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# FINAL EVALUATION OF USAID/KENYA CONFLICT MITIGATION ACTIVITIES



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Kenya Support Services

## **DISCLAIMER**

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## ACRONYMS

3Ps	People to People Peace Project
ACK	Anglican Church of Kenya
AOR	Agreement Officer's Representative
CBO	community-based organization
CEWARN	Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
CS	civil society
CSO	civil society organization
DFID	Department for International Development
DPC	District Peace Committee
DRG	Democracy, Rights and Governance
ER	early response
EW	early warning
EWARN	Early Warning Alert and Response Network
EWER	Early warning and early response
FBO	faith-based organization
GBV	gender-based violence
GD	group discussion
GOK	Government of Kenya
ICC	International Criminal Court
ICG	International Crisis Group
IEBC	Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission
IRC	International Rescue Committee
KCSSP	Kenya Civil Society Strengthening Program
KECOSCE	Kenya Community Support Center
KII	key-informant interview
KRC	Kenya Red Cross Society
KTI	Kenya Transition Initiative
KTU	Kenya Tuna Uwezo
L&CSJ	Land- and Conflict-Sensitive Journalism
LEAP II	Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace
MC	Mercy Corps
MRC	Mombasa Republican Council
MSI	Management Systems International
NCCCK	National Council of Churches of Kenya
NCIC	National Cohesion and Integration Commission
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NSC	National Steering Committee
OCA	Organizational Capacity Assessment
PEV	postelection violence
PIK	Peace Initiative Kenya
RSA	Research Solutions Africa
SCEWER	Safe Coast Early Warning and Early Response

SMS	short message service
SOW	statement of work
TJRC	Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission
TOC	theory of change
TOO	target of opportunity
UN	United Nations
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WASH	Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene

## GLOSSARY OF TERMS

**Performance evaluation:** focuses on descriptive and normative questions: what a particular project or program has achieved (either at an intermediate point in execution or at the conclusion of an implementation period); how it is being implemented; how it is perceived and valued; whether expected results are occurring; and other questions that are pertinent to program design, management and operational decision making. Performance evaluations often incorporate before-after comparisons, but generally lack a rigorously defined counterfactual.

**Theory of change:** A tool to design and evaluate social change initiatives. It is a blueprint of the building blocks needed to achieve long-term goals of a social change initiative.

**Development Hypothesis:** Identifies causal linkages between USAID actions and the intended Strategic Objective (highest level result).

**Findings:** Empirical facts collected during the evaluation.

**Conclusions:** Interpretations and judgments based on the findings.

**Recommendations:** Proposed actions for management.

# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## Evaluation Purpose and Questions

The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of USAID-funded conflict mitigation activities and civil society strengthening projects in contributing to a peaceful Kenya. This information will help inform USAID/Kenya's conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening efforts and influence programming moving forward, in the context of a drastically reduced conflict mitigation budget and ongoing plans to support devolution. It will also inform the wider donor community in Kenya.

The evaluation seeks to answer six questions:

1. In what ways did USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation approaches contribute to peace during the 2013 general election?
2. To what extent have these identified approaches addressed root causes of conflict?
3. To what extent have attitudes and perceptions of individuals and communities changed toward peace and conflict in the targeted areas?
4. What components are likely to continue to influence conflict mitigation after program closure?
5. To what extent did USAID/Kenya strengthen civil society organizations'—especially local partners'—ability to implement and manage conflict mitigation programs?
6. What key lessons and good practices can be identified for future USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening programming?

## Project Background

In response to the violence that followed the 2007 Kenya general elections and in anticipation of the elections in 2013, USAID/Kenya's Democracy, Rights and Governance Office (DRG) ramped up its conflict mitigation activities through support to six projects. These projects are 1) the Kenyan Civil

### THE 10 APPROACHES

1. Early Warning and Early Response
2. Targets of Opportunity Grants
3. Peace Dividends Projects
4. Use of Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring
5. Community Dialogs and Reconciliation Efforts
6. Peace Messaging and SMS Platforms
7. Capacity Building for Local Partners
8. Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions
9. Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures
10. Support for and Training of District Peace Committees

Society Strengthening Program, 2) Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU), 3) Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace (LEAP II), 4) People to People Peace Project (3Ps), 5) Reporting for Peace, and Land- and Conflict-Sensitive Journalism in Kenya, and 6) Internews.

## Evaluation Methodology and Limitations

This evaluation sought to apply a theory of change (TOC)-based approach and contribution analysis as a framework to answer question 1. USAID and its implementing partners identified 10 program approaches (see box at left) capturing the range of activities undertaken in the six projects, and associated TOCs were developed for these

approaches in addition to an overarching theory of change. As this was a meta-evaluation, the team did not examine each individual project but, rather, considered its contribution toward peace during the 2013 elections Kenya through the lens of the 10 approaches. It was not intended that any firm statements/judgments on attribution would emerge, given the number of variables at play. The attribution problem is compounded by the number of donors and activities that worked in the conflict mitigation space before, during and after the elections, including DfID and the UN.



## Data-Collection Methods and Implementation

The evaluation employed a mixed-methods approach designed to collect data to inform each of the evaluation questions. The four main data collection methods used under this framework were

1. *Key-Informant Interviews (KIIs)*: Ninety-one KIIs were conducted with purposively selected members of stakeholder groups, including civil society, government, peace actors, media, religious leaders, and project and USAID staff.
2. *Group Discussions (GDs)*: Twenty-six group discussions were held, consisting of 3 informal and 23 formal GDs. Locations were purposively sampled and took place in the Coast, Mount Elgon, Nairobi, and Nakuru.
3. *A Face-to-Face Household Survey*: A randomly sampled in-depth survey was conducted with 1,255 respondents from targeted areas about their attitudes to peace and conflict during four periods up to and after the 2013 elections.
4. *Desk Study*: An extensive review of project documentation, academic, and gray literature was undertaken.

This combination of approaches allowed for the verification of findings through triangulation. A limited number of site visits was also conducted to view peace dividends and talk to surrounding communities. The qualitative and quantitative data were analyzed using outcome mapping, summary statistics, pattern/content/trend analysis, comparison analysis, and response divergence/convergence analysis and mixed-methods integration. Data were collected and analyzed on the basis of disaggregate demographic variables, including gender and age; differences in response according to demographic variables are identified in the report, although few were found for gender.

## Limitations

The team encountered several factors that affected the evaluation, some technical and others related more broadly to the environment, sector, and the nature of a meta-evaluation.

1. The scope was overly ambitious given the allotted time, resources, and breadth of the evaluation.
2. Political content and constraints above led to variable depth in findings and ability to extrapolate.
3. The absence of a firm counterfactual created difficulties with degrees of contribution.
4. The snapshot nature of peacebuilding evaluations also limited conclusions.
5. Retroactive testing of TOCs was problematic and of limited use.
6. Data limitations, owing to the absence of baselines, and empirical data constrained triangulation.
7. The strict application of USAID evaluation guidance in the context of the complexity of the topic led directly into the debate around the utility of quantification of qualitative information.
8. The scope and scale of the evaluation meant that the evaluators sought and obtained permission for a deviation from the reporting policy to allow for the report to extend to 45 pages.

## Key Conclusions

A key finding was that elections were not characterized by a “peace,” but instead by a relative absence of violence—the extent of which is also unclear. The contribution of the USAID-supported programs should be viewed in the light of this overall contextual background. This “negative peace” or absence of violence was the result of a combination of many variables and factors that can be categorized as “overarching” and community-level factors.

**Overarching factors** that contributed to an absence of violence were the International Environment: ICC’s tackling impunity; International ‘eyes’ monitoring; the National Institutional Environment: Constitution and Institutional reform (IEBC); the judiciary; police reform; NCIC’s tackling structural causes of violence in 2008, including environment of impunity and its enabling environment: “conflict

memory,” political alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto; monitoring: NCIC, hate speech, political incitement; national self-regulation: politicians, religious institutions, media houses, media council, civil society; horizontal interactions (between the different stakeholders); externally supported interventions (e.g., in support of reform processes). The 10 USAID conflict mitigation approaches were both influenced by and contributed to these factors.

Community-level factors that contributed to an absence of violence were a) *state-led interventions* such as security force deployment, b) *civil society–led interventions encompassing the 10 approaches*, and c) *joint civil society and state interventions* (also encompassing the 10 approaches).

USAID support through the 10 approaches was concentrated on supporting community-oriented responses to conflict (the community-level factors). These undoubtedly played a significant role in contributing to the absence of violence in the 2013 elections in the areas where they were implemented. However, evidence from the evaluation suggests that the overarching factors, many of which speak to the root causes of violence in Kenya, can be considered to have played a more influential role in preventing a repeat of the 2007–08 violence.

**The 10 approaches** were reinforcing and interrelated. In aggregate the approaches strengthened conflict mitigation capacities at the local level. They **empowered and provided opportunities for individuals within communities, who did not want to return to 2007–08, to engage proactively in contributing to a more peaceful election**, whether this was through engaging in monitoring, early warning, peace messaging, dialog, more sensitive journalism, or through creating linkages with other actors. This was a meaningful contribution.

**Some of the approaches have provided the foundation for addressing certain root causes<sup>\*</sup> in the future if followed up.** For instance, community dialogs were not able to address root causes, and reconciliation is yet to be realized, but they opened spaces to tackle grievances and address ethnic mistrust. The 10 approaches as described were not, however, designed to specifically address the root causes of conflict.

**It is unclear whether people’s attitudes to peace and the way they perceive political violence are changing in the targeted areas.** There were contradictory findings in the survey data, with evidence both that people’s attitudes toward peace and conflict are improving, and simultaneously the reverse. The evidence for improvement includes findings that suggest a greater value attached to peace and increasing tolerance to other ethnicities (as evidenced by responses in relation to numerous proxy indicators) over the period of 2007–08 to the present. However, opposing findings suggest there has been little change. On being asked, “Would you agree or disagree that violence is justified to advance political goals?” those who disagree strongly (that is, who want peace) rose from 69 percent to 72 percent in that period. However, for the period around the time of the election the percentage of those who agreed with the premise that violence is justified was 17 percent (and 13 percent in 2007–08). This is a small but significant number of people—and further disaggregation reveals that 80 percent were youths. This suggests the need for further specific targeting of programs aimed at addressing youths who agree with the idea that violence is acceptable.

**Overall, sustainability is limited in all three types of components without further support.** The evaluation considered the nature of a “component” and disaggregated the term into the following types: Those that relate to people (e.g., relationships and contacts), those relating to mechanisms and institutions (e.g., organizational development of CSOs and peace structures), and finally components relating to activities (e.g., peace dividends). There are multiple reasons for this. The major ones are donor dependence and a lack of clarity in how components sit in institutional systems or individuals relate to them.

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<sup>\*</sup>Root causes are those identified and articulated in the USAID/DFID *Security Vulnerability Assessment* (2009).

**There are good indications that USAID projects (e.g., KCSSP) improved general management skills of civil society organizations leading to improved effectiveness (the ability to achieve objectives and the factors involved) of program implementation.**

## **Considerations and Recommendations Informing the Future**

### **Peace or the ‘Absence of Violence’ in Kenya Is Very Fragile**

It is clear that tension is still high in many parts of Kenya. There are multiple potential triggers and issues that mean that traditional hotspots, while still sensitive, are not the only areas vulnerable to eruptions of violence. These new expressions of Kenyan societal change and frustration are continually evolving and require constant analysis and ongoing efforts to understand them.

#### **Recommendation**

Continued investment in strong analysis at both the county and national levels is important to ensure continued relevance of programs.

### **Root Causes Must Be Addressed Directly Through Programs**

While some of the USAID-supported activities included in this evaluation did address root causes, more work must be done to make progress on the drivers of conflict in Kenya. While devolution is a critical element, nevertheless other “recognized” root causes also need to be addressed. In particular at the Coast and Rift Valley land is sensitive and liable to be a trigger. There must be visible substantive progress felt at the community level to instill confidence in the reform process.

#### **Recommendation**

Support the Land Commission at national and community levels to ensure functionality and implementation of devolved structures, and outreach programs.

### **Build on Success From the Conflict Mitigation and Peacebuilding Programs**

While USAID will be operating on a reduced budget, the Agency needs to capitalize on its investments in peace for two reasons—first, to enable progression to the next stage. Programs have established foundations, so it is possible that a further investment will soon yield greater benefits. There is a clear window of opportunity now that people are no longer distracted by elections. Second, given the fragility in many counties, space must be created for reform to take place and maximize the chances of success and minimize the risk of derailment.

#### **Recommendations**

Continue to support some elements of the peacebuilding portfolio in vulnerable areas to maximize chances of truly sustainable change, particularly if pursued simultaneously addressing root causes. Build on established good donor coordination practice and relationships to allocate scarce resources for peace even more effectively.

### **The Current Context and Key Conflict Risks**

At present Kenya has a very unpredictable political landscape given the situation at the ICC and perceived uncertainty regarding the alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto. Other serious potential causes of conflict that emerged include expanding extractive industries and big development projects, such as the proposed South Sudan pipeline and port at Lamu. Youth, too, was considered a rising concern, often coupled with the issue of drug prevalence. Land continues to be important and still has the potential to trigger violence. These concerns feed directly into, or reflect, the root causes. Significantly, the devolution process itself was also cited as an emerging potential conflict risk.

