rights, liberty and human dignity.
The process of democratic renewal has known many crises and interruptions since its beginnings in 1990 including five republics, three military coups, four political transition periods, two dissolutions of the National Assembly, and one dissolution of the Constitutional Court. It is within this context that the CSO sector emerged and developed. A 2005 study on the civil society sector in Niger produced under the European Union-funded Civil Society Support Project (PASOC) noted three major categories of CSOs: traditional organizations consisting of individuals belonging to a same class who have developed bonds of solidarity and mutual help; the farmer’s movement from the cooperatives beginning during the colonial period and expanding during the military regime in 1974; and, the youth movement and other socio-professional organizations working on development. These categories remain valid in 2015.

Civil society emerged in the 1990s with associations raising democratic demands. The repercussions of structural adjustment programs sparked intense debates within the emerging civil society sector. A 2005 study on the civil society sector in Niger proposes four levels of categorizing CSOs. The first, and perhaps the most common and with the broadest geographic coverage, is community-based organizations such as fadas, clubs, cultural troops, community-based radios, and small NGOs. The second group consists of formal structures (larger NGOs, development associations, or cultural associations) that provide services to populations both at a local or national level. The third group consists of producers groups, federations, or networks that provide individual member organizations with services such as knowledge sharing, communications, and tools for service delivery. The last category consists of networking organizations (platforms, forums, consultation groups, and union associations), which are often used to help organizations interact with and confront public authorities.

In Niger, the number of CSOs has grown exponentially in the past decade. According to data from the Ministry of the Interior, Public Security, Decentralization, and Religious Affairs, the government granted legal status to 1,294 organizations since 1981, 90 percent of which received that status since 2005. They have played an important role in political processes and promoting a democratic regime. They have also positioned themselves as indispensable actors for the government and international partners in political processes, especially those pertaining to social and economic development.

In Niger, CSOs were actively involved in the drafting of the Program for Social and Economic Development (PDES) 2012-15. This program creates a cooperation framework for diverse actors promoting the country’s development. A new development program planned for the 2016-20 period is expected to have greater involvement of CSOs, based on lessons learned from the previous strategy.

Despite their positive involvement in policy, CSOs are confronted with numerous and serious problems. They generally have weak organizational capacity, which limits the size and scope of their interventions. A study completed under the European Union’s first civil society support project identified many weaknesses and challenges that CSOs experience. These include collusion between CSOs and political parties; manipulation of CSOs by political parties that integrate their structures; compromising core values for funding opportunities; insufficient technical and financial resources; insufficient handover of CSO leadership; weak capacity to influence public policy; weak CSO-government collaboration; weak coordination among CSOs; insufficient synergies; and other deficiencies.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.1**

In addition to international legal norms and institutions, several legislative and regulatory texts govern CSOs in Niger. Articles 9 and 32 of the Constitution of the 7th Republic and the following laws have governed the activities of CSOs. Before 1984, Ordonnances 75-11 of March 13, 1975, and 77-36 of December 29, 1977, were the main legal texts for CSOs, which were replaced by Ordonnance 84-06 of March 1, 1984. That text has been modified on several occasions to reflect the emergence of non-governmental organizations and categorize associations by type, which led to Ordonnance 84-50 now approved. On May 20, 1991, Law 91-006 amended the former law in articulating a distinct legal regime for associations. Two application decrees were adopted: 84-89/PCMS/MI of March 1, 1984, and 92-292/PM/MF/P of September 25, 1992.
Registration for CSOs may be completed in two weeks. It is easy for CSOs to be registered, but they face considerable difficulties in obtaining a legal status. This is due to the discrepancy between the constitution and Ordonnance 84, as well as a disconnect between the development context and political will. Indeed, in the eyes of the law, an association only exists if it has been declared and authorized. In practice, there are de facto associations such as community-based organizations, fadas, clubs, and informal associations who have no legal status. These types of organizations are prohibited by Ordonnance 84-06 (Article 23).

According to the legal texts in force, CSOs are required to submit annual activity reports to government representatives. They may be suspended if they do not do so in a two-year time timeframe. In practice, however, only very few CSOs present these reports. In 2014, for instance, of 7,000 CSOs and associations, only 200 submitted their reports, many of which are of poor quality. Yet no CSOs have been suspended on those grounds.

The law in Niger protects CSOs from being arbitrarily dissolved by the government. An association may only be dissolved by court decision. Therefore CSOs in Niger are able to operate freely within the confines of the law and may participate in public debates on government policies. However, in 2015, we observed several restrictions on the freedom of expression of CSOs. The Ministry of Interior definitively suspended the activities of Volunteers for Integrated Education (VIE KANDE–Ni-BAYRA) because its activities went against the provisions in Ordonnance 84-06 of March 1, 1984. The ministry cancelled a conference organized by the Network of Organizations for Transparency and Budget Analysis (ROTAB) on the extractive industries. It also interrupted a conference on Boko Haram at Diffa, which was organized by Alternative Citizen Space (AEC) on the grounds that AEC was collaborating with Boko Haram and was threatening national security.

There was also the arrest of high-profile CSO leaders. The authorities justify these suspensions and arrests based on the need to maintain peace and security of people and goods. These incidences happen, because of insufficient legal texts, behaviors of those accused, mistrust between the government and CSOs, and insufficient lawyers who specialize in human rights and CSO interests.

Lawyers or legal specialists in urban centers do not specifically target CSOs. However, there are a small number of larger CSOs who have resources to hire legal services. Pro bono services are generally not available to the CSO sector.

The law on taxation provides exemptions on grants and subsidies that CSOs receive for the implementation of development projects. However, only CSOs with formal legal status that have signed a memorandum of understanding with the government can benefit from these, under specific conditions. There is no law that explicitly addresses taxation on revenue generated from goods and services that CSOs sell, although some CSOs do earn revenue from goods and services.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.1**

CSOs in Niger form local constituencies around current affair issues such as peace and security, electoral reforms, and empowerment of CSO groups. However, their organizational capacity limits many of them. Nigerien CSOs lead actions and initiatives that support their sector.

National-level CSOs and development associations have operating management and oversight bodies with a clear division in roles. For community-based organizations, these separate functions are combined in one management structure.

CSOs create networks, platforms, coordination frameworks, and coalitions. The establishment of action frameworks have had varied success, insufficient resources, insufficient transparency, and governance issues.

CSOs recognize the importance of having a vision and a strategic plan, although only some CSOs have a strategic plan that is regularly updated. Indeed, strategic planning is a process that requires expertise and means that the majority of CSOs do not possess. However, organizations such as Karkara, ABC Ecologie and
Rail Niger have considerable experience in this domain. In 2015, Rail will begin its third strategic planning process.

Most CSO personnel work as volunteers, who sometimes receive payment for specific tasks. A few national-level CSOs have full-time and permanent personnel, in addition to individuals who are hired for specific roles on donor-funded projects. The wage policies of CSOs are not attractive given their difficulties in convincing donors to increase salaries. This leads to qualified personnel choosing to work with international institutions and international NGOs implementing donor projects.

In terms of logistics, many CSOs have modern office equipment, which they usually receive from international partners. However, numerous CSOs do not have resources to maintain and update their equipment. Many CSOs, even at the local level, have access to Internet and social media, despite the expensive subscription fees.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.1**

The financial viability of CSOs in Niger is a challenge. Nearly all CSOs in Niger depend on funding from international donors. The most prominent international donors are the European Union, USAID, the Luxembourg Cooperation, the World Bank, the French Development Agency (AFD), and the German Cooperation Agency (GTZ). There are no local sources of philanthropy. However, some CSOs receive funds for small projects from companies such as Areva, a French mining company, and Sonidef, a parastatal Nigerien oil company.

Many CSOs do not have diversified funding sources. Only a few CSOs have resources to remain viable in the short or medium term, such as farmer’s groups, networks, and some CSOs like Karkara and Rail Niger. These organizations have been able to do so by diversifying their partners, transparent management, and providing diverse services such as staffing, studies, and logistical support. Despite this situation, CSOs have not been able to implement communication strategies or other approaches for diversifying their revenue.

Global socio-economic trends have led to a decline in development assistance, which has negatively affected CSOs relying on that support. This decrease has been among all donors and across sectors, although it appears that social sectors such as health and education have been most affected. At the same time, there is an increase in USAID funding going to American organizations working in the areas of governance, agriculture, and infrastructure.

CSOs in Niger are unable to retain the services of professional auditors or to produce financial reports. Only larger CSOs publish annual financial reports and commission financial audits.

There are CSOs who earn revenue from goods and services. Some unions, farmer’s associations, and development CSOs have built their own offices with conference spaces, which they rent to others, and other CSOs provide expert services for fees. Yet other CSOs have created cyber cafes or business centers as annexes to their offices, which allows them to cover operational costs. These services provided are not restricted to any client type. Government and private-sector organizations use these services as do common citizens.

Membership fees are also an important source of revenue. These are compulsory and respected in most serious organizations. A member that does not pay the fee for a long enough period of time may be sanctioned or even excluded from the organization all together. Some members provide in-kind support such as office space or equipment, which substitutes payments and is often essential for the CSO’s operations.

**ADVOCACY: 4.3**

The Nigerien CSO sector is involved in advocacy initiatives that are directed at the government and its partners on diverse general interest questions. These actions are led through consultation frameworks, which are the main platform for CSO involvement in the country’s development. In this way, the implementation of
the Social and Economic Development Plan of Niger (PDES 2012-2015) provided an avenue for CSOs to be involved in the national technical committee, the regional committees, and the thematic and sectoral groups.

On the interest in coordinating with CSOs, the PDES states that, “the credibility of the Republic’s institutions will be upheld through (…) a citizen oversight mechanism that will improve the functioning of State institutions and the reinforcing of cooperation and dialogue with civil society actors.” In this way, the PDES 2012-2015 provided an avenue for CSOs to be involved in the national technical committee, the regional committees, and the thematic and sectoral groups. In addition to coordination around the PDES, there is coordination at the regional level. In Maradi, there is a consultative framework among CSOs in the region, state actors, local authorities, and United Nations officials. That framework was established with the support of the United Nations Systems within the context of the Conjoint Maradi Project (PCM).

Nigerien CSOs are actively engaged in advocacy initiatives on diverse themes and in diverse sectors. In 2015, for example, there were specific initiatives to promote women’s rights, led by the Coordination of Women’s Non-Governmental Organizations and Associations (CONGAFEN). There was also the Education for All initiative, which the Education Sector Network of Niger (ROSEN) led. That effort compelled the government to rewrite its sectoral program for education and training and the education sector law (LOSEN). Thanks to the efforts of the Network of Health Sector NGOs and Associations (ROASSEN), a law on social protection is being studied and considered by the government for adoption.

CSOs actively participate in public audiences at the National Assembly. Alternative Citizen Space (AEC) was invited to participate in the National Assembly’s discussions on the 2016 finance law. Other coalitions have formed over the previous years such as the Coordination of Human Rights Defense Organizations (CODDH) or the Collective for the Right to Energy (CADDAE), which organized several campaigns in 2015 to denounce corruption in the government, clientelism, and the high cost of living.

Lobbying is not a well-known concept or practice in Niger.

Reform of the legal texts governing CSO activities is necessary given the evolution of the CSO sector. It is important for these texts to be in compliance with international treaties ratified by Niger. Although there is an advocacy movement supporting reforms that would benefit CSOs, there is weak involvement by CSOs and most lack expertise in the advocacy domain.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.5**

CSOs in Niger deliver a range of quality services in the fields of education, health, water and sanitation, environment, conflict management, and local governance. CSO actions basically provide the services that vulnerable communities need the most. These include building and providing equipment to schools and health centers, water wells, basic sanitation, humanitarian action through cash transfers, and food for work programs. Other services such as training and capacity building of beneficiaries are provided as well.

Wanting to ensure the quality of their services, most CSOs consult beneficiaries to assess whether services are meeting targeted needs. This process is realized in close coordination with community leaders. CSOs also lead studies and evaluations based on the needs of actors and international partners. For example, Karkara evaluated the third phase of the Project to Support Household Food Security, which sought to increase the food security of households in the regions of Maïné-Soroa, Goudoumaria, and Gouré. Another example is Rail Niger, which completed the diagnostic study for the actions taken under the cooperation project with the French commune of Faucigny Glères (CCFG-Tera).

CSOs who deliver products and services to earn revenue recover their costs. For example, a CSO renting out office space or providing services at an Internet café would first do a market study to assess the demand and willingness to pay. CSOs often determine prices according to the purchasing power of the population.

CSOs in Niger inform national and international opinion through the use of communication tools. The universities and administration also receive publications from CSOs, especially studies and reports focused on
project activities. The Niger Association for the Protection of Human Rights (ANDDH) publishes an annual report on the human rights situation in Niger. In general, international donors subsidize these publications, which are distributed for free. Also, CSOs train young graduates through immersion internships providing them with an experience that is vital for the career prospects in public, private, and civil sectors.

Even if relationships between CSOs and the government are tense, the public authorities at all levels recognize the value of CSOs in providing services to populations. Within the framework of implementing the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the government called upon CSOs to monitor and observe the progress that was being realized. As such, several trainings were conducted to develop the research capacity of Nigerian individuals and organizations.

Some local governments call upon the paid services of CSOs for services such as hygiene promotion and the distribution of aid to displaced persons, as well as defense operations and land restoration. For example, the town of Maradi signed a contract with a CSO to remove solid waste from some neighborhoods and roads in that city.

Unfortunately, the engagement of the government towards CSOs is often the result of international donor pressure. Similarly, local governments in general face challenges in working with CSOs, which they perceive to be bothersome monitors of public affairs.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.4**

The infrastructure supporting the CSO sector in Niger is weak. Only three intermediary support organizations and one resource center based in Niamey, supported by the Civil Society Support Program (PASOC II), build the capacity of CSOs. The services provided include training, information, strategic planning support, fundraising, and advocacy. These resource centers generate revenue from their services, which they use to complement their operating revenues. The hubs’ location in the capital and the price of their services make them inaccessible to many local associations.

Furthermore, CSOs at a national-level share information online through consultation frameworks and thematic or sector networks such as those on good governance, human rights and gender issues, education, water and sanitation, and decentralization.

Other organizations like Alternative Citizen Space and the Social Dynamics and Local Development Research Lab (LASDEL) continue to provide CSOs with CSO management and other trainings.

There are also individual consultants with specialized experience in training the CSO sector on topics like strategic planning, financial management, and technical knowledge and methodologies. However, these tend to be exclusively offered in the large cities, which is prohibitive for CSOs based in the regions. In addition, the trainings are usually conducted in French with the training materials not translated in local languages, which is another notable barrier to access for many CSOs.

Considerable effort is needed to build the supportive infrastructure for CSOs. Albeit, there are some inter-sectoral partnerships between line Ministries and associations that exist such as the Network of Education Sector Organizations in Niger (ROSEN) and the Network of Health Sector NGOs and Associations of Niger (ROASSEN). The Network of Journalists for Water and Sanitation (REJEA) is partnership with CSOs and the Nigeria Oil Products Company (SONIDEP), a state-owned enterprise.

There are local foundations that participate in development and improving basic social services. However, these foundations may have strong political affiliations. In 2015, the Foundation SAOU DJIBO, former president of the military transition in 2011, provided school materials to the commune of Tessaoua. Foundation Tatali Iyali gave in-kind grants to schools and health centers. There are other examples as well, but these foundations provide services directly to beneficiaries rather than to CSOs.
The CSO sector in Niger benefits from positive media coverage from both private and public media outlets. These outlets appreciate the actions of CSOs and cover them accordingly. Media also issues public service announcements, which are supportive to the causes of CSOs.

Journalists interview CSO staff to collect information and expert analysis on national public affairs issues. The media also organizes debates where CSO representatives are invited to discuss issues of national interest. This occurs most often through private media outlets. Nevertheless, media in Niger is faced with considerable challenges, which limit their abilities to carry out those activities. Journalists from the television station, BONFEREY, were assaulted at their work place. We may also note the theft of media equipment during the search of the domicile of the Secretary General of Alternative Citizen Space. Finally, when party President Meden Loumouna returned to Niger, there were arrests of journalists.

CSOs also use social media to address national interest issues. Thanks to the positive media covered, the public appreciates the role of the CSO sector in responding to the population’s needs. For instance, over the last three years on March 13th the radio-television group, TENERE, covers the activities of the Women’s Center for the NGO MGGM to celebrate the national day of the Nigerien woman without having any formal agreement with that organization.

The presence and affirmation of CSOs on the public scene in Niger is the result of an irrevocable process. The 2013 study mapping CSOs in Niger found a strong political will for including CSOs in managing public policies. This demonstrates the Government’s positive perception of CSOs. The same could be said of private sector actors who in some instances have sponsored CSO activities. There are several factors contributing to this positive perception. First, there is a tendency for CSOs to be politically aligned whereby a patron-client relationship may define interactions between the Government and a CSO. Some producer groups, for example, have been known to collude with public authorities or the opposition parties. The unfortunate consequence is that CSO representatives may be manipulated for political ends. Political parties may become involved in the operations of CSOs as a way of increasing their numbers of supporters.

Professional CSOs such as the Niger Association for the Revaluation of Animal Husbandry (AREN) and Niger Network for Agricultural Chambers (RECA Niger) have a code of ethics but typically they have not been formalized or validated. A charter for CSOs is in progress, but it is not clear what type of project would help it advance.
Nigeria continued to face many difficult challenges in 2015. Dwindling oil prices adversely affected the country’s economy, and the extremist group Boko Haram continued to spread terror with attacks on villages, theft of food, forced recruitment of young men, and abductions of women and young girls. Boko Haram’s assaults were especially brutal in the northern states of Yobe, Borno, Adamawa, Gombe, and Kano. In addition, violent conflicts between farmers and herders in Ogun, Nassarawa, Benue, Plateau, and Kano states resulted in many deaths as well as the destruction of property and the displacement of thousands of people.

Politically, the country experienced a monumental change in leadership with the ousting of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), which had ruled the country for sixteen years, in the general elections in March. Taking on the mantle of leadership was the All Progressive Congress (APC), led by President Muhammadu Buhari, who pledged to fight corruption and improve security. During the elections, various acts of violence were reported across the country, some resulting in fatalities. CSOs freely participated in all stages of the election process with little or no state harassment. A number of CSOs openly criticized the government’s decision to postpone the presidential elections by six weeks because of the security situation. After the
elections CSOs seized the opportunity presented by the new government to intensify their advocacy for good governance and improved management of the country's economy and security.

Like all Nigerians, CSOs were hit by continuing economic hardship and the insecurity perpetrated by Boko Haram in 2015. Especially in regions where Boko Haram is most active, the effectiveness of CSOs was significantly compromised. CSOs continued to suffer from low levels of staffing and dwindling grants. Otherwise the sector's sustainability remained stable in 2015. The legal framework did not change, and CSOs continued to provide basic services and advocate effectively in a variety of areas.

The total number of CSOs operating in Nigeria in 2015 is unknown. The Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), which registers national CSOs, reported an increase of 10,000 organizations in 2015, for a total of more than 80,000 registered national organizations. However, this number does not capture CSOs operating at the state and local levels, which seldom register with the CAC.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9**

Overall, the legal environment for CSOs in Nigeria did not change significantly in 2015. Because there is no separate law for CSOs, they continue to register under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA) of 1990, which regulates both for-profit and nonprofit organizations. The CAC is the only institution legally mandated to register CSOs on the national level. International and national CSOs must also register with the National Planning Commission (NPC), and national CSOs also register with the government ministries, departments, and agencies relevant to their areas of focus.

State and local CSOs register with the authorities at the appropriate level.

CAMA protects CSOs from arbitrary state control by providing that only the court has the authority to dissolve a CSO upon receipt of a written petition from the CSO’s governing body, two-thirds of its membership, or the CAC. In April 2015 the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) of Nigeria released a draft of the National Code of Corporate Governance, which seeks to extend corporate governance regulations to CSOs. The code sets requirements for the composition and activities of boards and other governing bodies. Initial responses to the code criticized the variance of some provisions with international standards. In addition, CSOs expressed concern that certain provisions of the code are inappropriate for CSOs. The FRC intends to implement the code in 2016 but has yet to clarify how it will be enforced.

CSOs and their representatives generally operate freely within the provisions of CAMA. However, in 2015 the Nigerian Police Force, Nigerian Army, and Nigerian Civil Defense Corps intervened several times in CSO events around the country. In January, when the National Consensus Movement sought to protest the postponement of the general elections with a march to the headquarters of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Abuja, the protesters were blocked by the police. Similarly, in Bayelsa State in May 2015, the police issued a ban on all protests, rallies, and demonstrations, evidently to curtail anticipated unrest.

CSOs pay taxes on profit-making activities but not on grants. CSOs may legally earn income from the provision of goods and services. CSOs may also bid on government contracts provided they meet relevant criteria.
Nigeria has an insufficient number of lawyers specialized in CSO legal issues. However, several key organizations, including the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD), CLEEN Foundation, and Policy and Legal Advocacy Center (PLAC), employ lawyers who render pro bono and paid legal services to other CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.9**

The organizational capacity of the CSO sector remained unchanged in 2015. Local constituency-building efforts were strong. Because it was an election year, many CSOs focused on involving constituencies in election-related activities. For example, the Center for Research and Documentation (CRD) and the Transition Monitoring Group (TMG) engaged in voter education at the grassroots level. The #BringBackOurGirls campaign, which was organized in 2014 to protest government’s slow response to the abduction of more than 200 girls by Boko Haram, continued to engage and focus its constituency, and CSOs behind the campaign strengthened their local base by reaching out to citizens and parents of the kidnapped girls. CSOs working on good governance, security, and the fight against corruption, such as the United Action for Democracy (UAD), also continued to maintain healthy local constituencies.

In 2015 there was a slight increase in the use of strategic plans by local CSOs, thanks in part to training offered by organizations such as ActionAid Nigeria. However, many CSOs failed to review their plans regularly or monitor their plans’ implementation. In addition, because of dwindling funds, many organizations deviated from their plans when presented with opportunities to obtain funding not in line with their stated missions.

The internal management structures of many CSOs remained weak in 2015. At the local level CSO boards typically exist only in theory and rarely or never meet to make decisions on behalf of their organizations. The boards of larger CSOs in major cities usually meet more regularly but in 2015 met less often because of dwindling funds. However, boards are beginning to respond to funding challenges by adopting innovative methods of meeting. For example, the board of the Women Environmental Program (WEP) met via Skype conference call in 2015. This unusual approach avoided the expense of transporting board members to Abuja and accommodating them in hotels.

CSO staffing continued to deteriorate in 2015 because of funding constraints. Many CSOs struggle to pay attractive salaries and lost staff to international organizations. For example, WEP lost four staff members to international organizations in 2015. In addition, an increasing number of CSO employees started working as independent consultants in 2015. Donor agencies partly contributed to this trend, as they began to rely on individual consultants rather than organizations to implement projects, evidently to save on costs. Despite these challenges, large CSOs in major cities were able to maintain a few permanent employees and adhere to sound human resource practices, such as clear job descriptions and personnel policies. CSOs around the country benefitted from a large pool of volunteers. Because of the high rate of youth unemployment in Nigeria—about 35 percent—many young graduates value volunteer work with CSOs as a pathway to permanent paid jobs. Retired professionals also volunteer their services. Only a few organizations at the national and state levels are able to engage professional services from accountants and auditors.

In general, CSOs’ use of information technology improved in 2015. However, many organizations, especially at the local level, struggled to obtain modern office equipment, such as computers. In some cases, limited funding also affected CSOs’ ability to pay rent.
FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7

In 2015 there was a slight decline in the financial viability of Nigeria’s CSO sector. Foreign donors remained the major source of funding, and with their shift in focus elsewhere, funds for Nigerian CSOs decreased, especially after election-related activities concluded. In addition, some donor agencies and international organizations began to implement projects directly or through individual consultants, which made it more difficult for many local CSOs to secure grants. For example, the Nigeria Stability and Reconciliation Program (NSRP), a DFID-supported program, continued to engage in direct implementation of projects in 2015. However, CSOs hope that the funding situation, especially for work in areas plagued by Boko Haram, will improve once the new government has settled in.

There was no significant increase of funding from local philanthropies in 2015. The major local philanthropies continue to include the T.Y. Danjuma Foundation, which in 2015 supported a program of the All Children Charity Foundation to help internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Chibok; Dangote Foundation, which provided scholarship aid and support to women; and the Tony Elumelu Foundation, which organized a two-day entrepreneurship boot camp for youth.

Membership-based CSOs, such as TMG, Civil Liberty Organization (CLO), and Community Action for Popular Participation (CAPP), failed to thrive because of dwindling donor funds and members’ decreasing payment of dues. Some CSOs curtailed their activities because of decreased funding. A few CSOs diversified their funding base by becoming more entrepreneurial. For instance, in 2015 the Center for Democracy and Development (CDD) and CLEEN Foundation sold publications, rented office space, and invested in other businesses, such as hotels. However, only a few larger CSOs in major cities, such as NOI Polls, African Center for Leadership, Strategy, and Development (Center LSD), Center for Social Justice, and Young Stars Foundation, had sufficient resources to remain financially viable even over the short term.

National and state governments continued to contract with CSOs in 2015. For example, the Adolescent Health Information Project (AHIP) and Isah Wali Empowerment Initiative (IWEI) partnered with the Ministry of Women Affairs to implement projects on women’s economic empowerment, political participation, and other gender-based issues. The Bureau for Public Procurement (BPP) awarded contracts to CISLAC, Center for Organizational and Professional Ethics (COPE-AFRICA), Active Support for Rural People Initiative (ASURPI), and other organizations to monitor and evaluate projects implemented by contractors. In fact, the Independent Service Delivery Monitoring Group (ISDMG), a consortium of Nigerian CSOs, rated the BPP the most outstanding regulatory agency in 2015 following its engagement of CSOs for these projects. In addition, CISLAC and Center LSD provided specialized training to federal civil servants, and the Center for Information Technology and Development (CITAD) trained secondary-school teachers on the use of technology to enhance teaching, with support from the Kano state government.

Only large CSOs have sound financial management systems and publish financial statements. Most small CSOs lack the resources to engage professionals to audit their accounts or produce reports. Although CSOs are required by law to send financial statements to the CAC annually, this requirement is weakly enforced.

ADVOCACY: 3.6

Overall, CSO advocacy efforts improved in 2015. Cooperation between government institutions and CSOs increased modestly in the framework of the general elections. INEC signed memoranda of understanding with CSOs such as CAPP, which allowed them to report about election activities directly to the commission and thus ensure transparency. Other CSOs across the country, including CDD, Enough is Enough (EIE), and Youth Initiative for Advocacy, Growth, and Advancement (YIAGA), created election-related advocacy
platforms using online radio and the “Buharimeter,” an online tool for tracking the accountability of the new government. CRD and TMG implemented voter-education and election-observation projects. At the local level, the Democratic Action Group (DAG) based in Kano was one of many CSOs that made an effort to discourage violence before, during, and after the elections.

An improved relationship between CSOs and policy makers was evident in 2015. Some projects, such as the monitoring and evaluation of contracts awarded by the BPP, facilitated direct communication between CSOs and policy makers. However, CSOs still felt that they were not adequately represented in the new government’s appointments to governmental committees and working groups, such as the Police Service Commission. Nevertheless, in an indication that the new government might more fully involve CSOs in the decision-making process, a newly constituted anti-corruption committee included a few individuals from the CSO sector. Governments at both the state and local levels were also accessible to CSOs. For example, in Kano State the newly elected state administration showed more responsiveness to CSOs by actively involving them in the 2016 budgeting process.

CSOs continued to engage the government at the federal level in various forms of advocacy. In July 2015 government officials, led by the president, met for the first time with CSOs involved in the #BringBackOurGirls campaign. CSOs had protested the government’s slow response to the abduction of the Chibok schoolgirls by Boko Haram, and at the meeting the government pledged to rescue the girls and put an end to the insurgency. In addition, the Nigeria Labor Congress and the Trade Union Congress organized rallies across the country to lend support to the new administration’s fight against corruption. CSOs such as United Action for Democracy (UAD), YIAGA, and CISLAC participated actively in these rallies. Other advocacy efforts included issue-based coalitions that united leading CSOs on such issues as electoral reform, extractive industries, and violence against women.

In 2015 CSOs successfully influenced the legislative process with input into amendments to major bills, including the Violence Against Persons Prohibition (VAPP) Act and the Administration of Criminal Justice (ACJ) Act. The VAPP Act deals comprehensively with rape, and on CSOs’ urging it was expanded to include provisions protecting male victims and the identity of rape victims generally. The ACJ Act aims to ensure that the criminal justice system is efficient and protects the rights of victims, defendants, and suspects alike. CSOs contributed to several of the act’s key amendments. Advocacy for legal reforms at the state level remained sluggish, and only Plateau and Benue states enacted laws, including the State Internal Revenue Administration Law of Benue State, which reflected CSO advocacy efforts.

Although CSOs are generally aware of the benefits of a favorable legal and regulatory framework, there was no noticeable effort to promote legal reform on behalf of the CSO sector in 2015.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.1**
involvement in economic empowerment programs continued to grow. For example, Women Farmers Advancement Network (WOFAN) intensified its efforts to empower rural women with skills in rice and groundnut oil production, especially in the northern regions. CSOs also implemented election-related service programs—for example, educating communities about the electoral process and the use of readers to authenticate voter cards. CSOs were less involved in housing, water and sanitation, land management, and the environment than in previous years because of dwindling funds from donor organizations. CSOs’ efforts during the year to interest donors in housing and land issues were not successful.

Most CSOs have close relationships with their communities, including IDPs in camps scattered across the country, and are familiar with the issues affecting them. These relationships ensure that the goods and services provided by CSOs reflect the needs of their constituents and communities.

CSOs continued to distribute publications to academia and the government. NSRP shared publications with the national government on such topics as youth employment and the insurgency. The public benefited from widespread CSO sensitization workshops on the requirements for election candidates and the operation of voter card readers, which were rumored to be an election-rigging device.

Donors usually pay for the goods and services that CSOs provide, so few organizations make an effort to recover costs. However, many large CSOs are aware of market demand for their goods and services. Certain national CSOs, including CLEEN Foundation, CDD, and NOI Polls, sell publications to generate income for their daily operations, and some organizations conduct training workshops for other CSOs, for which they charge fees. Consultants engaged by donor agencies and sometimes by the government provide services such as training for business audiences. For example, as part of the Enhancing Nigerian Advocacy for a Better Business Environment II (ENABLE2), a DFID-supported program, consultants from the CSO sector helped business membership organizations develop advocacy skills through capacity-building activities. Smaller CSOs have few or no income-generating activities, largely because of inadequate capacity and, more importantly, financial constraints.

Governments at both the national and state levels recognize the value of CSOs in service provision. WEP works with the Ministry of Environment on a project called the Community Emergency Response Initiative, which aims to identify community environmental issues that require urgent action by the government. CSOs work under contract with the Ministry of Women Affairs, INEC, and other government agencies to provide services at the state and local levels. For example, INEC awarded a number of contracts to CSOs to provide services during the elections. However, in comparison to foreign-sourced funding, overall government funding is still minimal.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

The infrastructure for CSOs changed little in 2015. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers continued to offer training, capacity building, and information services. However, they are few in number and located mainly in major cities such as Abuja and Lagos. Rural CSOs’ limited access to training and information has not improved. Most resource centers are funded by donors, although some centers earn additional income by charging fees for services and renting office space.

CISLAC, ActionAid Nigeria, NOI Polls, and other large CSOs re-grant international donor funds to local CSOs. In 2015 organizations lacking the capacity to handle projects and funds on their own partnered with larger national organizations to obtain sub-grants. For example, CITAD partnered with CDD on a project about budget transparency in Kano State, and local CSOs worked with national CSOs such as TMG during the general elections. A few organizations that received grants to implement projects in the north but are based outside of the region re-granted funds to local CSOs.
In the absence of a single unifying network of CSOs, various coalitions, including TMG and Youth Coalition Against Electoral Violence (Y-CAEV), disseminate information to their members through workshops, press conferences, e-mails, and social media. They also provide members with capacity-building training. TMG, for example, organized training on election monitoring in 2015. There are capable CSO management trainers in Nigeria, mostly based in major cities. Most training offered by CSOs, including WEP, the Pat Utomi Center for Leadership, and the Nigerian Leadership Institute, is donor funded. Some organizations, such as Center LSD, charge fees for training, which many local CSOs are unable to afford. Independent consultants also provide specialized training in areas such as fundraising and financial management. Training materials are largely written in English, although a few CSOs, including CLEEN Foundation and CRD, have translated materials into Hausa, a local language.