## Devolution

In their efforts to ensure “peaceful” elections in 2013, civil society leaders held out the possibility of hope and future change as an alternative to potential violence. The message was, generally: “Hold on; you will be able to address your issues through the county devolution process.” This has raised the stakes considerably on expectations and the need for the devolution experiment to succeed. There is no shortage of challenges, and it is likely that the process will take numerous years before sound positive change is witnessed. This timeframe may be incompatible with current expectations, and USAID will need to keep an eye to the following potential conflict concerns raised with respect to devolution:

- *Deepening of inequalities:* Dangers of deepening inequalities or marginalization of ethnic minorities, representation and power dominated by ethnic voting blocks.
- *A fractal of the national picture:* That national political model is devolved to the county level. At its worst this may include corruption and the capture of political and economic power in the hands of a small number of people.
- *Devolution of ethnically based conflicts:* The danger of ethnically based conflict systems operating at the county level, even in homogeneous counties where intracommunity differences come to the surface and become points of conflict and possibly violence.
- *Competition for resources:* There may also be a potential increase in the disputes over borders at the ward and county level as well as other associated resource disputes—particularly natural resources such as land and water (and extractives).

## Recommendations

**Embed conflict sensitive approaches** in *all* aspects of the emerging devolution landscape. This will require partners and county officials trained and ongoing support to implementation of principles in staffing, planning, budgeting, and resource allocation. Similarly ensure that a conflict lens is applied to all USAID-supported sector programs at the county level.

**Strong peace architecture:** In conjunction, ensure the emergence of clear peace and conflict mitigation institutions, networks, and relationships at the county level. USAID programs suggest that early warning and early response (EWER) and District Peace Committees (DPCs) have strong roles to play in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation stability at the county level; however, their potential has yet to be fully realized and in the case of DPCs their future is uncertain within the county structures. This support should address challenges identified from this evaluation, including

1. Clarifying the roles and relationship b/w civil society and government, in the peacebuilding architecture
2. Their structures, selection of members and relationships
3. Lines of accountability at the county level and linked to the national level
4. Implementation of appropriate checks and balances

**Monitoring, Research, and Learning:** Close scrutiny of some key elements in the devolution experiment is required to learn and apply emerging lessons. USAID should choose carefully where to invest its resources to capture insights into a wide diversity of experience—for instance, counties that have the following characteristics: a) multiethnic counties with “negotiated democracy,” b) monoethnic counties, c) counties that enable comparative analysis on issues such as political commitment and allocation of resources, and d) counties that have a high risk of conflict from issues such as extractives, potential extremism, and political dissent (e.g., the MRC at the coast).

## EVALUATION PURPOSE AND QUESTIONS

On September 10, 2013, the Kenya Support Project was awarded the Conflict Mitigation Multi-Activity Final Evaluation, with a budget of \$380,658 (see Task Order in Annex C).<sup>2</sup> The evaluation was conducted from September 30, 2013 (the start of desk review) to November 27, 2013 (the date of the draft submission to USAID).

The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of these conflict mitigation activities and civil society strengthening projects in contributing to a peaceful Kenya. This information will help inform USAID/Kenya's conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening efforts and influence programming moving forward, in the context of a drastically reduced conflict mitigation budget and ongoing plans to support devolution. It will also inform the larger donor community in Kenya.

The design was developed in collaboration with the six implementing partners and USAID. On July 16, 2013, representatives from the six partners and USAID staff participated in a session facilitated by MSI. The session aimed at clarifying the purpose of the evaluation, helping the Kenya Support Project to understand the programs and areas of operation, discovering existing data and giving the implementing partners a sense of what would take place during the evaluation.

### THE SIX EVALUATION QUESTIONS

1. In what ways did USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation approaches contribute to peace during the 2013 General Election?
2. To what extent have these identified approaches addressed root causes of conflict?
3. To what extent have attitudes and perceptions of individuals and communities changed towards peace and conflict in the targeted areas?
4. What components are likely to continue to influence conflict mitigation after program closure?
5. To what extent did USAID/Kenya strengthen civil society organizations', especially local partners', ability to implement and manage conflict mitigation programs?
6. What key lessons and good practices can be identified for future USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening programming?

The fieldwork for the evaluation was conducted from Oct. 17 through Nov. 5, 2013. The evaluation methodology was approved by USAID on Oct. 16, 2013, and seeks to answer the six questions above.

## PROJECT BACKGROUND

In response to the violence that followed the 2007 Kenya general elections and in anticipation of the elections in 2013, USAID/Kenya's Democracy, Rights and Governance Office (DRG) ramped up its conflict mitigation activities through support to six projects. These projects are described in Annex B and summarized in Table 1.



Project activities active in highlighted counties in Kenya

<sup>2</sup> The scope of work was modified twice, with specific approval from the Contracting Office for the purpose of extending the draft survey to October 9 and increasing the number of pages to 45.

<b>Table I.DRG Conflict Mitigation Activities</b>			
<b>Project and Implementer</b>	<b>Summary of Program</b>	<b>Funding</b>	<b>Implementation Dates</b>
Kenyan Civil Society Strengthening Program PACT Inc.	Strengthen the capacity of civil society in 1) advocacy for improved governance, 2) conflict management, and 3) Natural Resource Management	\$35.5 million	2008–13
Kenya Tuna Uwezo CHF International	The program uses the Constitution as a uniting document to educate and develop civic action interventions in Nairobi slums. Different ethnic groups are targeted, and work is conducted through a conflict mitigation lens.	\$1.6 million	2/27/2012 – 2/26/2014
Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace (LEAP II). Mercy Corps	Strengthen the ability of local actors to address the root causes of postelection violence and to promote peace and reconciliation at the community level.	\$2.7 million	07/2010 – 07/2013
Peace Initiative Kenya—PIK International Rescue Committee	Train teachers, parent/teacher members, Yes Youth Can leaders, women's organizations, and possibly community health workers to be peacebuilders in their communities. Strong focus on GBV.	\$3.2 million	07/2012 – 09/2015
People to People Peace Project (3Ps) Catholic Relief Services	Strengthen community peace structures at the village and district levels and increase members' skills in peacebuilding. Targeted areas: Burnt Forest, Kuresoi, Likoni.	\$599,685	2/26/2010 – 2/25/2012 <sup>3</sup>
Reporting for Peace, and Land- and Conflict-Sensitive Journalism in Kenya. Internews.	Work with local media to mitigate conflict and contribute toward peacebuilding; CMM focus on land issues.	\$2.3 million	1/1/2010 – 5/31/2013
Total Funding		\$42.7 million	

## EVALUATION METHODS AND LIMITATIONS

This evaluation sought to apply a theory of change (TOC)–based approach<sup>4</sup> and contribution analysis as a framework to answer question 1. Further information on using TOC and contribution analysis as an evaluation approach appears in the evaluation methodology and workplan in Annex D.

Ten program approaches, capturing the range of activities undertaken within the six projects, were identified by USAID and its partners. These are listed in the box below. Theories of change were then developed for these approaches in addition to an overarching theory of change. The TOCs are described at Annex IV within the methodology and workplan document.

<sup>3</sup>There was an additional two months' no-cost implementation period added to this, with the project closing in April 2012. A theory of change–based approach to peacebuilding evaluation involves exploring the causal linkages in a results chain (the sequence and hierarchy of anticipated changes) and exploring the validity of the assumptions articulated in the theory of change. It involves making explicit the theories underpinning how interventions contribute to peace ("if-then" statements) and testing these against the understanding and perceptions of stakeholders obtained through data collection. Contribution analysis identified alternative explanations to the program to account for outcomes, such as other approaches, policies, political trends, and behaviors.

### THE 10 APPROACHES

1. Early Warning Early Response
2. Targets of Opportunity Grants
3. Peace Dividends Projects
4. Use of Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring
5. Community Dialogues and Reconciliation Efforts
6. Peace Messaging and SMS Platforms
7. Capacity Building for Local Partners
8. Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions
9. Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures
10. Support for and Training of District Peace Committees

While the evaluation examined the contribution the approaches made toward a peace during the 2013 Kenya elections, it was not intended that any firm statements on attribution would emerge—given the number of variables at play supporting a peaceful election. Similarly, given that it was a meta-evaluation, the team did not examine each individual project to analyze the extent to which it was implemented as planned and reached project-specific objectives and project goals but, rather, considered its contribution through the lens of the 10 approaches.

Given the difficulties making credible claims of causality within the multiple TOCs, the methodology evolved to concentrate on a more pragmatic approach that drew logical connections between and among the 10

approaches, their theories of change (broadly), and the evaluation questions. A contribution analysis approach was used to contextualize the approaches within the multiplicity of factors playing a role in the peaceful 2013 Kenya elections. As noted below, the quality of data further limits the extent to which claims of causality and contribution may be made.

## Data-Collection Methods and Implementation

The evaluation employed a mixed-methods approach designed to collect data to inform each of the evaluation questions. The four main data-collection methods used were key informant interviews (KIIs), group discussions (GDs), a comprehensive, face-to-face household survey, and an extensive document review. This approach strengthened verification of findings through triangulation. A limited number of site visits were also conducted to view peace dividends and talk to surrounding communities. In addition to a theory-based approach and contribution analysis, the emerging qualitative and quantitative data was analyzed using outcome mapping, summary statistics, pattern/content/trend analysis, comparison analysis, and response divergence/convergence analysis and mixed methods integration. (See Annex D, Methodology and Workplan).

**1. Key-Informant Interviews (KIIs):** The team conducted purposive semi-structured interviews with 91 key individuals representing different stakeholder groups relevant to conflict mitigation and peacebuilding during the period of 2007–13. These included 14 program-implementing USAID staff; 30 civil society actors including community-based organizations, community elders, representatives from women's and youth groups, peace committee representatives, and peace actors; 13 faith-based organizations, religious leaders, and "senior" elders; 15 media members, businesspersons, politicians, and donors; and 19 Government of Kenya (GOK) officials, including senior staff from bodies such as the National Steering Committee (NSC), the National Cohesion and Integration Commission (NCIC), the Inspector General of Police, Intelligence Departments, and senior county police and provincial administration staff. In addition, efforts were successfully made to interview the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC) and ex-members of militias. (See Annex F for the complete list of KIIs.)

**2. Group Discussions (GDs):** Twenty-three formal and three informal group discussions were conducted by the team, consisting of three types: Group A (direct project and indirect beneficiaries),



Group B (community peace actors and leaders),<sup>5</sup> and informal, ad hoc stakeholder group discussions.

*Survey Site Selection.* A purposive sampling was undertaken to identify appropriate locations to conduct group discussions. The key criterion was to ensure locations were reflective of a broad range of program activities. As a result, group discussions were conducted in Nairobi (Informal Settlements), the Coast (Mombasa, Kwale and Kilifi), Mount Elgon (Bungoma), and Nakuru (Molo/Kuresoi, Naivasha).

**3. Face-to-Face (F2F) Survey:** The team designed and conducted an in-depth survey in which it asked 1,255 household (HH) respondents from within the targeted areas their perceptions of and attitudes to peace and conflict and interethnic and communities relationships, and awareness of peace activities during four periods: a) immediately after the December 2007 general elections, b) after the August 2010 Referendum, c) just before and during the March 2013 general election, and d) after the March 2013 general election. These dates were selected to gather data to indicate the degree of attitude change during the period under evaluation.

*Survey Site and Household Selection.* The identification and selection of the final survey sites was based on the results of discussions involving MSI, USAID, and the team's local partner, RSA. Six target counties of Kericho, Mombasa, Nairobi, Nakuru, Nandi, and Uasin Gishu were sampled. Purposively identified districts with relatively higher numbers of beneficiaries enabled the development of a list of districts from which to randomly select two target districts per each of the six target counties. A random sampling methodology was developed for the selection of households. (See Annex D, Methodology and Workplan.)

**4. Desk Study:** The team conducted an extensive review of USAID/Kenya program documents, and additional relevant materials concentrated on conflict mitigation and peacebuilding, drawing on a range of strategic, analyses, programmatic, and performance documents provided by partners and independent stakeholders working in the sector.

A table appended to the methodology and workplan in Annex D lists the different evidence, sampling approach data collection, and analysis methods for each question.

## Limitations

The team encountered several factors that affected the evaluation—some technical limitations and others related more broadly to the environment, sector, and the nature of a meta-evaluation.

**The scope of the evaluation:** This was a meta-evaluation considering six projects and 10 approaches with a multiplicity of activities and theories of change simultaneously. As such, it covers far more than a standard evaluation of a focused set of activities, and there is enormous complexity and heterogeneity among the approaches and between the approaches and the context. This scope was ambitious, given the allotted time and resources, and this led to a variable depth in findings and ability to extrapolate.<sup>6</sup>

**The challenges inherent in evaluating peacebuilding and conflict programs:** Peacebuilding and conflict programs are notoriously difficult to assess because of the complex and fluid multicausal and multistakeholder nature of the sector. Models of conflict dynamics are conceptually underdeveloped, and there is greater debate within the field on what explains dynamics than in other areas such as health, economic growth, agriculture, or even similar sectors such as democracy and human rights. In addition, there is little agreement among scholars and practitioners regarding what are the most reliable

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<sup>5</sup>See Annex D, Methodology and Workplan, for detailed description of respondent criteria.

<sup>6</sup> The scope of the evaluation, covering all of the implementing partners funded by USAID in this sector, also made it difficult to find evaluators with no connection to the implementing partners. The team leader worked for one of the implementing partners in their regional office for a period of time, but had no day to day involvement with KCSSP, in either management or technical aspects of the project. MSI presented his work experience to USAID and he was approved. All evaluators signed conflict of interest forms and are located in Annex C.



indicators of successful, sustainable, and positive social change.<sup>7</sup> In addition the absence of a firm counterfactual<sup>8</sup> (how does one measure the “absence of violence”?) creates difficulties with degrees of contribution.<sup>9</sup>

Further, the nonlinear nature of complex social change means that evaluation can provide only a snapshot at the time of undertaking. This may not necessarily adequately reflect the success or otherwise of the different approaches, as these may emerge (both positively or negatively) later. Measuring sustainable, structural social change may not be possible for many years (or certainly multiple electoral cycles). Indeed, stakeholder perceptions of the success of program activities may also fluctuate depending on when questioned or when they are reflecting on the situation.

**Constraints are imposed by the nature of the discussion content.** Discussing issues of conflict can tap into deep emotional trauma from respondents’ past experiences. In these situations it is inappropriate for interviewers to curtail articulation of these emotions, even if this may be at the expense of broader data collection.<sup>10</sup> Similarly, while the number of security issues encountered did not overly constrain data collection overall, nevertheless it did influence the depth of discussion and time factors in instances where host populations were aggressive and/or interviewers were intimidated and at risk of harm.<sup>11</sup> As a result, the extent of discussion and coverage of the different approaches within interviews and GDs was uneven and created challenges with the identification of denominators.

Discussions concerning conflict can be interpreted politically. The timing of the evaluation (while ICC sittings on Kenya were happening) also flavored the environment, with many respondents and groups suspicious of the intent behind data collection at this time possibly leading to less-open discussions. In the case of GDs, this precluded the use of recording facilities.

**The lack of internal stakeholder baseline data and limited access (at present) to objective empirical data from external sources** to substantiate and determine potential and relative contribution and impact presented further methodological constraints.

**Retroactive testing of created TOC was also found to be a) problematic and b) of limited use in addressing the evaluation questions for the following reasons.**

First, projects had not necessarily been working to the retroactively developed TOCs during the course of project implementation. This is because

- A. The TOC concentrated on how the activities would lead to a reduction in violence during the 2013 elections and, while shaped to better fit the election environment, nevertheless their original starting points were not initially designed with this end in mind. For example the LEAP

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<sup>7</sup>For some relevant discussions, see 1) Peter T. Coleman. 2003. “Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict: Toward the Development of a Metaframework.” *Peace and Conflict* 9(1):1–37. 2) Barbara Gray, Peter T. Coleman, and Linda L. Putnam. 2007. “Intractable Conflicts: New Perspectives on Causes and Conditions for Change.” *American Behavioral Scientist* 50(11): 1415–29. 3) Marc Howard Ross. 2000. “‘Good Enough Isn’t So Bad’: Thinking About Success and Failure in Ethnic Conflict Management.” *Peace and Conflict* 6(1):27–47.

<sup>8</sup>Bruce Russett. 1996. “Counterfactuals About War and Its Absence.” In Philip E. Tetlock and Aaron Belkin (eds.). *Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics: Logical, Methodological, and Psychological Perspectives*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

<sup>9</sup>While the evaluation did not attempt it, attribution is even more problematic.

<sup>10</sup>There is a large literature in psychology on this topic that is increasingly under consideration by researchers in the conflict analysis field. See 1) Michael G. Griffin, Patricia A. Resick, Angela E. Waldrop, and Mindy B. Mechanic. 2005. “Participation in Trauma Research: Is There Evidence of Harm?” *Journal of Traumatic Stress* 16(3):221–27. 2) Ervin Staub, Laurie Anne Pearlman, Alexandra Gubin, and Athanase Hagengimana. 2005. “Healing, Reconciliation, Forgiving, and the Prevention of Violence After Genocide or Mass Killing: An Intervention and Its Experimental Evaluation in Rwanda.” *Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* 24(3):297–334.

<sup>11</sup>For instance, particularly in the informal settlements, and despite being accompanied by local residents, data collectors were threatened with physical violence and two group discussions were required to cut short discussions because of security considerations within the location. See RSA Fieldwork Report Annex H.

program aimed to strengthen the ability of local structures to address causes of postelection violence and promote sustainable peace and reconciliation in the Rift Valley province.<sup>12</sup>

- B. Where approaches cut across different projects these projects may not necessarily have been working to the same implicit theory of change (as more often they did not appear to be working to *any* articulated theory of change) within that approach. The retroactively developed theories of change for each approach therefore often appeared a compromise where partners were best trying to express what they had been attempting in the light of hindsight. Differences are important, be they explicit or implicit. A strict analysis and testing of the theory of change would require consideration of additional or different aspects around these differences. This also meant that comparative perspectives were challenging.

Second, the close interrelated nature of the 10 approaches also created complications in considering retrospective theories of change, particularly constraining the capture of the extent to which they linked and reinforced one another.

Third, capturing the different approaches in one overarching theory of change was difficult since, although there were interrelations between the 10 approaches, there was also diversity (support to media and training of peace actors being an example), and none of the programs was actually attempting to address the overarching TOC.

Finally, and most important, it was found that a theory-based approach was not as informative as anticipated for answering question 1. The TOC methodology is best suited to addressing *relevance* as the primary evaluative criterion. Question 1 asks for the ways that the different approaches contributed to a peaceful election. The question, therefore, requires a more descriptive and less strictly evaluative approach and does not directly demand an assessment of the *relevance* of the different approaches (i.e., how relevant were the interventions for mitigating election-related violence?). Thus there is a fundamental mismatch between the methodology and the evaluation questions.

For these reasons, addressing the validity of the different theories of change developed was not found to be helpful in answering the evaluation questions and in particular the important question 1.

## CONCLUSIONS AND FINDINGS

### Question 1. In What Ways Did USAID/KENYA Conflict Mitigation Approaches Contribute to Peace During the 2013 Elections?

#### Introduction

In responding to this question the evaluation applies contribution analysis approach, first identifying, and describing, *all* the different factors perceived to have contributed to the peaceful election. Second, it considers the ways the aggregated approaches contributed and the validity of the overall theory of change. Finally, it considers each of the 10 approaches in turn, identifying the ways they individually contributed to a peaceful election. In adopting this approach, the evaluation seeks to contextualize the ways USAID support contributed to the peaceful election within the broader picture, since this is important for informing the emphasis of future support.

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<sup>12</sup>The three key objectives were a) strengthen sustainable mechanisms for conflict mitigation and reconciliation, b) sponsor community dialogs and implement joint development projects that build bridges among divided communities and demonstrate tangible benefits to cooperation, and c) support youth integration and address a key cause of violence through youth leadership training and income generation activities.

**Conclusion:** The elections were not characterized by a ‘peace’ but rather a relative absence of violence (or ‘negative peace’) <sup>13</sup> the extent of which is also unclear. The contribution of the 10 approaches should be viewed in the light of this overall contextual background. <sup>14</sup>

**Findings:** Individuals within over half of the GDs (14/23) did not feel comfortable with the proposition that the 2013 elections were peaceful, nor with describing the current situation as peace. Rather they were more at ease using descriptions such as an “absence of violence,” “calm,” “negative peace,” and

similar terms, adding that tensions exist and many underlying issues that could be a source of violence and conflict in the future have not been addressed. <sup>15</sup> Three of the 23 group discussions (2 of which were at the Coast) mentioned that their neighbors had moved out of the area for fear of violence as an indication of the level of tension and to support this point. Attendees at the partners’ meeting all stated that they do not know the extent of the violence nor what went on during the course of the 2013 elections, first because of the absence of reliable data, and second owing to media underreporting or “self-censorship.” <sup>16</sup> One example was striking in this regard, and while not representative of the extent of violence across the country, does cast light on the way the topic was treated. The group discussion in Kilifi noted that pre-election

### ‘PROFESSIONAL SURRENDER’—MEDIA BEHAVIOR DURING THE 2013 ELECTIONS

The local media displayed extreme caution and restraint, bordering on self-censorship, in terms of how it reported the election. When gangs ambushed and killed police officers and attacked a polling station in Kenya’s troubled coast region—where a group calling itself the Mombasa Republican Council had been making demands for secession, and had even threatened to boycott the elections—the story was barely reported in the local press. Similar acts of violence and disturbances in other parts of the country were also downplayed, perhaps in the belief that reporting these events would trigger copycat incidences elsewhere, or would make the violence appear more widespread than it really was.

Source: R. Warah. 2013. “The Kenya Media’s ‘Move On’ Mantra. *allAfrica.Com* Sept. 11.

violence in that area was *underreported* in the media and that the extent of the violence was significantly greater than that discussed or portrayed. This fits an emerging pattern reported (see box, above) that the media were uncertain how or whether to report incidences of violence, possibly with the fear that it might stimulate further escalation.

**Summary Conclusion:** This ‘negative peace’ or absence of violence was the result of a combination of many variables and factors that can be categorized as ‘overarching’ and community-level factors. The 10 conflict mitigation approaches contained within the USAID-supported projects both influenced and contributed to these factors (as the findings relating to each of the 10 approaches below illustrate).

**Overarching factors** present across the whole of Kenya influenced the relative absence of violence in

### OVERARCHING FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ABSENCE OF VIOLENCE

- International Environment: ICC tackling impunity, International ‘eyes’ monitoring
- National Institutional Environment: Constitution and institutional reform, IEBC, judiciary, police reform, NCIC’s tackling structural causes of violence in 2008 including environment of impunity
- Enabling Environment: conflict memory, political alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto
- Monitoring: NCIC, hate speech, political incitement
- National Self-Regulation: politicians, religious institutions, media houses, media council, civil society
- Horizontal Interactions
- Externally supported interventions (e.g., in support of reform processes)

<sup>13</sup>Enabling Environment: conflict memory, political alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto

<sup>14</sup>A note on terminology: The confusion surrounding the terms “conflict” and “violence.” During the course of the evaluation it became apparent that there is a lack of general understanding of the difference between the two terms, with respondents using the terms interchangeably. Conflict or disagreement between people may not necessarily be a negative concept, as it can lead to positive change depending on how it is managed, while violence is a destructive form or expression of conflict between people.

<sup>15</sup>For analysis that underscores the question of negative peace in the Kenyan election, see Alina Rocha Menocal. 2013. “Kenya’s Peaceful Election Doesn’t Make It a Healthy Democracy.” *Transitions* March 22.

<sup>16</sup>Henry Makori. 2013. “Kenya: Elections 2013—How the Media Failed Kenya.” *Pambazuka News* Sept. 12.

the 2013 elections. These are listed in the box at left and are described below.

**Overarching International Environment: Conclusion:** The awareness of being monitored by the international community, in conjunction with the ICC proceedings, constrained politicians' behavior.

*Findings:* Respondents noted the constraining nature of the ICC prosecutions on leaders' and politicians' behavior with its implicit message of being responsible and accountable for one's actions. When asked what were the factors contributing to the peaceful election, 30 of the 91 KIs and 7 of the 23 GDs cited the ICC factor. This is supported by findings in other literature that cite the influence of having international "eyes" monitoring how Kenya conducted its elections.<sup>17</sup>

**National Institutional Environment: Conclusion:** Together these reforms and processes provided a greater degree of confidence that there were genuine avenues of recourse should elections be disputed, as well as holding out hope for improvements in governance.

*Findings:* The influence of the national institutional environment and reforms emerged as a factor contributing to the peaceful election—whether that be the introduction of the new 2010 Constitution and associated institutional reform of key institutions such as the IEBC, judiciary, the police, processes under way such as the TJRC, and the importance of the new commissions such as the NCIC. These findings were substantiated by views expressed in 16 of the 91 KIs and 17 of the 23 GD as well as by numerous academic articles.<sup>18</sup> Additionally, in a survey of 4,000 Kenyans from each of Kenya's 47 counties during the election period conducted by Long et al. 78% reported "a lot" or "some" trust in the Supreme Court and 69 % felt that the Supreme Court's decision in relation to the electoral outcome had been fair and impartial.<sup>19</sup>

**Political Alliance: Conclusion:** The political alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto in the Jubilee Alliance was a key factor in preventing violence between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu.

*Findings:* The political agreement between these two leaders brought together the previously conflicting ethnicities of 2007–08 in alignment rather than contesting political power. It was therefore no longer in their interest to fight. This was considered a factor preventing violence by all of the four group discussions in the Rift Valley and 14 of the 91 KIs (10 of which were located in the Rift Valley). This factor was considered particularly influential in preventing violence in the Rift Valley international environment of the ICC cases).<sup>20</sup>

**'Conflict Memory': Conclusion:** The people of Kenya did not appear to want to return to the type of conflict that was experienced in 2007–08.

*Findings:* The ongoing influence of the traumatic violence or "conflict memory" of 2007–08 was considered a key factor and cited by 13 of the 23 group discussions and 24 of the 91 KIs. Half of the GDs that felt this was important were from the Rift Valley and areas of Nairobi that experienced significant PEV in 2007–08.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>17</sup>1) International Crisis Group. 2013. *Kenya's 2013 Election*. Africa Report no. 197, Jan. 17, 8–9. 2) James D. Long, Karuti Kanyinga, Karen E. Ferree, and Clark Gibson. 2013. "Choosing Peace Over Democracy." *Journal of Democracy* 24(3):140–55. 3) S. Richard. 2013. *Bombing the People With Peace: A Follow-Up Report on the 2013 Kenyan Elections and Disaster Risk-Reduction Efforts*. Feinstein International Center, 10.

<sup>18</sup>See also 1) S. Richards. 2013. *Bombing the People With Peace: A Follow-Up Report on the 2013 Kenyan Elections and Disaster Risk-Reduction Efforts*. Feinstein International Center, 11. 2) International Crisis Group. 2013. *Kenya's 2013 Election*, Africa Report no. 197, Jan. 17, 6–7 (on the Supreme Court). 3) Mwangi S. Kimenyi. 2013. "Kenya: A Country Redeemed After a Peaceful Election." Brookings Institution. 4) Yuhniwo Ngege. 2013. "Kenya 2013 Elections: Reflections on the Supreme Court Ruling and the Role of the Judiciary in Democratization." *Open Democracy* April 18.