CSOs continued to partner with the government, business, and media in 2015. ENABLE2 and NSRP were especially active in this respect. Although CSOs’ relationship with business remained generally at a minimum, ENABLE2 partnered with other CSOs to help build the advocacy capacity of business organizations. CSOs such as NOI Polls continued to offer research services to leading companies such as Honeywell, and NSRP facilitated cooperation between CSOs and media organizations to mitigate violence during and after elections. Other organizations worked closely with the media during the elections to inform the public about the electoral process. In addition, WAZOBIA FM, Freedom FM, and Rhythms FM created platforms for CSOs to educate the public about issues such as hate speech.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.0**

In 2015 public perceptions of CSOs were largely determined by political affiliations. That is, opposition supporters had positive opinions of CSOs that openly supported the opposition, whereas government supporters had favorable views of CSOs that supported the ruling party. Government officials at the national level similarly saw CSOs as either friendly or hostile depending on their party affiliations. CSOs involved in the #BringBackOurGirls campaign that were critical of the national government before the elections were regarded by the government as working for the opposition. Businesses in general, and especially business membership organizations receiving capacity-building services through the ENABLE2 program, positively saw CSOs as understanding the Nigerian business environment.

During the year CSOs increased the visibility of their activities through social media. There was a huge increase in the use of press releases and social media tools such as Twitter to engage the public on crucial national issues. Other innovative platforms, such as the Buharimeter and online radio, helped publicize CSOs’ engagement on national issues, such as corruption, poverty, and security challenges. CISLAC, Media Rights Agenda (MRA), CLEEN Foundation, and Network of Nigeria NGOs (NNNGOs) were at the forefront of this trend in 2015.

CSOs are required by law to submit annual reports and audited accounts to the CAC, Federal Inland Revenues Services (FIRS), and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC). However, usually only national CSOs comply with this requirement. CSOs have yet to adopt a code of ethics on a sector-wide level as past initiatives in this area have not been successful.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Nigeria

CSO Sustainability

Legal Environment
Public Image
Organizational Capacity
Infrastructure
Financial Viability
Service Provision
Advocacy

Nigeria 4.6

Sustainability Enhanced  Sustainability Evolving  Sustainability Impeded
Rwanda’s legal and political context changed considerably in 2015. The Rwandan parliament approved constitutional amendments that allow President Paul Kagame to seek a third term in 2017 and potentially stay in office until 2034. The amendments elevated some domestic laws above the government’s international commitments, including those on human rights. Ninety-eight percent of voters approved the amendments in a referendum held in December. However, according to the U.S. State Department’s 2015 Human Rights Report on Rwanda, voters did not have access to the text of the amendments prior to the referendum, and political parties were not permitted to hold rallies or public meetings to express opposition to the amendments. No independent international observers monitored or reported on the conduct of the referendum.

In November 2015 the Rwandan government updated the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) about its progress in implementing recommendations received during the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) in 2011. Rwanda had accepted sixty-seven of seventy-three recommendations in 2011 but was more selective during the second UPR cycle in 2015, accepting only fifty of eighty-three recommendations. Participating
states expressed concerns about ongoing restrictions on freedoms of expression and peaceful assembly as well as several cases of missing persons. In 2015 a group of CSOs presented a joint report to the UNHRC detailing the government’s failure to comply with all of its recommendations. These organizations later reported government-backed retaliation after making their report to the UNHRC.

Some media practitioners and civil society activists focused on aid effectiveness, media reform, governance, democracy, and human rights were subject to government harassment. For example, the chairman and executive secretary of the Rwanda Media Commission resigned from their positions, and the chairman fled the country after reportedly receiving threats because they had criticized the government’s suspension of a local broadcast of the BBC. Serious public dialogue on other crucial issues facing the country was restricted as the political space for dissent continued to shrink. Individuals who did not agree with the government’s positions were subject to threats, intimidation, arbitrary arrest, and illegal detention, and there were also reports of disappearances and extra-judicial killings.

In 2015 1,945 CSOs, including churches and faith-based organizations (FBOs), were registered with the Rwanda Governance Board (RGB). During the year about 500 organizations were in the process of registration or re-registration, and of these 227 received registration certificates. Another 160 international CSOs are registered under the Directorate General for Immigration and Emigration (DGIE). About 2,500 domestic organizations operate informally or have been in the process of registering for years.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.5**

CSOs in Rwanda are regularly subject to uneven application of the law, but in 2015 this trend grew worse. The three laws governing the organization and functioning of CSOs are Law No. 04/2012, which governs domestic CSOs (also known as the NGO Law); Law No. 05/2012, which governs international CSOs; and Law No. 06/2012, which governs faith-based organizations (FBOs). The RGB registers and monitors domestic CSOs and FBOs, while the DGIE registers and monitors international CSOs. In addition, organizations seeking to register must receive authorizations to operate and memoranda of understanding signed by their line ministries. In 2015 discussions took place about possibly transferring responsibility for international CSOs to the RGB so that one institution can regulate all CSOs.

Although domestic CSOs register only once, their registration process has become more complex since it was assigned to the RGB under the NGO Law. It is difficult for newly created domestic CSOs to obtain legal personality, since the RGB, which is not a ministry, cannot issue ministerial orders, which are a requirement for the recognition of legal personality. Therefore all CSOs registering with the RGB must operate with a provisional authorization until their status is clarified with the publication of a notice in the official gazette. However, this provisional authorization is difficult to obtain, since before they can register CSOs must obtain letters from the districts in which they will operate to show that their actions plans align with district priorities. Some new organizations are subject to lengthy delays when seeking to register or their registrations are denied. In the past CSOs were also required to make mandatory contributions to the Joint Action Development Forum (JADF), a platform for dialogue between CSOs and the government, but this contribution was made voluntary in 2015. Organizations that are already registered must participate in JADF planning meetings at the district level and produce letters from their districts or face restrictions in their operations.
In contrast to domestic CSOs, international CSOs are required to register every five years. In practice, however, the government grants only single-year registrations to most international CSOs. In March 2015 the newly issued Ministerial Order No. 06/01 stated that international CSOs that start activities before their registration is completed or operate without re-registering are operating illegally, and their activities must be suspended immediately. This order effectively restricted the operations of international CSOs, as their registration process is long and complex and must be completed within a fixed three-month period. International CSOs reported that the government used the registration process to pressure them into supporting government programs and policies and threatened legal action against organizations that did not submit reports or registration paperwork on time. After twenty-two international CSOs failed to complete re-registration for the 2014-15 fiscal year within the set time period, the DGIE introduced an online registration system in 2015. This system was intended to ease the registration process but in practice did not function properly and thus introduced even more delays. The DGIE sought to compensate for this service failure by extending the registration period for the 2015-16 fiscal year by an additional month. Altogether, between 2010 and 2014 forty-seven international CSOs closed down in Rwanda because of registration impediments or funding constraints, and in 2015 another seven international organizations shut down.

During the year the government used the registration process to target both international and domestic CSOs engaged in human rights issues, particularly if they published reports critical of the government. For example, the re-registration of Human Rights Watch (HRW) was delayed after the organization published a controversial report about the disappearances of individuals in the Northern and Western provinces and another report about illegal detentions and arbitrary arrests. The government requested that HRW share its draft reports prior to release as a precondition for re-registration, which was not completed by the end of the year. The re-registration of the Human Rights League in the Great Lakes Region (LDGL), an international CSO involved in human rights monitoring and reporting, was similarly obstructed in 2015. After LDGL and other organizations submitted a report to the UNHRC detailing unresolved issues with Rwanda’s implementation of UPR recommendations, a campaign to take over LDGL’s management began. The organization’s leadership was detained, the executive secretary’s passport was confiscated, LDGL’s vehicle was impounded, its offices were broken into, and some office equipment was stolen. In September 2015 LDGL’s registration renewal was suspended on charges of internal disputes in the organization. Several other CSOs that contributed reports to Rwanda’s UPR process reported that their members were temporarily detained or threatened with arrest and prosecution because of the content of their reports. Pro-government groups also continued to take over the leadership and management of other CSOs, usually organizations with the capacity to advocate effectively for human rights. In 2015 take-over attempts occurred in at least two human rights organizations.

Article 17 of the NGO Law states that CSOs have the right to tax exemptions. However, CSOs secure exemptions only through memoranda of understanding with government ministries. Few organizations—mainly FBOs and CSOs involved in health and education, according to their mission statements—manage to obtain these memoranda, as in practice the government seems reluctant to grant them.

Under the 2012 NGO Law, CSOs are legally permitted to conduct commercial activities and may make profits provided the profits are used to fulfill their missions. CSOs that conduct commercial activities are subject to commercial law and related tax regulations.

Since legal issues and conflicts have burgeoned in the CSO sector, lawyers’ interest in working with CSOs has grown. Some lawyers are now committed to helping human rights organizations improve their working environment and defend their efforts in accordance with universal standards.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.7**

The organizational capacity of Rwandan CSOs worsened in 2015, mainly because of a lack of professionalism and a legal environment that inhibited their ability to develop internally, realize their missions, and mobilize funds. Moreover, the increasing infiltration of dynamic CSOs, including FBOs and churches, by pro-government actors weakened and undermined those organizations.
During the year CSOs involved in education, agriculture, and health had easy access to their constituencies, while those involved in media and human rights found access more difficult because of greater government control. Since CSOs must align their operations with the government’s priorities at the local and central levels, they are restricted from engaging in activities that are not in line with those priorities, even if there is an obvious need. This constraint sometimes undermines citizens’ support for CSOs. Some CSO leaders forge personal relationships with local authorities to facilitate their operations on the ground. International CSOs find it more difficult to develop such relationships.

Many CSOs in Rwanda have clear missions, visions, and action plans. However, the change in the legal and regulatory environment in 2015—especially the requirement that CSOs align their activities with district priorities—meant that these plans and visions were often no longer relevant. As a result, many CSOs faced the choice of either closing or curtailing their operations or changing their missions. For example, Turengere Abana, which promoted children’s rights, closed for good in 2015; the Forum of Activists Against Torture shifted its focus to HIV/AIDS prevention; and the Rwanda Writers Organization (IBARWA) no longer has a physical address, staff, or activities.

As a result of reduced funding opportunities, organizations are increasingly unable to afford to recruit and retain competent staff and staff turnover is high. While nearly all CSOs are affected by this trend, it is a particular problem for organizations in remote areas, which have very limited financial resources. The use of volunteers to supplement staff is not a frequent practice at Rwandan CSOs. Some organizations host interns, who generally more spend time learning about CSO programs than helping implement them.

Most CSOs, especially in rural areas, lack the financial means to renovate offices, purchase modern equipment, or maintain communications tools such as Internet access or web sites.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

Donor funding has decreased considerably since 2014. Entities providing funds to Rwandan CSOs include the European Union (EU), the German-owned development bank KfW, African Development Bank (AfDB), USAID, United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida), the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC), and some Commonwealth countries. CSO activities are shaped by donors’ priorities, and donors’ development programs are usually formulated without CSO involvement. Donors usually provide support for specific projects rather than institutional growth.

In 2015 donors began discussions about forming a basket fund for CSOs to avoid duplicate funding strategies, strengthen CSO capacity, and facilitate CSOs’ access to funds for longer periods. CSOs welcomed the initiative and expressed hopes that funding requirements would be flexible and easy to meet, especially for newly created domestic CSOs. By the end of the year donors and the government still had not agreed on a governance structure and the fund was not yet operational.

The constitution of Rwanda states that the government shall provide financial support to CSOs. However, the national budget does not allocate funds for this purpose. With funds from One UN Rwanda, the RGB awarded grants in 2015 totaling $620,000 as part of its Strengthening CSOs for Responsive and Accountable
Governance in Rwanda program. During the year the Rwandan government sought to persuade donors to provide additional funds to the RGB for a similar grant-making mechanism. Some CSOs, especially those engaged in human rights and democracy, fear that this strategy, if realized, will weaken them financially by allowing the government to control their access to funding and break them down organizationally by allowing the RGB to monitor their activities.

In 2015 the government successfully persuaded some donors to reduce their contributions to CSOs and increase government-to-government funding, primarily for budget support. Many donors report that they have not been able to convince the government to support CSOs if they do not implement programs in areas that are government priorities, such as development, energy, agriculture, health, and education. Thus CSOs involved in service delivery access available funding relatively easily, while organizations active in democracy and human rights find it difficult to obtain funds. Human rights and democracy CSOs fear that their funding situation will worsen if donors transfer all responsibility for supporting CSOs to government institutions such as the RGB.

Most CSOs work with vulnerable populations that cannot provide financial reimbursement for the services they receive. However, communities sometimes help with the implementation of CSOs’ activities at the grassroots level. Organizational membership fees are not regularly paid and are not sufficient to support CSOs without other external funding. Although CSOs are legally allowed to operate businesses, the country’s high tax rate is a disincentive for CSOs to become involved in commercial activities.

Individuals, local philanthropic organizations, and some FBOs support a few charitable projects in the education and health sectors or that target the needs of specific groups, such as genocide survivors and orphans. The private sector does not support CSOs in Rwanda, with the exception of banks that offer funds for micro-finance and cooperative groups.

Donors usually require that CSOs use funds transparently and efficiently and undertake internal and external audits. However, although some CSOs use accounting software, many organizations do not have the resources to obtain such software and do not employ modern systems of financial management—a deficit that weakens their ability to access funds.

**ADVOCACY: 4.1**

In general, Rwandan CSOs have little influence on government policies. This deficiency points to a widespread weakness in the advocacy capability of Rwandan CSOs, despite the training that many staff members have received in advocacy, lobbying, networking, and policy analysis and development. Conflicts within the CSO sector have weakened many dynamic CSOs to the extent that they no longer effectively address issues of democracy and human and citizens’ rights. In meetings with government officials, some CSOs seem to be persuaded or intimidated into believing that there are no urgent issues that they can engage in that the government cannot better solve through its own programs. In practice, once CSO representatives are involved politically or are promoted by politicians to leadership positions in government forums, they seem no longer able to engage the government on controversial issues because their organizations have been selected by the government itself to act as its advocates. These CSOs rarely assert an independent position for fear of being disqualified for anti-government attitudes. For example, in 2015, during reviews of the labor law, the family code, and the law governing matrimonial regimes and succession, representatives of women’s empowerment organizations never raised the issue of women’s rights to own and manage land, work, and have maternity leave but instead expressed support for government programs. The recent legal recognition of the right of women to own land came about thanks to the UPR process rather than advocacy efforts by domestic CSOs.
Many CSOs are hesitant to use rights-based approaches, engage the government on human rights pledges, or cite international human rights instruments in their activities. For example, CSOs did not play a visible role during the process of amending the constitution, largely because the issues were highly sensitive and dissenting opinions were strongly discouraged. Human rights organizations expressed fear of government monitoring and self-censored their comments. This dynamic contributes to the absence of a common understanding among CSOs about advocacy priorities and difficult working together on issues of common interest. For example, some organizations that contributed to CSOs’ joint report to the UNHRC assessing Rwanda’s implementation of UPR recommendations later denounced it as presenting an unfavorable image of the country.

On the district level, chapters of the Joint Action Development Forums (JADF), which were put in place by the government to serve as a forum for CSO-government dialogue, are no longer sustainable, as CSOs are no longer obliged to contribute to their operations and they are staffed by volunteers. As a result, JADF’s role at the district level has weakened. Otherwise, cooperation between CSOs and local governments usually takes place between individuals and is focused on government priorities in service provision. Although a few service-providing CSOs advocate on behalf of their beneficiaries, their advocacy efforts are rarely effective because they avoid challenging existing laws and policies that affect their work.

No CSOs are focused on advocating for an enabling environment to assist the sector’s growth and sustainability.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.2**

The decline in funding weakened many CSOs’ capacity for service delivery in 2015. Rwandan CSOs are active in service delivery, especially health, education, housing, relief, and agriculture, all of which are government priorities. Many organizations provide support and services directly on the grassroots level. A growing number of CSOs are organizing into cooperatives or creating local microfinance institutions to provide loans and financial support to members and other organizations. For example, in 2015 AJPRODHO distributed goats to youth from poor families in the Gatsibo district of Eastern province. The need for service provision increased with the arrival of refugees from Burundi in April 2015, and the number of CSOs engaged in humanitarian interventions with the refugees increased considerably.

However, as many donors are now committed to providing support to the government’s budget, the corresponding decline in funding for CSOs has weakened many organizations’ overall capacity for service delivery. Donors have begun to emphasize a rights-based approach to service provision by CSOs. One example of this new emphasis is the online platform Sobanukirwa, which means “get involved” or “the right to know.” Sobanukirwa emerged in 2015 to relay requests for information from the public to governmental and private institutions. The platform is the first to help citizens engage with local leaders by asking questions, seeking information, and complaining about the quality of services. Sobanukirwa’s stated aim is to boost an open society and open government, but it was not able to obtain answers to most requests it received, suggesting that even if a CSO is committed to providing services to citizens, its effectiveness will ultimately depend on the government.

CSOs enjoy close relationships with the people they work with and understand their challenges at the local level. Communities are usually very supportive of the direct and visible support they receive from CSOs, even if such support is short term. Some CSOs have compiled registers and law books that citizens can access in the local language, thereby strengthening the work of, for example, mediation committees or service-delivery CSOs. Other organizations work with government institutions—for example, by offering capacity building to
local district administrative offices on topics such as decentralization, good governance, mediation, and conflict resolution or providing training and materials to the judiciary.

As services provided by CSOs are usually funded on a project basis, organizations do not usually seek to recover their costs.

The government generally recognizes the importance of CSOs insofar as they help districts achieve their performance goals. However, the government sometimes criticizes CSOs for serving as donors’ watchdogs, especially when they engage in politically sensitive issues. When this happens, CSOs can lose the support of their constituencies and, in some cases, even their donors. This situation discourages CSOs from cooperating freely with government officials at various levels and can adversely affect service delivery.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and CSO resource centers do not generally exist in Rwanda. CSOs typically rely on informal networks that function as support organizations at the grassroots level to assist community-based initiatives and organizations.

Mutual suspicion, competition for funding, and the lack of a common understanding of CSOs’ role in development hinders CSO cooperation and partnerships. Infighting in the CSO sector has weakened many vocal and dynamic organizations and pushed others to operate in a closed environment, in which they avoid sharing experiences with other organizations both in and outside the country. In addition, networks sometimes operate as organizations separately from their members, which weakens their effectiveness. At the same time, the government encourages the formation of networks so as to coordinate and control them and undermine their effectiveness. Some local CSO networks used to provide subsidies to their members for projects, but this has not happened in last two years. Some networks choose to support members based on relationships among their leaders rather than objective criteria.

CSO training in thematic areas is offered regularly with the support of development partners. Some donors have been discouraged by what they perceive to be the low impact of CSO training, and to reinforce CSO capacity they have shifted to a rights-based training approach that emphasizes the link between human rights and service provision.

Governmental cooperation with CSOs is crucial and realized through memoranda of understanding that state each partner’s responsibilities. CSOs involved in development collaborate easily with central and local governments provided their activities are in line with government priorities. Many intersectoral initiatives are rooted in friendships. As the private sector is focused on business and trade rather than poverty reduction, it does not understand CSO operations, and potential collaborations have not been realized.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

Although there is no independent polling in the country to offer independent verification, it appeared that the public image of some CSOs worsened in 2015. CSOs’ image in the media is a function of their activities. Organizations that are involved in service delivery can mobilize positive media coverage of their work—for example, when they provide supplies to local citizens or assist refugees. But CSOs involved in human rights are usually not covered by the media, or the media sometimes take advantage of the government’s criticism of them to provide citizens with biased information or instruct audiences not to challenge the government’s positions. Although exclusively private, the media generally report in the way that the government expects and thereby help shape CSOs’ reputations.
During the process of amending the constitution and Rwanda’s report to the UNHRC in 2015, public officials’ statements about CSOs were more critical than usual, possibly to discourage dissent. The government tarnished the reputations of advocacy organizations that did not support the constitutional amendment by labeling them Western agents. Service-providing CSOs were largely ignored.

Public perceptions of CSOs generally vary. Citizens usually have a good opinion of CSOs that provide them with services and do not attract government criticism. But if CSOs are subject to government criticism, the public rarely offers overt support. In general, the main role of CSOs in Rwanda is considered to be supporting and implementing government policies and programs. In addition, as many CSOs do not disclose their financial information to the public, their accountability and transparency can be questioned.

The government recognizes the achievement of both domestic and international CSOs, even if it does not respect their mandates, particularly in human rights. In general, the government wishes CSOs to act as policy implementers rather than as watchdogs of its policies and actions. Businesses generally regard CSOs positively.

Most CSOs do not have websites or communication strategies.

CSOs do not engage in self-regulation, as any regulatory authority would be managed or influenced by the government. CSOs are required by law to publish annual reports, but usually only international CSOs observe this requirement since the reports are needed for their annual registration renewal. CSO reports are sometimes obtained through individual connections.
In Senegal, there remains an open dialogue between the government and CSOs. The government considers that CSOs have an important role in regulating society and serving the public. Through their representatives, CSOs are involved in the government’s elaboration of development policies.

Most CSOs, especially national-level NGOs, are encountering increasing difficulties to lead their activities due to declining financial viability. In 2015, CSOs expected to see funding opportunities through the implementation of the Community Development Emergency Program (PUDC), which covered areas where CSOs have demonstrated expertise. However, the government decided to have the United Nations Development Program in Senegal lead this program’s implementation. This decision had a negative effect on local CSOs’ ability to capture local funding.
Politically, there remains insufficient clarity around the length of the presidential mandate. The president committed to changing it from seven to five years. However, it is not yet resolved as to whether the next presidential elections will be held in 2017 or 2019. Opposition politicians have denounced this uncertainty and are becoming increasingly radical.

Officially launched in 2013, Senegal’s third decentralization act (Act III) is a new major reform initiative to promote local development. It defines the county (or département) as an administrative unit comprised of forty-two territorial collectivities and it transforms all rural communities into 557 communes. The evaluation of this reform initiative exposed its limitations, especially the insufficient funding for personnel at the levels of counties and communes. This reform has failed to produce real institutional change in its first years. CSOs who were expecting to contribute significantly to its implementation are still waiting for their involvement to materialize. The president’s formulation of a specific framework for “territorialization” whereby regions would be organized into hubs is still forthcoming.

The social context was marked by unrest among labor unions of teachers, health workers, and local government officials. Their dissatisfaction was caused by uncertainty over wage demands, insufficient diligence and transparency regarding agreements that the government has already signed, the possibility of a decrease in benefits as imposed by the World Bank, and the imbalance between salary expenses and local revenues, which have decreased significantly since the implementation of Act III of decentralization.

The government expected that the demands would be satisfied with the publication of the study on civil servant salaries. However, the results of that study are still forthcoming. The World Bank asked the Government of Senegal to reduce the level of civil servant benefits, which had attained the same level as salaries.

In the development context, the government has committed to revising the county’s social protection policy. CSOs mobilized to contribute to that reform process. The creation of the universal health care agency is also a notable event.

In 2015, the mobilization and active participation of CSOs in land tenure reform was also noteworthy. This was done through public information campaigns, studies on land governance, experimentation with participatory models, and promoting dialogue between decentralization actors and the National Commission for land tenure reform.

In terms of agriculture, the rainfalls are expected to be strong. However, commercialization of primary products remains an issue. CSOs will have to become involved in asking the government to import less and promote local agricultural production and commercialization.

Finally, it is important to note that the Casamance peace process is in a consolidation phase. An important initiative funded by the World Bank, the Pole Territorial Casamance, brings together CSOs to promote the integration and socio-economic development of southern Senegal through the rehabilitation and extension of the road network, the establishment of drilling and production areas, the improved access to electricity, and the development of economic activities (agriculture, agro-industry, arboriculture, and fish farming). CSOs have been involved since the beginning of the crisis. The Council for Development Non-Governmental Organizations (CONGAD) established an emergency program to promote peace and local economic development in Casamance through awareness campaigns, psychosocial support for children victims of the conflict, and capacity building for community groups.
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.9

The Civil and Commercial Obligations Code grants any CSO the right to register as an association and carry out activities that conform to the law. CSOs that conform to the law do not have any issues becoming registered and operating freely. However, the process is notoriously long taking approximately three months.

The Civil and Commercial Obligations Code covers all questions pertaining to internal management, field of authorized activities, financial reporting, and the dissolution of CSOs. Its provisions are generally favorable for CSOs to operate independently. However, CSOs today face real threats. Indeed, in 2015, the legal framework for CSOs changed with the adoption of Decree 2015/145, which contains two provisions that are unfavorable to CSOs. The first is the requirement that CSOs submit requests for registration approval and planned programs with the prefects. If a CSO fails to submit its program after six months of operating, the government can take away its registration. This process can create delays and blockages. The public administration is known for its slow processing of citizen requests. There is also the risk of files being lost by an inefficient decentralized structure. This was the case for Unity, Solidarity, and Cooperation (ONG USE). The second provision is that CSOs are forced to contribute financially to the CSO monitoring fund that the government established.

Overall, the government does not harass CSOs, because it recognizes its important role in developing policies and providing advice on governmental issues. For example, the government did not prevent CSOs from denouncing their insufficient involvement in the Community Development Emergency Program (PUDC). When CSOs assess that communications are not sufficient, they call upon judicial authorities. For example, CONGAD protested Decree 2015/145 in front of the Administrative Chamber of the Supreme Court. The government did not retaliate. CONGAD is a CSO network representing 178 national and international organizations, which has been the main interface for CSO-government relations since 1982.

Local lawyers are trained in laws that govern CSOs and represent CSOs in local courts. For example, CONGAD had legal counsel when it sued the government over Decree 2015/145.

CSOs who do not have recognized non-profit status do not receive any tax benefits. In general, these organizations are governed by the Code of Civil and Commercial Obligations and do not receive any benefits or exemptions articulated in Decree 2015/145.

CSOs that have legal status as an NGO benefit from such an exemption if their programs are approved by the Ministry of Finance, based on advice from the competent inter-ministerial commission. Funds that are allocated for corporate social responsibility are not taxed.

CSOs are authorized to generate revenues to cover operational and programmatic costs. They are able to respond to the government’s request for proposals both at central and local levels. CSOs are implementing agents for projects executed under the Millennium Challenge Account (MCA). For example, NGOs such as the African Network for Integrated Development (RADI), NGO Concept, and Hope 87 implemented activities pertaining to community reforestation and environmental protection as well as raising HIV/AIDS awareness.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.0

Considering their insufficient finances, CSOs seek technical, strategic, and political support externally. CSOs working on climate change issues have developed partnerships with researchers, the Environment Ministry, and local collectivities. In the health sector, NGOs have developed a platform to work with the government on the issue of universal health care. In addition, CSOs mobilize local constituencies around matters of
national concern through partnerships with religious and traditional groups, women’s associations, and youth groups.

There are several unions, NGOs, and platforms that have strategic plans, such as CONGAD, the National Center for Rural Collaboration (CNCR), Platform for Northern Initiatives (PINORD), the Federation of Senegalese Non-Governmental Organizations (FONGS), the group for women’s initiatives, the national network of people living with HIV/AIDS, and others. International partners support the implementation and monitoring of those strategic plans.

Generally, CSOs have at least in form a board of directors that is separate from personnel members. The most efficient structures are the ones that systematically use a procedures manual and audit practices. These are becoming increasingly common, because of a greater desire to self-regulate, as well as requirements of international partners.

Due to budgetary constraints, NGOs generally have a few full-time paid staff, usually around three or four. There is no national collective agreement on how salaries are determined. This is instead at the discretion of CSOs who sometimes articulate their human resources policies in a procedures manual. CSOs typically hire personnel through fixed-term contracts. Overall, most local NGOs operate using a combination of volunteers and experts.

The majority of CSOs are able to maintain modern office equipment through donor support they receive to implement specific projects and programs.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

CSOs do no benefit from any local funding and depend almost exclusively on international donors. CSOs do not have diversified funding sources, which is a major difficulty for them. For social programs, the World Bank’s program on social protection in Africa (JIPSA) has been an important funding source for CSOs. There appears to be a decline in funding to CSOs, because eligibility criteria are prohibitive.

The expert panel notes the corporate social responsibility of SONATEL, the national telecommunications company, within the context of the Millennium Challenge Account. Also, within the context of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), CSOs may access some funds for local development.

All CSOs have some type of financial management system. Conducting annual audits and publishing financial reports is a requirement for CSOs to be able to access donor funds.

Local Senegalese CSOs have not established a group of local supporters that can help finance their activities. Philanthropic movements that benefit CSOs are nominal.

Faced with insufficient financial sources, CSOs are increasingly engaged in generating revenue through requests for proposals from the government program coordination units and international development agencies. CSOs benefit from such opportunities under the Millennium Challenge Account and the World Bank-funded Sustainable and Participatory Energy Management (PROGEDE) Project.
ADVOCACY: 3.7

The government has established a solid partnership with CSOs involving them in the development of public projects and programs. They come together to design, monitor, or evaluate programs. Examples include the national commission for land reform and the general delegation on social protection and national solidarity within the context of the government’s national strategy for social protection.

In Senegal, advocacy campaigns are one of the key competencies of CSOs. CSOs such as CONGAD launch advocacy campaigns for achieving progress on the Millennium Development Goals and the post-2015 agenda, which have had results at the local, national and international levels. Under the auspices of CONGAD, Senegalese CSOs produced a report documenting progress on the MDGs and providing recommendations, which was included in Senegal’s national report to the United Nations. It was also referenced in the president of Senegal’s presentation at the United Nations Headquarters in New York. For its advocacy work, CONGAD received a competitive prize from the International Association of Economic and Social Councils and Similar Institutions (AICESIS).

In 2015, civil society contributed substantively to social reform processes. For example, they participated in the design of the national strategy for social protection. They also led awareness campaigns regarding universal health coverage. In addition, CSOs organized regional panels on land reform. In Senegal today, some CSO leaders are embedded in government bodies where they can influence political decision making. For example, the President of CONGAD played an important role in operationalizing the monitoring plan for the Plan Sénégal Emergent, the country’s social and economic development policy. Other CSOs have a similar involvement on the country’s efforts to define its strategy for national social protection. In addition, the Synergy in Support of Public Education (COSIDE) played an important role in resolving the school crisis between the government and teachers’ unions.

CONGAD has mobilized other NGOs and community-based organizations to defend the interests and overall sustainability of NGOs.

SERVICE PROVISION: 3.9

Basic social service provision is the preferred field for CSOs in Senegal. They are engaged in various sectors such as education, health, and water, sanitation, and hygiene, which increase the quality of life of populations. CSOs help construct basic infrastructure. They bring know-how and technical capacity.

In the health sector, for instance, the National Alliance Against HIV/AIDS (ANCS), Plan International, and Intrahealth provide a variety of health services through the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria. The national union for community health insurances is the primary partner of the agency for universal health coverage.

CSO interventions respond to the real needs of populations who participate in and benefit from their projects. CSOs develop strategies that are adapted to the socio-cultural realities of the populations they serve.

CSOs provide services other than basic social services such as research. Studies are disseminated during workshops with other CSOs, government officials, and local collectivity representatives. Publications are
shared with the public at large, academics, and other researchers. Recently, CONGAD completed studies on land governance in Senegal, which were well received by experts and university researchers. CSOs provide social rather than commercial goods and services.

Both the government and the populations recognize CSOs for their effective contribution to basic social service delivery. CSOs benefit from government contracts and exemptions, but they do not receive grants directly from the government.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.6**

There was some improvement in infrastructure between 2014 and 2015. In 2015, intermediary support organizations (ISOs) such as CONGAD continued to develop exchange and collaboration mechanisms allowing them to reinforce the capacity of their members. CONGAD and other organizations such as CNCR, the Rural Foundation of West Africa (FRAO), and the Platform for non-State Actors provide services to local NGOs in terms of access to information, training, and technical support. Overall, these services are provided for free across the Senegalese territory. National ISOs do not typically provide grants to other organizations. Instead, CSOs receive grants from private foundations, humanitarian organizations, or international development organizations. In addition, under the banner of corporate social responsibility (CSR), companies in the extractive industries finance CSOs to implement projects.