<sup>19</sup>Long, J. D., K. Kanyinga, K. E. Ferree, and C. Gibson, (2013), "Choosing Peace over Democracy," *Journal of Democracy* 24:3 (July): 140-155. P 151

<sup>20</sup>K. Opala. 2013. "Postelection Report: Kenyan Elections 2013," March 11.

<sup>21</sup>International Crisis Group describes this phenomenon as "a national consensus for peace with no one wanting a return to the experience of 2007–08." ICG. 2013. *Kenya's 2013 Election*. Africa Report no. 197, Jan. 17, 1.

**Monitoring: Conclusion:** Forms of monitoring of hate speech and political incitement played a role in curbing incitement by politicians and therefore reducing violence.

*Findings:* Ten of the 91 KIs described the environment. This monitoring was conducted by a range of actors from NCIC and civil society monitors, as well as trained police monitors listening to political leaders at public rallies and holding them to account.<sup>22</sup>

**National Self-Regulation: Conclusion:** Key stakeholders such as politicians, religious institutions, media houses, and civil society were keen to demonstrate that they were “doing the right thing” and were promulgating peace.

*Findings:* Respondents noted that key stakeholders such as politicians, religious institutions, media houses, and civil society were keen to demonstrate that they were “doing the right thing” and were promulgating peace. For example, speaking at Uhuru Park, at a prayer meeting ( Feb. 24, 2013) presided over by prophet David Owuor, the two top presidential candidates ( Uhuru Kenyatta and Raila Odinga) each pledged to preach peace ahead of the general elections and to concede defeat if he lost.<sup>23</sup> Further, the electoral code of conduct<sup>24</sup> served to check the behavior of political leaders in promoting the conditions conducive to the conduct of free and fair elections and a climate of tolerance. Another example is the engagement of the media by the Media Council to promote the Guidelines for Election Coverage and the development of codes of regulations by individual media houses.<sup>25</sup>

**Horizontal interactions: Conclusion:** There were not only vertical interactions between stakeholders (and factors influencing them) but also important horizontal interactions.

*Findings:* There were interactions between the different stakeholders holding one another to account. For instance, Mercy Corps cited its contacting national politicians to provide messages of peace at the community level. KRC held a public event in which politicians signed a commitment to peaceful elections and an acceptance of the result.

**Interventions:** Donors were supporting interventions at the national level focused on promoting a supportive national institutional environment for peaceful 2013 elections.<sup>26</sup>

**Different Interventions at the Community Level (Including the 10 Approaches):**

**Summary Conclusion:** In conjunction with the overarching factors operating, there were also significant factors at the ‘community level’ supporting the absence of violence. These included strongly-felt influences from the above list of factors, and 3 categories of intervention, including the USAID–supported 10 approaches.

*Findings:* Strongly felt influences from the aforementioned list of factors were consistently cited by respondents as affecting the absence of violence in the 2013 elections. The most significant factors at the community level and cited by GDs included the national institutional environment (including the new constitution) [17 of the 23 GD], the effect of the ICC constraining politicians’ and others’ behavior (6 of the 23 GDs), and the political alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto (4 of the 23 GDs) and

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<sup>22</sup>International Crisis Group (2013), Kenya’s 2013 Election, Africa Report no. 197, 17 January p. 4; Richard, S. (2013), “*Bombing the People with Peace: A Follow-up Report on the 2013 Kenyan Elections and Disaster Risk Reduction Efforts* (Feinstein International Center, May), p. 14.

<sup>23</sup>Capital Fm news, February 24, 2013.

<sup>24</sup>Elections Act, 2011, Second Schedule (S. 51(6), 110(1)) pg 95.

<sup>25</sup>Nation Media Group published an announcement outlining the requirements of any political advertisement several months before the elections *Saturday Nation*, May 19, 2012).

<sup>26</sup>See, for example, USAID Kenya. 2012. *Democracy, Rights and Governance Project, Project Approval Document*, October and DFID Kenya (2012) Operational Plan 2011–15, KTI (2013) Legacy Report.

the instructions of peace that these leaders passed to their constituencies.<sup>27</sup> Similarly, more than half (13) of the 23 GDs noted that their own “conflict memory” was a powerful disincentive for violence with recognition that communities had everything to lose and nothing to gain from violence. The extent to which conflict memory played out as a factor is correlated with the incidence of PEV in 2007–08, with Rift Valley and Nairobi respondents expressing this more than others.

At the community level, three categories of conflict mitigation intervention were mentioned as having contributed to the peaceful elections: a) *state-led interventions* such as security force deployment and contingency planning were cited by 7 of the 23 GDs and corroborated with an interview with the Chief Inspector of Police; b) *civil society–led interventions encompassing the 10 approaches*, and c) *joint civil society and state interventions* (also encompassing the 10 approaches) with examples such as EWER, hate-speech monitoring, as well as other interventions such as the police-led community policing initiative implemented in different parts of the country since 2003.

The ways interventions falling into the latter two categories contributed individually and together are discussed further below (under the 10 approaches). The different peacebuilding approaches were mentioned by 19 of the 23 GDs and 57 of the 91 KIs. These are described as “peacebuilding initiatives” in the following chart that illustrates the total number of times that all aggregated peacebuilding activities were mentioned in discussions and KIs.


**Summary Conclusion:** USAID support through the 10 approaches concentrated predominantly on supporting community-oriented responses to conflict. They undoubtedly played a significant role in contributing to the absence of violence in the 2103 elections in the areas they were implemented. The ways they did this will be explored further below. However, the overarching factors, many of which speak to the root causes of violence in Kenya (see box on root causes), can be considered to have played a more influential role in preventing a repeat of 2007–08.

**Findings:** Two key findings support this conclusion. First is the degree of weight attached to the overarching factors during GDs and KIs (and further substantiated by the literature) and second, there is some evidence of limited penetration of peacebuilding initiatives at a community level. Overarching factors were cited by KIs and GDs as having contributed to the “peaceful” election almost twice as many times as the peacebuilding initiatives (combining the 10 approaches). Overarching factors when taken together were cited 47 times by GDs, whereas the peacebuilding initiatives were cited 19 times by GDs. Overarching factors were cited 98 times by KIs and peacebuilding initiatives 57 times of the 221 DG times and KIs as illustrated in Figure 1.<sup>28</sup>

Nevertheless as noted in the limitations section, caution should be exercised in attributing too much significance to qualitative data that has been quantified. However, these figures are informative. Notably, conflict mitigation interventions are likely to have been given greater significance in this sample since the largest stakeholder group was civil society actors, many of which had been involved in their

implementation. Indeed, 75 percent all the GD respondents were direct beneficiaries.

**Conclusion:** The level of penetration within the community of interventions / peacebuilding activities appears to have been<sup>29</sup> limited.



*Findings* from the F2F survey suggest that throughout all four periods, only a very small proportion of respondents were aware of peacebuilding activities undertaken within their community. Of those aware, more knew of peace activities after 2007 elections (14 percent), and just before and during the 2013 elections (11 percent). Only 3 percent knew after the 2010 referendum and 5 percent after March 2013 elections. Taking the period “just before and during the 2013 elections” as the most relevant in measuring the level of penetration of current interventions, of the 11 percent described above, this represents 133 out of 1,255 respondents (39 in Kericho, 0 in Mombasa, 26 in Nairobi, 7 in Nakuru, 4 in Nandi, and 57 in Uasin Gishu). They were asked further questions around their engagement in and perceptions of the effectiveness of the activities. However, the small sample size (11 percent of the total) limits the extent to which one can confidently draw on these data to extract findings in relation to the 10 approaches.

## THE 10 APPROACHES

**Summary Conclusions:** The 10 approaches strengthened conflict mitigation capacities at the local level. They empowered and provided opportunities for individuals within communities, who did not want to return to 2007–08, to engage proactively in contributing to a more peaceful election, whether this was through engaging in monitoring, early warning, peace messaging, dialog, more sensitive journalism, or through creating linkages with other actors. Significantly, they have also provided hope for the future for many young people and communities and in the case of the Rift Valley dialogs have enabled sections of the community to return to a large degree of normalcy—something almost unthinkable a few years ago when people could not even talk to each other or travel on the same matatu. This was a meaningful and “significant” contribution, particularly for the communities within which these activities took place.

### Early Warning and Early Response

This approach was employed to alert all pertinent actors on potential threats to public order and cohesion and to seek suitable measures to stem these threats before they escalate into violence, and stop it from spreading when it occurs.

**Conclusion:** Early warning mechanisms succeeded insofar as they led to a) an increased number of people and agencies proactively monitoring contextual dynamics, b) an increased reporting of threats, and c) increased chance of response. In some instances this successfully led to a mitigation of violence during the election period, but in one case an EW mechanism is thought to have been misused.

*Findings:* During the lead up to and through the elections, new early warning mechanisms were formed to monitor threats and respond to them. This is in stark contrast to the situation before these initiatives. In the past, EW mechanisms were primarily found only in border areas where CEWARN operates, as well as those areas with a history of peace committees such as North Eastern. The 23 GDs mentioned a total of 21 different early warning mechanisms. An example of a particularly active system was the Safe Coast Early Warning and Early Response (SCEWER) mechanism designed in November 2012. Ten of 16 Coast KIs mentioned SCEWER and/or KECOSCE as one of the early warning mechanisms that were relied on for context monitoring. SCEWER received 1,200 SMS alerts of potential conflict, of which 600 were verified. KECOSCE held 60 community sensitization forums, with a direct reach of 2300 people.<sup>30</sup> UCHAGUZI, another new mechanism, was also formed after the 2008 postelection violence, receiving 5,500 conflict alerts, which were analyzed and shared with relevant actors for requisite response (one KI). “Uwiano Platform must have received more than 5,500 alerts,” said one respondent (one KI). It is assumed that the increase in avenues for reporting and generating alerts increased at least the possibility of a response.

<sup>30</sup>Source KECOSCE presentation, 2013.



There is evidence of EW leading to ER. In 15 of 23 GDs, participants were able to give illustrations (see example in the box) of how early warning generated responses. Moreover, 6 of 23 GDs and 33 of 91 KIs considered that civil society–led early warning mechanisms had contributed to peace during the

#### EWER in Action During the 2013 Elections

**BURNT FOREST**—A Kikuyu killed Kalenjin during a fight in a bar. This was reported not as ethnically or politically motivated violence, but as criminal in nature. A local community member reported the incident through an early warning system. In response a civil society actor visited Burnt Forest, along with an NCIC official to call an urgent peace meeting. This prevented the escalation of the incident into broader ethnic violence during the tense election period.

Sources: KI, Eldoret.

elections. An example demonstrating the success of the mechanism when operating well is illustrated by the backlash from groups whose interests were threatened by the success of the system. For example, at the Coast, MRC threatened to attack KECOSCE for making its life difficult through the SCEWER system.

**Conclusion:** Early warning mechanisms were perceived to have provided a safe space for public participation (and engagement) in early warning.

**Findings:** In 18 of the 23 GDs<sup>31</sup> where early warning systems were discussed, early warning systems, having been designed to rely on SMS–based alerts, gave the public increased confidence to participate in reporting threats. Another important KI observed that SMS–based early warning systems provided a safe space for women to report gender-based violence cases anonymously and reduced their having to go personally to the police or other authorities.

**Conclusion:** Platforms and mechanisms provided an opportunity for state and nonstate actors to coordinate to support better informed and targeted responses.

**Findings:** The majority of respondents (16 in 23 GDs) noted that the existence of early warning structures provided a mechanism for state and nonstate actors to work together in concert to ensure security. This finding was also supported by comments from 33 of 40 KIs where early warning systems were discussed. Given the historical distrust between civil society and the security authorities, early warning mechanisms appeared to have provided a set of mechanisms where they could work together without past friction—for instance, through individual CSO “brokers” who were trusted both by communities and the senior police and were therefore able to access and therefore pass on information safely.

**Conclusion:** There are examples where early warning led to early response, which in turn led to a mitigation of violence. *But* early warning did not necessarily result in early response and could be misused.

**Findings:** While there is evidence to suggest an increase in early response, nevertheless participants in 9 of 23 GDs noted that the police did not always respond; and if they did, it wasn’t always timely. Two key issues emerged. First, *tolerance*. In some areas, law enforcers took early warning reports lightly and were unresponsive or slow, even when it was an emergency.<sup>32</sup> For example, in Korogocho police were called when killings were taking place among the villagers, but they reportedly came as spectators and were quoted as saying, “Go ahead you can kill each other.”<sup>33</sup> Second, *possibility of EW system abuse*. There were occasions when it appeared that the EWER mechanism was misused. For example, in Korogocho there were rumors during the 2013 elections that people were fighting and killing one another, so a helicopter was immediately sent to assess the situation, but on the ground nothing was actually happening. This latter issue holds the risk of reinforcing the former “tolerance.” Constantly crying wolf risks security forces increasingly not taking warnings seriously.

#### Recommendations:

<sup>31</sup>One particularly credible key Informant, deeply involved in implementing successful early warning mechanism, also supported this finding.

<sup>32</sup>For instance, 9 of 23 GDs mentioned complained about instances when their alerts were ignored.

<sup>33</sup>Korogocho Group Discussion, Oct. 18, 2013.



1. Undertake further analysis to understand which early warning systems were most effective and, even deeper than that, which aspects or components could be drawn on to design the optimum type of early warning–early response mechanism. This is to be able to answer the following questions:

- a. To what extent should early warning–early response mechanisms be managed by civil society?
- b. To what extent is it helpful to have a plethora of different systems rather than one harmonized system per region?
- c. What is the optimum accountability mechanism to ensure that early response does indeed follow from the early warning?
- d. How can vertical and horizontal systems best be combined to obtain the fastest and most effective response?