FRAO has implemented training cycles in strategic and operational planning. This has been helpful for CSOs, because this topic is the foundation for results-based management. It is the road map for an organization to achieve its medium and long term vision. The Association for Action has developed and disseminated best practices in institutional development, planning, and management for the civil society sector. CONGAD organized a training series for its members on public procurement regulations.

CONGAD’s support office continues to provide technical assistance to CSOs in administrative procedures required for acquiring a legal status and for having their programs approved. Other local organizations, such as the Agriculture and Rural Initiative (IPAR) and the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning, also offer training services.

To improve the services it delivers to its members and to strengthen its role in health policy, CONGAD, in collaboration with the Support Program for Sanitation Governance (PAGOSAN), a project funded by the Belgian Cooperation Agency, created a database to support institutional learning and synergies, action research, and decision making.

CSOs such as CONGAD, CNCR, FONGS, and FAFS form networks that allow information sharing among members and are for defending the interests of the CSO sector. CONGAD initiated a consensus-building process for articulating non-governmental actors’ position on updating the National Strategy on Social Protection (SNPS).

Among CSO personnel, there are trainers in urban and rural areas who have experience in many areas that are of interest to CSOs wanting to improve their organizational capacity and performance. These areas include CSO management, strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, managing volunteers, and establishing a board of directors. These training topics reflect priority needs for CSOs and can be delivered in local languages. CSOs such as ACA, CESAO Senegal, ARED, CONCEPT and many others have been delivering trainings for decades on themes that CSOs have identified as being important.

There are intersectoral partnerships in Senegal. CONGAD’s HIV/AIDS, Health, and Population network and the Ministry of Health are partnered on specific programs such as GAVI, the Vaccine Alliance. In
Senegal, there are also partnerships between CSOs and the private sector. The Private Sector Health Alliance (ASPS) is a partnership between NGOs and private actors, such as medical associations, clinics, and pharmacies.

CONGAD has established partnerships with the media to promote open and fair dialogue among all stakeholders on land reform issues. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria works with the National HIV/AIDS Alliance, a local NGO, to implement its programs. An agreement was also made between CONGAD and the Public Procurement Regulation Authority for training CSOs on public procurement regulations.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.7**

CSOs have a positive media image at both local and national levels. Media outlets cover CSO activities, which populations appreciate. This positive image has allowed CSOs to be involved in many decision-making processes. For example, CSOs participate in the presidential councils, national reform commissions, and the National Office for Combatting Fraud and Corruption (OFNAC).

The public appreciates the positive role of CSOs, which they see as benefiting them more directly with less bureaucratic hurdles.

Government agencies generally have a positive perception of CSOs, because of their expertise in social development. Nevertheless, the private sector remains insufficiently aware of CSO's role in promoting economic and social development.

The Ministry of Economy and Finance’s presentation of the audit findings on NGO funding improved the public’s perception of NGOs compared to 2014. It praised NGOs for being able to mobilize funds and to achieve results in the field. However, the framework agreement between NGOs and the government remains to be signed.

CSOs owe their positive reputation to the manner in which they engage populations to define priority development needs and involve those populations in the implementation of activities. CSOs have been able to build relationships with the media to reinforce that positive image.

Some CSOs, such as CONGAD, have a code of ethics, but operationalization remains weak. The larger CSOs publish annual reports, but their dissemination is low.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Senegal

CSO Sustainability

Sustainability Enhanced  Sustainability Evolving  Sustainability Impeded

Senegal 4.2
After an eighteen-month struggle against the Ebola virus, the World Health Organization announced in November 2015 that transmission of the disease in Sierra Leone had ended. During the year, the scourge had derailed the country’s political, economic, and social development. With nearly 13,000 Ebola cases over a two-year period, Sierra Leone was plunged into an unprecedented health crisis. Many people stopped working, social gatherings were restricted, food was scarce, and businesses were forced to close. Eventually, as the disease subsided in the second half of the year, employment rebounded, and children returned to school, but food shortages continued. Moreover, the management of donor funds during the Ebola crisis became a public controversy. The auditor general identified a number of irregularities in the conduct of both public authorities and donor agencies, including the duplication of activities and the lack of supporting documentation for expenditures.

Another development that attracted widespread attention in 2015 was the expulsion from the ruling All Peoples’ Congress Party (APC) of Vice President Alhaji Samuel Sam-Sumana, followed by his dismissal from
office by President Ernest Bai Koroma. The vice president’s expulsion and dismissal were grounded in various complaints and stirred intense debate over presidential powers and the constitution. Eventually the Supreme Court ruled that the president had the authority to replace the vice president.

The mandate of the Constitutional Review Committee, which the president appointed in 2013 to strengthen multi-party democracy and create an open and transparent society in Sierra Leone, was extended in 2015 because the Ebola crisis had interfered with its work. Committee members included CSOs and other stakeholders from a wide range of backgrounds. CSOs submitted more than eighty position papers to the committee and hosted community events to raise public awareness about constitutional issues and the reform process. The committee is expected to make recommendations about a new constitution in 2016.

In 2015 the space for civil society and public activism in Sierra Leone dwindled, mainly because of the lack of political pluralism. CSOs were undermined by parliament’s summonses of certain organizations to account for their receipt of funds from foreign donors, and there were several instances of political interference in CSO operations. In addition, “rogue” CSOs that support political parties, endorse government actions, and contest opposing views emerged in greater numbers, thereby threatening the CSO sector’s credibility with the public. On the positive side, advocacy and service provision by CSOs showed improvement, especially within the context of the constitutional reform process and the Ebola crisis.

The number of CSOs in Sierra Leone is difficult to ascertain because organizations register with various organizations and consolidated data is not available. The total number of organizations, including community-based organizations (CBOs), is thought to be about 1,000. As of 2015, 241 organizations were registered as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), a distinct legal form. Of this number, ninety-one organizations were international CSOs, and 150 were domestic NGOs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.2**

Sierra Leone’s 1991 constitution offers broad guarantees for freedoms of assembly, association, and expression. There is no consolidated law governing CSOs, and the main regulatory framework is the Revised NGO Policy Regulations of 2009, which stipulates CSOs’ operational requirements, down to the number of staff members and the quality of office space.

CSOs have several options for registration. Depending on their mission, location, and proximity to government offices, most CSOs register with either the Office of the Administrator and Registrar General, the ministry responsible for their area of intervention, or a city or district council. Registration with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development (MOFED) is required to obtain NGO status, which confers eligibility for tax waivers. Normally the registration process is fairly easy, and there is abundant evidence that the number of registered CSOs in Sierra Leone increased during the 2014-15 Ebola outbreak because of the need for assistance. However, registration with MOFED is exceptionally cumbersome and can take up to six months to complete. For one thing, organizations wishing to register as NGOs must become members of the Sierra Leone Association of NGOs (SLANGO), a government-created entity that ostensibly bridges the gap between CSOs and the government but in practice is aligned with the government. Many CSOs find SLANGO’s role in the registration process an impediment. SLANGO requires CSOs to submit two-year project proposals, budgets, evidence of the number of local and expatriate staff, and recent tax clearance certificates. In addition, applicants must produce attestations showing affiliations with line ministries and
other CSOs before it will issue clearances for registration. These attestations can take a long time to obtain, especially for new CBOs.

During the year the government announced its intention to propose a new NGO policy, which would require all CSOs to pay taxes on imported goods, align their programs with the national development plan, and register with SLANGO. CSOs reacted negatively to the proposal, as they believe it violates the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The government has recently begun to require that CSOs have service-level agreements to ensure the coordination of, in particular, health-related service delivery. There were reports that some CSOs had to stop working on Ebola-related activities because they lacked service-level agreements, but exact data on the volume of interrupted work is not available.

In 2015 the space for alternative views continued to shrink, making many CSOs reluctant to express criticism of the government or challenge its positions. The parliament’s role in monitoring CSO operations continued to cause concern. The parliament summoned five CSOs, including all leading members of the Non-State Actors Coalition that were MOFED grantees, to account for funding they had received from foreign donors. When he opened parliament in December 2015 the president emphasized the importance of these hearings for improved accountability. In a related development, a newspaper editor and a radio station manager were summoned by parliament to answer questions about their reporting on a sitting minister’s travel expenditures. CSOs saw the parliamentary summonses and the president’s statement as efforts to intimidate their leaders and stifle their operations.

There were several other instances of political interference in CSO operations in 2015. Press releases on issues related to government accountability were censored, and relevant ministries summoned the organizations issuing the press releases for questioning about their mandates and the authenticity of their evidence. CSOs were not allowed to discuss issues under parliamentary consideration, in accordance with parliament’s standing orders prohibiting public debate on issues on its agenda. This was a worrying development, since the standing orders were invoked when CSOs sought to open discussion on critical issues of accountability, such as the auditor general’s report on the use of Ebola funds. The authorities also muzzled professional organizations, including the Sierra Leonean Bar Association, which the police prevented from holding a rally after the vice president was dismissed. At the same time, a number of local organizations involved in democracy and human rights campaigns shifted their allegiances and began to serve as mouthpieces for the government—for example, by issuing joint statements that actually undermined the importance of their campaigns.

All CSOs must pay taxes on income from grants, endowments, fees, and economic activities. NGOs registered with SLANGO are entitled to exemptions from duties on imported goods, but the process for obtaining these exemptions is rigorous. In 2015 MOFED proposed that all NGOs start paying taxes on imported goods in 2016 as part of its new NGO policy. CSOs are against this change, because the tax waiver is crucial to the financial sustainability of many organizations. Discussions are ongoing about the exact percentage of tax that CSOs will be required to pay.

There is no legislation that prevents CSOs from earning income from the provision of goods and services. However, Sierra Leone’s not-for-profit culture and CSOs’ sense of their own integrity as watchdogs inhibit most organizations from engaging in income-producing activities. Similarly, although CSOs are allowed to compete for government contracts, most organizations do not do so because of the country’s not-for-profit culture.

Most CSOs find it difficult to obtain sound legal advice, since only one legal practitioner in Sierra Leone is familiar with the laws and regulations governing CSOs. The Society for Democratic Initiatives (SDI) sometimes represents CSOs in court on a pro bono basis.
ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.8

CSOs and CBOs generally enjoy legitimacy in local communities and have the reputation of serving as the voices of their constituencies. Before project implementation, the more credible organizations hold meetings with local communities in which they share the objectives and budgets for their work. This growing trend has helped build trust and a sense of legitimacy among CSOs and their communities. The public often relies on the heads of key organizations to lead discussions on emerging issues and take positions on its behalf.

Although most CSOs operate on a project-by-project basis, they normally have clearly defined missions and adhere to them in their programming and community interventions. A formal strategic-planning process is not feasible for many organizations, since they lack the required expertise, but most organizations agree upon and realize specific organizational benchmarks. In 2015 the Ebola outbreak diverted most CSOs from long-term strategic issues as they focused on social mobilization to help end the scourge.

Internal management structures vary from one organization to the next. Some CSOs have well-defined structures composed of a board, management, and staff. Although each component normally has a separate function, in some organizations there is an imbalance in their relationships, and the executive director exerts more influence than the board. Moreover, some CSOs, especially in the provinces, are regarded as “owned” by the individuals who founded them. This trend is quickly becoming a challenge to CSO sustainability, as organizations revolve around one person and may find it difficult to survive that person’s departure.

Because government salaries are currently more attractive than those offered by CSOs, many qualified CSO employees have shifted to the public sector. International organizations, such as ActionAid Sierra Leone, are able to maintain paid staff, but many other CSOs rely on interns and long-serving volunteers because they have limited core funding and institutional support. The heads of some organizations have gone for months without salaries because the organizations lacked funded projects. The culture of volunteerism is growing quickly in Sierra Leone, and citizens increasingly seek to play a role in the development of their communities. CSOs are benefiting from a huge crop of volunteers who augment staffing and help cut costs. Many organizations now consist solely of a head and volunteers. Although CSOs violate labor laws and breach employee rights when they retain volunteers for more than three months, many volunteers plead to stay on because of the country’s high unemployment rate. When core funding lapses, passion and activism often keep CSO staff committed to working for their organizations without pay.

CSOs in Sierra Leone have limited technological capabilities. Organizations in urban locations often have second-hand computers with Internet access. However, because their equipment is usually donated and donations take place mainly during emergencies such as the Ebola outbreak, many CSOs cannot count on having reliable equipment over the longer term. CSOs in rural communities have very limited access to computers, fax lines, and the Internet.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.7

The main source of funding for Sierra Leonean CSOs is external donors. In 2015 most donor funds were directed to international CSOs, which typically sub-contract with local organizations. This was the approach during the Ebola crisis, when the World Bank and other donors mobilized $318 million to help Sierra Leone fight the disease. During the crisis most local organizations shifted their focus to help end the scourge, but they were not involved in discussions about post-Ebola programming, as funders prefer to deal with international organizations with verifiable track records. CBOs’ lack of contact with external funding sources often hampers their search for funds. However, some donor organizations, such as the Open Society Institute
West Africa (OSIWA), now have in-country offices, which augment their understanding of the needs and interventions of local CSOs.

Local philanthropy is almost non-existent in Sierra Leone. Despite a burgeoning mining industry, for example, CSOs find it difficult to raise funds from mining companies, because they seem interested only in funding local community initiatives that do not involve CSOs.

The culture of fundraising is still new in Sierra Leone. Organizations usually seek to obtain funding by writing proposals and forging partnerships with international CSOs. The long processing time for project proposals often means that salaries and other institutional costs go unfunded. Moreover, donor fatigue is setting in, and even CSOs that were funded in the past are no longer receiving funding. Although multi-year funding would enhance CSOs’ sustainability and effectiveness, it is usually unavailable.

While no law explicitly prevents CSOs from earning income, CSOs see themselves as non-profit-making organizations and thus do not charge for their goods and services. Membership organizations that depend on subscriptions can find it difficult to collect fees.

CSOs are generally aware of the need to produce yearly financial reports, especially if they are registered as NGOs, for which it is a legal requirement. However, many organizations do not have the resources to implement sound financial management systems or hire a reputable financial firm. Some organizations, such as SDI, Center for the Coordination of Youth Activities, and Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), post financial reports on their notice boards or publish them on their websites. However, the vast majority of CSOs does not compile or publish accounts of their financial transactions. This is particularly true if an organization goes an entire year without a funded project, which is not unusual.

**ADVOCACY: 4.1**

In the past CSOs shied away from working with state institutions because of the highly polarized political environment. But this tendency began to give way with the introduction in Sierra Leone of the Open Government Partnership (OGP), a global initiative that promotes governance reform and collaborative advocacy. CSOs are now seeking to work more closely with government agencies on issues of common interest, and in 2015 organizations such as SDI, CGG, Budget Advocacy Network (BAN), Democracy and Development Associates, and Transparency International Sierra Leone (TISL) worked with government representatives on the steering committee of OGP. Moreover, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and other donors have set performance benchmarks that require the government to involve CSOs in policy formulation and implementation.

CSOs from all sectors engaged with unprecedented intensity in the constitutional review process. The CSO sector considered the review a unique opportunity to influence legal reforms in the country, and various coalitions, led by organizations such as CGG and SDI, worked on a wide range of governance issues, including chieftaincy, elections, human rights, gender, and the executive powers of the president. CSOs served on the Constitutional Review Committee and submitted more than eighty position papers on various topics. CSOs also hosted community events to raise public awareness about issues surrounding the constitution and the reform process. During the year CSOs took part in the hearings on the national budget with MOFED and served on the National Coalition on Gender-Based Violence, a multi-stakeholder advocacy platform.
The Ebola outbreak underscored the need for social mobilization throughout Sierra Leone, and in 2015 CSOs continued several initiatives to help women and youth affected by the disease. For example, the Women’s Response against Ebola (WRESL) Campaign, which was launched in 2014 by the Women’s Forum, 50/50 Group of Sierra Leone, Sierra Leone Market Women’s Association, and other organizations, continued to advocate for women’s participation, health care, and economic empowerment in the post-Ebola period. Another network of women’s organizations, led by Mano River Women’s Peace Network and the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone, worked with the government to urge pregnant girls to go to school during the outbreak. CSOs also created a coalition of Ebola survivors to coordinate post-Ebola health care and livelihood support in partnership with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender, and Children’s Affairs.

Several key CSO lobbying efforts were successful in 2015. Thanks in part to CSOs’ efforts with parliament, the government agreed to lift the state of public health emergency imposed during the Ebola crisis, which CSOs felt was limiting freedom of expression and association. In addition, CSOs finally succeeded in pushing the government to establish a legal-aid board to allow vulnerable litigants, such as commercial bike riders and market women, to access justice. Women’s organizations led by the Advocacy Movement Network (AMNet), a Sierra Leonean CSO, and Ipas, a global CSO, worked with parliament to implement the Maputo Protocol, an instrument adopted by the African Union to protect women’s rights. This network also gained passage of a safe abortion bill. However, because this bill was controversial, it stalled for the year, awaiting the president’s signature. Finally, CSOs promoted legal reform at the district level on issues such as land grabbing and the governance of natural resources.

Some organizations sought to influence national policies by producing research, publications, and public-attitude surveys on democracy, governance, and related issues. For example, BAN issued a report on the country’s revenue losses as a result of tax incentives granted to mining companies in 2015. However, government officials do not generally seem to respect civil society’s opinions and rarely take action on reports issued by CSOs.

During the year, CSOs conferred on the new NGO policy that the government plans to take to parliament. In November, SDI led a meeting on the new policy, in which it was resolved that the policy violates human rights provisions of the United Nations’ Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Meeting participants also agreed that the policy would create challenges for effective service delivery. For example, CSOs would have to align their programs with the national development plan, which does not adequately describe all services that CSOs currently provide. In addition, some observers asserted that current taxation policy and practice favor international organizations over local CSOs and mining companies over CSOs generally. CSOs have also been consulting with the government since November 2015 on the new tax policy.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.0**

CSOs in Sierra Leone offer a diversified range of goods and services in areas such as health, sanitation, civic education, contract monitoring, entrepreneurship, slum dwelling, and tree planting. CSOs continued to offer Ebola-related services in 2015, including food distribution to quarantined facilities and social mobilization through community outreach. For example, in 2015 the Health For All coalition monitored free healthcare and drug delivery for pregnant women and lactating mothers and played a key role in providing information on the status on peripheral health care units as they transitioned to post-Ebola services. After the scourge ended many organizations reverted to their original pre-Ebola programs while incorporating aspects of the post-Ebola priorities. CSOs and CBOs in Sierra Leone now see themselves as experienced in social mobilization and fighting deadly health outbreaks such as Ebola.
CSOs of all sizes and capacities seek to meet the priorities and needs of the communities that they serve. CSOs generally enjoy their constituencies’ confidence and are regarded as trusted partners, thanks in part to the widespread use of needs and exit assessments. Community members are usually involved actively in the implementation of projects. For example, youth groups mobilized into task forces to help identify Ebola-infected people in their communities and alert medical personnel. Organizations providing agricultural services sometimes ask communities to provide seeds in the form of a seed bank.

Leading CSOs often serve as resources for researchers and donors who require first-hand information to design effective interventions. Most CSO offer their services free of charge.

Although the government recognizes the ability of CSOs to reach out to citizens and provide needed services, it does not offer them financial support. Nevertheless, the government and CSOs often work together to provide services and raise public awareness. For example, in 2015 Water and Sanitation Network (WASHNET) validated the Sierra Leone Water Company’s rural water project by issuing a public statement. In July 2015 the government launched a new initiative to rebuild the health sector in the post-Ebola recovery period. The plan emphasizes CSO-government coordination to ensure proper services and has been assigned to a presidential delivery team for implementation.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.1**

Donor-created CSO resource centers are located in some towns in Sierra Leone. CSOs use these centers as meeting venues but seldom rely on the informational materials that they offer. Sustaining these centers is a challenge. For example, many computer centers have opened at the community level but stop functioning after initial funding dries up. Donors tend to support the establishment of centers, especially by transferring previously owned materials such as publications. However, ongoing support for Internet access or the replacement of computers is generally unavailable.

The two most important local grant-making organizations are ActionAid Sierra Leone and OSIWA. Competition for funds from these organizations is intense, and only a small number of organizations receive grants, usually for human rights and governance work. In 2015, Ebola-related service delivery and accountability were also a priority.

CSOs form partnerships and coalitions to share information and ensure that advocacy and service-providing initiatives address issues of common concern. Thematic coalitions address such issues as democracy and human rights, agriculture, health, and water and sanitation. To strengthen their initiatives, CBOs often receive training on working effectively in coalitions, usually conducted by the coalition’s lead organization.

Established CSOs are invited to take part in trainings offered by international partners, but such opportunities are usually ad hoc. The trainings mostly focus on project implementation, especially the use of data-gathering tools.

Intersectoral partnerships between CSOs and government ministries, departments, and agencies take place at the national and local levels. Government-CSO partnerships were particularly robust during the Ebola crisis, when both sides met weekly to coordinate efforts on health-care provision, social mobilization, quarantine facilities, and vaccine testing. CSOs also offer checks and balances and monitor service delivery in such areas as health and education. For example, a number of healthcare coalitions, such as Health Alert and Health For All, keeps track of free medications in hard-to-reach peripheral healthcare units, and school monitoring committees ensure that the government delivers subsidies and educational materials on a timely basis. CSO
partnerships with the business community are very limited. Mobile phone companies are in the frontline of cooperation, but their support is mostly skewed toward entertainment and sports.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

Coverage of CSO activities in print media and by the government-run Sierra Leone Broadcasting Corporation, which broadcasts on both radio and television, occurs on a paid basis only. CSOs usually factor media costs into their budgets and thus tend to benefit from extensive and favorable coverage. For example, National Election Watch partners with the independent Radio Network (IRN) and pays a lump sum for countrywide outreach. In addition, CSOs often enter into long-term partnerships with community radio stations at a minimal cost. These arrangements help ensure that communities enjoy full coverage of CSO activities.

Nevertheless, the public has a mixed view of CSOs. CSOs generally enjoy strong relationships with the public at the local level, especially because of their work during the Ebola crisis and their visibility in communities. However, parliament’s questioning of CSOs about their use of foreign funding has caused public confidence in CSOs to drop considerably. Rogue CSOs, which protect the interests of political parties and taint CSOs’ image with a partisan cast, have also affected CSO credibility.

The government and the private sector are fully aware of the invaluable role CSOs play in ensuring proper service delivery and improving democratic governance. The expertise of Sierra Leonean CSOs in handling Ebola-related needs is recognized both nationally and internationally, and the presentation by Sierra Leonean CSOs of their experiences in fighting Ebola in several international fora has given them an outstanding profile. The government sometimes asks credible CSOs to endorse its programs but tends to seek the support of rogue CSOs when it wants their backing for questionable actions. Fortunately, the public easily identifies rogue CSOs as deceptive groups that do not represent citizens’ interests but instead validate government positions on controversial issues.

NGOs must adopt a code of ethics when they join SLANGO. However, SLANGO lacks the financial and human resource capacity to monitor compliance with the code. CSOs usually publish annual reports as accountability tools, although their quality can vary.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Sierra Leone

CSO Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>7</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legal Environment
Public Image
Organizational Capacity
Infrastructure
Financial Viability
Service Provision
Advocacy
The year 2015 was turbulent and frustrating for South Africans. According to the Statistics South Africa website, the economy grew by 1.3 percent in the first quarter of the year and shrank by 1.3 percent in the second quarter. The unemployment rate stood at 25.5 percent, with six of South Africa’s nine provinces recording increases in 2015. In particular, young people struggled to find jobs in the tough economy.

The country again experienced widespread unrest over the government’s poor delivery of services. Between January and May 2015, protests erupted in Gauteng, Eastern Cape, Kwa-Zulu Provinces, and elsewhere because of poor water and electricity supplies, deteriorating roads, and other inadequate services. The vast majority of protests were peaceful and seemed uncoordinated and community generated. Large-scale outbursts of xenophobic violence against foreign nationals took place at the beginning of the year and continued sporadically during the following months.

Student demonstrations also gathered steam across the country in 2015. In March a student-led anti-colonialism protest movement called for the removal of the statue of Cecil John Rhodes at the University of Cape Town. The campaign attracted global media attention and had its goals met in April when the university council voted to remove the statue. In late October students at the University of Cape Town and the
University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg protested a proposed hike in academic fees. The “FeesMustFall” protests spread rapidly to other universities, and after a week of unrest the government gave in to students’ demands and froze the fees, although without clarifying how universities were to meet their funding shortfalls.

The inquiry into the use of government funds on the private residence of President Jacob Zuma at Nkandla continued to unfold in 2015. Opposition party lodged a case with the Constitutional Court to force the president to pay back some of the funds, as was recommended by the public protector, whose duties are to investigate official corruption and misconduct. In a report to the parliament about the matter, the public protector did not blame the president directly for the excess expenditures but nonetheless requested that the responsible parties be held accountable. Several CSOs agreed and mounted public protests demanding that the over-expenditures be repaid to the state.

CSOs continued to operate in a very harsh economic climate, as government and other funding declined during the year while a decline in the value of the rand made imported items more expensive. Nevertheless, advocacy improved as several organizations successfully realized their advocacy goals. Many unemployed youth entered the CSO sector, both as volunteers or as sporadically paid employees, but they often lacked the skills needed to manage their projects successfully. Few formal training opportunities were available.

No new statistics are publicly available about the size and scope of the CSO sector in 2015. According to the Nonprofit Organizations (NPO) Directorate of the Department of Social Development (DSD), there were 130,612 registered voluntary associations in South Africa at the end of 2014. The Department of Trade and Industry has not released figures on the number of nonprofit companies and trusts. The South African Revenue Service has removed its list of registered faith-based organizations (FBOs) from its website.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 3.3**

The legal environment for South African CSOs remained unchanged in 2015. CSOs can register as voluntary associations, trusts, or nonprofit companies. Nearly 95 percent of all registered CSOs are voluntary associations. Registration continued to be a straightforward process in 2015. After the introduction of an online system at the DSD in 2013, registration took an average of thirty-four days, which was well within the sixty-day limit set by the NPO Act of 1997.

CSOs are required by law to submit annual narrative and financial reports. However, most organizations fail to submit reports, and as a result many organizations began to be de-registered in 2012. In July 2015 the DSD introduced a moratorium on de-registrations in response to protests by CSOs and began to re-register organizations that had been de-registered in 2012. To avoid another mass de-registration, the DSD spent ZAR 2.5 million (approximately $165,000) on an educational campaign to help CSOs improve their compliance with the NPO Act, especially in filing narrative and financial reports.

The DSD continued its diagnostic evaluation of the NPO Regulatory Framework and Legislation, which was started in 2014 and is expected to be completed in 2016. However, a tender that had been advertised to complete this diagnostic evaluation appears to have been shelved without being awarded.

After somewhat of a decline in 2014, there were several instances of political harassment or inappropriate government interference in CSO affairs in 2015. For instance, after the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) launched a protest action against the alleged corruption of a member of a provincial health department’s
executive committee, local officials claimed that TAC was acting as a political party and threatened to de-register the organization. The entire CSO community condemned these threats, and no action was taken. In another incident, the Sunday Times reported that officials of the State Security Agency (SSA) had warned parliamentary staff that certain CSOs, specifically Right2Know, were known to be foreign agents—a claim that Right2Know forcefully refuted. Finally, in May 2015 the Trade Union Registrar applied through the Labor Court to have the Chemical, Energy, Paper, Printing, Wood, and Allied Workers Union (CEPPWAWU) suspended because of its repeated failure to submit annual audited financial statements. The minister of labor removed the registrar from his post, claiming that he had failed to follow correct procedures in suspending CEPPWAWU. The registrar opposed his dismissal in court and in October 2015 a judge ruled in his favor. The re-instated registrar again applied to the Labor Court to suspend CEPPWAWU, emphasizing his regulatory duties as enunciated in the NPO Act. CSOs interpreted the incident as a warning that in the future they may expect action to be taken against them if they violate provisions of the NPO Act.

The Income Tax Act provides for tax deductions for individual and corporate donors, provided the recipient organization meets certain conditions, such as acting in the public interest in seventeen designated areas, including education, training, and research. Public-benefit organizations (PBOs) are entitled to tax exemptions on the income they earn from activities in the seventeen areas, but the government is slow to implement these exemptions.

CSOs are permitted by law to earn income from the provision of goods and services as long as the revenue from their commercial activities does not exceed predefined limits. The tax authorities monitor this proportion closely.

Law students receive some training in nonprofit law, and some legal practitioners in both primary and secondary cities provide services to CSOs. Legal services generally remain too expensive for CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.8

South African CSOs continued to seek out local constituencies as they pursued organizational objectives and initiatives in 2015. For example, Unite Against Corruption built a broad consortium after its general call to arms to organizations and individuals who view corruption as an assault on the constitution’s promise of equality and dignity. During the attacks on foreign nationals and the student protests during the year, communities provided food, shelter, and comfort to the affected populations.

Most South African CSOs do not have strategic plans or leadership succession plans, mainly because of a lack of funding. Some foreign donors insist on seeing program plans but often fail to review organizations’ overall strategic plans. CSOs are gradually starting to develop vision and mission statements but often are not able to implement them.

CSOs generally have written internal management structures and adhere to them in their daily operations. CSO boards are either elected or appointed, depending on an organization’s constitution. Some organizations offer board inductions and training, but the majority are not able to do so because of limited funding.

Many organizations find it difficult to retain professional and skilled staff members in the medium to long term, because they can offer only low pay. CSOs usually offer staff contracts, but many of these contracts are only for the duration of a particular project. Staff contracts usually comply with the basic conditions of the employment law. Some organizations have internal grievance and disciplinary procedures. There is some evidence that volunteers are increasingly providing services, mainly in health, welfare, and children-focused organizations. A recent survey released by the government statistical service estimates that more than one million South Africans volunteer for CSOs.
In South Africa widespread load shedding, or planned power outages, causes electricity supplies to fluctuate, making a full day’s work impossible. During the outages CSOs are unable to use the Internet or respond to inquiries. Although the outages affect CSOs in both urban and rural areas, the effect on organizations in rural areas is more intense. Many CSOs are unable to make capital expenditures for alternative sources of energy. CSOs do not typically have state-of-the-art equipment but do have access to refurbished or donated equipment. Organizations usually seek to have office space close to their beneficiary groups, especially as rent in towns and cities is expensive. Like-minded organizations often share office space or rent space in the same building.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.3**

![Financial Viability in South Africa](chart)

Financial sustainability remained a challenge for most South African CSOs in 2015. CSOs derive their funding from six major sources—government subsidies, local donations (including CSR programs), membership subscriptions, service delivery, sales, and international donors—and all of these sources of funding declined during the year.

CSOs working in healthcare depend largely on overseas development aid from foundations, international CSOs, and foreign governments. Some organizations were dealt a significant blow in September when the U.S. President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) stopped supporting CSOs working in regions with lower concentrations of HIV/AIDS. However, reports suggest that some CSOs were able to retain funding by shifting their activities to priority locations. Other CSOs that were already working in those locations obtained funding to fulfill the PEPFAR programming goals.

South Africa’s civil society welcomed the announcement in February 2015 of a $25-million fund established jointly by the Open Society Foundation, Ford Foundation, and Atlantic Philanthropies. The fund aims to advance constitutionalism and is unique in that over the next ten years it will provide long-term institutional support, which has never before been available to South African CSOs. The fund was not yet operational by the end of the year.

Major government donor agencies include the National Lottery Distribution Trust Fund (NLDTF) and the National Development Agency (NDA). The NLDTF was instituted by an act of parliament to raise funds for charities through a national lottery system. The NDA was established to serve as a fund providing capacity-building resources for CSOs. In 2015 the National Lotteries Commission (NLC) invited CSOs to apply for funding provided they complied with set criteria. The grants were administered in two waves: first for registered medium-sized organizations seeking funding in excess of ZAR 500,000 (approximately $34,000), and later for smaller organizations. The NLDTF received the applications and made grants in four legislated areas—charities, sports, arts and culture, and heritage—along with a general miscellaneous category. No recent information is available about the total amount of funding provided.

Two issues bedeviled the NLDTF’s operations during the year. The minister of trade and industry appointed a new lottery-operating agency, which was challenged in court by the previous holder of the license. The delay in the appointment affected the operations of the lottery, and it was unable to make grants to CSOs. In addition, the fund changed application deadlines and limited grant funding amounts without informing the CSO sector. Operations at the NDA were similarly impeded because of delays in appointing a new board of directors and chief executive, which undercut the agency’s ability to carry out its mandate to fund CSOs.