2. Ensure that there is one central bank for all national EW and ER data, so that analysis of national and regional trends can be undertaken. This will then indicate whether there are increasing trends in certain areas and could lead to more timely and thoughtful responses by peacebuilding actors as well as possible deployment of security forces. In other words, the system in itself could become part of the early warning mechanism.

3. Compare several pilot responses to test which combination is most helpful to Kenya right now. For instance, in different counties one could try the following types of response in conjunction with a) future community policing initiatives, b) normal security response, c) joint civil society/security agency interventions, and d) civil society–only responses. This would need to be designed carefully both in terms of where these interventions should take place as well as the conditions under which security forces should definitely be involved.

### Targets of Opportunity

TOO was an approach under KCSSP to avail funds quickly and expeditiously toward addressing arising and unforeseen conflict and mobilize local communities and other actors toward timely resolution of conflict.

**Conclusion:** The extent to which (and indeed whether) the TOO mechanism played a role in mitigating election related violence in the period of the 2013 elections remains unclear.

*Findings:* During the course of the evaluation, numerous questions emerged in relation to TOOs and remain outstanding. A brief analysis of the grant list suggests that the majority of the activities undertaken through this grant-making facility were not *direct* conflict mitigation or rapid response–related activities (22/110) but rather were *indirect* in nature (88/110), including trainings, policy support, peace messaging, civic participation, or awareness raising on voter education, devolution, and other topics.<sup>34</sup>

**Conclusion:** The increased number of grants in the final months leading up to the elections, at minimum, reflects a general indication of preelection activity, and may be a result of increased potential for violence or fears that this potential may have been increasing.

*Findings:* The grant disbursement rate went up dramatically just before the elections (an almost equal number of grants disbursed under this mechanism were conducted during the six months before the elections (47) as those in all the previous years of the program (48). However, it is unclear why and whether these grants were addressing arising and unforeseen violence. The explanation is not immediately apparent, as it is difficult to ascertain the extent of “risk of violence” that was being addressed from the thumbnail descriptions, with the majority of grants appearing to be preventive

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<sup>34</sup>These numbers are indicative and reflect the evaluators’ judgment, as they depend on interpretation of what is direct or indirect peace mitigation.

rather than responsive,<sup>35</sup> and a liberal interpretation suggests about 12 grants were issued just before the elections in response to the risk of immediate violence versus 7 over the project life before that. The seven recipients of TOO that were met had received grants for a variety of activities. One of these grants was a *direct* (as opposed to indirect) attempt at mitigating electoral violence at Likoni and resulted in warnings being given to two police stations (Kisauni and Changamwe) considered to be at risk of attack. (The KII noted that the Changamwe police station was also warned but apparently did not take the warning seriously. Subsequently, four policemen were killed and one seriously injured).

Broader findings on the performance of the TOO mechanism not directly relevant to this question, but nonetheless informative (including in relation to the speed of disbursement, the nature of the grants) can be found at Annex I.

**Recommendation:** Deeper analysis must be conducted across the portfolio of TOO grants to glean richer lessons from the experience of this mechanism. This should be conducted through the following process (or similar):

- Conduct an analysis, in conjunction with Pact, of the grants found in the list of grants to classify them according to the typology list found in Annex I.
- ‘Interrogate’ this list to explore the findings and draw conclusions about how to better use such a mechanism in the future.
- Analysis, with Pact, of the grant list to identify about 24 grants (50 percent) close to the elections, of those that most likely fit the profile of a grant addressing potential violence. USAID AOR should then conduct a desk review followed by an interview process with the grantee, and Pact staff to assess a) the extent to which it was a direct threat or indirect threat of violence as well as whether it was preventative or responsive, b) the rationale for why it was funded at this particular time and to what extent it ‘added’ to the suite of activities, and c) what the lessons are from the mechanism.
- The output should be a discussion paper that considers the utility of having such a mechanism embedded within all major programs (or which type), and if appropriate the optimum form.
- Such a process could take 10 days: 2 days’ preparation defining the scope of work, 7 days’ fieldwork interviewing grantees and Pact, 3 days writing the discussion paper.

## Peace Dividends Projects

These are tangible community projects that demonstrated peacetime benefits as more compelling for communities in comparison with conflict, and engendered reconciliation and cohesion.

**Summary Conclusion:** The connector projects have successfully provided a strong focal point for people-to-people reconciliation processes *at this point in time*. However, relationships remain fragile and projects could become a source of tension in the future. The extent to which the reconciliation processes played a role in the ‘peaceful’ election is unclear, since in the areas where the majority projects were implemented (Rift Valley) the overarching factors, in particular the Jubilee Alliance and memory of violence, appeared more significant in bringing the two communities together.

*Findings: Contribution to peace.* Of the 11 group discussions covering the five locations where peace connector (dividend) projects were undertaken, six groups raised the projects as an important

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<sup>35</sup>In other words, they were suggested to be addressing tensions rather than rapid response activities responding to incidences of violence that needed to be contained. This again points to the difficulties described in the limitations section, of a lack of a counterfactual when considering peace evaluations.

contributor to peace. However, an interesting distinction arose: four group A's (involving project direct and indirect beneficiaries) mentioned it while only two group B's (peace actors) spoke about these projects. Conclusion: Aside from the small sample, it may simply reflect the nature of the way that discussions were structured to better cover the 10 different approaches. Nevertheless at face value it may suggest a distinction between the importance of these projects as perceived by community members compared with their leaders.

**Conclusion:** *There is an improved sharing of resources and relationships but this is fragile:* There is evidence that points to improved relationships between ethnicities as a result of connector projects and associated processes, particularly in the Rift Valley between the Kalenjin and the Kikuyu.

*Findings:* The household survey supports such a finding, as evidenced by the increase in perceptions of those interviewed who consider relationships between ethnicities to be improved. Examples of how these changes were experienced at the community level were cited in ad hoc community discussions at two connector project sites in Burnt Forest: the bridge and the market. These examples included descriptions of a progression from a) little or no interaction between “opposing groups” to b) greeting each other, c) to examples of recent intermarriage between groups.

Further evidence of increased interactions and positive relationships between communities was provided by three KIs who noted that the connector projects provided an initial strong focal point for people-to-people reconciliation processes at a community level. This improvement was then expressed in further collaborative efforts on top of the connector project itself, such as helping each other planting seeds, carrying goods of the elderly to market. The 3Ps final evaluation also confirms the finding of improved positive relationships.

The school in Burnt Forest is a connector project that has provided a place for interaction between ethnicities and is now being shared equally by both Kalenjin and Kikuyu children as a result of the 3Ps project and school efforts. It used to be considered a “Kikuyu school” with 60 children in 2009, but now there are 130 children in the ratio of 50/50 Kalenjin/Kikuyu as well as Kisii and Luhya pupils. The headmaster, while pleased with progress, noted that peace is still “very fragile” and cited a recent example to illustrate this. A student was punished, and the students concerned were asked to bring their parents to school for a consultation. Instead they brought the whole Kalenjin community armed with weapons, as the students had informed their parents that they were being punished not because of what they had done but because of their ethnicity. Similarly, he noted the importance of ensuring the student council was representative as well as the teaching staff and board of governors. This was not yet institutionalized, though.

*Expectations and ongoing use:* **Conclusion:** As with all development projects, there are dangers with peace dividends around issues of expectations and the potential to be dividers (see below).

*Findings:* Respondents said the peace hut (supported under the 3Ps project in Likoni) is not in a useful site and therefore not used very much. Nor does it have any equipment or resources attached to it and so cannot be used for other purposes easily (e.g., a resource center for youth) according to the few villagers consulted and the Likoni group discussions.<sup>36</sup>

**Conclusion:** These two issues point toward questions of expectation and ongoing management as well as a possible flaw in the original decision around where to place the hut. This is not necessarily, however, a poor reflection of the initial process as it could be a question of clarity of hindsight and other physical limitations on availability of space.

*Findings:* Another example concerning expectations was raised with respect to the successful milk collection and cooling facilities in Molo/Kuresoi. In this case, buildings have been provided but the respondents are “waiting” for milk cooling equipment. It is not clear whether this was part of the

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<sup>36</sup>This potential shortcoming is also cited in Catholic Relief Services. 2012. *People to People Peace Project (3Ps) Final Evaluation*.

agreement, but whether it was or not there is an ongoing expansion of groups from both conflicting ethnicities engaged in milk collection and benefiting from this economic activity (GD Molo).

*Potential Dividers:* **Conclusion:** The potential for connector projects to become dividers, as raised by key informants and noted in previous research (KTI social audit and Mercy Corps Lessons Learned), does not appear to have been realized here. None of these projects has yet become a divider, rather there *may* be the *potential* for that to happen.

*Findings:* The potential issue that connectors may become dividers was raised by two key informants and supported by findings in two documents (KTI Social audit and Mercy Corps Lessons learned document). For example, a market connector project at Burnt Forest, while not a program outcome (as it was supported by KTI) serves as an indicator of these potential difficulties. Further, a social audit undertaken on behalf of KTI discovered that “out of the 24 stalls that are currently being used, 98 percent of them are owned by the Kikuyu, with the Nandi and Luyha each taking 1 percent, respectively. The interpretation of the statistics is that the project has benefited the Kikuyu more compared to their Kalenjin counterparts.”<sup>37</sup> Nevertheless this serves to illustrate how, if a resource ends up disproportionately serving one side of the conflict, this could later become a source of resentment from the other group and thus transform into a “divider.” The second example of potential vulnerability (note that it was avoided) was provided in a LEAP II document pointing to the dangers associated with benefits appearing to accrue more to one set of stakeholders than another. In this case the difference was due to the project being artificially defined by an administrative boundary. Those on the other side were resentful but Mercy Corps was able to address this issue through a different project.

## Recommendations

1. Continue to support the peace dividend approach when undertaking peacebuilding programming as an effective focal point for relationship building, trust building, and interactions between potentially antagonistic groups or those with a history of divide.
2. Monitor and follow up connector projects over the long term (at least 10 years) to create an evidence base to understand the long-term impacts of peace connectors and the extent to which they remain peace dividends (or peace monuments as the 3Ps project calls them) still used equally by both parties that were originally involved in the development project. There is an opportunity to build this into the regional conflict mitigation and peacebuilding work of PEACE III, as there is an accompanying solicitation for learning and the final evaluation. It is suggested that this mechanism be used to periodically “check in” and conduct a social audit of a) peace dividends from PEACE II and b) peace dividends from the 3Ps and LEAP II programs. This would be a major contribution to the peacebuilding field, as there has not yet been a long-term assessment of this approach.

## Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring

The media, particularly radio, were used to disseminate accurate and unbiased information across Kenya. In addition, to reach a growing number of youths, social media were used to communicate peace messages and to monitor cases of hate speech for further action.

**Summary Conclusion:** External support contributed to the media’s positive behavior during the elections—one of the factors contributing to a generally nonviolent election—however, the extent is difficult to gauge. Unlike 2007–08, when some stations were found to be biased and to have provided a platform for hate speech,<sup>38</sup> in 2013 media behavior was considered to have played a more positive role. How much of this can be attributed to external support and USAID-supported interventions is difficult

<sup>37</sup>Social Audit Report for Burnt Forest Market, Eldoret East Constituency on behalf of USAID/KTI, 2012, May 28.

<sup>38</sup>Report of Commission of Inquiry on Postelection Violence. 2008, 41.

to assess, since there were many other factors influencing media behavior, notably the “overarching factors” mentioned above. External support did, however, play a part a) by providing journalists with the skills to cover election-related and conflict issues sensitively and in an informed way (rather than simply not reporting at all) and b) by supporting linkages between media and peacebuilding actors and enabling them to use the media positively for their peace messaging.

*Findings:* The final evaluation of the Land- and Conflict-Sensitive Journalism found that the media sector as a whole was widely praised for its responsible coverage of the elections.<sup>39</sup> This finding was also reflected in this evaluation research. All six of the journalists spoken to considered the media sector to have been balanced and unbiased during the 2013 elections. More than half (6) of the 11 focus groups where the media were discussed also considered it to have played a positive role in the peaceful elections.<sup>40</sup>

Media behavior during the 2013 elections was affected by numerous factors, including a) a “natural caution” from journalists mindful of the attentions of the ICC and world public opinion, b) parallel restraint from previously outspoken politicians,<sup>41</sup> c) and the presence of hate speech monitoring and a more robust legislative framework.<sup>42</sup> In the words of one GD member, “the FM stations would not have dared inciting... they knew they were being watched.” Two of six journalists spoken to ascribed this change to the fact the media had reflected on and absorbed the lessons of 2007–08, and one suggested the media wanted to clear their name. They also talked of the media feeling monitored, including concerns that their mobile phones were being tapped.

All the journalists spoken to during the course of the evaluation (6/6) considered the conflict-sensitive journalism training they (or colleagues they knew) had received to have led to more “conflict sensitive” and balanced reporting of important election-related issues. It also contributed to an increased sense of personal responsibility and understanding of the role and danger of the media. This perception is in line with the final evaluation of the USAID L&CSJ Program that states that it contributed greatly to “a new sense of professionalism amongst the staff of their 15 partner radio stations, alongside a much clearer understanding of their influence and the skills needed to broadcast in highly charged situations where ethnic identities can easily provoke violence.” By way of example, radio programs emerging from L&CJP project highlighted looking at the role of politicians in incitement. These were found to have had a big impact on listeners in their awareness of these issues.<sup>43</sup>

Interviewees and group discussion members considered that support led to stronger relationships between and among peacebuilding CSOs, communities, and media and provided a platform for the peacebuilding agenda before and during the elections. In the informal settlements of Nairobi, L&CSJ–supported stations were considered by two of the four Nairobi-based GDs to have played a role in supporting peace and conflict mitigation during the election period, by giving space to peace actors. In Mombasa, one interviewee highlighted the role of support to the media in creating and strengthening relationships between journalists and civil society actors, including religious leaders and providing a platform for the latter in calling for peace. The L&CJ evaluation underscores the strengthened interactive links with between the media and communities they serve.