Another significant source of income for CSOs is CSR programs, implemented mostly by larger corporations. These programs traditionally fund areas such as education, healthcare, and housing, depending on the interests of the corporations making the grants. In 2014 CSR funding amounted to ZAR 8.2 billion (approximately $550,000,000) and was expected to be higher in 2015. However, CSR programs are often
supported by businesses as public relations exercises or to curry favor with the government rather than as social investment efforts. Little monitoring or evaluation of CSR programs takes place.

CSOs continued their efforts to diversify their income streams. Some organizations increased their membership fees, while others charged for services such as trauma counseling. Local organizations raised funds through cake sales, raffles, and the re-sale of in-kind donations from the public of items such as clothing and books.

Fundraising was a high priority for many organizations in 2015. Most CSOs raise funds repeatedly from the same donors based on existing relationships. Because no donor directory exists in the country, donor agencies are often inundated with proposals outside of their funding guidelines, and many CSOs chase a few donors without positive results. Welfare organizations remain dependent on diminishing government grants to fund their activities. Fundraising appeals to the public are not very successful because of the economic recession and increasing unemployment. While many CSOs are interested in fundraising through the Internet, anecdotal evidence suggests that this is not as successful in South Africa as in other developed countries.

CSOs have a range of financial management systems. Many well-endowed organizations have staff members specialized in finance, while smaller CSOs often use the services of third parties who are not always competent to do this work. DSD statistics indicate that nearly a third of registered nonprofit organizations do not regularly provide reports as required by government regulations. Some CSOs effectively use their websites to publicize their reports.

**ADVOCACY: 3.2**

Cooperation between CSOs and the government was mixed in 2015, but otherwise CSOs’ advocacy efforts were strong. To fulfill the vision of the National Development Plan (NDP) 2030 for the social welfare and protection sector, CSOs and the minister of social development agreed in 2015 to jointly coordinate implementation of the policy through periodic meetings. These meetings allowed CSOs and other stakeholders to provide valuable input into the social welfare and protection process envisioned by the NDP. On the other hand, CSOs continued to be frustrated by bureaucratic delays in their efforts to measure the government’s compliance with the Promotion of Access to Information Act (PAIA) in 2015.

CSOs continued to advocate strongly for various causes during the year. In May 2015 the Southern Africa Litigation Center (SALC), an independent regional human rights organization, demanded that Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir be arrested for crimes against humanity if he attended the African Union summit in Johannesburg. SALC stated that it would file an urgent application in the High Court to ensure Bashir’s arrest if the government failed to act. Bashir came to South Africa and was allowed to depart the country from a military base while SALC’s case was still in court. After his departure the court ruled that Bashir should not have been allowed to leave the country. The incident reinforced a popularly held belief that the state is not accountable for its actions to either domestic or international stakeholders. As a consequence of the incident, the African National Congress (ANC) put forward a resolution to withdraw from the International Criminal Court (ICC) at a meeting of its National General Council in October 2015.

In June 2015 twenty-two CSOs launched the Judges Matter Coalition to lobby for transformation of the judiciary. The coalition emphasized the importance of the judges in cases involving women’s rights, housing, and the environment and sought to reform the process for selecting judges. As a result of the coalition’s efforts, President Zuma made a number of new appointments to the judiciary in December 2015, all of whom were women.
In a landmark case, TAC and Sonke Gender Justice joined the largest class-action lawsuit in South African legal history. The suit seeks justice for hundreds of thousands of mineworkers who contracted silicosis or tuberculosis while working in South African gold mines. The suit was still underway at the end of the year. As CSOs use the courts effectively for their advocacy work, there is a countervailing response from politicians that the courts are against the government and its executive decision-making role. In reaction to this perception, judges of constitutional and appeals courts across the country met with the president to emphasize the constitutional separation of judicial and executive powers.

Another important case concerned the award of a tender by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). South Africa’s Constitutional Court had ruled in 2013 that the SASSA’s award of a ZAR 10 billion (approximately $600 million) contract to a Net1 subsidiary, Cash Paymaster Services (CPS), was unconstitutional and ordered SASSA to reissue the tender by October 2015. In mid-2015 a prominent CSO, the Black Sash Trust, alleged that CPS was continuing to benefit from the first tender and asked SASSA to prevent the company from making unlawful deductions from social grants and exploiting confidential data about social-grant beneficiaries. On October 15, 2015 Black Sash Trust held silent protests in Soweto, Cape Town, and other cities as part of its “Hands Off Our Grants” campaign. The government did not respond.

In lobbying efforts, CSOs representing women and people with disabilities successfully petitioned the Department of Public Service and Administration (DPSA) to set targets of 2 percent for the employment of disabled people in all government departments and 50 percent for women in senior management. In July 2015 efforts by the organization Resources Aimed at the Prevention of Child Abuse and Neglect (RAPCAN) and others led to a new law decriminalizing sex between consenting adolescents. CSOs also opposed a draft Internet regulation policy, which was introduced by the Film and Publication Board (FPB) as the first formal attempt to regulate online content in South Africa. During the period for public comment, the Legal Resources Center (LRC) commented that the draft policy is constitutionally problematic and needs revision.

Currently CSOs are not involved in any local advocacy for legal reform, as the DSD has not yet produced new draft legislation to govern CSOs.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.2**

In 2015 CSOs continued to provide much-needed services in various sectors, including health, education, disaster relief, housing, water, and legal aid. For example, in the children’s sector, CSOs provided services related to adoption, childcare, education, orphanages, and abuse. They also provided services to disabled people, the aged, and the vulnerable. There was a slight increase in the number of hospice care facilities in 2015 in response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic.

The goods and services provided by CSOs in 2015 reflected the needs and priorities of their constituents, and communities and other beneficiaries responded positively to their efforts. Community clinics run by CSOs were well attended. More than three hundred local advice offices provided legal assistance to indigent beneficiaries, and several women’s organizations provided counseling services and legal support to rape victims. Some traditional leaders provided counseling and mediation services to help resolve family or inheritance disputes in rural areas.

CSOs recover few costs from the services they provide, mainly because of extreme poverty and high unemployment in the communities they serve. A further problem is that the tax law limits CSOs’ potential for cost recovery, and CSOs risk losing their nonprofit status if they violate the law’s provisions.

The government recognizes and supports CSO service provision. In rural areas CSOs’ efforts are more visible and therefore more appreciated.
INFRASTRUCTURE: 3.8

The infrastructure supporting CSOs in South Africa remained largely unchanged in 2015. Intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and resource centers such as the Southern Africa Community Grantmakers Leadership Forum (SACGLF) continued to provide training to enhance the growth and sustainability of the sector, with a special focus on leadership and governance.

Local corporate grantmaking is limited to areas of corporate interest and non-controversial issues. It is directed mainly at primary and high-school education and may provide grants or scholarships for professional studies at the university level. Local support to health organizations has diminished in recent years, and little funding is available for advocacy work or human rights campaigns.

CSOs occasionally come together to address issues of common interest, such as media laws, election observation, and land matters. However, these groups are often not able to sustain themselves over the longer term, usually because a lack of funding, personality conflicts, regional differences, or simply differing approaches breaks them apart. This was the case, for example, in a recent effort to address the national minimum wage, with community groups taking a different approach than trade unions.

Many CSOs continued to provide training, education, and research services to other CSOs in 2015. Training usually takes place in urban centers, although rural-based CSOs also attend. Specialized training in local CSO law, taxation, and management is sometimes offered to and appreciated by CSOs. However, funding to attend training on these topics is scarce. Training programs offered in metropolitan areas are usually conducted in English or the dominant local language. Much of the training in rural areas is conducted in the local language.

A prime example of cooperation between business, government, and educational CSOs is the National Education Collaboration Trust (NECT), which continued its work to improve the education system in 2015. The Department of Education has joined the trust and now operates it together with the business and CSO partners. Another example of an effective intersectoral partnership is in the housing sector, where construction companies and CSOs have jointly established housing trusts to provide poor communities with houses. In the water sector, engineering companies have partnered with government and CSOs to provide water and sanitation facilities to communities. More recently, businesses and CSOs have established joint activities to harness solar energy to provide electricity to communities.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.6

CSOs continued to receive fairly positive media coverage at the local and national levels in 2015. Coverage on radio and television is more common than in print media. Many CSOs seek to maintain personal relationships with journalists, understanding that these relationships are essential for effective media coverage. For example, TAC sends weekly or even daily updates to reporters via email.

Generally, it is not easy to determine public perceptions of CSOs. According to the 2015 Edelman Trust Barometer, public trust in South Africa’s CSOs was at 61 percent, down from 66 percent in 2014. In fact, in 2015 there were no major cases of fraud or corruption in the CSO sector, and civil society’s image may have become more positive. At the same time, while many individuals support CSOs, others believe that CSOs routinely pursue personal agendas rather than those of the community. Two especially contentious issues in 2015 were
nuclear energy and fracking in the Karoo. CSOs, business, the government, and communities were divided on these issues, and some communities perceived CSOs as not acting in the community’s interests.

Government relations with CSOs often reflect hostility and competition. More collegial relationships exist between CSOs and officials in the social development and health departments because of mutual dependencies. However, negative perceptions of CSOs dominate in the labor and land departments. Businesses are of the view that CSOs should at least provide services to them if they are demanding funding.

Trade unions disseminate media statements regularly, as they have media desks or staff devoted to this function. Few CSOs have such resources and therefore are not able to disseminate positive stories to the media to enhance their public images. While larger NGOs often have public relations programs, many smaller organizations are not able to afford such programs.

Regulations require that CSOs file annual narrative reports with relevant government departments and ministries. To maintain their funding, most CSOs that receive or seek to receive funding from the government comply with these requirements. CSOs typically no longer produce print copies of their annual reports. Instead, they are more likely to produce a small quantity of printed reports for funding purposes and otherwise distribute their reports through their websites. Many organizations have developed their own code of conducts for board and staff members and police them internally. Other codes with a broader audience are not widely used. The Institute of Directors in Southern Africa is developing new standards for corporate governance, which CSOs have requested be tiered so that small organizations can adhere to the basic concepts of good governance while larger organizations follow a more comprehensive approach.
Sudan continued to experience severe political and economic challenges in 2015. Armed conflicts persisted and even intensified in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile, displacing large numbers of people. Food production declined in most parts of the country at the same time that refugees and transitory migrants from neighboring counties continued to stream in, straining Sudan’s dwindling resources. With more than 70 percent of the national budget allocated to security and defense, inflation was high. Young people and professionals continued to leave the country in significant numbers.

The most important political developments of the year were in follow up to the Political Declaration on the Establishment of a State of Citizenship and Democracy (also known as the “Sudan Call”), which was issued by Sudanese opposition parties, armed rebel groups, and CSO activists in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on December 3, 2014. The declaration calls for ending the war and addressing humanitarian issues in a comprehensive manner, resolving the economic crisis, organizing a national dialogue as promised by President Omar al-Bashir in January 2014, revoking laws restricting freedoms and human rights, and forming...
a transitional government to implement a permanent constitution and organize national elections. The government responded aggressively to the Sudan Call by detaining some signatories on their return to Khartoum and charging them with crimes punishable by death. In 2015 these charges were dropped and the detainees were released, apparently because of domestic and international pressure as well as a weak legal case. The national dialogue called for by the president began in October 2015, with participants coming mainly from groups aligned with government or factions that had split off from armed groups in Darfur.

In November 2015, the government amended the constitution to concentrate power in the hands of the president and expand the authorities of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) and the police. NISS launched a heavy-handed campaign against the media, confiscating and banning some newspapers and charging journalists and editors with various crimes, including “attempting to dismantle the state,” an offense punishable by death.

These events severely constrained civil society during the year. Most CSOs were concerned with their survival more than their long-term sustainability and preferred to maintain a low profile. Some organizations changed their mandates to avoid working on human rights and democracy issues, which could attract government harassment. Closures, delays in registration, the cancelation of activities, and a drop in funding led to a significant decline in output compared to the previous year. Nevertheless, several organizations played an important role in the follow up to the Sudan Call—most notably, by organizing a campaign to define conditions for a comprehensive, inclusive, and productive national dialogue. Service-providing CSOs working in conflict areas continued to face restrictions on the locations and target groups for their work, while CSOs focused on human rights and democratization were forbidden from working in those areas altogether.

There are no exact figures available on the size of the CSO sector. But in 2015 an official with the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), the government agency charged with monitoring CSOs, publicly stated that the total number of CSOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) registered with HAC was about 15,000, including 4,000 in Khartoum state. Another 500-600 CSOs are probably registered as cultural groups and training institutions. The number of active organizations could be fewer than 10 percent of that figure.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.5**

Most CSOs in Sudan are registered under the Voluntary Organizations Law (2006), which is implemented by HAC. Some organizations are registered with the Ministry of Culture, Ministry of Trade, or the National Training Council. There are also a few unregistered but active advocacy groups that work in such areas as human and women’s rights. As it is illegal to work for unregistered organizations, individuals working with these organizations are vulnerable to arrest.

The registration process for CSOs grew more difficult in 2015. Registration procedures were already complicated by contradictions between federal and state laws and the imposition in 2013 of a requirement for state-level registration, despite the lack of a supporting law. In 2015 the HAC adopted “unified procedures guidelines” and a “technical agreement” format that did little to resolve the lack of clear registration procedures. In fact, the guidelines are so vague in certain areas that they make CSOs even more liable to legal action and have had the effect of spreading corruption by prompting some organizations to “buy their way out.”
After its transfer to the Ministry of Interior in 2014, HAC was moved to the Ministry of Social Affairs in 2015, where it regained a semi-independent status, although it continues to be controlled by NISS. CSOs must renew their registrations annually, which includes submitting annual activity reports and audited financial statements for approval by the authorities. In addition, the government maintains the right to inspect CSO premises and activities. In 2015, the increased powers of NISS allowed the security service and HAC to suspend CSOs’ registration renewal requests and activities on verbal instruction and without a specific reason, thus preventing organizations from taking legal action against such decisions. For example, in 2015, the authorities delayed or froze the registration renewals of the Regional Center for CSO Capacity Development (RCDCS), Sudanese Organization for Research and Development (SORD), and Environmentalist Society, and cancelled the registration of the Sudanese Writers Union and Mahmoud Mohamed Taha Cultural Center. The deteriorating situation with registrations increased pressure on CSOs—particularly large and prominent organizations that are members of the Confederation of Sudanese CSOs (CSCSOs)—to ease up on their efforts to strengthen and protect CSOs in Sudan.

Two new draft laws threatened further to constrain the legal environment for CSOs. In 2015, a draft national law was leaked that appears to be much more restrictive than previous laws and seeks greater control over national CSOs. For example, national CSOs will be required to sign technical agreements with HAC for every project they intend to implement and to work with partners identified by HAC at the state level. This second provision is part of a new trend in 2015 in which the government is requiring national and international CSOs to work with local partners as a condition for obtaining mandatory work permits, particularly in states outside of Khartoum, where HAC’s grip is much stronger. A second new law under discussion in parliament aims to combat corruption. It includes provisions that will allow the Anti-Corruption Commission to investigate foreign funding for CSOs—a provision that can be used to undermine the credibility of an organization’s leadership, even if legal action is not warranted.

CSOs are exempted from taxes by law, but lengthy and complicated procedures and contradictions among ministry-level regulations effectively deter CSOs from obtaining exemptions. Among the few exceptions to this general rule are CSOs working in health-related fields, which can import drugs and medical equipment on a tax-exempt basis relatively easily.

While the Voluntary Organizations Law makes no clear reference to earned income, most CSOs avoid income-generating activities for fear that the authorities will view such pursuits as illegal. Exceptions include some Islamist organizations, such as Al Bir Charity, which invests in the profit-making Al Qabas schools operating in almost all large towns, and government-initiated or -supported organizations (GNGOs), such as Sanad, which is headed by the president’s wife and engages in healthcare and education.

Generally, there is increasing awareness among CSOs of their legal rights and the procedures for pursuing them. However, CSOs’ legal capacity remains weak, especially among smaller organizations and those working on the state level. Very few organizations have permanent legal advisors. A few lawyers work with CSOs on human rights issues and defend them in court, for the most part on a volunteer basis.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 5.3**

Community-based organizations (CBOs) working at the village level have good relations with their constituents, especially since local residents formed many of these organizations to fill gaps in service provision. At the national level, government restrictions and the focus of larger CSOs on national issues hamper constituency building. However, in communities where national CSOs have operated continuously for some time, CSOs are making progress in building relationships with local and tribal constituents, who offer them some protection from government harassment.
Many CSOs, especially larger and urban-based organizations, understand the need for strategic planning and have well-crafted plans along with mission and vision statements. But implementation remains a challenge, especially as the political and funding environment is not conducive to long-term planning. On the local level, CBOs rarely engage in strategic planning but nevertheless continue to develop as organizations, especially if they collaborate with national and international CSOs and United Nations agencies, which provide them with training and tools. Some CBOs have introduced more modern management techniques, such as monitoring and evaluation systems and the use of spreadsheets for accounting. Area-based and tribal associations are generally weak, and local politicians and tribal leaders use many of them for their own ends.

Awareness of the value of good governance and management practices is high, but fear of exposure often prevents CSOs from adopting stringent transparency measures, such as public debate of financial reports or their publication on websites. Although the use of technology in management is expanding, a culture of verbal communication still dominates and there is little documentation of processes, knowledge, and lessons learned. Increasingly CSOs address organizational differences by spinning off parts of their organizations. This practice, likely learned from political parties, has been encouraged by donors that fund the formation of youth organizations splintered off from established CSOs. These donor-formed youth organizations lose the opportunity to benefit from the strengths of the older generation in existing organizations and as a result tend to be short lived. In contrast, spontaneous, unregistered youth organizations are emerging in larger towns and have proved very effective at generating resources and addressing problems. Examples include Shari Al Hawadith, Sadaqat, and Sunna’ Al Hayat.

The most successful CSOs have effective full-time executive bodies composed of at least an executive director and a financial manager. However, these organizations amount to no more than 5 percent of all organizations. Among other CSOs, staff is employed for a particular project, and the vast majority of organizations depend on volunteers.

Most CSOs have basic office equipment, including computers, printers, and mobile phones. However, their progress in acquiring new technology has slowed in recent years, mainly because donors have become less generous in funding equipment. In addition, the government prohibits the use of certain communications technologies, and a U.S. embargo on Sudan deprived CSOs of needed personal communications hardware and software until the embargo was partially lifted in 2015. Some CSOs are reluctant to possess expensive equipment for fear it will be confiscated by the authorities.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 6.0**

Most CSOs are heavily dependent on foreign donors, and the ongoing decline in foreign funding continued in 2015. Since donors regard Sudan as a crisis zone, humanitarian assistance is the most common area for funding. Thus service-delivery organizations are financially more sustainable than advocacy organizations. CSOs’ heavy dependence on foreign donors sometimes shifts their priorities away from local needs. For example, in November 2015, the European Commission made work with transitory migrants in east Sudan a focus of CSO funding. The 2014 withdrawal of some international CSOs continued to have a negative impact on Sudan’s CSOs, as local organizations are not allowed to receive money from any organization that is not registered in Sudan.

In general, local financial support for CSOs is very limited in Sudan. Some unregistered service-delivery groups rely on charities and individual donations for support. In addition, a few businesses, such as DAL Food Industries, have started to fund CSO activities, and wealthy telecommunication companies invest heavily in areas that provide opportunities for advertising, such as sports and music. Otherwise, except for the Haggar Foundation, no private philanthropic institution in Sudan supports CSOs in a sustained manner.
Some pro-government organizations receive grants from the government, the Zakat Chamber, or private-sector entities, which act on recommendations from the government.

Most CSOs find traditional methods of fundraising, such as exhibitions and music festivals, less productive than in the past, mainly because of the population's increasing poverty and the availability of alternative sources of entertainment such as television. Additional deterrents to fundraising are the costs of licenses and locality and state taxes. Most CSOs refrain from income-generating activities for fear that the authorities will view such activities as illegal.

However, this is not the case with GNGOs, some of which are allowed to engage in a range of profitable activities. Several GNGOs, such as Sanad, Al Shaheed, and Al Zubeir, have established commercial businesses or companies that produce profits to supplement their easily accessed direct government funding. Among Islamic organizations, Al Qabas commercial private schools are one of the large investments of the Al Bir charity.

Although most CSOs have internal financial management systems and are subject to annual auditing, the political environment hinders full transparency in financial matters. CSOs practice a high level of internal accountability and transparency at their general assembly meetings and through their constitutions and by-laws, which define their work and relationships. However, for protection most CSOs do not publish financial information on their websites. In 2015, there was no known case of the authorities freezing CSO bank accounts, as happened in previous years.

**ADVOCACY: 5.1**

CSO advocacy in Sudan is difficult for a variety of reasons. Not only do CSOs have weak advocacy skills, but they are prevented from engaging with the public to influence attitudes or impart knowledge, especially as the media is controlled and censored by the government. In addition, CSOs operate in an undeclared state of emergency as NISS maintains the right to stop any activity, organization, or person.

Communications between CSOs and the government vary considerably. At the federal level, communication on policy issues is non-existent, and CSOs engage with ministries mostly on technical issues, such as the acquisition of permits. At the state and local levels, their engagement is deeper and projects are sometimes implemented jointly. For example, CSOs may work with local government on projects in water, education, or agriculture, which helps build confidence and increase cooperation between CSOs and government technical staff and sometimes even political decision makers. Nevertheless, these relationships cannot be described as partnerships.

The most important advocacy campaigns in 2015 concerned the national dialogue and democratic transformation. In May 2015, CSCSOs organized a nationwide consultation to identify regional problems, development goals, and priority areas that the dialogue should address. More than 250 organizations took part in the consultation and afterwards presented a statement to a meeting of a parliamentary committee and at a panel organized by the National Endowment for Democracy in Washington, D.C. CSOs refused to join the national dialogue unless specific conditions were met, such as the inclusion of all political parties, armed groups, and regional representation; the repeal or freezing of all restrictive laws to allow for free dialogue; and the release of political detainees. As these conditions were not met, no independent CSOs joined the dialogue when it started in October 2015. In a further step, the Civil Society Initiative (Al Muba dara), a coalition of CSOs, formed to support the Sudan Call and further the country’s democratic transformation. Although the impact of the network has yet to be seen, it is gradually engaging in peace talks mediated by the African Union. This is the first time that a civil society group has acted as a partner in the political settlement process.
In addition, some “non-political” initiatives enjoyed immediate success. For example, when CSOs launched a campaign to enforce the right of blind law graduates to be employed by the Ministry of Justice, the ministry agreed to comply with their demands.

The culture of lobbying is undeveloped in Sudan. It is hampered mainly by the one party-state, which controls both the legislative and executive bodies. In addition, state control of the media and competition among some CSO leaders undermines solidarity and joint projects. In 2015, CSOs made some effort to pursue legal reform on the national level, mainly by targeting security laws, print and press laws, and laws against women.

CSOs have been stalled in their challenge to the 2006 Voluntary Organizations Law. Their suit was accepted by the Constitutional Court in 2006 but has never come to a ruling.

### SERVICE PROVISION: 5.2

Services provided by CSOs are quite diverse and usually address needs in essential areas such as health, education, water, and the environment. Many services provided by CSOs are seasonal in nature or shaped by the availability of funding and donors’ priorities. Many international donations to Sudan are for humanitarian aid to conflict areas (Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile states), where service provision includes relief operations for internally displaced persons (IDPs), emergency supplies of water, health and educational projects, and peace building. Most GNGOs work in service delivery.

At the local level, beneficiaries and local authorities generally appreciate CSO services. In most cases CSOs deliver services in collaboration with local government institutions. The authorities usually reserve the right to decide the locations and target groups for service delivery. Although not prohibited by law, NISS and HAC usually prevent CSOs from combining service delivery with work on issues of governance or accountability, which the government views as against its interests. This is especially true of the Environmentalist Society operating in Blue Nile, Kordofan, and Darfur states. In South Darfur state, HAC sent written instructions to all CSOs to focus on relief and service delivery and not to engage in any awareness-raising or mobilization work.

A few CSOs carry out needs assessments or baseline surveys to determine constituents’ needs. However, they are often not considered necessary, as projects are based on donors’ calls for proposals or government directives and in most cases the assumption is that communities need almost anything they can get. In addition, politics and tribalism interfere in determining locations and target groups for service delivery in many states, so that responses to survey results or actual needs are not always possible.

With the exception of organizations for persons with special needs and a few active trade unions, most CSOs provide services to target groups rather than their members. Materials, workshops, and training opportunities are shared with other CSOs and wider groups, including government staff. Except for some larger CSOs that hire expert consultants, CSOs’ relationship with academia is limited.

Most CSOs provide services free of charge, either because the recipients are poor, the donors so require, or organizations fear that the authorities will view any fees as illegal. Exceptionally, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), in collaboration with village CBOs, has set up accounts run by village committees to receive funds recovered from its programs and sustain ongoing interventions.

The federal government is discriminatory and selective in its support of CSOs. Those classified as pro-government are financially supported and provided with space and media coverage. In conflict areas,
especially in Darfur, the government allows only pro-government organizations to engage in humanitarian work.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.3**

A lack of resources, the worsening legal environment, the reluctance of donors to support institutional capacity building, and the geography of the country all helped to impoverish the infrastructural capacity of CSOs in 2015.

There are few resource centers in Khartoum that publish materials or provide training to CSOs. Larger CSOs such as the National Civic Forum maintain strong links with resource centers abroad, and some of these organizations pass on the information they receive to other CSOs free of charge.

There are no local grant-making organizations as such. Some CSOs re-grant donor funding to partner CSOs or CBOs, which are located mainly in the states. For example, the Sudan Development Initiative (SUDIA), which is implementing a household livelihood support program in Darfur funded by the World Bank, re-grants funding repaid by its first beneficiaries to other new beneficiaries. A few businesses, such as DAL Food Industries, provide support to service-providing CSOs as part of their corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs. Other CSR programs include those of Haggar Foundation, which supports several educational and women’s development programs run by CSOs, and of CTC Group, which helps CSOs construct schools in rural Sennar state and provide livelihood programs to flood-affected populations.

The most effective CSO coalitions are formed to pursue specific objectives and then cease to operate soon after their goals are achieved. Some specialized networks on topics such as the environment, human rights, or HIV/AIDS are formed at donors’ urging. These networks usually become independent organizations but subsequently grow less effective at conducting campaigns or achieving results, mainly because they do not arise from a shared conviction or need and instead, their member organizations often compete against each other for resources and visibility. In addition, NISS and HAC sometimes single out CSOs for interrogation and detention to cultivate differences among organizations. However, because they have come under pressure, human right groups have recently started to strengthen cooperation, particularly during common efforts such as the Universal Peer Review process.

Most coalitions, including CSCSOs, Darfur Advocates Association, the Committee for Solidarity with the Martyrs, Wounded, and Detainees of the September Intifada, and Sudanese Journalists Network, are not registered or recognized by the state, which can limit their effectiveness and ability to use the media or press legal claims. Information sharing usually takes place horizontally among larger organizations. Many CSOs now also benefit from the Internet as an information source. Generally, research on civil society is weak and does not seem to be a high priority for either donors or CSOs.

As resources have decreased and funding has shifted to humanitarian assistance, most larger CSOs that provided training, such as the Al Khatim Adlan Center, have been dissolved. Other organizations reduced their training programs in the face registration problems, as was the case with the Regional CSO Capacity Development Center and SORD. In 2015, opportunities for training declined a great deal in comparison to the previous year. Most training that was still available from CSO providers and private consultancy firms was short term. Training opportunities outside of Khartoum are scarce and of poor quality. Training tools are often foreign sourced and not adapted locally. Online training is rare.

CSOs sometimes enjoy cooperation and temporary partnerships with state government ministries in different sectors. For example, the Sudanese Development Call Organization (NIDAA) provides school maintenance and meals in collaboration with state ministries of education. In most cases partnerships at a state level are
imposed by HAC. NGOs work with the government in most relief operations. The private sector has no ongoing partnerships with independent CSOs, as it fears that contact with them could worsen its relationships with the government. However, some businesses donate to CSOs during emergencies and for humanitarian interventions. CSOs’ relationships with the media depend on personal rather than institutional linkages.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 5.2**

CSOs generally seek to maintain a low profile to avoid negative attention from the government. Media coverage of CSOs varies between Khartoum and other states. In Khartoum coverage can be broad and CSOs sometimes pay for it. Independent newspapers usually provide the most positive coverage, while government-controlled media reflect a negative picture of CSOs or ignore their achievements altogether. Outside of Khartoum, the media sometimes covers CSOs’ activities, but their focus is usually on participating government officials, who may take the credit for service delivery.

Government perceptions of CSOs are predominantly negative at the federal level. In contrast, at the local level the official attitude is generally positive, especially towards service-providing organizations. However, all organizations providing social services are neutralized and controlled, while those working on rights, good governance, and democratic transformation are mostly classified as anti-government and treated as such.

In Khartoum the public view of CSOs is influenced by the government-controlled media and is generally negative. The closure or freezing of the activities of several CSOs has damaged CSOs’ image, as they are now seen as inactive. In addition, the public is receptive to the government’s media messages that CSOs are agents of foreign powers. However, in the states and especially in rural areas where CSOs provide much-needed services, the public widely recognizes CSOs’ role and expresses its appreciation through in-kind contributions and the protection of CSOs against attacks by the authorities. CSOs’ links with the business community are very limited and are hindered by the government’s negative attitudes. Some businesses donate to CSOs during emergencies and for humanitarian interventions but not on a regular basis.

Journalists are actively engaged in CSO activities, and the Sudanese Journalists Network takes part in several independent coalitions. However, at the editorial level, most newspapers are controlled by NISS and subject to censorship. Since independent CSOs are not allowed to conduct their work freely, they find it difficult to organize public-relations activities or obtain funding for this purpose. CSOs use social media to communicate and share information with each other, but Sudan’s 60-percent illiteracy rate, coupled with the security hazards of freely expressing views, discourage CSOs from using social media more broadly.

In accordance with the law, CSOs submit annual activity reports and audited financial statements to their general assemblies and the authorities. Over the last two decades, CSOs have made three attempts to introduce a sector-wide code of ethics. These efforts have failed for various reasons, among them CSOs’ desire to avoid feeling controlled, personality issues, lack of adherence to ethical standards, and the intermittent nature of such attempts.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Sudan

CSO Sustainability

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sustainability</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>Sudan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evolving</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impeded</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Legal Environment
Public Image
Organizational Capacity
Infrastructure
Service Provision
Advocacy
Financial Viability
The year 2015 was marked by two important events in Tanzania. First, on April 2 the National Electoral Commission (NEC) indefinitely postponed a referendum on a highly controversial, people-centered draft constitution, which included provisions for the separation of powers and greater accountability from elected officials. The commission blamed the postponement on alleged delays in voter registration. Some members of the opposition felt that the voter registration process was unduly rushed, leaving little time to educate the public about the draft constitution. Four main opposition parties withdrew from discussions of the draft when it came up in parliament, claiming that the most useful provisions proposed by the Constitution Review Commission had been removed during the Constituent Assembly in 2014. Among these provisions was a clause that gave the public the power to remove elected leaders from their positions if they did not implement the priorities expressed during their campaigns.

Second, general elections for the president, members of parliament, and ward councilors took place on October 25. The ruling party’s candidate, John Pombe Magufuli, was elected president. However, the
Zanzibar election results were declared invalid and nullified by the Zanzibar Electoral Commission, despite reports from all observers that the elections there had been free and fair. Many CSOs engaged in election observation activities. But in contrast to previous general elections, in 2015 the NEC required CSOs to request permission before offering civic education during the period leading up to the vote. Although permission was usually granted, organizations that had included civic education in their missions at the time of registration had to undergo this process, and they therefore viewed it as an unnecessary impediment.

In mid-2015, the parliament enacted three new laws—the Cybercrime Act, Statistics Act, and Whistleblower and Witness Protection Act—under certificates of urgency, which limited the period for public and parliamentary comment on the bills. The speed with which the government pushed these bills through parliament was widely criticized by various stakeholders. In addition, some observers expressed concerns that the Cybercrime Act and Statistics Act would limit freedom of expression.

During the year the economy grew at a rate of 7.9 percent. But inflation was high and the Tanzanian shilling depreciated more than 20 percent against the U.S. dollar. Foreign aid to the country decreased at the same time that the cost of imports rose. These trends contributed to an increased cost of living and led to cutbacks in CSO services. In a significant shift, many CSOs redirected their activities from service provision to advocacy projects in response to donors’ priorities.

In 2015 1,450 new CSOs were registered, bringing the total to 22,055 registered organizations. Most CSOs are registered in cities but implement projects and programs in rural areas.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.5**

Although there were no major changes in the laws governing CSOs in Tanzania, overall the legal environment for CSOs worsened in 2015, mainly because of the passage of new laws that threaten to undermine civil society.

CSOs continued to register under various acts as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), societies, cooperative societies, companies, trusts, or other types of organizations. NGOs must register with the Ministry of Community Development, Gender, and Children, while trusts register with the Registration, Insolvency, and Trusteeship Agency (RITA). Other types of organizations register with relevant ministries and government agencies. In 2014 the government devolved the registration of NGOs to district community development offices, which helped speed up the registration process. The government also improved the process for online registration by facilitating access to registration forms through social media platforms such as Facebook. In Zanzibar the duties of the registrar of societies were redefined, and with fewer responsibilities that office was able to deal with CSO registration and other matters more quickly.

The final authority for the dissolution of a CSO rests with the agency or ministry under which it is registered. No domestic organization underwent compulsory deregistration in 2015, although a few organizations requested voluntary dissolution. Twenty-four international CSOs, including Dan Church Aid and the World Society for the Protection of Animals, were deregistered on the grounds that they had not complied with the NGO Act No. 24 of 2002. Their deregistration was a new development, because although the NGO Act requires, for example, the submission of annual reports, not many CSOs comply with the law’s requirements and the government had never before taken action.
In 2015 three new laws—the Cybercrime Act, Statistics Act, and Whistleblower and Witness Protection Act—were passed by the parliament under certificates of urgency, which limited the period in which the public and members of the parliament could offer comments on the bills. The speed with which the government pushed these bills through the parliament was widely criticized by various stakeholders, including the media, CSOs, and some legislators. CSOs generally believe that the Cybercrime Act limits freedom of expression and access to information by opening the door to punishing individuals who are the recipients of information even if they did not request it. CSOs and journalists believe the Statistics Act similarly undermines freedom of expression by requiring researchers to allow the government to review any information that they plan to make public. Several other incidents suggested that a general effort to curtail CSOs’ freedom of expression was underway. During the general elections the Association of NGOs of Zanzibar (ANGOZA) conducted civic education programs using a film on political tolerance from Ghana. Although ANGOZA had followed all necessary procedures for obtaining approval to show the film, including submitting it to government censors, the government ordered the organization to stop screenings. In addition, staff members from the Legal and Human Rights Center (LHRC) accredited as local election observers were arrested without explanation and their election monitoring equipment was confiscated. In Zanzibar a local radio was suspended after announcing the general election results, and in Kondoa Sikika a local CSO was forced to close down its project after releasing the results of the public expenditure tracking system, which exposed corruption in the local government. The government also claimed that CSOs working on land issues in Loliondo were inciting communities against investors and issued verbal warnings for them to stop.

Grants and endowments are not taxed. Revenues earned from the provision of goods and services are taxed unless CSOs apply for tax exemptions. The process of applying for exemptions is long, bureaucratic, and time consuming. International organizations sometimes have long-term agreements that allow exemptions on goods brought into the country. Faith-based organizations (FBOs) enjoy automatic tax exemptions. CSOs that deliver services such as medication, food, and donations to children do not pay value-added tax.

CSOs are legally allowed to compete for government contracts at the central and local levels but find it difficult to access information about tenders. The tendering process sometimes involves requirements that CSOs are unable to fulfill.

The Ministry of Community Development, Gender, and Children has lawyers on its staff who can assist CSOs with legal issues. Professional lawyers employed by LHRC, Tanzania Women Lawyers Association (TAWLA), Women’s Legal Aid Center (WLAC), and Women in Law and Development in Africa (WiLDAF) Tanzania also provide legal advice and education to CSOs.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.3**

Constituency building in the sense of influencing public opinion and motivating people to take collective action decreased among grassroots CSOs in 2015 because of the decline in their funding from donors. Better-funded national organizations generally had sufficient resources to retain more vibrant relationships with their constituencies.

Most large and mid-sized organizations have strategic plans with defined visions and mission statements, while the majority of smaller organizations do not have these tools because they are still formalizing their operations. In 2015, the Foundation for Civil Society (FCS) facilitated the development of strategic plans and vision and mission statements at ninety-five local organizations. However, most of these organizations were unable to implement their plans because they lacked sufficient funding to do so.
Many CSOs, especially at the regional and grassroots levels, lack internal policies as well as human resource and financial management manuals. Organizations that have such policies often find adhering to them a challenge. For example, many Tanzanian CSOs still exhibit founder’s syndrome, with founders dominating decision making and thereby limiting adherence to organizational policies and curtailing organizational growth. Most CSOs have boards of directors, since they are a requirement for registration, and the majority of large and mid-sized CSOs have governing bodies with clearly defined structures, roles and responsibilities. However, boards often are not functional or are poorly constituted, with board members who lack the skills to provide guidance or hold management accountable. In many cases, board members are simply friends and relatives of other members of the board.

Many CSOs found it difficult to retain permanent staff in 2015, largely because of unstable projects, non-compliance with human resource policies, and changing funding levels, all of which affected salaries and other benefits. This situation led to high staff turnover, even at larger organizations. On the other hand, most organizations continued to be helped by volunteers, who often hope that with time they will be offered jobs. The rate of volunteerism rose during the elections, when many volunteers took part in election monitoring. CSOs continued to act as a training ground for recent university graduates and interns, which has prompted the government similarly to look at recent universities graduates for potential recruitment.

Tanzania has recently experienced a rapid growth in the use of communications technology, and national and most regional CSOs have access to modern equipment. A growing number of organizations use websites, email, blogs, Facebook, and Twitter to share information with their constituencies. Smaller and rural CSOs often do not have computers or cameras. Even if they can afford such equipment, they still must deal with the challenge of insufficient electricity supplies in rural areas.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 4.9**

Most Tanzanian CSOs are dependent on foreign aid. In 2015 some CSOs continued to experience a decrease in aid, largely because of shrinking foreign aid budgets and increased competition between international and domestic organizations. In addition, international organizations such as Restless Development and Right to Play International are now implementing projects directly in local communities rather than partnering with domestic organizations. Among the international organizations that continued to offer funding to domestic organizations in 2015 were UN Women, which awarded grants for women’s empowerment, and Norwegian Church Aid, which provided ongoing support to FBO partners working in governance, economic empowerment, gender, and climate change. Finally, in 2015 agreements that FCS had with donors to re-grant funds expired and were not immediately renewed, as FCS was still developing a new strategic plan. As a result, FCS distributed significantly less money during the year, and the number of CSOs receiving grants decreased from 350 in 2014 to 125.

Changing donor priorities and declining donor support limited the diversification of funding for most CSOs. Nevertheless, capacity-building training in 2015 helped some organizations diversify their sources of income. For example, New Youth Fashion Tanzania, a local organization in Sikonge district in Tabora, Nyakitonto Youth for Development Tanzania in Kigoma, and Agape AIDS Control Program in Shinyanga were able to secure funds from new donors, including Planning International, Equip Tanzania, and Board of World Mission.

Although domestic sources of funding continued to be minimal in 2015, some CSOs were able to secure local funds. For examples, six community-based organizations (CBOs) in Ileje district in Mbeya were able to access small grants of about $500 each from the local community development office for small business projects such as goat and poultry keeping and gardening. As savings and credit cooperative organizations and village community banks continued to help meet local needs, they increased local resource mobilization and
stimulated a sense of volunteerism among individuals and groups. Corporate and individual foundations and trusts are beginning to provide support in different forms, ranging from establishing libraries to donating bed sheets to health organizations, but they usually manage their own projects. In 2015 a wealthy local businessman provided loans to youth to implement entrepreneurship projects.

In recent years CSOs’ fundraising efforts have concentrated largely on proposal writing. However, many organizations now realize that this alone does not suffice and in 2015 took part in debates about the sustainability of the CSO sector. The first-ever forum on local philanthropy in Tanzania took place in September, with discussions focusing on funding diversification and opportunities for funding from local sources other than traditional donors. The private sector, charity walks, and fundraising lunches and dinners were all identified as possible new sources of funding, and a secretariat was established to stimulate the development of local philanthropy. This ongoing initiative will aim to strengthen the voice of philanthropy in national development, provide learning and exchange platforms for philanthropic organizations, and strengthen collaboration and innovation in philanthropy at the national level.

Some CSOs earn income by marketing products such as homemade goods and publications.

Other organizations have acquired land or constructed buildings to rent. Large and well-established CSOs, such as the Kilimanjaro Women Information Exchange and Consultancy Organization (KWIECO), National Networks of Farmers’ Groups in Tanzania (MVIWATA), and Tanzania Gender Networking Program (TGNP), have consultancy practices that generate income.

The quality of financial management systems continued to vary greatly in 2015. Most urban and national CSOs, trade unions, and more mature organizations have well-established financial management systems and employ the services of qualified certified accountants. They also publish audited annual financial statements. Small and rural CSOs, which are the majority of organizations, have weak financial management systems and internal controls and perform limited external audits. This deficiency is mostly attributable to their poor funding base, which limits their ability to employ qualified staff and hire external audit firms. Nevertheless, the registrar of societies in the Ministry of Community Development, Gender, and Children reported an increase in the number of organizations complying with requirements for audits in 2015.

ADVOCACY: 3.5

A significant shift from service delivery to advocacy is underway in the Tanzanian CSO sector. This change is due largely to donors’ new interest in human rights issues. Donors are increasingly less interested in financing service provision and instead are focusing on developing citizens’ ability to advocate for their rights. This shift is rooted partly in the belief that service provision alone is not sustainable and that other approaches, such as the empowerment of communities to demand services of the government, are also needed. This changing aid paradigm has pushed even the most traditional service providers, such as FBOs, to engage in mainstream advocacy, especially on natural resource issues, such as mining and gas. Most of the funds that FCS gave for advocacy projects in 2015 focused on the rights of people with disabilities and their needs during the elections, as well as women’s inclusion and participation in the election process.

In 2015, CSOs cooperated effectively with both national and local governments. Cooperation is easiest at the district, ward, and village levels, where CSO staff members are able to engage directly with local government officials. For example, local authorities sometimes use CSO staff as trainers on climate change, gender, agriculture, and other issues. In 2015, the health department in Magu district invited the organization UVUUMA from Mwanza to conduct trainings on entrepreneurship for eighteen groups of people living with HIV/AIDS.
National authorities are less willing than local governments to work with CSOs. Their interactions with CSOs tend to be more bureaucratic in nature and focus mainly on policy issues. For example, in 2015, several ministries consulted with CSOs and other stakeholders during a review of a reporting tool known as Police Form Number Three (PF3), which allows victims of violence to access hospital treatment. As a result of CSOs’ input, a new PF3 form was developed that requires medical practitioners to provide information related to sexual assault or gender-based violence for potential use in court. In Zanzibar CSOs helped draft a second strategy for growth and poverty reduction, known as MKUZA III, and took part in a review of the Zanzibar Youth Policy.

CSOs engaged in the 2015 electoral process in various ways. Some CSO practitioners participated in the elections directly by running for office. If they were not elected they often returned to their CSO positions, thereby undermining their effectiveness as civil society advocates because of their identification with political parties. CSOs such as the Tanzania Human Rights Defenders Coalition (THRD), TGNP, and organizations for people with disabilities issued manifestos during the elections to influence public opinion. A task force of people with disabilities developed a position paper outlining their needs during the act of voting, which was presented to the NEC, Zanzibar Election Committee, political parties, and media and helped ensure that voting stations had ballots available in Braille or special queues for people with disabilities. Unlike in previous general elections, most local CSOs did not engage in civic education, mainly because funding from the United Nation Development Program was not available for this purpose in 2015. However, in both mainland Tanzania and Zanzibar almost all CSOs that applied to NEC for permission to offer civic education were allowed to implement their programs with funding from FCS, Women Fund Tanzania, and Voluntary Service Oversees.

In 2015, some CSO groups worked together on the constitutional process. The Media Council of Tanzania (MCT) spoke out against the newly enacted laws, while the Mwalimu Nyerere Foundation pressed for national unity, and farmers associations championed farmers’ rights. Women Dignity, Tanzania Media Women’s Association (TAMWA), and Wanawake na Maendeleo (WAMA) advocated against teenage and child marriage. Other issue-based coalitions active in 2015 included religious groups promoting peace during the constitutional review and general elections and the Child Dignity Forum, which advocated for the rights of children. These groups all faced the general challenge of acquiring mass popular support from a public that was divided politically and prioritized issues differently than civil society.

CSOs continued to lobby for various legal reforms in 2015. In particular, when the long-awaited Right to Information Bill, which had been pending for more than five years, was taken to the parliament on a certificate of urgency, this move was sharply criticized by CSOs and opposition political parties, because the government had not consulted with stakeholders before re-tabling the bill. Their criticism prompted the government to drop the certificate of urgency and allow the draft law to be made public so that CSOs and other groups could provide inputs. The bill is expected to be presented to the parliament in 2016. CSOs also protested the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Statistics Act, and Whistleblower and Witness Protection Act under certificates of urgency, but their criticism had little effect.

CSOs have long believed that aspects of the NGO Act limit their freedoms. For example, Section 29 of the act requires CSOs to submit narrative and financial reports, and organizations are threatened with deregistration if they do not comply. THRD has undertaken a legal analysis of laws that limit CSOs’ freedom and is expected to publish a report on the topic in 2016. In Zanzibar CSOs participated in the reform of the Zanzibar CSO Act and requested successfully that the registrar be responsible for registering NGOs and companies only.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.4**

In 2015, service provision remained largely unchanged. Despite the fact that the decline in funding resulted in some reduced service provision, many CSOs continued to provide services in areas such as education, training, health care, and economic development. In Zanzibar, for example, the Zanzibar Outreach Program, which engages largely in the provision of health service and education, offered mobile health services in
various locations. WLAC offered free legal aid on women and children’s issues through a countrywide network of paralegals, and TAMWA provided assistance to victims of gender-based violence through the Crisis Resolve Center (CRC). At the same time, the changing aid paradigm shifted the focus for many CSOs from direct service provision to rights-based approaches, and some organizations concentrated on building the capacity of local communities to press for their right to receive services in such areas as health and education. CSOs also provided disaster relief. For example, the Christian Council of Tanzania supported victims of a storm that killed at least thirty-eight people and injured sixty others in Shinyanga in March 2015.

The goods and services that CSOs provide reflect community needs and priorities. Although the law allows CSOs to earn income to support their activities, in 2015 the majority of CSOs continued to provide goods and services free of charge, mainly because community members’ ability to pay is very limited. Larger CSOs continued to market their products and sell their publications at meetings and festivals. Some CSOs market services such as workshops to other CSOs as well as academia and churches.

In 2015, the government continued to recognize the contribution of CSOs and offered them various types of work and projects. The Zanzibar NGO Cluster for HIV/AIDS Prevention, Control, and Sustainable Development (ZANGOC) was commissioned by the Zanzibar AIDS Commission to conduct a study on the impact of HIV/AIDS at the community level, and Umoja wa Waweleshaji KIOO based in Kigoma received funds from the government to implement a project on social accountability monitoring. The Zanzibar Association of People Living with HIV/AIDS (ZAPHA+) was reported to have received funds from the Revolutionary Government of Zanzibar to implement a project on HIV/AIDS. CSOs sometimes receive training from local extension officers and work with community development officers to implement projects. There were a few allegations in 2015 that government officials reported services provided by CSOs as their own achievements and misappropriated resources intended for those services.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.2**

CSOs’ infrastructure remained unchanged from 2014. Several networks of resource centers continue to serve as sources of information, training, and technical assistance for Tanzania’s CSO communities. Some resource centers earn income from their services. For example, TGNP charges entry fees to users to access their well-stocked libraries.

Domestic funding mechanisms, particularly FCS, Legal Services Facility (LSF), and Women Fund Tanzania (WFT), continued to re-grant donor funds to Tanzanian CSOs in 2015. FCS grants focused on governance and accountability and amounted to approximately $1.8 million, a decrease of more than 50 percent over the 2014 budget. WFT disbursed grants to women-led organizations to raise awareness of the importance of participating in the general elections.

Regional- and district-based networks continued to offer information and capacity-building training to CSOs. TGNP, TAMWA, and LHRC strengthened CSO capacity in gender, women’s empowerment, and legal aid at the regional and district levels. The Coalition on Election Monitoring and Observation in Tanzania (CEMOT) offered one-stop shopping to CSOs for information and capacity building during the general elections, and the Tax Justice Group advocated for just and transparent tax regimes. Other informal alliances supporting CSOs included the Youth Climate Activists Network (YouthCan) and Tanzanian Civil Society Forum on Climate Change (Forum CC). Some organizations working in similar areas formed groups via
mailing lists and social network groups to further learning and communication. FCS facilitated a meeting of CSO chief executive officers to discuss the future of CSOs in the country.

During the year more than 1,080 organizations took part in trainings hosted by FCS, TGNP, KWIECO, and MVIWATA. These peer-learning interventions provided practical, experience-based solutions for improved organizational performance in areas such as conflict management, gender mainstreaming, financial management, and evidence-based advocacy. Most of these trainings were offered in Kiswahili, which allowed non-English-speaking staff from rural CSOs to take part.

CSOs and the government engaged in several partnerships in 2015. The Tanzania Chamber of Commerce and Trade started to work with CSOs on building awareness of trade opportunities in the East African Community. In addition, WILDAF signed a memorandum of understanding with various government entities to carry out joint campaigns against gender-based violence. CSOs also formed peace dialogue platforms with officials from district commissioners’ offices and the NEC to help maintain peace during the elections. ANGOZA reached an agreement with the Zanzibar Chamber of Commerce to allow CSOs to access its resource center for information on entrepreneurship, business, and social development. The relationships between the private sector and CSOs also grew in 2015. For example, the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation participated in the annual Civil Society Forum and discussed opportunities for implementing the Sustainable Development Goals.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 3.9**

CSOs and the media continued to cooperate in 2015. In addition to routine coverage of CSO activities, the media turns to CSOs for opinions on topical issues. They also offer CSOs free airtime, especially on special occasions such as the Day of the African Child and International Women’s Day. Radio spots by the organization Geha Habib and the live television show of the CSO Wanawake help spread information on gender-based violence. TAMWA, MCT, ANGOZA, and other organizations use the media for public engagement, and community-based media such as radio are growing more accessible, making it possible even for grassroots CSOs to use the media for program outreach. However, the payments demanded by journalists and the costs of airtime remain a common challenge, as they are beyond the ability of most CSOs to pay.

CSOs generally have a good reputation with the public, and communities are ready to support them even when their positions contradict those of the government. Service-delivery and economic-empowerment projects have especially strong community support. A few government officials and politicians have negative perceptions of CSOs. For example, during a debate over local land investment, the Minister for Natural Resources and Tourism stated that CSOs should engage in service delivery only and avoid advocacy work. The private sector appreciates the role of CSOs and participates in CSO-run workshops and meetings.

Despite their media successes in 2015, CSOs usually have limited communications strategies and staff. However, the growing use of social media by CSOs is evident. For example, organizations such as CEMOT, Tanzania Election Monitoring Committee (TEMCO), and Tanzania Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation (TACCEO) used social media extensively in 2015 to share information during the general elections.

CSOs at the national level usually publish annual reports with financial information and share them on their websites. Most rural and smaller organizations produce project-based reports as feedback to their donors. However, some rural CSOs still find it difficult to document, report, and disseminate the results of their work because of limited capacity and funding. The Ministry of Community Development, Gender, and Children
reported that in 2015 it received annual reports from the majority of CSOs. The capacity of the CSOs to comply with codes of ethics is also growing.
**UGANDA**

**Country Facts**
- **Capital:** Kampala
- **Government Type:** Republic
- **Population:** 37,101,745
- **GDP per capita (PPP):** $2,000
- **Human Development Index:** 163

Political life in Uganda in 2015 was focused largely on the general elections scheduled for 2016. The build-up to the elections was characterized by violence during party primaries, voter bribery, and incidences of brutality against members of the opposition. Citizens groups, CSOs, and opposition parties repeatedly called for free and fair elections, and through a consultative process they presented proposals for electoral reforms to the parliament. Unfortunately, none of the proposals, including a demand to restore presidential term limits, was incorporated into the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 2015 passed by parliament in April 2015.

Uganda’s economy continued to grow in 2015 but failed to generate new jobs. Eighty-three of every one hundred young people remained unemployed. The Uganda shilling weakened significantly against the U.S. dollar, which increased operating costs for CSOs. Funding for CSOs continued to dwindle and, as a result, the scope of their interventions narrowed. In addition, the donor community seemed unwilling to finance new projects until after the 2016 general elections.
The Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Registration (Amendment) Bill proposed in 2012 was dropped in 2015. In its place parliament passed a new NGO Bill, which, although it has potentially constraining provisions, includes most proposals made by CSOs and is viewed by many in the CSO sector as an improvement over previous drafts. The authorities continued to curtail the work of some CSOs through intimidation and arrests.

The NGO Board, which oversees CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs), does not have accurate statistics about the number of registered organizations. The board estimates that more than 13,000 CSOs are currently registered. This number does not include not-for-profit companies registered at the Uganda Registration Services Bureau (URSB). The exact number of unregistered CSOs is not known, but many such organizations exist at the grassroots level.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 5.2**

The legal environment for CSOs in Uganda witnessed mixed developments in 2015. CSOs continued to register as NGOs with the NGO Board. But as the registration process with the NGO Board can be protracted and abused, many groups register as not-for-profit companies with the Registrar of Companies at URSB, since it is an easier and more predictable process. Local NGOs and CBOs register with district administrations and local councils, which often delay issuing registration permits. Most groups seek legal status because it is a prerequisite for obtaining funding, opening bank accounts, and concluding contracts with professional staff.

In anticipation of the 2016 general elections, the government published a new Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Bill on April 10, with the goal of repealing the NGO law in effect at the time. The draft law ostensibly sought to provide legal and procedural guidelines for CSOs so they could contribute to national development in a harmonized and transparent manner. However, the bill also included ambiguous and repressive provisions that would curtail freedoms and shrink civic space. For example, the law required CSOs to undergo mandatory registration and re-registration through a laborious procedure that lacks safeguards, such as fixed timelines and clearly defined powers. The proposed law sent shock waves throughout the CSO community, and CSOs responded with a position paper demanding that most of the bill’s proposals be revised. In its final form, the NGO Bill 2015 addressed more than 80 percent of CSOs’ suggestions, although it still contains restrictive provisions, such as limits on permissible activities and places of operation. For example, the bill allows the NGO Bureau to refuse to register an organization if its objectives are regarded as contravening the country’s laws and prohibits any activity that has not been approved by the district NGO monitoring committee and local government in a memorandum of understanding. The president signed the NGO Bill 2015 into law in January 2016.

A number of organizations were targeted for possible dissolution in 2015. For example, the Great Lakes Institute for Strategic Studies (GLISS) was investigated on the ambiguous charge of “de-campaigning” government programs and recruiting “youth to join opposition political parties” through its Free and Fair Election campaign. After the minister of internal affairs wrote a letter of complaint about GLISS, the Registrar of Companies was asked to investigate the organization’s activities and take appropriate action, “including dissolution.” GLISS’s offices were searched and its directors interrogated in an investigation that was ongoing at the end of the year.
The police continued to use the Public Order Management Act to curtail the work of CSOs. For example, when the Uganda National NGO Forum launched the Citizen’s Manifesto 2016-2021, a document that outlines citizens’ expectations of their elected leaders, the police threatened to charge the organization with illegal assembly. Seven youth activists were also arrested in July for holding a press conference protesting the arrest of the former prime minister, who had declared his intention to run for president. Other activists who attempted to bond them out of police custody ended up in detention for “disobeying lawful orders” after they refused to leave the police station without their colleagues. These and other events intimidated CSOs, and many organizations exercised self-censorship to avoid government harassment in advance of the elections.

Although Uganda’s Anti-Homosexuality Law was withdrawn in 2015, CSOs working on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexual rights continued to operate with a low profile. The NGO Act 2016 is expected to further curtail their work, as it restricts organizations from engaging in activities that are prejudicial to “the security and laws of Uganda” or “the interests of Uganda and the dignity of Ugandans,” which are ambiguous terms that the government can interpret as prohibiting a broad range of conduct.

CSOs in Uganda are required to pay taxes such as pay-as-you-earn, value-added, local service, and import taxes. Organizations can occasionally obtain tax exemptions from the Uganda Revenue Authority. For example, both local and international CSOs can apply for exemptions from taxes on vehicles and machinery, and CSOs working in service delivery can claim exemption from value-added tax (VAT). In addition, Uganda’s Income Tax Act exempts an organization from paying income tax if it falls within the definition of an “exempt organization” (which basically covers all CSOs except for nonprofit companies) and has been issued a formal ruling to that effect from the Tax Commissioner. However, many local and grassroots CSOs lack information about tax exemptions and fail to apply for them. Not-for-profit companies established under the Companies Act do not qualify for tax exemptions.

The legal framework does not prohibit CSOs from competing for government contracts. However, all government procurement requests require copies of trading licenses, annual financial data, bid securities, and other documents that most CSOs are unable to provide. Thus, CSOs usually lose out on government contracts to for-profit companies. CSOs are not prohibited from engaging in profit-making activities.

There are several lawyers trained in CSO law in Kampala. However, their services can be difficult to obtain, as most lawyers view CSO cases as unprofitable and thus undesirable. Outside of Kampala there is a shortage of lawyers and CSOs often rely on legal-aid service providers. In 2015, Chapter Four Uganda, a local civil rights group, continued to provide legal support to CSOs and worked to develop a pool of civil-liberties lawyers.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 3.9**

CSOs’ organizational capacity deteriorated in 2015. This development was mainly due to a reduction in funding from donors. In addition, donors shifted a significant amount of funding to electoral reform in anticipation of the 2016 elections. Democratic Governance Facility, the largest basket fund for CSOs, supported election monitoring by the Citizens Election Observers Network (CEON), a consortium of fifteen CSOs, as well as the civic education projects of other organizations. At the same time, donor investment in capacity building for CSOs declined. For instance, the number of CSOs in the Support Program for Advocacy Networks (SPAN), supported by the Democratic Governance Facility, dropped from 212 in 2014 to 83 in 2015.

During the year CSOs in Uganda made great strides in building local support for their initiatives. In a bid to ensure transparency and integrity in the 2016 general elections, for example, CEON mobilized and trained...
election observers. Also in preparation for the elections, the Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform heard from more than 13,000 citizens in 225 consultations, which provided input into the Citizen’s Manifesto issued by the Uganda National NGO Forum. Through its Action 2015 campaign, the CSO Core Reference Group on SDGs was able to mobilize more than 3,200 citizens to raise their voices against poverty, inequality, and climate change in connection with the UN’s new sustainable development goals (SDGs).

Most CSOs have clearly defined missions and strategic plans, but many organizations struggled to implement them in 2015 because of funding shortfalls and problems with accountability and organizational capacity. As in the past, sub-national CSOs often responded to calls for proposals for projects that did not align with their strategic objectives.

While larger and established CSOs typically have clearly defined management structures, smaller CSOs often operate without them. Boards of directors of established CSOs usually approve organizational policies and convene annual general meetings to report on accomplishments and make plans for the coming year.

Because of the challenge of securing funding to cover staff costs, many CBOs and FBOs at the district and sub-county levels do not retain permanent staff or hire professional services. National CSOs usually provide staff contracts, job descriptions, and medical insurance. Although Uganda continues to grapple with high unemployment, staff turnover in the CSO sector continues to be common because of poor pay. In 2015, given the general financial constraints, a number of organizations had to scale down their staffing. Volunteerism in the sector remains high.

Many established CSOs have sufficient funding to purchase new computers, printers with scanners, photocopying machines, and Internet connections. Although CBOs and FBOs do not usually have the funding for similar equipment, larger CSOs generally have offices that are better equipped than those in the public sector. Most CSO employees use private cell phones to communicate, take photographs, and upload content to social media sites.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.0**

Overall, the financial viability of CSOs in Uganda did not change in 2015. CSOs continued to depend heavily on donor funding, and as the Ugandan shilling weakened against the U.S. dollar, the cost of CSO operations increased. In addition, some donors shifted their focus to the electoral process, leaving insufficient funds for CSOs working on other issues. As a result, many organizations had to reduce staffing and scale back activities. Smaller community-oriented CSOs continued to lose out to more established CSOs in applying for funding through basket funds, such as the Democratic Governance Facility and Civil Society Fund. Lastly, some donors were not willing to finance new projects in the period leading up to the 2016 general elections.

National-level CSOs have up to three donors supporting their management costs and specific projects. Smaller organizations lack the capacity to attract significant amounts of funding to ensure their sustainability, even in the short term. However, philanthropy is slowly taking root in Uganda and a number of corporate institutions have corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs that benefit CSOs. For instance, Standard Chartered Bank partnered with organizations such as GOAL, Reach a Hand, and SightSavers to raise adolescent girls’ awareness of HIV/AIDS and offer eye operations to vulnerable communities. MTN Uganda partnered with a number of institutions to organize the 2015 MTN marathon, whose proceeds went to improving health in Kampala public schools.

Ugandan CSOs continue to find ways to supplement their incomes with revenue-generating activities. Some umbrella groups and network organizations, including the Human Rights Network-Uganda (HURINET),
Legal Aid Service Providers’ Network (LASPNET), Development Network of Indigenous Voluntary Associations (DENIVA), and the Uganda National NGO Forum, raise funds through membership fees and rental income. However, such income typically amounts to only 2 to 5 percent of their overall operating budgets and thus is insufficient to sustain these organizations over the long term. Churches, mosques, and other religious organizations receive support from their congregations and followers. Other CSOs raise money through charitable events, such as walks, marathons, music concerts, sports days, and dinners. For example, 40 Days Over 40 Smiles, a local CSO, sponsored several sporting events to raise money for a children’s dormitory in 2015.

Although they recognize the need for financial accountability, the majority of CBOs do not conduct annual financial audits, maintain proper accounts, or produce annual reports because of funding constraints and poor understanding of proper financial management by staff. However, as larger CSOs are under pressure to demonstrate that they use resources in an efficient, accountable and transparent manner, they usually put internal controls into place and undergo independent audits.

**ADVOCACY: 3.4**

CSO advocacy efforts showed some improvement in 2015. At the national level, CSOs continued to work productively with policy makers on a number of issues. For instance, the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group (CSBAG) and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development convened joint quarterly press conferences and released reports tracking the national budget. In addition, Chapter Four Uganda, Uganda National NGO Forum, HURINET, and other CSOs worked effectively with the NGO Board, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Parliamentary Committee on Defense and Internal Affairs on the NGO Bill 2015. Their efforts led to a parliamentary committee report proposing favorable amendments to the original bill.

At the sub-national level, CSOs experienced growing tensions with local government officials. This development largely stemmed from the NGO Bill 2015, which calls for establishing district CSO monitoring committees chaired by resident district commissioners (RDCs), who represent the Office of the President at the district level. In anticipation of the implementation of the new law, some RDCs began to demand greater control over CSOs’ activities. Thanks to advocacy efforts by CSOs, the NGO Act 2016 stipulates that district chief administrative officers rather than RDCs will chair the committees.

In 2015, several key CSO coalitions focused on the electoral process leading up to the 2016 general elections. CEON continued to expose issues affecting the integrity of the electoral process; Alliance for Election Campaign Finance Monitoring (ACFIM) advocated for increased transparency in the financing of political parties and election campaigns; ActionAid Uganda and the Uganda National NGO Forum steered a No Vote Buying and Selling campaign; think tanks such as GLISS cooperated with politicians, mostly in the opposition, on the Free and Fair Election campaign; and the Citizen’s Coalition on Electoral Democracy in Uganda (CCEDU), an umbrella group of more than 600 CSOs, conducted the Votability and Topowa campaigns, which urged citizens to register and vote in the upcoming elections.