**Conclusion:** Individuals within communities undertook hate-speech monitoring through SMS systems. Alongside other forms of hate-speech monitoring (e.g., by police) and the introduction of a legislative framework, this was a factor in preventing politicians from inciting violence during the elections (and

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<sup>39</sup>G. Adam and N. Harford. 2013. L&CSJ Evaluation, Internews Kenya, iMedia Associates Ltd., I.

<sup>40</sup>This was through, for example, being less biased, more balanced.

<sup>41</sup>G. Adam and N. Harford. 2013. L&CSJ Evaluation, Internews Kenya, iMedia Associates Ltd., I. This point was raised by two key-informant interviewees.

<sup>42</sup>ICG. 2013.

<sup>43</sup>G. Adam and N. Harford. 2013. L&CSJ Evaluation, Internews Kenya, iMedia Associates Ltd.

supporting a nonviolent election). However, hate-speech monitoring did not succeed in preventing incidences of hate speech over the social media (Facebook), a medium frequented by youth.

*Findings:* Incidences of hate speech were not as frequent as in past elections because of “self-censorship”—for example, in the media (see above) the existence of monitoring and the introduction of legislation.<sup>44</sup> Although the evaluation was unable to obtain figures on how many individuals were involved in reporting hate speech through SMS mechanisms, 4 (of 70 community-based KIIs) reported (unprompted) incidents of community monitoring, and 1 reported both the monitoring and a successful response.

More broadly, 12/93 KIIs highlighted hate-speech monitoring as a factor leading to less incitement to violence by politicians. Nearly half of these mentions were on the Coast, where the elections were closely fought. One KII described community monitoring as “increasing the sense of surveillance” felt by politicians. The phenomenon of an increase in hate speech over social media was covered in various reports<sup>45</sup> and was further substantiated by members of two GDs who reported having received hate messages by social media. Although there were no reports of hate speech over social media leading to violence during the 2013 elections, it has been associated with violence in other contexts—for example, Myanmar—where links have been established between hate speech in the social media and violence between followers of Buddhism and Islam.<sup>46</sup>

## Recommendations

1. Follow up with NCIC (and possibly NDI) under the devolution program a) to monitor the extent to which hate speech prosecutions result in convictions, b) to design accountability mechanisms in conjunction with civil society groups, at the county level to ensure that, first, minority groups are sufficiently represented in employment in accord with the new constitution and, second, that appropriate hate-speech monitoring and protocols are embedded in county assembly procedures to ensure that national expectations on behavior with respect to ethnicity are brought down to the county level as a “norm.”
2. Explore ways to monitor hate speech on social media to better understand the extent to which hate speech is a phenomenon of “displacement” versus a growing medium for vocalization of negative ethnicity. Possibly a small grant to an organization such as Sisi ni Amani could be requested to undertake this, or iHub under Daudi Were.

## Community Dialogs

This approach aimed to bring communities together in dialog forums to air their grievances and perceptions about the “other side,” establish common themes, and identify solutions to collective challenges facing them in an effort toward reconciliation.

**Conclusion:** Community dialogs contributed to some extent to the peaceful 2013 general election through providing spaces for community reconciliation and led to improved relationships and reduced tensions amongst participating ethnically polarized communities. It is difficult, however, to gauge contribution given the overall political context.

*Findings:* Nineteen of the 23 group discussions considered community dialogs to have contributed to the peace during the 2013 elections. In addition, 16 key informants also mentioned community dialog to have played a role in peace during the election 2013. Community dialogs were mentioned particularly by

<sup>44</sup>Global Center for the Responsibility to Protect. 2013. “The March 2013 Elections in Kenya and the Responsibility to Protect,” 3.

<sup>45</sup>See for example the final report of the Umati Social Media Monitoring Platform (Sept 2012 – May 2013).

<sup>46</sup>S. Richards. 2013. ‘Shae Thot’ Rapid Conflict Assessment: The Dry Zone – confidential report for Pact.

respondents in the Rift Valley, reflecting the fact that these initiatives were mostly implemented in the Rift. In Nakuru, a participant noted: “They have helped communities to air their grievances. In Ndeffo for example, before the dialog process there was a cut line, communities were not on talking terms, they did not share even a market, they had different matatu stages, they did not trade with each other, they did not board on each other’s Matatus, but because of these dialogs they are now on talking terms, they are sharing the market and even trading together.” One key informant observed: “Through community dialogs communities began to see common concerns through common lens and started to separate issues from perceptions and think through how to work on it.” The level of contribution, though, is hard to gauge. In South Rift, for instance, when asked, “Without dialogs would there have been peace in the area?” all respondents in the Nakuru and Molo GDs gave an affirmative yes, saying that the Uhuru–Ruto factor played a more significant role in uniting them. Although in Kilifi, Mombasa, and Nairobi respondents in GDs said that without community dialogs the situation could have been worse.

**Summary Conclusion:** Community Dialogs provided platforms for sharing of political power (negotiated democracy) that helped ease political tension and competition. In some contexts, this may have contributed to reduced violence.

**Conclusion:** There is evidence that in some contexts community dialogs have provided a platform to address issues of power sharing, and how the different electoral positions available might be shared peacefully to ensure appropriate and fair ethnic representation.

*Findings:* Four key informants in Bungoma said that interethnic negotiation through the council of elders, local civil society, and political leaders resulted in the Mabanga Peace Accord, which, using one KII’s own words, “incited them toward peace.” Similarly in South Rift, three key informants noted that intercommunity meetings in Nakuru between Kikuyu and Kalenjin helped them deal with differences between them. They considered this to have contributed to the unity of presidential candidates through influencing the leaders’ mutual understanding and recognition that their supporters would accept their unity. One highly informed and influential KII in Eldoret also considered this dynamic to have been at play.

## **Recommendation—See Question 5**

### **Peace Messaging**

This approach included all messages that espoused peace, and included ICT material and use of SMS blasts, to reach large numbers of citizens particularly before the elections.

**Conclusion:** Peace messaging was ubiquitous in the run up to and during the 2013 elections across a range of different media. Peace messaging, particularly by politicians and elders, made a substantive contribution to the ‘peaceful elections.’ It was found that messaging broadly supported the overall atmosphere and social norms relating to peaceful behavior under which the elections were contested. Messaging also reinforced other overarching factors, such as conflict memory.

*Findings:* GDs highlighted 12 different forms of peace messaging present across all locations visited.<sup>47</sup> The majority of GDs (across all regions 17/23) cited peace messaging as among the most important factors contributing to a peaceful (or nonviolent) election. In Mombasa, where groups were split according to gender, all the women’s groups cited messaging as the most important factor. Two of the 23 GDs went as far as to suggest that without the peace campaigning and messaging things “could have been worse.” One GD suggested they were necessary with people needing to be reminded “over and over again.” Four of the 23 GDs mentioned specifically the significant positive impact of the politicians in preaching peace.

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<sup>47</sup>A “gap map” showing the nature and extent of the different forms of messaging appears in Annex J.

The ways in which the messaging contributed to the overall atmosphere in which the elections were fought were as follows: By creating a “tidal wave” with “everyone going in the same direction.” This concerted nature of peace messaging from different actors was highlighted by 2 of the 23 KIIs and has also been noted in the literature on the 2013 elections.<sup>48</sup>

**Conclusion:** Messages reminded people of the effects of violence and made people self-reflect.

*Findings:* GDs (6/23) highlighted this effect with those (3/9) on the coast mentioning the films showing scenes of the 2008 violence as particularly important in this respect. One KII suggested that; “the saturation of the public space with peace messages played on people’s conflict memory.” Messages were sometimes described as *reducing fear and supporting hope* with GDs (4/23), and one stating that ‘they changed peoples’ perceptions not to be fearful’ (GD Kwale) while another noted that it ‘eased the tension’ (GD Naivasha). They also provided some individuals with *a sense of empowerment* with members of two groups described how by passing on messages or wearing T-shirts they felt they could play a positive role and help shape events. There were some reports in GDs (4/23) observing that messaging also helped people to resist violence. For instance in Kimilili one respondent described how the peace messaging gave him the confidence to rebuke spoilers and ‘warmongers’, with others (2/23) describing how messaging brought discussions on the importance of peace into the public space.

There were however, also instances of negative impacts related to messaging (4/23 GDs) suggesting there are risks or unintended negative impacts that need to be managed. At the Coast GDs (2/9) mentioned instances of messaging relating to MRC objectives “*Pwani si Kenya*” (Coast is not Kenya) were communicated via T-shirts. This helped to identify the divides and led to a war of messages with other T-shirts communicating “*Pwani ni Kenya*” (Coast is Kenya). In Naivasha the peace T-shirts unfortunately included jubilee colors and therefore were seen as partisan.

## Recommendations

In the light of the increasing mobile phone penetration of Kenya and the success of some forms of peace messaging through USAID supported groups like Sisi ni Amani, it is recommended that USAID:

1. Support the development of a manual around the production of peace messages and specificity of targeting in the light of Sisi ni Amani’s experience (both positive and negative). Such a manual should outline best practice, emerging lessons, as well as specifically draw on and tap into private sector experience from both the marketing and advertising fields.
2. Simultaneously an analysis should be undertaken of the potential triggers for conflict that are likely in the USAID supported counties (when they are selected) and a preliminary contingency plan developed for each county that could identify (a) key stakeholders (b) possible types of message (c) issues of language and sensitivities.
3. Direct linkages should be developed with the private sector to see how they might best contribute in the future to such endeavors.
4. As a matter of urgency support an impact evaluation of Sisi ni Amani’s peace messaging work. While this was funded under KTI, there is a rich vein of learning to be had that could inform the whole of USAID’s conflict mitigation work in the future. This would be a very worthwhile investment.

## Capacity Building of Local Organizations

Note that this approach is expounded under evaluation question 5.

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<sup>48</sup>See, for example, 1) Richards. 2013. 2) ICG. 2013.



## Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions

*In order to engage as many people as possible to ensure successful management and mitigation of conflict, this approach trained potential actors and peace ambassadors. With this training, alternatives to violence as a conflict resolution mechanism were identified and communities empowered to address issues at the very local level.*

### **Conclusion: Training of local actors enhanced their skills to diffuse tensions and increased trust with police forces.**

*Findings:* Faith-based organizations' (FBOs') involvement in training local actors and peace champions was lauded by 7 out of 23 GDs as having enhanced skills transfers in conflict epicenters contributing to the diffusion of tensions.<sup>49</sup> Two of the GDs noted that FBOs have organized further workshops with one outcome being a growing trust between CSOs and police that encourages information sharing.<sup>50</sup> Nevertheless trainings appeared to be concentrated in urban areas (4/23 GDs) and one group in Kimilili, Bungoma County thought: "The training hasn't been adequate. There is need for more training."

### **Recommendations**

At the county level:

- 1) Identify an appropriate role for a peace champion in a community. This could consist of some of the following tasks:
  - a. Be trained in and develop an understanding of conflict sensitivity to be applied to local development projects or CDF
  - b. Be the lead on peer-peer programs with other ethnicities in the county (if there are any)
  - c. Monitor county development plans for conflict sensitivity
  - d. In the event of a potential trigger event such as a by-election, serve as a community peace champion in the same way that they have in the 2013 elections
  - e. Serve on the DPC as a youth or woman representative
  - f. Serve as a 'hate speech monitor' at public events.
  - g. Conduct further outreach training on conflict management and conflict sensitivity to peer groups
- 2) Identify potential longer-term peace champions and develop a cadre that can link with the DPC to 'extend its reach' (in whatever form it ends up taking). Given the findings of the evaluation these need to be people that fulfill the following criteria:
  - a. Not the 'regular work-shop goers'
  - b. Focus on youth and women as they are likely to be more 'long-lived'
- 3) Design a 'self-replicating' model that invests in its sustainability. Given the evaluation findings, it is likely that there will be a slow erosion of activity if a way of 'refreshing' the system is not found. An example of how this might work is as follows: identify a community champion through a community selection system, train the champion and provide them with a manual describing their role and community expectations, after one year in the position the community selects a new person to be trained and mentored by the first champion for a period of a few months, and so on.

## Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures

*These were all the efforts toward connecting existing peace structures with peer structures as well as supporting them to have a wider reach on higher levels, influence policy, and expand their networks horizontally and vertically.*

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<sup>49</sup>Group discussions in Bungoma, Nakuru, Naivasha, 2-Uasingishu, and Mombasa

<sup>50</sup>GD-Mount.Elgon Group B and Kimilili, Group A.

**Conclusion:** There have been increased and improved multilevel relationships amongst different stakeholders working toward conflict mitigation. This supported the emergence of ‘web of actors’ engaged in conflict mitigation around the 2013 elections resulting in better information sharing and synergies through a coordinated approach. A multifarious picture is emerging of increasingly diverse interactions within the peace ecosystem. Illustrating the vertical linkages.

#### Responding to Conflict Risks in Mombasa: The ‘Web’ of Actors in Action

A KII in Mombasa underscored how a USAID–supported program had helped her organization strengthen networks, coordination, and relationships horizontally between and among different peace actors, including early warning hubs, District Peace Committees, and security actors. The result of this interaction was the timely diffusion of tensions in a community during the electoral period. Following a message through the EW system reporting the marking of the homes of “up country” people, the DPC and police were informed, and together these three sets of actors used their comparative advantages to respond to the situation by engaging the communities and enhancing security. The result was that in that area there was no movement of people.