Other CSOs joined or supported issue-based coalitions or conducted broad-based advocacy campaigns in 2015. For example, the Black Monday Movement continued its fight against the theft of public resources; CSBAG led a campaign to reject amendments to the Public Finance Management Bill 2015; and the Uganda National NGO Forum coordinated the Action 2015 campaign to end poverty, inequality, and climate change.

In a significant victory, the Coalition to End Maternal Mortality in Uganda successfully challenged the refusal of the Constitutional Court to hear cases about maternal healthcare. In 2011, the families of two pregnant women who had died in childbirth joined the Center for Health, Human Rights, and Development
(CEHURD) to file suit against the attorney general, arguing that the failure to provide maternal health services violated the constitution. In 2015 the Supreme Court ruled that in fact the Constitutional Court has the jurisdiction to hear cases on the violation of maternal health rights. This was a landmark ruling that will buttress CSOs’ efforts to fight maternal mortality in Uganda.

Another important achievement was the November 9 launch of the Citizen’s Manifesto 2016-2021 by the Uganda Governance Monitoring Platform, a coalition of CSOs united in a quest for good governance. The platform conducted more than 225 consultations at the sub-national level and used them develop the manifesto, which proposes a national vision that includes increased accountability from public officials. More than 1,000 CSO representatives, government officials, journalists, and others attended the launch, which achieved remarkably broad outreach for a policy initiative.

In lobbying efforts, CCEDU worked with legislators to draft the Electoral Reform Bill. Although no CSO proposal on electoral reform was incorporated into the Constitution (Amendment) Bill, the process for gathering the reform recommendations brought together political parties and civil society in an unprecedented partnership. The Uganda Debt Network, Anti-Corruption Coalition Uganda (ACCU), and other CSOs were instrumental in the passage of the Anti-Corruption Amendment Act 2013 in July 2015, which gives binding powers to the government to confiscate the assets of officials convicted of corruption.

Overall, CSOs at both the national and district levels exhibited improved awareness of the importance of a favorable regulatory legal framework. CSOs across the country responded quickly to the publication of NGO Bill 2015. Their activities included interviews at a public parliamentary hearing on June 25, submission of written memoranda to the parliamentary committee, sponsorship of district dialogues on the bill, and, under the auspices of the Uganda National NGO Forum, release of a position paper calling for revision of the bill’s more ambiguous and repressive provisions. CSOs’ coordinated push led to a parliamentary report that took their views into account, and the final act as passed did not include the provisions that would have made the operating environment for CSOs nearly intolerable.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.5**

In 2015, the performance of Ugandan CSOs in service provision did not change significantly. CSOs continued to face increased demand for their services in health, legal aid, human rights, good governance, education, economic empowerment, environmental protection, sanitation, and community radio stations. However, geographic constraints such as mountainous terrain hindered the delivery of services in rural and semi-urban communities. Service provision by the Inter-Religious Council of Uganda (IRCU) continued to be affected by donors’ cuts to its funding in 2014 in part because of the IRCU’s anti-homosexual stance.

CSO projects are largely reflective of the needs and priorities of the communities they serve. For instance, Spark Microgrants facilitated meetings with rural communities in Eastern Uganda to help them identify problems, such as the lack of pit latrines and clean water, and then offered funding to correct these deficiencies. LASPNET legal-aid service providers offered free services to incarcerated indigents. District networks of CSOs continued to convene community dialogues and focus group discussions with youth, women, the elderly, and other groups to generate priorities for district budgets.

During the year CSOs continued to conduct workshops, trainings, and sensitizations for a wider audience than their immediate constituencies. For example, the Uganda Law Society enrolled more than 350 lawyers in its Pro-Bono project to provide free legal services to underprivileged and marginalized groups. Other organizations disseminated public-interest publications, such as the National Development Plan II and Citizens’ Survey on Uganda Vision 2040.
Most CSOs provide goods and services free of charge. A few CSOs, including the Uganda Association of Women Lawyers (FIDA), which offers legal services, and the Human Rights Network, which conducts trainings on board development and strategic planning, charge modest fees for their services.

The government generally recognizes the value of CSOs working in areas that do not involve criticism of its performance on human rights and accountability. For example, the Ministry of Finance asked the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group to monitor its performance on the national budget. Local governments also offer support to service-providing CSOs. For instance, in 2015, local governments made land available for the construction of shelters for domestic violence victims and offered office space for justice centers to operate legal aid clinics.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.4**

Overall, the infrastructure supporting CSOs improved in 2015. This improvement was due to increased online information sharing within the sector, the establishment of resource centers by a number of organizations, and increased collaborations by CSOs, as seen in collective advocacy initiatives and other joint activities.

The Uganda National NGO Forum is the major resource center serving CSOs across the country. In 2015, the forum offered capacity-building support and widely distributed information on various policy issues, including the post-2015 development process, NGO Bill 2015, Retirement Benefits Liberalization Sector Bill, and Black Monday campaign. Other key organizations offering resource support to CSOs include Chapter Four Uganda, African Center for Media Excellence (ACME), Forum Women in Democracy (FOWODE), Human Rights Center Uganda (HRCU), and Kabarole Research and Resource Center (KRC).

Uganda has few local grantmaking organizations. However, international organizations such as World Vision, Oxfam International, and ActionAid Uganda continued to sub-grant to local organizations in 2015. In addition, national-level organizations often re-grant funding to sub-national organizations for advocacy and service-delivery activities. For example, in 2015, SPAN provided support to six grassroots organizations to build a civic agency to identify development issues and engage with leaders for better accountability and transparency. Some umbrella groups and network organizations, including HURINET, LASPNET, DENIVA, and Uganda National NGO Forum, also act as local sources of funding for member organizations.

CSO coalitions are increasingly viewed as critical to civil society’s ability to play an advocacy role. Coalitions are also instrumental in sharing information and enhancing cooperation within the sector. However, the positions of CSO coalitions are usually formulated by organizations that can afford to attend their meetings, thus ultimately excluding the views of grassroots organizations. Some of the most influential coalitions include CSBAG, CCEDU, ACCU, and Health Advocacy Coalition. Significant meetings organized by these coalitions in 2015 included the Annual National Anti-Corruption Convention and the National CSO Consultative Budget Dialogues. The Uganda National NGO Forum continued to play its convening role and champion the cause of CSOs in various contexts.

In 2015, SPAN trained 628 CSOs in board leadership, networking and collaboration, women’s empowerment, oversight, and human rights. Local CSO trainers continue to offer workshops on project planning and management, networking, proposal writing, monitoring and evaluation, fundraising, social enterprises, and the use of new media. However, since most training events take place in Kampala, Entebbe, and Jinja districts, the staff of local organizations cannot usually afford to attend. CSO sustainability is an area that has not been adequately covered in trainings.
There was a general increase in awareness of the benefits of intersectoral partnerships in 2015. For example, a national children’s helpline was set up in September thanks to a partnership between the government, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD), and Plan International, with support from UNICEF Uganda. The helpline center is one of the few in Africa and receives an average of 700 calls each day on its toll-free number. UNICEF Uganda also hosted a dialogue between CSOs and the private sector on how businesses can support Ugandan children. CCEDU partnered with the Electoral Commission and the media to implement the Votability and Topowa campaigns. The budget process has become more open and participatory with good intersectoral cooperation between the Civil Society Budget Advocacy Group and the Ministry of Finance, Planning, and Economic Development.

PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.1

The public image of CSOs improved during the year. Media coverage of CSOs is generally positive, although some media houses display inadequate knowledge of the role of CSOs, which negatively affects their coverage. For instance, CSOs engaged in protecting the rights of sexual minorities are sometimes portrayed as foreign agents. Broadcast media may demand payment at commercial rates for CSO public service announcements, but many stations, including NTV Uganda, NBS TV, K-FM 93.3, Radio One FM 90, Hope Radio, and Voice of Kigezi in Kabale, provide free airtime for talk shows with CSOs. The activities of large CSOs, such as ACODE, Uganda National NGO Forum, LASPNET, ActionAid Uganda, DENIVA, and Water Aid, are sometimes covered on live television. Journalists often demand reimbursement for transportation costs to cover CSO events and generally attend events only if high-profile guests are present. These considerations limit coverage of events sponsored by CBOs, FBOs, and other organizations at the local level.

The public’s view of CSOs generally improved in 2015. Although the government’s negative rhetoric about organizations working on issues related to sexual minorities, civil rights, and democratic reform affected public perceptions, CSOs effectively clarified myths about the sector and rebutted false allegations during the parliamentary debates on NGO Bill 2015. The Uganda National NGO Forum led a CSO initiative to bring more than 5,000 citizens to the Fifth National CSO Fair, which celebrated the theme “Leaving No One Behind: Uganda’s Place in the Next Global Development Agenda.” Participants attended twenty-one thematic sessions and toured more than 200 exhibition stalls showcasing CSOs’ work. Nevertheless, many people do not welcome CSOs’ efforts to protect the rights of sexual minorities and according to the 2015 Afrobarometer survey would like homosexuality to remain illegal.

Senior government officials continued to brand CSOs that are critical of the government’s performance as foreign agents or as involved in partisan politics. For example, the government dismissed the legitimate activities of GLISS in the Free and Fair Elections campaign as an effort to recruit youth for the opposition, and RDCs erected numerous impediments to CBO activities at the local level. The private sector generally considers CSOs as key partners and values their contributions. Private media houses welcomed CSOs’ efforts to advocate for a free environment in which journalists can work without intimidation.

ACME provided technical expertise to several CSOs on strengthening their public image. This assistance increased the number of CSOs interested in promoting their brand and helped cultivate a positive relationship between CSOs and editors. CSOs continued to organize events to publicize their work, including the Annual CSO Fair and regular press conferences on topical issues.

CSOs in Uganda have a self-regulatory mechanism, the NGO Quality Assurance Mechanism (QuAM), which emphasizes ethical standards and operational norms. However, adoption of this mechanism remains slow. In 2015 only sixty-two new organizations (as opposed to seventy-nine in 2014) underwent the QuAM process.
and received certificates. This decline can be attributed in part to weaknesses in the QuAM structure and low levels of staffing at the QuAM secretariat.
2015 CSO Sustainability Scores for Zambia

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Sustainability Evolving 4.6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legal Environment</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organizational Capacity</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial Viability</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Provision</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Infrastructure</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public Image</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

ZAMBIA

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.6

Following the sudden death of Zambian president Michael Sata in October 2014, a presidential by-election was held on January 20, 2015. Edgar Lungu, the candidate of the ruling party, the Patriotic Front (PF), was elected president in a close race. Lungu appointed Inonge Wina as Zambia’s first female vice president.

During the year the development of a people-driven constitution continued to be one of the most hotly debated issues facing the nation. CSOs were divided about how best to achieve this goal. The Civil Society Constitution Coalition (CSCC), a group of like-minded CSOs, and the Grand Coalition on the Constitution, a grouping of civil society alliances and opposition political parties, insisted that the new constitution be brought to a referendum before the 2016 general elections. Other CSOs, including the Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI), supported a piecemeal approach, with parliament considering amendments to the current constitution before the 2016 elections and then holding a referendum on more contentious amendments in tandem with the elections. The government decided to proceed with the piecemeal approach, and in December parliament approved an amendment to the constitution that changed several aspects of Zambia’s electoral framework, including enabling election by absolute majority, establishing a running mate, and strengthening the role of the vice president. While the...
government-run press reacted positively to the passage of the amendment, other observers criticized the bill for containing several passages that were open to interpretation.

Economically, 2015 was a difficult year for Zambians. An electricity crisis resulted in more than eight hours of load shedding each day, which caused productivity costs to rise. Because of a decrease in the price of copper, Zambia’s main export, several large mines had to lay off employees. In addition, the Zambian kwacha quickly depreciated by more than 40 percent, increasing the prices of goods and services that are import dependent.

Although the sector’s overall sustainability remained largely unchanged, CSOs faced mixed opportunities in 2015. Organizations working on governance experienced operational difficulties orchestrated by the state, while CSOs focused on the economy and service provision enjoyed a relatively relaxed working environment. Implementation of the 2009 Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) Act, which was a source of tension in 2014, was suspended in 2015 pending consultations between CSOs and the government. CSOs continued to contend with funding challenges throughout the year.

No firm data about the scope of civil society in Zambia is available. The Registrar of Societies at the Ministry of Community Development reports that 555 CSOs were registered under the Societies Act as of December 2015. The last mapping exercise conducted by the Ministry of Community Development, Maternal and Child Health in 2012 showed that 442 organizations operated under the NGO Act. These numbers do not include community-based organizations (CBOs), faith-based organizations (FBOs), or community clubs.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 4.8**

In 2015 most CSOs in Zambia continued to register under the Societies Act or, to a lesser degree, the Patent and Companies Registration Act. The registration process is generally straightforward if organizations provide all necessary documentation and meet administrative requirements.

CSOs were still threatened by a provision of the 2009 NGO Act that requires them to re-register with the Registrar of NGOs or risk de-registration. However, tensions over the act abated in 2015 as its implementation was suspended so that discussions between the government and CSOs about potential reform to the act could get underway. These discussions were still ongoing at the end of the year. With the support of the German government’s assistance agency, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the Zambian government undertook a study of the compatibility of the act with other pieces of legislation, including the current constitution. The main conclusion of the study is that the act is not compatible with other legislation and should be repealed and replaced with a CSO law that would better support self-regulation. The study led to a commitment by the Ministry of Community Development to repeal the act and come up with a new interim CSO policy.

Despite this progress, CSOs such as the Foundation for Democratic Process (FODEP) continued to face hurdles when challenging earlier de-registrations in court. These lawsuits went forward only if the organizations’ legal status could be validated under other existing pieces of legislation. In addition, as the judicial system moves slowly, the lawsuits caused debilitating lags in CSO operations, and specialized pro bono legal advice was often difficult to find. Although the government threatened to de-register certain CSOs in 2015, no actual instance of such an action was reported.
Throughout 2015 CSOs working on governance issues experienced operational difficulties orchestrated by the state. For example, the government accused several members of the Grand Coalition, including Transparency International Zambia (TIZ), FODEP, and Caritas Zambia (CZ), of supporting opposition political parties, particularly in the lead-up to the presidential election. The allegations brought negative publicity and posed risks to the cooperation these organizations enjoyed with partners that would not want to be affiliated with a seemingly political CSO. Although the accusations never led to legal or other action, they inhibited the Grand Coalition’s relationship with the government during the discussions about constitutional reform. The government made similar accusations when CSOs addressed other governance issues but again took no substantive action.

The government continued to implement the colonial-era Public Order Act, which requires organizations to notify the police before conducting a public gathering, as a tool to limit the activities of some CSOs. For example, during the year the police failed to issue permits for demonstrations and cancelled the meetings of some advocacy CSOs, such as the Poverty Observatory Group (POG), although the groups had notified the police of their plans well in advance in accordance with the law. CSOs can, to a limited extent, express criticisms of the government, but the absence of an access-to-information law makes it difficult for them to do so in an informed manner.

CSOs are required to pay taxes on goods and services used in the course of their work. The 2013 Statutory Instrument 103, which withdrew tax exemptions for CSOs on capital goods, remained in effect in 2015. The government has accused some CSOs of abusing waivers and failing fully to comply with tax laws, and there is in fact evidence that some organizations lack the capacity to file tax returns with local authorities. In 2015 many funders began to work with CSOs to address this deficiency.

Zambian CSOs are not legally allowed to raise funds through the provision of goods and services, but they may establish subsidiary companies to generate income, including through government contracts. However, the lack of capital to start up a business makes this an impracticable option for many organizations.

Some local legal capacity is available to CSOs, but lawyers usually charge high fees for their services, making them unaffordable for most CSOs. Few attorneys specialize in nonprofit law or are willing to pick up cases pro bono. Some CSOs have brought legal specialists onto their boards to help with legal matters.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.2**

Most CSOs continued to have a strong presence in their local communities in 2015. For example, Civil Society for Poverty Reduction (CSPR) worked closely on budget tracking with communities in Luapula, Western, North-Western, Southern, and Eastern provinces. Nevertheless, CSOs face challenges in building sustainable constituencies beyond their traditional geographical areas. CSOs have found it easier to build constituencies and have impact by working through coalitions and networks, and a number of CSO networks began to strengthen their presence on the ground in 2015 through platforms such as Publish What You Pay and, at the local level, social and economic justice or natural resource watch committees.

CSOs continued to use strategic plans in 2015, as they are a requirement for donor funding. Larger organizations, such as the NGO Coordinating Council (NGOCC), have incorporated strategic planning into their institutional policies and often include their provincial offices in planning efforts. However, local FBOs usually do not have strategic plans, and donors have not supported the development of their planning capacity, thus constraining their access to funding.
Most Zambian CSOs have clearly documented organizational structures and continuously try to improve their management standards. In smaller organizations there is sometimes a thin line between the board and the staff, usually stemming from a lack of funds to recruit permanent employees. In such cases board members may carry out the duties of staff to ensure the continuity of the organization. It is becoming common for the boards to issue statements without consulting with the executive secretariat.

In 2015 staff turnover in the CSO sector remained high because of poor salaries, non-competitive employment conditions, and the prevalence of short-term contracts, especially for junior staff. Organizations such as FODEP could not afford to pay technical staff and relied on volunteers. Other CSOs, including CZ and CSPR, have relied on volunteers in the past but found in 2015 that the spirit of volunteerism seemed to be waning. CSOs engage professional services when they have the funding to do so. Accountants are generally employed, since organizations want to comply with donors’ financial requirements.

Many CSOs receive funding from donors to procure office equipment, but they find it a challenge to maintain computers and upgrade software. Most CSOs use the Internet, except in rural provinces, where the lack of reliable Internet or mobile telephone access imposes lags on information exchange.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.6**

Reduced funding continued to be the main threat to CSO sustainability in 2015. Most CSOs depend on foreign funding, and some donors, including Denmark, Canada, and the Netherlands, have left the country in recent years. GIZ, Irish Aid, Action Aid Zambia, UNICEF, and the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) continued to offer funding in 2015. However, some donors, such as GIZ, have changed their areas of focus and stopped supporting a number of CSOs. For example, in 2015 GIZ no longer supported CSPR, FODEP, and CZ. It is especially hard for smaller, less well-known CSOs to secure funding from donors, as most donors are committed to providing regular support to a limited number of organizations or to a certain type of organization, such as FBOs.

Another factor making CSOs financially vulnerable is the lack of a philanthropic culture in Zambia. In Chongwe a local CSO encouraged citizens to donate one kwacha (less than ten cents) for every year they had lived as a gesture of thanks to God. But dire economic conditions made it hard for people to participate in even this modest fundraising program. There are currently no local grant-making organizations or businesses with corporate social responsibility (CSR) programs.

Local CSOs have tried to diversify their income base by taking on activities that do not always align with their missions or core expertise. During the election period, for example, CSOs took on election monitoring, voter registration campaigns, and similar programs because donor funding was available for these activities, even if they were not part of their strategic plans. However, this sort of income diversification is usually unsustainable and very short-lived.

Membership-based CSOs found it particularly difficult to operate in 2015, as growing numbers of members were unable to pay their fees. For instance, CSPR and NGOCC could no longer rely on receiving previous levels of income from membership fees, and Catholic women’s organizations experienced a loss of income as membership numbers decreased. This loss of income from fees poses a real threat to the financial sustainability of many membership-based CSOs.

Most organizations lack clear fundraising policies and strategies. Although a few CSOs earn money by renting out real estate, consulting, or selling products, most organizations find it hard to develop this kind of unrestricted funding, as they lack start-up capital and clear business plans.
CSOs in health, agriculture, and other areas of service provision are awarded contracts by the central government. In 2015 CSOs in health care continued to receive contracts from the Road Development Agency (RDA) to conduct sensitization training on HIV/AIDS in road infrastructure development programs. According to RDA rules, a percentage of total contract awards must be committed to HIV/AIDS, poverty reduction, and other social programs, which compels the contractor to identify at least one CSO to undertake these projects.

CSOs have begun to build financial management systems, including risk management strategies, with the support of donors. These systems encourage organizations to become more accountable by adopting formal procedures. However, the lack of legislation requiring CSOs to be transparent can create problems for emerging CSOs, as it allows for financial mismanagement, which can potentially lead to litigation.

**ADVOCACY: 3.7**

CSOs’ record on advocacy was mixed in 2015. On the positive side, working relationships with the government were better than in previous years, and many initiatives were underway. But despite a full roster of advocacy and lobbying activities, engagement between CSOs and national and local governments was generally poor and CSOs’ efforts suffered from bureaucratic inefficiencies and confused messaging.

Governance-oriented CSOs worked constructively with the Electoral Commission of Zambia and the Anti-Corruption Commission, and their productive cooperation was evident in those agencies’ public citations of CSOs’ work. CSPR, CZ, and the Jesuit Center for Trade and Research (JCTR) cooperated with the Ministry of Finance on budget proposals and fiscal policy management. In addition, the Zambia Education Coalition engaged with the Ministry of Education in program implementation, while NGOCC and the Women’s Lobby worked with the Ministry of Gender on women’s participation in government decision-making processes.

In agriculture, the Zambia National Farmers Union (ZNFU) and the Agriculture Consultative Forum cooperated with government ministries on farmer input support programs. The Zambia Land Alliance worked with the government on land administration systems, and the government-affiliated Center for Trade and Policy Development (CTPD), together with the Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research (ZIPAR), influenced policymaking on maize and jobs.

The government also invited CSOs to take part in joint technical working groups on such topics as the Tripartite Free Trade Area, economic partnership agreements, and Millennium Development Goals. The Zambia Tax Platform (ZTP) provided strong leadership on issues of illicit financial flows and fiscal and monetary policy. The Decentralization Alliance Network (DAN) continued to work on decentralization, and a new coalition on the economy exerted pressure for fiscal discipline.

In 2015 CSOs also influenced governmental decision making through sectoral advisory groups, district development coordinating committees, and provincial development coordinating committees. CTPD and other organizations lobbied for an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) policy for Zambia—a goal that was approved by the cabinet and is currently under development. CTPD also contributed to a review of the Zambia Development Agency Act, which the government submitted to parliament for amendment.

The government’s Human Rights Commission and the Southern African Center for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD) pushed parliament to review the Public Order Act, and in September 2015 the president pledged that the act would be amended. The government, however, took no official action to amend the act.
Despite this full roster of advocacy and lobbying activities, engagement between CSOs and national and local governments suffered because of ongoing bureaucratic inefficiencies, such as the need to obtain approval from the central government before engaging with certain officials. Another weakness of many advocacy and lobbying initiatives was that CSOs tended to work on multiple projects, leading to inconsistent and incoherent messaging. In the period before the elections, many CSOs shifted their focus to take advantage of funding for political campaigns, which diverted their attention from their core mandates. Their advocacy efforts usually improved when they worked with political parties on specific issues, such as the promotion of pro-poor agendas for inclusion in party manifestos. In rare instances the government commits resources to CSO-government engagement, but the cost is normally borne by CSOs.

Most CSOs are aware of the importance of a solid legal framework and support a review of the 2009 NGO Act, as they believe that it is unconstitutional and could limit CSO operations. CSOs have participated in meetings on the act with the government, which were coordinated and facilitated by GIZ. CSOs have been able to voice their views in the media.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 4.4**

In 2015 CSOs delivered basic services in education, agriculture, health, and water and sanitation. CZ, World Vision, CARE, ZNFU, and the District Farmers Association distributed relief packages and temporary shelter to people in disaster-prone areas in Gwembe, Mambwe, Chama, and Petauke districts. Through its countrywide district farmers’ associations, ZNFU offered loans to small farmers for supplies such as fertilizer and seeds, which enhanced household and national food security. ZNFU also helped improve the distribution of farmer inputs through an e-voucher system.

The goods and services provided by CSOs generally reflect the needs of the communities in which they work. CSOs have developed strong mechanisms for identifying community needs and encouraging civic participation in their interventions. Some organizations have invested a great deal in the wider dissemination of their knowledge management processes. CSOs often work together with community members to translate knowledge into actions useful for development. For example, based on research conducted by Young Women’s Christian Association (YWCA) in 2015, CSOs noted that early marriages had a negative effect on local development. With the help of NGOCC and other CSOs, chiefs came up with memoranda of understanding to eliminate early child marriages and pregnancies in their chiefdoms and communities.

At the provincial and district levels, CSOs enjoyed strong partnerships with the government in service delivery in 2015. The government recognizes CSOs’ efforts mainly by citing their work, such as JCTR’s basic needs basket, CSPR’s barometer for monitoring service delivery, NGOCC’s efforts on gender mainstreaming in service provision, and ActionAid Zambia’s work on tax reform. The government also makes use of CSO studies in policy making, such as the maize reports prepared by CTPD and IAPRI. However, despite continued efforts by CSOs to monitor the government’s delivery of service in agriculture, education, health, and other fields, the collection of information remains a challenge in the absence of an access-to-information law. To obtain information CSOs must request authorization from the heads of departments and often depend on the good will of individual government officials. This limitation has a negative impact on public awareness of government programs, especially in local communities.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 4.9**

Key intermediary support organizations (ISOs) in Zambia include CSPR, JCTR, and Afya Mzuri, which provide services in areas such as community mobilization, resource mobilization, research, policy engagement
platforms, and capacity building for CSOs working with the grassroots. In 2015 ISO resources continued to decline along with demand for their services, mainly because so much information can now be obtained online.

The Zambia Governance Foundation (ZGF) and the Civil Society Environment Fund (CSEF) still operate as local sub-granting institutions. However, the requirements for ZGF grants are difficult for grassroots organizations to fulfill. In addition, these institutions continue to prefer to support their traditional partners, which further narrows the opportunities for other CSOs.

Various CSO coalitions, alliances, and networks address specific issues effectively. For example, the Grand Coalition, the Zambia Tax Platform, and DAN continued to work on various policy issues in 2015. The Zambia Tax Platform provided recommendations for the 2016 annual budget, of which about 35 percent were adopted into the position of the ministry of finance. However, Zambian CSOs have yet to develop a platform that could unite them and serve as a conduit for information sharing.

Some training is available to CSOs, usually through ZGF or donors such as GIZ or DFID. Access to these trainings is somewhat limited, as not all CSOs receive support to attend or have funding to spend on unbudgeted items such as training. In addition, the trainings are not publicly advertised and therefore many CSOs are not aware of them. Trainings by donors are not offered in local languages.

CSOs often worked in partnership with the government in 2015, as cited in earlier sections. Partnerships with the private sector still need to be nurtured and did not show much improvement in 2015.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

CSOs received mixed media coverage in 2015, with positive stories originating mainly from private and community media houses. For instance, CSPR received favorable coverage on community radio stations and print media about its consultative symposiums on the seventh national development plan in the Northern and Southern provinces. The media coverage emphasized the participation of youth in the meetings. Government-run media sometimes criticized CSOs for their opposition to the government's plans for constitutional reform and for their civil rights advocacy work. CSOs are featured in state-owned media only if they speak in support of the government. CSOs continue to hold press conferences and appear on television and radio programs. It is common for CSOs to pay journalists to cover their activities, which makes it difficult for smaller organizations to attract media attention. Personal differences between a CSO and the head of a media house can also contribute to a lack of coverage. CSOs do not sponsor trainings for journalists and therefore reporting on issues that CSOs work on is often not emphasized.

Public and government perceptions of CSOs still need improvement. The government often accuses CSOs working on governance issues of being politically aligned troublemakers who have little understanding of national issues. Parts of the business community view CSOs at times as anti-investment, because of their strong advocacy against bad corporate practices such as tax avoidance, their work to encourage CSR programs, and their awareness of the environmental and social impacts of business activities.

CSOs have begun to use social media to promote their causes, but their reach is limited to urban areas as rural areas have limited to no Internet access. They also engage regularly with the media by issuing press statements that state their positions.
No self-regulatory mechanism has been implemented in the CSO sector. However, in 2015 a code of ethics was under development, as CSOs widely believed that some organizations do not behave transparently. Most CSOs publish annual reports and make them available to stakeholders electronically (via email and on their websites) and in print editions, which they distribute to partners.
ZIMBABWE

The year 2015 was challenging for Zimbabweans. On the constitutional front, the dominance of the ruling party, the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), coupled with paralysis in the opposition, contributed to the government’s continued lack of will to realign more than 450 pieces of legislation with the constitution. Towards the end of the year, internal fissures in ZANU-PF emerged as the race to succeed 91-year-old President Robert Mugabe intensified. The infighting in the ruling party compromised the state’s ability to attend to its obligations and improve the lives of Zimbabweans.

In 2015 Zimbabwe’s economy plummeted and the rate of growth was projected to be somewhere between 1.5 and -1.5 percent. Because of deflation, most citizens were unable to purchase basic commodities despite their abundance on the market. After the Supreme Court ruled that employers could dismiss employees on three months’ notice, the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions recorded 20,300 new cases of unemployment within a few months. As state-provided services dwindled, a second year of drought caused a poor harvest and widespread food insecurity, prompting domestic and international CSOs to provide food relief.

CSO SUSTAINABILITY: 4.8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country Facts</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital: Harare</td>
<td>Legal Environment: 6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government Type: Parliamentary Democracy</td>
<td>Organizational Capacity: 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population: 14,229,541</td>
<td>Financial Viability: 5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP per capita (PPP): $2,100</td>
<td>Advocacy: 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index: 155</td>
<td>Service Provision: 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Infrastructure: 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Public Image: 4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The operating space for civil society continued to shrink in 2015. The country suffered an indelible dent on its human rights record when journalist-activist Itai Dzamara was abducted on March 9, reportedly by state agents, after petitioning the president to step down and pave the way for an elected democratic government. At the end of the year Dzamara was still missing. Although CSOs were able to engage with the state on issues of socio-economic justice, organizations working on civil and political rights and, in isolated cases, service-providing CSOs continued to be victimized under draconian laws, including the Public Order and Security Act (POSA). On a positive note, CSOs affirmed the importance of coordination to improve their advocacy and lobbying efforts.

According to the National Association of Non-Governmental Organizations (NANGO), there are 993 private voluntary organizations (PVOs) in Zimbabwe. The number of registered PVOs remained the same as in the previous year because the registration process is cumbersome and the registering body sits only once annually. Other estimates suggest there are more than 5,000 trusts and common-law organizations known as univeritas. There is no publicly available record of registered legal entities, but recent unconfirmed statements by government officials put the total number of CSOs in Zimbabwe at more than 20,000, a figure that includes inactive organizations.

**LEGAL ENVIRONMENT: 6.3**

The challenge of registering a CSO in Zimbabwe did not abate in 2015. Ideally a CSO registers as a PVO under the PVO Act, which allows an organization to enter easily into a memorandum of understanding with local authorities. This memorandum is not a legal requirement but is increasingly demanded by district and provincial administrators if an organization wants to conduct activities in their jurisdictions. PVO status brings additional benefits, including tax rebates and waivers, and some donors consider PVO status a prerequisite for funding. However, registration as a PVO is an unattractive prospect for most CSOs, as the application process takes at least two years and usually results in rejection. Moreover, applicants must be vetted by the state security apparatus and declare their sources of funding, which can compromise the operations and security of international development agencies, donors, and other partners. As a result, most CSOs—particularly those with programs on governance, human rights, and democracy—opt to register either as trusts or univeritas, even though their lack of PVO status can make it difficult for them to obtain required police clearances.

During the year several CSO leaders were arrested and detained for contravening POSA. For instance, the spokesperson and program manager of the Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition (CiZC) were arrested on charges of organizing an illegal gathering after a solidarity visit to Harare Remand Prison, where the leadership of the National Vendors Union Zimbabwe (NAVUZ) was detained. The police also arrested citizens protesting xenophobia in South Africa at the South African embassy in Harare and barred public events in support of the missing activist Itai Dzamara. The ruling party and the government sought to prevent CSOs from operating in local communities, arguing that they were part of an illegal regime-change effort. For example, in Mashonaland West Province during the run-up to the June 10 by-election, the ruling party accused staff of some community-based organizations (CBOs) of seeking to overthrow the government, prompting them to seek refuge in Harare and resume operations in the province only after the by-election was over. Other local authorities required memoranda of understanding to slow and monitor CSOs\(^5\) work at the local level.
PVOs are entitled to tax exemptions and waivers on import duties. Other types of organizations can obtain tax exemptions if they cooperate with PVOs or other tax-exempt entities, such as development agencies. All CSOs are allowed to earn income through the provision of goods and services.

Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (ZLHR), Zimbabwe Women Lawyers Association (ZWLA), and the Legal Resources Foundation (LRF) continued to provide legal support to CSOs and individuals in 2015. These organizations are conversant with CSO law and have a network of lawyers throughout the country who offer their services free of charge.

**ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY: 4.5**

Despite funding constraints, Zimbabwean CSOs tend to have positive relations with their constituencies. In their effort to help develop a democratic Zimbabwe, many CSOs seek out low-cost, high-impact activities that are relevant to the needs of their constituencies. For example, in 2015 the organization Veritas lodged a challenge in the Constitutional Court that resulted in a ruling outlawing child marriages, and the Chitungwiza Residents Trust mobilized communities in Chitungwiza to successfully petition local council authorities to stop their demolition of houses.

Since ZANU-PF’s return to power in 2013, CSOs have been compelled to rethink their strategies for consolidating the democratic gains scored during the earlier era of inclusive government. In 2015 many CSOs undertook strategic planning exercises, and some organizations decided to pursue dialogue and engagement with state institutions and local community leadership. For example, the Center for Applied Legal Research (CALR) began working with the Ministry of Justice, Legal, and Parliamentary Affairs on the constitutional alignment exercise.

Most CSOs have internal management structures that include boards of trustees, in the case of registered trusts, or boards of directors, in the case of registered associations. CSO boards usually have a clear mandate to give direction to organizational policies, while the staff provides technical expertise and translates the policy frameworks into tangible projects. Boards tend to operate transparently and engage with their organizations in fundraising, the processing of contracting and tender bids, and other activities.

CSOs are able to attract qualified personnel, but because of funding cuts many organizations downsized their paid staff and relied on volunteers and interns in 2015. Larger CSOs manage to retain a full complement of paid staff, but they renew employee contracts on an annual basis or for the duration of a particular project only. Most organizations maintain a pool of volunteers to help with the implementation of projects. Organizations with stable and generous funding usually engage information technology experts, auditing firms, and lawyers when needed. Some larger CSOs hire in-house specialists.

Most organizations in urban areas have the equipment they need for their work, including computers, cell phones, cameras, and vehicles. They keep up with current technology by using, for example, social media to inform and mobilize their constituents. Smaller CBOs in rural areas often lag behind in their use of technology, especially since some areas lack both electricity and Internet access. CSOs often share office space or operate in virtual offices.

**FINANCIAL VIABILITY: 5.8**

Funding for CSOs comes almost exclusively from foreign missions and aid agencies. Some of the main donors are USAID, European Union (EU), UNDP, UNICEF, and UK Department for International Development (DFID). Recently, other European countries, particularly Denmark and the Czech Republic,
have begun funding youth organizations. For example, the Youth Agenda Trust engaged in a partnership with the Social Liberal Youth of Denmark in 2015.

Despite the presence of multiple donor agencies, donor resources continued to dwindle in 2015, especially for CSOs working in democracy and governance, many of which struggled to stay afloat. A number of factors accounted for the decline in foreign funding. Some donors have changed their country strategies, and multiple foreign missions announced during 2015 that they would close operations in 2016. At the same time, donor investments in health, humanitarian assistance, and related sectors grew. The multi-donor Transparency, Responsiveness, Accountability, and Citizen Engagement (TRACE) mechanism, jointly funded by DFID, Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), and Danish International Development Agency (Danida), was launched in 2015 as an important new source of funding for organizations working in media, elections, gender, access to justice, natural resource exploitation, and the creation of coalitions addressing public-interest issues.

CSOs in Zimbabwe do not benefit from systematic financial support from local sources of philanthropy. However, communities often contribute to CSOs’ activities with free labor, meeting spaces, and other in-kind support. Partnerships with corporations such as banks began to emerge in 2015 but were limited to non-advocacy programs, as businesses fear that cooperation with CSOs perceived as political could lead to victimization by the state or, worse, cancellation of their operating licenses. Most partnerships with businesses focused on the environment and climate change or relief assistance to flood-affected populations in Chingwizi. Businesses mostly funded CSOs’ publicity materials and rarely covered administrative expenses.

Some PVOs are able to obtain support from the government, although such support is limited because of the government’s lack of funds. PVOs receiving government funding typically work in service provision, where they are viewed as less of a threat to the state. For example, in 2015 the Zimbabwe Doctors for Human Rights and the Zimbabwe Community Development Association received funding for a program in water, sanitation, and health (WASH).

Some organizations earn income from business activities. For example, the Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust built a conference facility that CSOs can lease and has a bus that CSOs can hire to transport participants during their activities. A number of membership organizations have begun to explore the possibility of membership fees as a sustainable funding source. However, membership fees remain minimal at most organizations. For example, NAVUZ’s membership fees are only one dollar per year, since most members come from low-income backgrounds and cannot afford to pay more.

Most national organizations have functioning financial management systems. Larger organizations often mentor smaller CSOs lacking strong financial and administrative systems. For example, the Zimbabwe Coalition on Debt and Development (ZIMCODD) helped NAVUZ and the Citizens First Forum develop stronger administrative systems by offering internships to their financial and administrative staff. Most donors require their grantees to undergo annual organizational audits or audits of specific grants.

**ADVOCACY: 4.2**

During 2015 CSOs’ engagement with the government improved slightly, mainly because the CSO sector changed its advocacy approach from confrontation to dialogue after the 2013 elections. Most CSOs sought to create neutral, non-partisan spaces in which to engage with the departments of labor, health, and education and other government agencies.

Advocacy CSOs engaged with government mainly in the areas of constitutional and electoral reform. Among their many initiatives on constitutional reform, CSOs identified clauses in the constitution—for instance,
statements on the rights to healthcare, education, and water—to use in their push for realignment of the laws to be more supportive of CSOs’ work. CSOs successfully challenged the constitutionality of the detention of activists by police for longer than forty-eight hours and continued to educate citizens about the constitution’s bill of rights. On electoral reform, the Election Resource Center developed a paper outlining the fundamental changes needed in the election law and coordinated civil society’s rejection of the General Laws Amendment Bill, which proposed changes to the Electoral Act. CiZC continued to urge countries in the region to pressure the Zimbabwean government to implement the constitution.

In 2015 CSOs pressured the government on the slow pace of realigning legislation, pushed for the implementation of constitutional provisions using strategic-impact litigation, and advocated for all constitutionally mandated independent commissions to be set up. For example, CSOs called for the establishment of the National Peace and Reconciliation Commission, which should help strengthen their work by allowing monitoring of the state’s performance and providing corrective measures on conflict-related issues. CSOs such as the Zimbabwe Human Rights Association worked constructively with the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission—for example, on investigating cases of human rights abuse.

CSOs and CSO coalitions continued their important work on women’s issues in 2015. The Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe pressured the government to constitute the Gender Commission, conducted awareness-raising activities in local communities, and engaged in high-profile lobbying and advocacy efforts at the local and regional levels.

In 2015, as the country’s economic performance began to decline, CSOs continued to engage on economic and natural resource governance. For example, CiZC released an alternative economic policy blueprint when the government’s blueprint failed to turn around the economy. As an increasing number of citizens joined the informal economy, vendors’ associations, such as NAVUZ, Zimbabwe Informal Sectors Organization, Vendors Initiative for Social and Economic Transformation, and the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy Associations, became increasingly active. In the first half of 2015 these organizations were key in mobilizing vendors to take part in peaceful protests against the arbitrary confiscation of their wares by council officials. The Zimbabwe Informal Sectors Organization and the National Vendors Union Zimbabwe called on city officials to consult with vendors before relocating them from central business districts to peripheral locations.

CSOs are aware that restrictive legislation hampers their advocacy and lobbying efforts. For this reason, in 2015 the reform of POSA and the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) remained a priority for CSOs, although not for the government. CSOs are aware that many of the restrictions they face are not legal but political in nature and legal reforms alone are unlikely to resolve these challenges.

**SERVICE PROVISION: 3.3**

Service provision by CSOs increased in 2015. CSOs in Zimbabwe provide services in a broad range of areas, including health, education, humanitarian assistance, agriculture, environment, human rights, and governance. In the wake of the food security crisis caused by the drought in 2015, CSOs increased service provision to support vulnerable populations throughout the country. For example, humanitarian organizations such as World Vision, Care International, CAFOD, Plan International, and SAFIRE offered food or temporary shelter to vulnerable populations.
in Tokwe-Mukosi, Muzarabani, Masvingo, Buhera, Zvishavane, Gwanda, Hwange, Umzingwane, Nkayi, and elsewhere. The Zimbabwe Project Trust implemented a Child Supplementary Feeding Scheme in drought-prone wards in Umguza and Umzingwane districts, and the project also targeted orphans, vulnerable children, and child-headed families for critical nutritional support.

Service-providing CSOs are highly responsive to their beneficiaries’ needs. Many CSOs now emphasize the importance of undertaking needs-based assessments in communities prior to the implementation of project activities. In 2015 organizations trained their constituencies on a broad range of issues or incorporated local communities into their work. For example, the Zimbabwe Community Development Trust implemented a project to refurbish or build primary schools, and at the Samurwio Primary School in Chihota district the community provided labor to help with the construction.

CSOs distributed a number of publications to their constituencies, as well as larger audiences. In 2015 ZLHR continued to produce 50,000 copies weekly of The Legal Monitor, which addresses contemporary legal and human rights issues. As an increasing number of organizations engage in evidence-based programming, other stakeholders, such as media and academia, have found their research findings useful. Institutions such as the Zimbabwe Democracy Institute, CiZC, and the Labor and Economic Development Research Institute of Zimbabwe (LEDRIZ) are at the forefront of providing thought leadership through empirically grounded research papers. Most of these products are donated free of charge at a local level, as CSOs rely on donors for their funding.

Throughout the year the government continued to engage with humanitarian organizations, especially CSOs working in food relief and livelihoods projects. The government often calls on CSOs in service provision to provide relief assistance, and CSO-government partnerships were especially important in the aftermath of the 2015 droughts. At the same time, the state can be quick to dismiss CSOs in times of major political upheaval, especially if the country’s democratic processes are implicated. Some service-providing CSOs, particularly in Masvingo Province, were accused by the state of seeking to overthrow the government in 2015.

**INFRASTRUCTURE: 5.0**

A number of CSOs in Zimbabwe host resource centers. For example, NANGO, CiZC, LRF, Youth Empowerment and Transformation Trust, ZLHR, Zimbabwe NGO Human Rights Forum, Women’s Coalition of Zimbabwe, Zimbabwe Women Resource Center and Network, Media Institute of Southern Africa (MISA), and Media Center all provide their members, other CSOs, and the public with access to the Internet, research papers, library resources, or legal advice.

Some international CSOs sub-grant international donor funds to smaller organizations that show potential but lack the technical, administrative, and financial systems and skills needed to attract foreign funding directly. Large international donors, including USAID and AusAid, implement programs through organizations such as PACT International, Hivos, and Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), which channel funding for domestic CSOs and provide technical capacity-strengthening programs. In 2015 TRACE focused on issues of accountability and public governance, while PACT emphasized citizen engagement, social accountability, and advocacy for reform. International CSOs derive some revenue from the administration of grants and fees for capacity-building trainings. However, these organizations are largely concentrated in the capital city and can be difficult for non-Harare-based organizations to access.

Donors, coalitions, international CSOs, and larger Zimbabwean CSOs continue to offer programs to strengthen CSOs’ abilities to operate effectively in the challenging political context. The programs are varied. Many address citizens’ socio-economic rights and practical means for developing a democratic Zimbabwe. Some coalitions help members that are struggling to attract funding by offering training on fundraising.
strategies, internal administrative systems, and rebranding. Others explore ways CSOs can remain relevant to their constituencies—for example, by setting up membership structures.

Donors and international organizations also provided training on project management, results-based management, monitoring and evaluation, and advocacy techniques. CSO training is usually not conducted in local languages, but most people working in civil society are comfortable working in English. A number of civil society activists benefit from scholarships and fellowship programs abroad.

Businesses are usually hesitant to work with CSOs on advocacy initiatives, largely because of fears of being deregistered, as the state emphasizes that businesses should not meddle in political processes. They also see a risk of being labeled merchants of regime change, which can also result in deregistration. However, in 2015 privately owned media houses engaged in partnerships with CSOs. For instance, *Newsday* ran articles on the implications of the abduction of Itai Dzamara, and a group of freelance journalists partnered with CiZC to produce a small video describing Dzamara’s Occupy Africa Unity Square initiative and urging the state to account for his whereabouts.

**PUBLIC IMAGE: 4.5**

CSOs’ public image was unchanged in 2015. While state media coverage of service delivery-oriented organizations is positive, its coverage of pro-democracy CSOs is overwhelmingly hostile. In particular, ZANU-PF, which controls the media houses, characterizes CSOs focused on democracy, human rights, and governance issues as Western agents and uses the state media to discredit them. This coverage seriously damages civil society’s image, especially among people with limited access to independent media. However, in 2015 the state media occasionally provided modest positive coverage of CSOs working on issues the state considers “moderate,” such as HIV/AIDS.

CSOs receive positive coverage in privately owned press, including *Newsday*, *The Zimbabwean*, *Daily News*, *Zimbabwe Independent*, *Financial Gazette*, and *Southern Eye*. The so-called “pirate” radio stations—Voice of the People, SW Radio Africa, and Voice of America’s Studio 7—and community radio initiatives also provide positive coverage of civil society. Many organizations place advertisements and public affairs programs on these stations to explore issues ranging from HIV/AIDS to gender-based violence and elections. Star FM and ZiFM, which were licensed in 2012, have created programs for CSOs to debate issues live on air and counter coverage by the state media that may be biased. Although the independence of these stations is questionable, access to them has increased CSOs’ public profile.

The public has mixed perceptions of CSOs. Organizations that provide relief aid such as food and agricultural inputs are viewed positively, whereas CSOs involved in political advocacy can be judged harshly, depending on the dominant political narrative in their locations. For example, people living in urban areas are generally aware of civil society’s role and appreciate its contribution. However, in rural areas people strongly believe that CSOs have abandoned their legitimate mandates in favor of a regime-change agenda. These attitudes were evident in surveys conducted by the Mass Public Opinion Institute (MPOI) and Afrobarometer in 2015, which showed that the majority of Zimbabweans trust state institutions and are uncomfortable with CSOs working in democracy and governance, especially in rural areas. In 2015 CSOs began to seek to overcome their reputation of being allied with opposition political parties by creating spaces in which they could participate with business and communities in a national dialogue. CiZC, for example, conducted its +263 Dialogue series to serve as a non-partisan platform for public discussion of key national issues. These independent fora have become popular and attract huge crowds whenever they convene in local communities. Although businesses usually view CSOs’ work as legitimate, they do not publicly support them for fear of reprisals.
Many CSOs have productive relations with journalists. Some CSOs employ journalists to provide their organizations with media access and create opportunities to educate the media about their work. CSOs regularly invite journalists to cover their events, and they often hold press conferences together and issue joint statements on key issues. To raise awareness of their efforts and build their public images, CSOs produce paraphernalia such as mosquito nets, t-shirts, caps, umbrellas, and cups.

Self-regulatory initiatives are still under discussion in the CSO sector. CSOs often publish annual reports and usually share them with funding partners. Few organizations are able to distribute their annual reports more broadly, mainly because the high cost of printing is not covered in the funding they receive. CSOs often have policy and procedural manuals stating rules for their activities, associations, and professional conduct, including internal control systems.
ANNEX A: CSO SUSTAINABILITY INDEX
METHODOLOGY: DIRECTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING PARTNERS

I. INTRODUCTION

The CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa is a tool created by USAID to study the strength and overall viability of CSO sectors in each country. The Index is a valuable resource for USAID, other international donors, local CSO advocates, development partners, researchers, and academics. By using a standard set of indicators and collecting data each year, the CSO Sustainability Index tracks changes in the strength of the CSO sector over time and allows for cross-country comparison.

While the Index was initially developed as an internal USAID management and monitoring tool, its uses have broadened significantly over the past decade. In particular, we are pleased that local CSO leaders and activists have found the Index process and final product to be a useful opportunity to look at the larger picture and reflect on sectorial advancements and remaining challenges. Other offices and bureaus within USAID also view the CSO Sustainability Index as a unique model when developing their own monitoring tools.

The CSO Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa complements the long-standing CSO Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia, the seventeenth edition of which is published in 2014. Given the increasing prominence of civil society and its role in development, the Index expanded into two new regions in 2011. The first editions of the CSO Sustainability Index for the Middle East and North Africa and the CSO Sustainability Indexes for Afghanistan and Pakistan were published in July 2012, the first edition of CSO Sustainability Index for Asia bringing the total number of countries covered by CSOSI reports to seventy-five.

The 2015 Index will be the seventh edition of this publication. In order to ensure consistency and simplicity, no major changes in either the methodology or the questions were made this year.

Also, once again this year we emphasize one core step in the process: check your proposed scores with the corresponding description in “Ratings: A Closer Look” in order to ensure that the score accurately reflects the present state of CSO sector development in the country.

As in the past years, the contract for the 2015 Index has been awarded to Management Systems International (MSI) and the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). MSI and ICNL will manage coordination and editing of the Index. A senior staff member from each MSI and ICNL will serve on the Editorial Committee as will one or more senior USAID/Washington officials.

Your key points of contact at each organization are:

Jennifer Stuart, Senior Editor
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL)
Email: jstuart@icnl.org Phone: 1-202-452-8600
CSOSI responsibility: Editing of country reports and final index, coordination with local implementing partners on editing the country reports.

Alex Nejadian
Management Systems International (MSI)
Project Manager
Email: anejadian@msi-inc.com
Phone: 1-703-979-7100
CSOSI responsibility: Key coordinator between local implementing partners, MSI, ICNL and USAID.
II. METHODOLOGY FOR THE IMPLEMENTER

The following steps should be followed to assemble the Expert Panel that will meet in person to discuss the status of civil society over the reporting year, determine scores, and prepare a country report for the 2015 CSO (Civil Society Organization) Sustainability Index for Sub-Saharan Africa. The reporting year will cover the period of January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015.

1. Carefully select a group of not less than 8-10 representatives of civil society organizations to serve as panel experts. Implementers are free to select panel members based on the following guidelines. If desired, the panel may include one representative from the USAID Mission, who would observe the process but not cast a vote on the scores. The panel members should include representatives of a diverse range of civil society organizations including the following types:

   • local CSO support centers, resource centers or intermediary support organizations (ISOs);
   • local CSOs, community-based organizations (CBOs), and faith-based organizations (FBOs) involved in a range of service delivery and/or advocacy activities;
   • academia with expertise related to civil society and CSO sustainability;
   • CSO partners from government, business or media;
   • think tanks working in the area of civil society development;
   • member associations such as cooperatives, lawyers' associations and natural resources users groups;
   • international donors who support civil society and CSOs; and
   • other local partners familiar with civil society.

MSI recommends that the Expert Panel be primarily nationals. CSOs represented on the panel can be those whose work is heavily focused on either advocacy or social service delivery. To the extent possible, panelists should represent both rural and urban parts of the country. They should also represent women’s groups, minority populations, and marginalized groups, as well as sub sectors such as women’s rights, community-based development, civic education, microfinance, environment, human rights, and youth. The panel should include an equal representation of men and women. If the implementer believes that this will not be possible please explain why in a note submitted to Allison Poyac-Clarkin (apoyacclarkin@msi-inc.com) at MSI for consideration prior to undertaking the panel.

In some instances, it may be appropriate to select a larger group in order to reflect the diversity and breadth of the civil society sector in the country. Please keep in mind, however, that a significantly larger group may make building consensus within the panel more difficult – and more expensive if it entails arranging transportation for panelists who are based far from the capital. Alternatively, if regional differences within a country are significant, implementers may want to consider holding regional panels. Should the implementer wish to pursue this additional task, the methodology should be outlined and submitted to Allison Poyac-Clarkin (apoyacclarkin@msi-inc.com) at MSI for consideration prior to undertaking the regional panels.

2. Ensure that panel members understand the objectives of the exercise. The objective of the panel is to develop a consensus-based rating for each of the seven dimensions of civil society sustainability covered by the Report and to articulate a justification or explanation for each rating consistent with the methodology described below. The overall goal of the Report is to track and compare progress in the sector over time, increasing the ability of local entities to undertake self-assessment and analysis. It also aims to develop an increased understanding of the civil society sector among donors, governments, and CSOs for the purposes of better support and programming.

The instructions and previous years country report should be submitted to the the members of the Expert Panel a minimum of three (3) days before convening the panel so that they may develop their initial scores for
each indicator before meeting with the other panel members. If possible, it is useful to hold a brief orientation session for the panelists prior to the panel discussion. Some partners choose to hold a formal training session with panel members, reviewing the methodology document and instructions, other partners provide more of a general discussion about the objectives of the exercise and process to the panelists.

3. **Convene a meeting of the Expert Panel.** MSI requests that implementers plan to complete this meeting no later than October 15, for the 2015 exercise.

4. At the Expert Panel meeting, please **remind panelists that each indicator and dimension of the Africa CSO Sustainability Report should be scored according to relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, and events in the country.** They should review the previous year’s score prior to reviewing the indicators for the current year. The rating process should take place alongside or directly following a review of the rating process and categories provided in “Ratings: A Closer Look.”

For each indicator of each dimension, allow each panel member to share his or her initial score and justification with the rest of the group. At the end of the discussion of each indicator, allow panel members to adjust their scores, if desired. Then, **eliminate the highest score and the lowest score,** and average the remaining scores together to come up with one score for each indicator. Once a final score has been reached for each indicator within a given dimension, calculate the average or arithmetic mean of these scores for a preliminary score for the dimension. Be sure to take careful notes during the discussion of each indicator, detailing the justifications for all scores, as this should serve as the basis of the written report. Please keep all scores on record, making sure that personal attribution cannot be made to individual panel members (see sample below, Figure 1). Ultimately, every score should be supported by evidence in the country report (see #8 below), and should reflect consensus among group members.

**Figure 1: Score Sheet for Panel Meeting**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Panel</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

5. **After the panel has come to a score for each dimension, compare the score for each dimension with last year’s score to ensure that the direction of change reflects developments during the year.** For example, if an improved score is proposed, this should be based on concrete positive developments during the year. On the other hand, if the situation worsened during the year, this should be reflected in a lower score.

Note that the Sustainability Index methodology recognizes that change tends to be incremental and that most dimensions of the Index will not change radically from year to year. As a result, the Editorial Committee generally only recommends a change of .1 for modest changes in a dimension. A change of .2 is considered very significant and is recommended only for major changes in a dimension. Larger differences are generally only warranted if there are radical changes in a country’s political environment that impacted CSOs.

6. **Once scores for each dimension are determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look.”** Discuss with the group whether the score for a country matches that rating description. For example, a score of 2.3 in organizational capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. Please read the “Sustainability Enhanced” section for...
Organizational Capacity in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the civil society environment. If not, discuss as a group to determine a more accurate score that fits the description for that dimension.

7. **Discuss each of the seven dimensions of the Index and score them in a similar manner.** Once all seven dimensions have been scored, average the final dimension scores together to get the final country Index score. Be sure to include a synopsis of this discussion in the draft country report.

8. **Please remind the group at this stage that reports will be reviewed by an Editorial Committee (EC) in Washington, D.C. that will provide feedback on recommended scores and possibly request adjustments in scores pending additional justification of scores.**

9. **Prepare a draft country report.** The report should cover the calendar year 2015 (January 1, 2015, through December 31, 2015). The draft report should include an overview statement and a brief discussion of the current state of sustainability of the civil society sector with regard to each dimension. The section on each dimension should include a discussion of both accomplishments and strengths in that dimension, as well as obstacles to sustainability and weaknesses.

In the overview statement, please include an estimated number of registered and active CSOs, as well as an overview of the primary fields and geographic areas in which CSOs operate.

Please limit the submissions to a maximum of five pages in English. Please keep in mind that MSI is relying on implementers to ensure that reports are an appropriate length and are well written, as it does not have the capacity to do extensive editing.

Please include a list of the experts who served on the panel with the report. This will be for MSI’s reference only and will not be made public.

Before finalizing your report, please ensure that it meets the following criteria:
(1) The score for each dimension must be within 0.3 of the score on the previous year’s report. Please refer to the instructions for an explanation of what each 0.1 score change means.
(2) All indicators for which there were changes from the previous year are addressed in the narrative section for each dimension. (If there was no change in a specific indicator, please state “there was no change in” that indicator.)
(3) The narrative description of each dimension includes sufficient specific examples from the year covered by the report
(4) If there are no changes in a dimension, the report must state “no events or changes in this dimension.” Do not simply copy sections from the previous year’s report
(5) Reports must include a 1 – 2 paragraph overview of key trends in the country context that affect CSOs and their constituencies.

Deliver the draft country reports with rankings via email to Vanessa Coulomb (vcoulomb@msi-inc.com) at MSI **no later than October 31, 2015** unless MSI approved a later delivery date in your work plan.

The project editor will be in contact with you following receipt of the report to discuss any outstanding questions and clarifications regarding the scoring and the report’s content.

10. **Revise the report.** Within 2 weeks of receiving your draft report, MSI and its partner, ICNL, will send you an edited version of your report that has been copy edited for grammar, style and content. As necessary, the editors will request that you revise the reports on the 5 criteria laid out in step 9. Please request any clarification needed as soon as possible, then submit your revised report within 2 weeks of receiving feedback from the editors.
11. In Washington, an Editorial Committee (EC) will review the scores, ratings, and draft country reports, and it will discuss any issues or concerns with the implementer. The EC consists of representatives from USAID, MSI, ICNL and at least one regional expert well versed in the issues and dynamics affecting civil society in Sub-Saharan Africa. Further description of the EC is included in the following section, “The Role of the Editorial Committee” (see below). If the EC determines that the panel's scores or ratings are not adequately supported by the description provided in the country report, particularly in comparison to the scores and reports of other countries in the region, the EC may request that the description be strengthened and the score be adjusted, thereby ensuring cross-country comparability. The implementer will be responsible for responding to all outstanding comments from the EC, as communicated by the project editor, until the report is approved and accepted by USAID. A USAID representative chairs the EC.

12. Once the 2015 Africa report is approved by USAID for distribution, MSI will send you both electronic and hard copies of the final report so you can conduct outreach activities to promote its distribution in your country. Examples of such outreach activities are: a reception, a presentation of the findings of the report, electronic distribution (e.g., listserves or websites) posting on websites. The final public reports will be made available in English and French. Please note that it is very important that outreach activities and distribution of the final report do not begin before you receive the final report confirmation.

13. MSI is very interested in using the preparation of this year's Report to track lessons learned for use in improving the monitoring process in upcoming years. MSI would appreciate if implementers would record and submit observations that may increase the usefulness of this important tool to Allison Poyac-Clarkin (apoyacclarkin@msi-inc.com). To the extent feasible, please submit observations that cover your experiences with each step outlined above.

**The Role of the Editorial Committee**

All country reports are reviewed and discussed by the Editorial Committee (EC) composed of regional and sector experts in Washington, D.C. This committee is chaired by a USAID representative and it includes additional USAID representatives with regional expertise. The committee also includes civil society experts representing MSI and ICNL.

The Editorial Committee has three main roles. It reviews all reports, scores, and ratings to ensure that country report narratives are well written and compelling, and that they support the scores and ratings. A compelling narrative demonstrates that a score and rating is based on sufficient evidence (i.e., systematic and widespread cases or situations) and is not based on one or two individual or random cases or situations. For example, if a country has a large number of CSOs with strong financial management systems that can raise funds locally from diverse sources, there would be a compelling justification for a favorable financial viability score and rating. On the other hand, if a country has only one or two CSOs with the ability to raise funds from diverse sources, a favorable financial viability score would be less justified. The EC also ensures that the rating for each dimension meets the criteria described in “Ratings: A Closer Look,” so that scores and narratives accurately reflect the sustainability of civil society in each country. Finally, and most importantly, the EC considers a country's scores and ratings in relation to the scores for other countries, providing a regional perspective that ensures comparability of scores across Sub-Saharan Africa and across other regions covered by the CSO Sustainability Index Report, including the Middle East- North Africa and Europe and Eurasia.

The USAID Chair of the EC has the final say on all scores and may contact an implementer directly to discuss a panel’s scores and to clarify items in the country report prior to finalizing the scores and country reports.
Implementers are encouraged to remind panels from the outset that the EC may ask for further clarification of scores and ratings, and may modify scores and ratings where appropriate. However, by adding the step for each panel to compare its scores with “Ratings: A Closer Look” (which is essentially what the EC does), there will be less of a need for the EC to adjust scores. Ensuring that the country report narrative for each dimension adequately justifies the corresponding score will also reduce the need for the EC to make adjustments or to request clarification.

III. INSTRUCTIONS FOR EXPERT PANEL MEMBERS

I. DEFINITIONS:

Throughout the process of developing a country report for the CSO Sustainability Index (CSOSI), please use the following definitions:

*Civil Society Organization (CSO):* Civil society organizations are defined “broadly as any organizations, whether formal or informal, that are not part of the apparatus of government, that do not distribute profits to their directors or operators, that are self-governing, and in which participation is a matter of free choice. Both member-serving and public-serving organizations are included. Embraced within this definition, therefore, are private, not-for-profit health providers, schools, advocacy groups, social service agencies, anti-poverty groups, development agencies, professional associations, community-based organizations, unions, religious bodies, recreation organizations, cultural institutions, and many more.”

*CSO Independence:* In many countries, government, political parties, and private companies establish and support CSOs. However, the CSOSI includes only organizations and groups that are self-governing, with a distinct legal and/or functional identity. CSOs typically include informal non-registered groups, but to be included in the CSOSI they must possess the structure and continuity to be distinguished from a single gathering of individuals and from personal or family relationships.

II. PROCESS:

The following steps should be followed to assemble a country report for the CSOSI.

---

Step 1: After the CSOI Implementing Partner (IP) selects panel members, which much be approved by MSI, the IP should meet with selected panelists to explain the process, review the scoring methodology, and provide the previous years’ country report. Selected panelists should then use the following steps to guide them through the individual rating process. This should occur in advance of the Expert Panel Meeting. The steps that follow will then be repeated during the CSO Expert Panel meeting, where panel members will discuss their initial scores, and the evidence for these scores, and determine by consensus the final scores for each of the indicators and dimensions.

Step 2: Selected panelists review the prior years’ country report, taking note of each dimension score and the narrative supporting it. For the current edition of the country report, every dimension score must be within 0.3 above or below the dimension scores in the previous year’s report, and the narrative must explain how the situation has changed to justify the change in dimension score. For example, if the dimension score was 4.3 the previous year, the current dimension score must not be above 4.6, or below 4.0. In all cases the shift in score, regardless of the increment, must be fully supported by the accompanying report narrative.

Step 3: Please rate each of the seven dimensions and each of the indicators within each dimension on the following scale from 1 to 7, with a score of 1 indicating a very advanced civil society sector with a high level of sustainability, and a score of 7 indicating a fragile, unsustainable sector with a low level of development (see Annex 1, CSOSI Dimensions and Indicators Score Sheet). Fractional scores to one decimal place are encouraged.

Step 4: When rating each indicator, please remember to consider each one carefully and make note of any specific, country-relevant examples of recent or historical conditions, policies, or events that you used as a basis for determining this score. Please remember you are only focusing on the year that is being assessed in the report.

Step 5: When you have rated all of the indicators within one of the seven dimensions, calculate the average of these scores to arrive at an overall score for that dimension. Record the indicator scores and overall score in the space provided on the CSOSI Dimensions and Indicators Score Sheet (Annex 1).

Step 6: Review the country report from the previous year and compare the dimension score against the score you derived for the dimension. Make sure that the change from the previous year is within 0.3 and is
justified by changes in the situation of CSOs within that dimension. Review the information in Section III about score changes and adjust dimension scores as necessary.

**Step 7:** Once the overall score for a dimension has been determined, as a final step, review the description of that dimension in “Ratings: A Closer Look” to ensure that this accurately describes the environment (Annex 2). For example, a score of 2.3 in Organizational Capacity would mean that the civil society sector is in the “Sustainability Enhanced” phase. In the Expert Panel Meeting, if after reviewing “Ratings: A Closer Look” it is determined that the score does not accurately depict the description, work together to determine a more accurate score that better fits the description for that dimension. This is a very important step of the process which, if not done correctly, often leads to the adjustment of scores by the Expert Panel as well as the Editorial Committee.

**Step 8:** Once you have scores for each dimension, average these seven scores together to arrive at an overall country rating and document all scores and supporting information.

**Step 9:** Once the panelists have gone through this process individually, the process will be repeated by the entire Expert Panel. The CSOSI IP will convene and facilitate this Expert Panel Meeting. The CSOSI IP will record all scores as well as discussion. NOTE: The IP will eliminate the highest score and the lowest score, and average the remaining scores together to come up with one score for each indicator. Once a final score has been reached for each indicator within a given dimension, the average of these scores will be taken as the score for the dimension.

It is extremely important that the discussion includes specific examples and information that can be used to justify the Expert Panel scores. Please note that the Editorial Committee will request additional information if the scores are not supported by the report narrative. If adequate information is not provided, the Editorial Committee has the right to adjust the scores accordingly.

### III. SCORING

**Scoring Scale**

The CSOSI uses a seven-point scale, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of sustainability. These levels are clustered into three general stages: Sustainability Enhanced (1 to 3), Sustainability Evolving (3.1 to 5), and Sustainability Impeded (5.1 to 7). The following broad guidelines can be used in determining scores for individual indicators and dimensions:

1. The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced significantly by practices/policies in this area. While the reforms or developments that are needed may not yet be achieved, the local CSO community recognizes the need for them and has a plan and the ability to pursue them itself.
2. The civil society sector’s sustainability is enhanced by practices/policies in this area. The local CSO community demonstrates a commitment to pursuing reforms and developing its professionalism in this area.
3. The civil society sector’s sustainability somewhat enhanced by practices/policies in this area, or its commitment to developing the aspect in question is significant.
4. The civil society sector’s sustainability minimally affected by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a stagnant economy, a passive government, a disinterested media, or a community of good-willed but inexperienced activists.
5. The civil society sector’s sustainability somewhat impeded by practices/policies in this area. Progress may be hampered by a contracting economy, an authoritarian leader and centralized government, a
controlled or reactionary media, or a low level of capacity, will, or interest on the part of the CSO community.

6 The civil society sector’s sustainability impeded by practices/policies in this area. A hostile environment and low capacity and public support may prevent the growth of the CSO sector.

7 The civil society sector’s sustainability significantly impeded by practices/policies in this area, generally as a result of an authoritarian government that aggressively opposes the development of independent CSOs.

For more specific information about the meaning of ratings for individual dimensions, please refer to “Ratings: A Closer Look” (below).

**Score Changes from Previous Year**

Because most change in the CSO sector is incremental, changes in dimension scores from the previous year must be within a range of 0.1 to 0.3 above or below the dimension score in the previous year. Changes in dimension scores from the previous year have the following significance:

0.1 Moderate change

0.2 Significant change

0.3 Cataclysmic and often unexpected change

Please note that all changes in scores must be supported by a country report narrative that includes examples and information that illuminates the trend being observed (increase or decrease).
IV. DIMENSIONS AND INDICATORS

I. LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

REGISTRATION. Is there a favorable law on CSO registration? In practice, are CSOs easily able to register and operate?

OPERATION. Is the internal management, scope of permissible activities, financial reporting, and/or dissolution of CSOs well detailed in current legislation? Does clear legal terminology preclude unwanted state control over CSOs? Is the law implemented in accordance with its terms? Are CSOs protected from the possibility of the State dissolving a CSO for political/arbitrary reasons?

ADMINISTRATIVE IMPEDIMENTS AND STATE HARASSMENT. Are CSOs and their representatives allowed to operate freely within the law? Are they free from harassment by the central government, local governments, and tax police? Can they freely address matters of public debate and express criticism?

LOCAL LEGAL CAPACITY. Are there local lawyers who are trained in and familiar with CSO law? Is legal advice available to CSOs in the capital city and in secondary cities?

TAXATION. Do CSOs receive any sort of tax exemption or deduction on income from grants, endowments, fees, or economic activity? Do individual or corporate donors receive tax deductions?

EARNED INCOME. Does legislation exist that allows CSOs to earn income from the provision of goods and services? Are CSOs allowed legally to compete for government contracts/procurements at the local and central levels?

II. ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

CONSTITUENCY BUILDING. Do CSOs clearly identify and actively seek to build local constituencies for their initiatives? Are they successful in these endeavors?

STRATEGIC PLANNING. Do CSOs have clearly defined missions to which they adhere? Do CSOs have clearly defined strategic plans and incorporate strategic planning techniques in their decision-making processes?

INTERNAL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE. Is there a clearly defined management structure within CSOs, including a recognized division of responsibilities between the Board of Directors and staff members? Does the Board actively engage in the governance of the CSO? Do the Boards of Directors operate in an open and transparent manner, allowing contributors and supporters to verify appropriate use of funds?

CSO STAFFING. Are CSOs able to maintain permanent, paid staff in CSOs? Do CSOs have adequate human resources practices for staff, including contracts, job descriptions, payroll and personnel policies? Are potential volunteers sufficiently recruited and engaged? Do CSOs utilize professional services such as accountants, IT managers or lawyers?

TECHNICAL ADVANCEMENT. Do CSOs’ resources generally allow for modernized basic office equipment (relatively new computers and software, cell phones, functional fax machines/scanners, Internet access, etc.)?

---

3 Constituency building: Attempts by CSOs to get individual citizens or groups of citizens personally involved in their activities, and to ensure that their activities represent the needs and interests of these citizens.
III. **FINANCIAL VIABILITY**

___ **LOCAL SUPPORT.** Do CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources? Are CSOs able to draw upon a core of volunteer and non-monetary support from their communities and constituencies? Are there local sources of philanthropy?

___ **DIVERSIFICATION.** Do CSOs typically have multiple/diverse sources of funding? Do most CSOs have enough resources to remain viable for the short-term future?

___ **FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS.** Are there sound financial management systems in place? Do CSOs typically operate in a transparent manner, including independent financial audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements?

___ **FUNDRAISING.** Have many CSOs cultivated a loyal core of financial supporters? Do CSOs engage in any sort of membership outreach and philanthropy development programs?

___ **EARNED INCOME.** Do revenues from services, products, or rent from assets supplement the income of CSOs? Do government and/or local business contract with CSOs for services? Do membership-based organizations collect dues?

IV. **ADVOCACY**

___ **COOPERATION WITH LOCAL AND FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.** Are there direct lines of communication between CSOs and policy makers? Do CSOs and government representatives work on any projects together?

___ **POLICY ADVOCACY INITIATIVES.** Have CSOs formed issue-based coalitions and conducted broad-based advocacy^4^ campaigns? Have these campaigns been effective at the local level and/or national level at increasing awareness or support for various causes? *(Please provide examples, if relevant.)*

___ **LOBBYING^5^ EFFORTS.** Are there mechanisms and relationships for CSOs to participate in the various levels of government decision-making processes? Are CSOs comfortable with the concept of lobbying? Have there been any lobbying successes at the local or national level that led to the enactment or amendment of legislation? *(Please provide examples, if relevant.)*

___ **LOCAL ADVOCACY FOR LEGAL REFORM.** Is there awareness in the wider CSO community of how a favorable legal and regulatory framework can enhance CSO effectiveness and sustainability? Is there a local CSO advocacy effort to promote legal reforms that will benefit CSOs, local philanthropy, etc?

V. **SERVICE PROVISION**

___ **RANGE OF GOODS AND SERVICES.** Do CSOs provide services in a variety of fields, including basic social services (such as health, education, relief, housing, water or energy) and other areas (such as economic development, environmental protection, or governance and empowerment)? Overall, is the sector’s “product line” diversified?

___ **COMMUNITY RESPONSIVENESS.** Do the goods and services that CSOs provide reflect the needs and priorities of their constituents and communities?

___ **CONSTITUENCIES AND CLIENTELE.** Are those goods and services that go beyond basic social needs provided to a constituency broader than CSOs’ own memberships? Are some products, such as publications, workshops or expert analysis, marketed to other CSOs, academia, churches or government?

---

^4^ Advocacy: Attempts by CSOs to shape the public agenda, public opinion and/or legislation.

^5^ Lobbying: Attempts by CSOs to directly influence the legislative process.
COST RECOVERY. When CSOs provide goods and services, do they recover any of their costs by charging fees, etc.? Do they have knowledge of the market demand -- and the ability of distinct constituencies to pay -- for those products?

GOVERNMENT RECOGNITION AND SUPPORT. Does the government, at the national and/or local level, recognize the value that CSOs can add in the provision and monitoring of basic social services? Do they provide grants or contracts to CSOs to enable them to provide such services?

VI. INFRASTRUCTURE

INTERMEDIARY SUPPORT ORGANIZATIONS (ISOS) AND CSO RESOURCE CENTERS. Are there ISOs, CSO resource centers, or other means for CSOs to access relevant information, technology, training and technical assistance throughout the country? Do ISOs and CSO resource centers meet the needs of local CSOs? Do ISOs and resource centers earn some of their operating revenue from earned income (such as fees for service) and other locally generated sources? (Please describe the kinds of services provided by these organizations in your country report.)

LOCAL GRANT MAKING ORGANIZATIONS. Do local community foundations and/or ISOs provide grants, from either locally raised funds or by re-granting international donor funds, to address locally identified needs and projects?

CSO COALITIONS. Do CSOs share information with each other? Is there a network in place that facilitates such information sharing? Is there an organization or committee through which the sector promotes its interests?

TRAINING. Are there capable local CSO management trainers? Is basic CSO management training available in the capital city and in secondary cities? Is more advanced specialized training available in areas such as strategic management, accounting, financial management, fundraising, volunteer management, and board development? Do trainings meet the needs of local CSOs? Are training materials available in local languages?

INTERSECTORAL PARTNERSHIPS. Are there examples of CSOs working in partnership, either formally or informally, with local business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives? Is there awareness among the various sectors of the possibilities for and advantages of such partnerships?

VII. PUBLIC IMAGE

MEDIA COVERAGE. Do CSOs enjoy positive media coverage at the local and national levels? Is a distinction made between public service announcements and corporate advertising? Do the media provide positive analysis of the role CSOs play in civil society?

PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CSOS. Does the general public have a positive perception of CSOs? Does the public understand the concept of a CSO? Is the public supportive of CSO activity overall?

GOVERNMENT/BUSINESS PERCEPTION OF CSOS. Do the business sector and local and central government officials have a positive perception of CSOs? Do they rely on CSOs as a community resource, or as a source of expertise and credible information?

PUBLIC RELATIONS. Do CSOs publicize their activities or promote their public image? Have CSOs developed relationships with journalists to encourage positive coverage?

---

6 Intermediary support organization (ISO): A place where CSOs can access training and technical support. ISOs may also provide grants. CSO resource center: A place where CSOs can access information and communications technology.
SELF-REGULATION. Have CSOs adopted a code of ethics or tried to demonstrate transparency in their operations? Do leading CSOs publish annual reports?

V. RATINGS: A CLOSER LOOK

The following sections go into greater depth about the characteristics in each of the seven dimensions of the sector's development. These characteristics and stages are drawn from empirical observations of the sector's development in the region, rather than a causal theory of development. Given the decentralized nature of civil society CSO sectors, many contradictory developments may be taking place simultaneously. Therefore the characteristics of the seven dimensions are not considered as seven distinct steps of development. Instead, these characteristics are clustered into three basic stages: Sustainability Enhanced, Sustainability Evolving, and Sustainability Impeded. The Sustainability Enhanced stage, the highest level of sustainability and development, corresponds to a score between 1 and 3 points; the Sustainability Evolving stage corresponds to a score between 3.1 and 5 points; and the lowest level of development, the Sustainability Impeded stage, corresponds to a score of 5.1 to 7 points on the scale.

LEGAL ENVIRONMENT

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): The legislative and regulatory framework makes special provisions for the needs of CSOs or gives not-for-profit organizations special advantages such as: significant tax deductions for business or individual contributions, significant tax exemptions for CSOs, open competition among CSOs to provide government-funded services, etc. Legal reform efforts at this point are primarily a local CSO advocacy effort to reform or fine-tune taxation laws, procurement processes, etc. Local and comparative expertise on the CSO legal framework exists, and legal services and materials are available.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): CSOs have little trouble registering and do not suffer from state harassment. They are permitted to engage in a broad range of activities, although taxation provisions, procurement procedures, etc. may inhibit CSO operations and development. Programs seek to reform or clarify existing CSO legislation, to allow CSOs to engage in revenue raising and commercial activities, to allow national or local governments to privatize the provision of selected government services, to address basic tax and fiscal issues for CSOs, etc. The local CSO community understands the need to coalesce and advocate for legal reforms benefiting the CSO sector as a whole. A core of local lawyers begins to specialize in CSO law by providing legal services to local CSOs, advising the CSO community on needed legal reforms, crafting draft legislation, etc.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): The legal environment severely restricts the ability of CSOs to register and/or operate, either through the absence of legal provisions, the confusing or restrictive nature of legal provisions (and/or their implementation), or government hostility towards and harassment of CSOs.

ORGANIZATIONAL CAPACITY

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): Several transparently governed and capably managed CSOs exist across a variety of sectors. A majority of organizations have clearly defined mission statements, and many CSOs utilize strategic planning techniques. Boards of directors exist, and there is a clear distinction between the responsibilities of board members and staff. CSOs have permanent well-trained staff, and volunteers are widely utilized. Most CSOs have relatively modern equipment that allows them to do their work efficiently. Leading CSOs have successfully developed strong local constituencies.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): Individual CSOs demonstrate enhanced capacity to govern themselves and organize their work. Some individual CSOs maintain full-time staff members and boast an orderly division of labor between board members and staff. CSOs have access to basic office equipment, including computers.
and fax machines. While these efforts may not have reached fruition yet, leading CSOs understand the need and are making an effort to develop local constituencies.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): CSOs are essentially "one-man shows," completely dependent upon the personality of one or two major figures. They often split apart due to personality clashes. CSOs lack a clearly defined sense of mission. At this stage, CSOs reflect little or no understanding of strategic planning or program formulation. Organizations rarely have a board of directors, by-laws, staff, or more than a handful of active members. CSOs have no understanding of the value or need of developing local constituencies for their work.

FINANCIAL VIABILITY

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): A critical mass of CSOs have sound financial management systems in place, including independent audits and the publication of annual reports with financial statements, to win potential donors' confidence. CSOs raise a significant percentage of their funding from local sources, including government, corporate and individual philanthropy, and earned income. Most CSOs have multiple sources of funding, which allow them to remain viable in the short term. A growing economy makes growth in domestic giving possible.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): CSOs pioneer different approaches to financial independence and viability. While still largely dependent on foreign donors, individual CSOs experiment with raising revenues through providing services, winning contracts and grants from municipalities and ministries to provide services, or attempting to attract dues-paying members or domestic donors. However, a depressed local economy may hamper efforts to raise funds from local sources. Training programs address financial management issues and CSOs begin to understand the importance of transparency and accountability from a fundraising perspective, although they may be unable to fully implement transparency measures.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): New CSOs survive from grant to grant and/or depend financially on one foreign sponsor. While many CSOs are created in the hopes of receiving funding, most are largely inactive after attempts to win foreign donor funding fail. Local sources of funding are virtually nonexistent, in part due to a depressed local economy. CSOs have no financial management systems and do not understand the need for financial transparency or accountability.

ADVOCACY

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): The CSO sector demonstrates the ability and capacity to respond to changing needs, issues and interests of the community and country. As CSOs secure their institutional and political base, they begin to 1) form coalitions to pursue issues of common interest, including CSO legislation; 2) monitor and lobby political parties; and 3) monitor and lobby legislatures and executive bodies. CSOs demonstrate the ability to mobilize citizens and other organizations to respond to changing needs, issues, and interests. CSOs at this stage of development will review their strategies, and possess an ability to adapt and respond to challenges by sector. A prime motivator for cooperation is self-interest: CSOs may form alliances around shared issues confronting them as nonprofit, nongovernmental organizations.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): Narrowly defined advocacy organizations emerge and become politically active in response to specific issues. Organizations at the evolving level of development may often present their concerns to inappropriate levels of government (local instead of national and vice versa). Weakness of the legislative branch might be revealed or incorrectly assumed, as activists choose to meet with executive branch officials instead ("where the power truly lies"). Beginnings of alternative policy analysis are found at universities and think tanks. Information sharing and networking within the CSO sector to inform and advocate its needs within the government begins to develop.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): Broad umbrella movements, composed of activists concerned with a variety of sectors, and united in their opposition to the Government fall apart or disappear. Some countries at this stage
have not even experienced any initial burst of activism. Economic concerns are predominant for most citizens. Passivity, cynicism or fear exist within the general public. CSO activists are afraid to engage in dialogue with the government, feel inadequate to offer their views and/or do not believe the government will listen to their recommendations. CSOs do not understand the role that they can play in public policy or do not understand the concept of public policy.

SERVICE PROVISION

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): Many CSOs provide a wide range of goods and services, which reflect community and/or local donor priorities. Many CSOs deliver products beyond basic social services in such sectors as economic development, environmental protection or democratic governance. CSOs in several sectors have developed a sufficiently strong knowledge of the market demand for their services, the ability of government to contract for the delivery of such services or other sources of funding including private donations, grants and fees, where allowed by law. A number of CSOs find it possible to cross-subsidize those goods and services for which full cost recovery is not viable with income earned from more lucrative goods and services, or with funds raised from other sources. Government bodies, primarily at the local level, recognize the abilities of CSOs and provide grants or contracts to enable them to provide various services.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): The contribution of CSOs to covering the gap in social services is recognized by government, although this is only rarely accompanied by funding in the form of grants or contracts. CSOs recognize the need to charge fees for services and other products—such as publications and workshops—but even where legally allowed, such fees seldom cover their costs. While CSO-provided goods and services respond to community needs, needs are generally identified by foreign donors, or by CSOs in an unsystematic manner. The constituency for CSO expertise, reports and documents begins to expand beyond their own members and the poor to include other CSOs, academia, churches, and government.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): A limited number of CSOs are capable of providing basic social services—such as health, education, relief, or housing—although at a low level of sophistication. Those that do provide such services receive few if any government subsidies or contracts. CSOs that produce publications, technical services or research do so only for their own members or donors. There are rarely attempts to charge fees for goods and services.

INFRASTRUCTURE

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): CSO intermediary support organizations (ISOs) and/or CSO resource centers are active in all areas of the country and provide advanced training, informational services, legal support and advice, and philanthropic development activities. Efforts are underway to establish and endow community foundations, indigenous grant-making institutions, and/or organizations to coordinate local fundraising. A professional cadre of local experts, consultants and trainers in nonprofit management exists. CSOs recognize the value of training, although the lack of financial resources may remain a constraint to accessing locally provided training. Topics of available training cover: legal and tax issues for CSOs, accounting and bookkeeping, communication skills, volunteer management, media and public relations skills, sponsorship and fundraising. CSOs work together and share information through networks and coalitions. CSOs are beginning to develop intersectoral partnerships with business, government, and the media to achieve common objectives.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): ISOs and resource centers are active in major population centers, and provide services such as distributing grants, publishing newsletters, maintaining a membership database, running a library of CSO literature, and providing basic training and consulting services. Other umbrella organizations and networks are beginning to be formed to facilitate networking and coordinate activities of groups of CSOs. Local trainers have the capacity to provide basic organizational training. Donors' fora are formed to coordinate the financial support of international donors, and to develop local corporate philanthropic activities. The value of intersectoral partnerships has not yet been realized.
Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): There are few, if any, active ISOs or resource centers, networks and umbrella organizations. Those that do operate work primarily in the capital city and provide limited services such as access to computer equipment, faxes, e-mail and meeting space. Local training and CSO development capacity is extremely limited and undeveloped. Primarily programs of international donors provide training and technical assistance. There is no coordinated effort to develop philanthropic traditions, improve fundraising or establish community foundations. CSO efforts to work together are limited by a perception of competition for foreign donor support and mistrust of other organizations.

PUBLIC IMAGE

Sustainability Enhanced (1-3): This stage is characterized by growing public knowledge of and trust in CSOs, and increased rates of volunteerism. CSOs coalesce to mount campaigns to increase public trust. Widespread examples of good working relationships between CSOs and national and local governments exist, and can result in public-private initiatives or CSO advisory committees for city councils and ministries. Media covers the work of CSOs, and CSOs approach media and public relations in a professional manner. Increased accountability, transparency, and self-regulation exist within the CSO sector, including existence of a generally accepted code of ethics or a code of conduct.

Sustainability Evolving (3.1-5): The media does not tend to cover CSOs because it considers them weak and ineffective, or irrelevant. Individual CSOs realize the need to educate the public, to become more transparent, and to seek out opportunities for media coverage, but do not have the skills to do so. As a result, the general population has little understanding of the role of CSOs in society. Individual local governments demonstrate strong working relationships with their local CSOs, as evidenced by their participation in advisory committees, consultations, public-private initiatives, and the funding of an occasional grant, but this is not yet widespread.

Sustainability Impeded (5.1-7): The public and/or government are uninformed or suspicious of CSOs as institutions. Most of the population does not understand the concept of "nongovernmental" or "nonprofit," including government officials, business leaders and journalists. Media coverage may be hostile, due to suspicion of a free but uninformed media, or due to the hostility of an authoritarian government-controlled media. Charges of treason may be issued against CSOs. Due to a hostile atmosphere caused by an authoritarian government, if individuals or businesses donate to CSOs at all, they do so anonymously.
**ANNEX B: STATISTICAL DATA FOR SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>COUNTRY</th>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.7</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.8</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.5</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.4</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Countries Ranked by Scores

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CSO Sustainability</th>
<th>Legal Environment</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability Enhanced</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustainability Evolving</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustainability Evolving</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING</td>
<td>SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING</td>
<td>SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rank</td>
<td>Score</td>
<td>Rank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>South Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>Ghana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Uganda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Namibia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Botswana</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Zambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Mali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>Tanzania</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>Rwanda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Senegal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Niger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Mozambique</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>The Gambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Guinea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Angola</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED</th>
<th>SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability Enhanced</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustainability Evolving</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustainability Evolving</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability Evolving</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustainability Evolving</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustainability Evolving</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa 4.3</td>
<td>Burkina Faso 3.1</td>
<td>South Africa 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya 4.7</td>
<td>South Africa 3.2</td>
<td>Zimbabwe 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana 4.7</td>
<td>Kenya 3.2</td>
<td>Kenya 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal 4.9</td>
<td>Uganda 3.4</td>
<td>Tanzania 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 4.9</td>
<td>Tanzania 3.5</td>
<td>Uganda 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda 5.0</td>
<td>Nigeria 3.6</td>
<td>Mali 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique 5.0</td>
<td>Ghana 3.6</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sustainability Impeded</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustainability Impeded</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sustainability Impeded</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin 5.1</td>
<td>Zambia 3.7</td>
<td>South Africa 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger 5.1</td>
<td>Mali 3.8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire 5.1</td>
<td>Liberia 3.8</td>
<td>Kenya 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar 5.2</td>
<td>Botswana 3.9</td>
<td>Tanzania 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia 5.4</td>
<td>Benin 4.0</td>
<td>Uganda 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali 5.5</td>
<td>Madagascar 4.0</td>
<td>Mali 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia 5.6</td>
<td>Namibia 4.1</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda 5.6</td>
<td>Rwanda 4.1</td>
<td>Ghana 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC 5.6</td>
<td>Sierra Leone 4.1</td>
<td>Botswana 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone 5.7</td>
<td>Mozambique 4.2</td>
<td>Burkina Faso 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria 5.7</td>
<td>DRC 4.2</td>
<td>Senegal 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe 5.8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe 4.2</td>
<td>Namibia 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso 5.8</td>
<td>Niger 4.3</td>
<td>Sierra Leone 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana 5.9</td>
<td>Malawi 4.6</td>
<td>Mozambique 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia 5.9</td>
<td>Burundi 4.6</td>
<td>Nigeria 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi 5.9</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire 4.7</td>
<td>Benin 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan 6.0</td>
<td>Gabon 4.9</td>
<td>Madagascar 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi 6.1</td>
<td>The Gambia 4.9</td>
<td>Rwanda 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon 6.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>Zamb</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## COUNTRIES RANKED BY SCORES

### INFRASTRUCTURE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED</th>
<th>SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING</th>
<th>SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kenya 3.6</td>
<td>Benin 3.3</td>
<td>Sierra Leone 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa 3.8</td>
<td>Burkina Faso 3.3</td>
<td>Rwanda 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 4.2</td>
<td>South Africa 3.6</td>
<td>Gabon 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin 4.3</td>
<td>Senegal 3.7</td>
<td>Sudan 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda 4.4</td>
<td>Namibia 3.8</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia 4.5</td>
<td>Tanzania 3.9</td>
<td>Niger 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar 4.5</td>
<td>Nigeria 4.0</td>
<td>The Gambia 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali 4.6</td>
<td>Kenya 4.2</td>
<td>DRC 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso 4.6</td>
<td>Mali 4.3</td>
<td>Malawi 5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal 4.6</td>
<td>Botswana 4.4</td>
<td>Ethiopia 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana 4.7</td>
<td>Zambia 4.9</td>
<td>Guinea 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia 4.8</td>
<td>Zimbabwe 5.0</td>
<td>Gabon 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana 4.9</td>
<td>Mozambique 5.0</td>
<td>Ethiopia 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia 4.9</td>
<td>Nigeria 5.0</td>
<td>DRC 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe 5.0</td>
<td>Angola 5.8</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique 5.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>The Gambia 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria 5.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### PUBLIC IMAGE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUSTAINABILITY ENHANCED</th>
<th>SUSTAINABILITY EVOLVING</th>
<th>SUSTAINABILITY IMPEDED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Benin 3.3</td>
<td>Benin 3.3</td>
<td>Malawi 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso 3.3</td>
<td>Burkina Faso 3.3</td>
<td>Sudan 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa 3.6</td>
<td>South Africa 3.6</td>
<td>Angola 5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal 3.7</td>
<td>Senegal 3.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia 3.8</td>
<td>Namibia 3.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania 3.9</td>
<td>Tanzania 3.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria 4.0</td>
<td>Nigeria 4.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda 4.1</td>
<td>Uganda 4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana 4.1</td>
<td>Ghana 4.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya 4.2</td>
<td>Kenya 4.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali 4.3</td>
<td>Mali 4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana 4.4</td>
<td>Botswana 4.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia 4.5</td>
<td>Zambia 4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe 4.5</td>
<td>Zimbabwe 4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone 4.5</td>
<td>Sierra Leone 4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda 4.5</td>
<td>Rwanda 4.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon 5.2</td>
<td>Gabon 5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan 5.3</td>
<td>Sudan 5.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire 5.4</td>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire 5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger 5.4</td>
<td>Niger 5.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia 5.4</td>
<td>The Gambia 5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC 5.6</td>
<td>DRC 5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi 5.6</td>
<td>Malawi 5.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia 5.6</td>
<td>Sudan 5.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea 5.6</td>
<td>Angola 5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi 5.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola 5.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>CSO Sustainability</td>
<td>Legal Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EAST AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5.3 5.2 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.4</td>
<td>5.8 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.0</td>
<td>5.3 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.5 5.5 5.6 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6</td>
<td>6.1 6.2 6.5 6.5 6.4 6.4 6.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>4.1 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9</td>
<td>4.5 4.1 4.1 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.7</td>
<td>4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>- - - 5.4 5.4 5.5 -</td>
<td>- - - 6.2 6.2 6.4 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>- - - 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.5</td>
<td>- - - 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4.2 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2</td>
<td>4.9 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9 4.8</td>
<td>5.1 5.1 5.1 5.3 5.4 5.4 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEST AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.2</td>
<td>- - - - - - - 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.2</td>
<td>- - - - - - - 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.9</td>
<td>- - - - - - - 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4</td>
<td>6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.3</td>
<td>4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>5.6 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5</td>
<td>5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.4 5.3 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8</td>
<td>5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4</td>
<td>4.3 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.9</td>
<td>- - - - - - - 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6</td>
<td>5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4.2 4.2 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.2</td>
<td>4.2 4.3 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8</td>
<td>5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.8 4.8 4.9 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7</td>
<td>4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTHERN AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5.6 5.6 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8</td>
<td>6.0 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>- - 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2</td>
<td>- - 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.5</td>
<td>- - - - - - - 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>- - 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2</td>
<td>- - 5.2 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4.8 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7</td>
<td>4.8 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.2</td>
<td>- - - - - - - 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6</td>
<td>3.5 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>- - 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6</td>
<td>- - 4.7 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8</td>
<td>6.1 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.3 6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.6</td>
<td>5.1 5.0 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## SCORES BY YEAR AND SUB-REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Organizational Capacity</th>
<th>Financial Viability</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEST AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTHERN AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Annex B** 269
## SCORES BY YEAR AND SUB-REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Advocacy</th>
<th>Service Provision</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EAST AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>4.6 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.6</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.2</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.8 6.0 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1 6.1</td>
<td>5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3.8 3.5 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2</td>
<td>3.5 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.9 4.1</td>
<td>4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>- - 4.9 5.0 5.2 - - 4.7 4.7 4.9 -</td>
<td>3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>- - 4.7 4.7 4.6 5.1 - - 5.2 5.2 5.2</td>
<td>3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4.0 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.5</td>
<td>3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.5 3.4</td>
<td>3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.4 4.3 4.2 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.1 4.0 4.0 4.2 4.2 4.3 4.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEST AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.0</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>- - - - - - 3.1</td>
<td>- - - - - - 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.7</td>
<td>- - - - - - 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>5.3 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.0 4.9</td>
<td>5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>- - 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9</td>
<td>- - 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4.0 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.7 3.6 3.6</td>
<td>3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5.7 5.5 5.3 5.3 5.2 5.2 5.1</td>
<td>5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>4.3 4.2 4.1 4.0 4.0 3.9 3.8</td>
<td>4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4.1 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8</td>
<td>3.6 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.3</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6</td>
<td>4.2 4.2 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4.0 3.9 3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.7</td>
<td>3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.2 4.1</td>
<td>4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.5 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.1</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.3 4.3 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTHERN AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5.5 5.5 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5</td>
<td>5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>- - 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.9</td>
<td>- - 3.6 3.6 3.7 3.7 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.0</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>- - 4.4 4.4 4.6 4.5 4.6</td>
<td>- - 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.2</td>
<td>4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.1</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.3 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3 3.3 3.2</td>
<td>3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>- - 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7</td>
<td>- - 4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.2</td>
<td>3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.5 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>4.0 4.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## SCORES BY YEAR AND SUB-REGION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Infrastructure</th>
<th>Public Image</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>EAST AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burundi</td>
<td>5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.7</td>
<td>4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6</td>
<td>5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia</td>
<td>5.3 5.3 5.5 5.6 5.6 5.5 5.6</td>
<td>5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.0 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>3.7 3.7 3.7 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6</td>
<td>4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.2 4.2 4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rwanda</td>
<td>5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1 5.1 5.1</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Sudan</td>
<td>- - - 5.7 5.7 5.7 -</td>
<td>- - - 4.9 4.9 5.0 -</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>- - - 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.3</td>
<td>- - - 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2</td>
<td>4.2 4.2 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.9 3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>4.8 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.5 4.4</td>
<td>4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.9 4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9</td>
<td>4.6 4.5 4.5 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>WEST AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.3</td>
<td>- - - - - - 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.6</td>
<td>- - - - - - 3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>- - - - - - 5.4</td>
<td>- - - - - - 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2 5.2</td>
<td>5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Gambia</td>
<td>- - 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4 5.4</td>
<td>- - 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7</td>
<td>4.3 4.3 4.3 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6</td>
<td>4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8</td>
<td>4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>4.9 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.4 4.4 4.3 4.3 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>- - - - - - 5.4</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0</td>
<td>4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.6</td>
<td>3.9 3.9 3.8 3.7 3.7 3.7 3.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SOUTHERN AFRICA</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Angola</td>
<td>5.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 5.8 5.8 5.8</td>
<td>5.4 5.4 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5 5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>- - 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.9</td>
<td>- - 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4 4.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.5</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>- - 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6 5.6</td>
<td>- - 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.1 5.0 5.0</td>
<td>4.9 4.8 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>- - - - - - 4.5</td>
<td>- - - - - - 3.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>3.9 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8</td>
<td>3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>- - 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.9 4.9</td>
<td>- - 4.4 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0</td>
<td>4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average</strong></td>
<td>4.9 4.9 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.9</td>
<td>4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.6 4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>