Source: KII Mombasa

*Findings:* Five of the 49 KIIs with whom this approach was discussed, indicated a variety of peacebuilding structures, relationships and engagements operating between the national and county levels. In some cases, the linkages cascade from NSC/NCIC, Provincial Peace Forum, to County and then to Village level. In others it ends at the divisional level, while others still are solely aligned to Central government. The ‘legitimacy’ of these structures is also varied and in some cases are not recognized by the County Governance system while others have linked with the County police security oversight authority and have sector working groups (e.g. in Bungoma County).

At the horizontal level, 3 of the 10 GDs that included peace actors noted positive relationships between DPCs, CSOs, and community (e.g. youth

and religious leaders were cited) with regular meetings between some of the stakeholders (e.g., inter-religious leaders meetings at the coast). This picture was reinforced by the comments of 6 KIIs noting that inter religious and inter-ethnic networks and forums have dissuaded clan-based politics and enhanced relation building among communities. Similarly in Bungoma the GD noted that a growing trust between CSOs, DPCs and the police, that encourages sharing of intelligence and information.

#### Recommendations

1. Within the proposed USAID County devolution program, ensure that lessons learned from the Nakuru regional peace forum and USAID (KTI) supported Peace Cops are incorporated into other counties and regions that demonstrate similar ethnic diversity and conflict dynamics (for instance Isiolo, Marsabit, Moyale and Mandera).
2. If the Nyumba Kumi (“10 household”) community policing model is implemented at the county level as planned, then support the development of appropriate differentiated roles and responsibilities and complementary linkages for DPCs, regional peace forums and the community policing. In particular draw on the experiences of Likoni with community policing and DPCs during the past six months and over the election period.

#### Training and Support to District Peace Committees

This approach aimed to enhance the impact of District Peace Committees at addressing conflict at the local levels and their capacity to play intermediary roles between the government and local communities in resolution of disputes.

**Conclusion:** DPC’s contributed to the peaceful election in a number of ways, including through peace messaging, mediation and preventing the escalation of disputes, early warning and response and enhanced cooperation between state actors and communities. It is difficult however to attribute this activity to the training they received since many factors were at play. Furthermore the extent of their contribution appears limited.

*Findings:* Community members consulted through GDs did not perceive DPC's to have made a significant contribution to a peaceful election. Less than a quarter (3/13) of those GDs that did not include DPC members (and therefore were less subjective) mentioned DPCs either as a factor or initiative contributing to peace in their area. Furthermore, visibility / awareness of the role of DPCs remains limited amongst communities. The survey undertaken for this evaluation found that there was little awareness of DPCs being active within the communities surveyed. Only 2 percent of those who were aware of activities to prevent or reduce conflict in their community before and during the 2013 elections cited peace structures including DPCs as one of these activities.<sup>51</sup> Furthermore, when asked who they would report conflict or the potential for conflict to only 1 percent of survey respondents mentioned DPCs (across all time periods).

These findings diverge somewhat from the evaluation of LEAP II evaluation, where over 50 percent of the non-project participants responding to a household survey stated they were aware of peace committees and 35 percent considering DPCs more specifically generally very effective. This divergence of response is hard to attribute but may be due to the fact that the LEAP II survey was more closely calibrated to the areas where the project operated than the survey undertaken for this evaluation.

Half of the 10 GDs that included DPC members and 36 of KIs where DPCs were discussed suggested that challenges they face limit their performance and account for variability. Challenges cited were: Low levels of trust in some contexts due to relationships with provincial administration/ state actors; concentration of structures at the district level with limited extension and outreach to the lower levels; not perceived as legitimate due to not being properly constituted on the basis of a bottom up and transparent approach; lack of legal framework and limited funds.<sup>52</sup>

However, there is evidence that in some locations DPCs / peace committees did play a role in addressing the potential for violence during the electoral period in the following ways:

- Enhancing cooperation and communication between different stakeholders, in particular community members, CSOs, security agents and administration in relation to potential for violence or incitement and supporting responses, including early warning. Examples of this role were cited in 4 of the 10 GDs where DPCs were discussed.
- Training the broader public and creating awareness-raising on key peace and conflict issues (including peace messaging) Examples of this role were cited in 4 of the 10 GDs where DPCs were discussed.
- A number we spoke to had been engaged in early warning (3/10) and in mediation, counseling and interventions to prevent the escalation of tensions as illustrated by the case of the DPC in Mombasa outlined in the box above (4/10).

However the extent to which these positive examples can be attributed to training is hard to assess as other factors were at play. 4 of 36 KI where DPCs were discussed attributed their performance in part to the training they had received. However this group of KIs also highlighted other factors impacting on performance including: their length of operation, individual DPC member commitment, length of operation and quality of relationships with administration, communities and CBOS.

## **The Aggregated Impact of Various Approaches**

**Conclusion: The approaches were reinforcing and interrelated.**

*Findings:* This was expressed best within the 3Ps project, where integrated training and relationship building for peace actors was combined with dialog and peace dividends in an excellent example of how

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<sup>51</sup>It should be noted however that this is a very small sample since only 11 percent or 133 of the 1,255 individuals surveyed stated that they were aware of activities to prevent or reduce conflict in their area.

<sup>52</sup>Many of these challenges were also cited in McCallum, J (2013) LEAP II final evaluation report, July

the different approaches were combined and could become more than the sum of their parts. Similarly, the role of DPCs in peace messaging and early warning supported mechanisms (highlighted above) is another illustration of the interrelated and reinforcing nature of the approaches.

**Conclusion: There were vertical linkages between the approaches and the overarching factors, particularly the ‘enabling environment.’** There is evidence that some of the approaches influenced, supported and fed into the ‘overarching’ factors highlighted above—in particular the “enabling environment.”

*Findings:* Peace messaging for example, played on ‘conflict memory’ and there is some (although weak) evidence that local dialogs in the Rift Valley may have laid the ground for the political alliance between Kenyatta and Ruto (2 KIIs). USAID supported partners were engaged in holding leaders to account for their behavior through the elections by making them sign peace pledges.

**Conclusion: There were some limited expressions of horizontal linkages between programs.**

*Findings:* ‘Incremental positive coordination’ at the Coast and in Eldoret, KCSSP organizational development approach through the OCA was complemented and supplemented by trainings or different approaches from PIK (Financial training) and LEAP (community dialog methodologies and mobilization techniques). Secondly under approach nine one key informant described the web of peace actors working together within the peace ecosystem as a self-supporting complementary and compensatory mechanism. Thus, if one part of the system was not operating well then the functions of that part would be taken on by another part.

## Question 2. To What Extent Have These Identified Approaches Addressed Root Causes of Conflict?

**Conclusion: The 10 approaches as described were not designed to specifically address the root causes of conflict.**

*Findings:* Given that stakeholders of this evaluation had different views on what constituted a root cause of the conflicts in Kenya, it was agreed that those identified in the USAID/DFID Security Vulnerability Assessment (2009), as listed in the right hand column of the following table, would be used as the basis for answering this question.

Table 2	
The 10 Approaches	Root Causes of Conflict in Kenya <sup>53</sup>
1. Early Warning Early Response	1. Ethnically based patronage politics in a ‘with corruption
2. Targets of Opportunity (TOO Grants)	2. Economic, social and political marginalization of certain communities
3. Peace Dividends Projects	3. Erosion of state capacities
4. Use of Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring	4. Existence of criminal groups and militias that can
5. Community Dialogs and Reconciliation Efforts	

<sup>53</sup>Identified in USAID/DfID Security Vulnerability Assessment (2009)

Table 2	
The 10 Approaches	Root Causes of Conflict in Kenya <sup>53</sup>
6. Peace Messaging and SMS Platforms	be incited into violence
7. Capacity Building for Local Partners	5. Cohort of idle/ unemployed youth unemployment
8. Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions	6. Culture of impunity and weak (and corrupt) police and justice sector
9. Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures	7. Grievances over the distribution and allocation of resources including land (historical grievances, corruption in allocation of land, and the like)
10. Support for and Training of DPCs	

A straightforward comparative analysis across the columns of the table demonstrates that there is a fundamental mismatch between the focus of the majority of the 10 approaches articulated on the left and the nature of the root causes listed on the right. As one senior Civil Society leader implementing a USAID supported conflict mitigation activity noted in the Partners' Meeting, *"It is unfair to ask this question at the end of the projects when the programs were not designed for that purpose."*

Nevertheless the evaluation found some overlaps where programs and approaches did touch on root causes and where it could be said that they made a possible contribution to addressing them. The table below explores these overlaps and drawing both on project documentation as well as data obtained through KIs.

Table 3	
Approach	A Theoretical Analysis of the Extent to Which the Approaches Are Able to Address Root Causes
Early Warning and Early Response	This is an approach to prevent violence and mitigate and contain it should it erupts. It is therefore not addressing underlying root causes, simply responding in the event of conflict or potential conflict. At a minimal level it might be argued that these mechanisms could bolster state capacities to respond where these mechanisms are embedded in state institutions and there is ongoing support.
Targets of Opportunity	This was a rapid response mechanism disbursing short-term grants (e.g. a couple of months) or one-off activities and so was not designed as a tool for root causes. Nevertheless some grants did support policy debate, public participation or structural issues linked to root causes, such as the Land Bill, Impunity etc.
Peace Dividends	By linking peacebuilding with development opportunities, it is, in principle possible to utilise peace dividends to address root causes such as the existence of unemployed or idle youth. Indeed the KTU project did target those youth vulnerable to incitement in the informal settlements and encouraged them to engage in joint cross-ethnic economic activities and to resist incitement. While LEAP also supported youth groups in economic peace dividends (see discussion below), which addressed root causes. In some cases, however the short-term nature and focus of connector projects may inhibit their potential to address the issues over the longer term <sup>54</sup> .
Use of Media, social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring	The L&CSJ project sought to engage on and address land issues both at the local level and the higher national policy level and therefore did seek to address the root cause; that of 'Grievances over the distribution and allocation of resources including land'. The

<sup>54</sup>For instance, the bridge connector projects involved youth labour and so halted once the project was completed.

	<p>extent to which it did this is explored further below.</p> <p>Hate speech monitoring is able to address a root cause of conflict– the ‘environment of impunity’ within which politicians act. However the long term impacts of this approach will be contingent on other elements being in place, notably successful convictions of those prosecuted for hate speech.</p> <p>Whilst there have been prosecutions of those involved in hate speech, those cases investigated by the National Cohesion and Integration Commission have yet to lead to convictions (interview). If there are no convictions, this risks an implicit message reinforcing impunity rather than accountability.</p>
Community Dialogs and Reconciliation Efforts	In theory, community dialogs and reconciliation efforts may help address ethnically based politics and optimistically, historical grievances, but were constrained in practice (see below).
Peace messaging and SMS platforms	Peace messaging, as an approach was not intended to address the root causes of conflict. However, some instances of peace messaging (community theatre) reported did explore deeper issues such as land, showing that in principle it might be possible.
Capacity Building for Local Organizations	This approach is aimed fundamentally at strengthening civil society organizations through ID and Skills transfer. It is possible that improving the effectiveness of local organizations addresses root causes indirectly through improving advocacy, policy influence and holding the government to account if local organizations are engaged in those types of activity. For the most part the peacebuilding and conflict mitigation activities were not, except through the provision of grants under KCSSP where such activities were supported.
Training for local actors and Peace Champions	This approach was aimed at providing skills to actors on peacebuilding and conflict skills as well as on hate speech monitoring. Improved skills at this individual level may assist in addressing small local or domestic disputes but is unlikely to be able to touch inter-community issues or historical grievances deeply. Nevertheless it may have enabled personal participation in peace activities and there were cases cited where monitors reported hate speech with a response. Without the institutional framework it is hard for this approach to address root causes.
Relationship building for local peace structures	This approach was aimed at linking actors within the peace architecture, in particular to mitigate conflict rather than address root causes.
Training and support of DPCs	DPCs are envisioned as a conflict management and mitigation mechanism, rather than one focused on key policy and institutional issues relating to root causes. However, if we see weak state capacities to respond to conflict as a key root cause of conflict— DPCs can be considered to play a role in helping support and facilitate the role of state structures and bringing on board civilian capacities. However, at this point in time while the structure has an uncertain future and institutional home and with the inconsistent support and multiple challenges facing DPCs their contribution is likely to be limited.

**Summary Conclusion:** Some of the approaches have provided the foundation for addressing certain root causes in the future if followed up:

- Community dialogs were not able to address root causes and reconciliation is yet to be realized but they opened spaces to tackle grievances and address ethnic mistrust
- Targeting Youth ‘at risk groups’, often the focus of political manipulation or perpetrators of conflict in informal settlements, with community dialogs, could address the issue of criminal groups and militias that can be incited into violence.

**Conclusion:** As can be seen from the table above, it is possible, in principle, for some of the approaches to address root causes and there is some evidence to suggest that a modest foundation has been built.

*Findings:* For instance with respect to community dialogs, while Bungoma GD participants felt that community dialogs had addressed root causes by tackling grievances informing inter-ethnic conflicts, in the Rift Valley they have not been successful in bringing about full reconciliation. Participants in Molo and Nakuru GDs said that they felt reconciliation was yet to take place in their area and 5/18 Key informants in Nakuru noted that peer groups were unable to dialog on key issues because of their sensitivity and explosiveness coupled with an absence of redress mechanisms. One key informant felt that root causes are so deep that communities alone cannot resolve them without tapping in to legal and policy procedures. One key element is the signing of social contracts between groups, and this could not be achieved. For instance according to CRS' 3Ps final Evaluation report, social contracts could not be accomplished. Two key informants in Eldoret confirmed this, one of whom authored 'Amani Mashinani.'<sup>55</sup> With respect to vulnerable youth, Nairobi GD participants felt dialog meetings targeting youth 'at –risk' groups were effective as they are the main targets of political manipulation and perpetrators of conflict. This is collaborated by the desk review where according to CHF Quarterly progress report, FY 2013 Q3, more youth turned from their criminal activities to join the cohesion champions and change agents.

**Conclusion:** The L&CSJ project more directly addressed land issues as a root cause of conflict and was successful, in the areas it operated, in providing communities with information to constructively address the land related issues affecting them.

*Findings:* At the Coast both of the journalists interviewed mentioned that the Internews approach helped to ensure a holistic understanding of the coastal land issues and supported their audiences to address them with some success. This finding was further substantiated by the L&CSJ evaluation that undertook a detailed case study on the dispossessed people of Kijipwa in the Coastal Region. This showed that through following the of L&CSJ supported articles, the Kijipwa District Commissioner was removed, some 9,000 title deeds were given to squatters and another 1,300 people resettled in the Rift Valley, all of these could be plausibly connected to the project.<sup>56</sup> Across the program areas there were 'positive results in terms of raising awareness of local issues, providing communities with the understanding necessary to engage positively on the issues and to place pressure on key actors to take steps to resolved them'<sup>57</sup> and the L&CSJ evaluation provides a number of case studies.

**Recommendations:** Build on current momentum, and relative post-election calm to address long standing grievances by linking community dialog platforms with legal and policy procedures at national and county levels to assist in addressing the root causes which have legal implications such as land. Follow through and continue with dialogs to the point of drawing up social contracts/agreements with ongoing management and monitoring mechanisms.

**Conclusion: Root Causes need to be addressed directly through programs**

*Findings:* Political analysts note that **many of the key root causes of conflict identified in the 2009 analysis remain**<sup>58</sup> and, while some of the USAID–supported conflict mitigation and peace activities (alongside other USAID investments) did address root causes (see above), greater emphasis must be placed on addressing the structural drivers of conflict in Kenya. Although devolution offers a critical opportunity to address structural conflict drivers (e.g. around the allocation of power and resources), it is nevertheless important that other root causes are also addressed. The research (see discussion under

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<sup>55</sup>Amani Mashinani (peace at the grassroots), Experiences of Community Peacebuilding in the North Rift region of Kenya.

<sup>56</sup>Adam, G and Harford, N (2013), L&CSJ Evaluation, Internews Kenya, iMedia Associates Ltd, July, p. 11.

<sup>57</sup>Ibid.

<sup>58</sup>Ibid.

evaluation Question 2, above) found that, in the Coast and Rift Valley particularly, land is a particularly sore issue and liable to become a trigger in the event that frustrations with lack of progress more generally continue to rise. Land related conflict was raised as an issue in all GDs in the Rift Valley and in 6/9 GDs at the Coast. At the Coast, an interview with a land rights organization and local human rights activist found that the distribution of land titles, ostensibly to ease disgruntlement over land issues, had in fact heightened frustrations and perceptions that this was ‘lip service’ as well as creating further conflicts (due to technical issues such as titles were apparently in the wrong name, or were disputed). This gives the impression that the government is not serious in trying to address the issue.<sup>59</sup> As a result it is important that, in future, programming addresses root causes such as land directly to ensure that visible substantive progress in relation to key issues is felt at the community level. This will serve to bolster confidence in the benefits accruing from devolution and has the double benefit that it addresses fundamental drivers of conflict while simultaneously creating space for further progress in devolution.

**Recommendations:** Correspondingly, it is suggested that the donor community provides support to the Land Commission at the national level to ensure its functionality as well as the implementation of its devolved structures, mechanisms and outreach programs at the county level, while at the same time supporting other organizations engaging at a community level addressing land issues. This will serve the dual purpose of enhancing the possibility of ‘quick wins’ and simultaneously provide opportunities for positive modeling.

Secondly, integrated peace building programs that simultaneously address community development needs, root causes and mitigate conflict are likely to provide the soundest basis for societal change. The findings of the evaluation indicate the effectiveness of integrating peace and development programs (as evidenced by the 3Ps and LEAP II projects) as well as linking with conflict mitigation. The missing piece in the majority of the projects has been an additional component that addresses root causes (although the LEAP II project was addressing that to a certain extent through their youth program) in that area. For instance in Rift Valley and at the Coast this might mean helping communities to understand the legal avenues that they have to explore injustices around land.

### Question 3. To What Extent Have Attitudes and Perceptions of Individuals and Communities Changed Toward Peace and Conflict in the Targeted Areas?

**Summary Conclusion:** It is unclear whether People’s attitudes to peace and the way they perceive political violence is changing in the targeted areas.

*Findings:* The findings from the survey of 1255 respondents drawn from the targeted areas showed that the major proportion of respondents strongly disagree with the statement that ‘Violence is justified to advance political goals’ over the four time periods: after 2007 elections (67 percent); after 2010 referendum (71 percent); just before and during 2013 elections (71 percent); after 2013 elections (72 percent). There is little significant change though, in the proportion espousing these attitudes over the last three time periods. A change of one percent from 71 percent to 72 percent is not significant over this period and suggests that there is little change. This contrasts however, with the finding that the proportion of respondents that strongly appreciate the value of peace steadily increased through the four time periods: after 2007 elections (41 percent); after 2010 referendum (51 percent); just before and during 2013 elections (56 percent); after 2013 elections (60 percent) (See graph below).

**Conclusion:** Although there is some evidence of a growing appreciation for peace that could form the basis of believing that people's attitudes and perceptions toward peace are changing positively, there is

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<sup>59</sup>One KII suggested this was in fact the case given the large swathes of prime land owned by senior government officials.



also a small but significant proportion of people who either strongly agree or agree with the statement ‘Violence is justified to advance political goals’.

**Findings:** 213/1255—in the period around the 2012 elections strongly agree. Thus after 2007 elections (13 percent) agree; after 2010 referendum (14 percent); just before and during 2013 elections (17 percent); after 2013 elections (15 percent). Of those who agree with the statement, 80 percent are youth (between ages 18 and 35) with the major age group in this category being 24-29 (33 percent) and 30-35 (29.8 percent) age brackets. A regional analysis suggests that over the four periods, Nandi County has the most respondents strongly agreeing that violence is an option to advance political goals. Within that county, these constitute 22 percent of all respondents there (for the period after 2013 elections). Uasin Gishu County comes second, with 11 percent of all its respondents holding the same view. Nairobi comes third with 8 percent in the same period (after 2013 elections). Kericho, Mombasa, and Nakuru had a negligible proportion of those in favor of violence (1 percent to 0 percent).

**Conclusions:** The qualities of relationships among communities in their areas have, in respondents’ perceptions, been increasingly cordial.

**Findings:** Overall findings, illustrated in the graph at Annex D, show that in respondents’ perceptions, the quality of relationships among communities in their areas have become increasingly cordial. The proportion who believes this has increased per time period, from a low of 16 percent after 2007 to 36 percent after the 2010 referendum, 41 percent around 2013 elections, and 49 percent after the 2013 elections. Conversely, the proportion that thought inter-group relations have been poor reduced from 21 percent after 2007 elections down to 1 percent for each of the three time periods. This finding is mirrored through four different questions and/or statements in the survey, as follows when respondents were asked:

- To rate their agreement with the statement “I am my ethnic group first and a Kenyan second” which has roughly remained the same over the four time periods,
- To rate their agreement with the statement “Any ethnic group can live in this area”
- “How likely were you to discuss conflict issues with a member of a different ethnic community?”
- The extent to which “You appreciated the value of peace.”

**Recommendation:** The findings suggest that targeting specific groups on the basis of demographic and geographic considerations is key in peacebuilding and conflict. This in turn suggests that design of programs requires a sound research basis in order to understand which youth are vulnerable and the reasons behind their views in relation to violence, to maximize the chance for successful impact. Overall these findings suggests that if programming around resistance to incitement was effective then you would expect to see much more consistent findings supporting an inclination toward peaceful attitudes. While programming may have impacted on some individuals, it is possible that the overall impact of programs is not yet big enough to be reflected in the broader population.

## Question 4. What Components Are Likely to Continue to Influence Conflict Mitigation After Program Closure?

**Introduction:** In considering which components are likely to influence conflict mitigation after program closure, the evaluation considered the nature of a ‘component’ and disaggregated the term into the following types:

1. Components that relate to people: for example relationships and contacts.
2. Components relating to mechanisms and institutions: for example organizational development of CSOs, Peace structures e.g. DPCs, EW.
3. Components relating to activities: for example data banks and Peace dividends.

Furthermore, the discussions touched on an important issue regarding how peacebuilding and conflict mitigation activities are viewed as either ‘event oriented’ or ‘process oriented’ and this issue is expanded on below.

**Conclusion:** Overall, sustainability is limited in all three types of component without further support.

*Findings:* The data for this question were obtained from semi-structured interviews of key informants and group discussions, with a large range of different stakeholders each of whom had a narrow understanding of the whole panoply of activities. They also had different foci, understandings and perspectives on some of the activities of their interest. As a result the topic of sustainability emerged in different ways and forms throughout the discussions and quantifying specific mentions of different components is not helpful. Nevertheless numbers will be utilized where possible, but extreme caution should be applied in attributing meaning to them. The set of comments below, are flavored by quotations to illustrate the challenges of sustainability of these programs.

*Senior leaders’ overview:* Four senior national figures<sup>60</sup> opined that sustainability of peacebuilding and conflict mitigation activities was limited, using phrases like ‘...most will fade away...’, ‘...many elements won’t be sustainable...’, ‘...most components won’t continue...’, ‘...are not sustainable except where project(s) are going forward...’

*Stopping after the elections:* In Kilifi as well as Nairobi group discussions in Kibera and Korogocho, all noted the phasing out and halting of activities after the elections, with no follow-up from within the communities. In Korogocho they described it as “NGOs disappeared after the elections.” One KII noted that the activities were fundamentally donor-driven and so when they stopped after the elections it is not surprising that there may be issues with sustainability.

*Not addressing underlying causes:* Two KIIs (out of 40 where sustainability emerged in discussions) noted that the majority of activities around the elections had been short term in nature. One of these people pointed out that donors were more interested in seeing organizations expend resources and “get funds out of the door followed by a decline in support. This is not good for sustainability.” A group discussion in Nairobi raised the point that peace initiatives had just “...scratched the surface and had not addressed underlying causes.” A senior national CS leader observed that sustainability is an issue since underlying issues have not been addressed so many people will slip back for economic reasons. This was echoed by a senior CS leader at the coast who said, “...people will slip back into old patterns....”

## **I. Components that relate to people:**

The range of comments that were made that relate to this aspect of programs noted that sustainability is contingent on the commitment of the person, the extent of embedding or linkage with institutions, and their location.

*Skills:* **Conclusion:** While skills may be retained at the individual level staff turnover within sectors is high. *Findings:* One of the two media KIIs at the coast (echoed by Internews staff as well) noted that sustainability and follow-up at the coast on key issues is limited due to the ‘brain drain’ to media houses in the city (ironically due to their increased skills). These skills are still retained by the individuals within the sector but now the gap is again at the coast where need is high. Internews has made a start on trying to ensure the approach is embedded more sustainably into journalist training has been made with Daystar and Moi Universities who are in the process of incorporating conflict sensitive journalism into their undergraduate communications and media curricula.

*Findings:* This issue was illustrated by one of the 10 leaders at the final partners workshop who when asked about the sustainability of investment in skills, who responded by saying that those trained still had

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<sup>60</sup>Three of the four were from government institutions and one from civil society, although it should be noted that all the government officials had extensive experience in civil society before taking up government appointments.

skills, but with no continued investment in peacebuilding and conflict mitigation activities they were unlikely to continue using them due to the donor ‘fashion industry’ whereby the next program (or set of clothes) will be devolution, WASH or some other development sector.<sup>61</sup>

*Relationships:* **Conclusion:** There is some evidence of new partnerships and/or strengthened relationships between peace actors and journalists through media work.

*Findings:* Two of 30 civil society respondents noted that they had benefited from new partnerships with international, national and local organizations during the course of their programs and these will continue moving forward. The continuing nature of this type of relationship was also echoed by a CSO leader in Mombasa who observed that relationships between civil society and the police force would continue as will the network of relationships between actors there.

*Community Dialogs:* **Conclusion:** The existence of community dialogs seems to depend on the extent to which they were embedded in the existing structures/community structures and accepted as legitimate methods of addressing community grievances.

*Findings:* Some community dialog platforms are still in existence as evidenced by 8 groups out of 23 who mentioned this. Community dialogs combined with connector projects seemed more sustainable as it gave the communities an opportunity to interact and continue as described by Kuresoi respondents. In Nakuru, Participants felt that community dialogs should continue now as they felt that it is the time to engage in community dialogs while “...things are cool” (Meaning that after the election period, people are calmer) . Further evidence of legitimacy and relevance is supplied by an example cited in a Mombasa women’s GD “Interreligious dialog and interethnic dialog forums; these forums are still in existence to date—we use them as development forums.” One key informant and a central proponent of a long series of important community reconciliation dialogs between Kikuyu and Kalenjin said bluntly, “The only thing that is sustainable are the ‘merry-go-rounds.’<sup>62</sup>”

According to the CRS evaluation, peace structures formed around community dialogs are likely to continue as the 3ps model invested in building local peace structures linked with DPC to the district levels.

## **2. Components relating to mechanisms and institutions:**

*Organizational Strengthening:* **Conclusion:** There was a heavy emphasis on institutional development as a mechanism, to strengthen organizations but this approach does not guarantee sustainability while CSOs are still reliant on external donor funds.

*Findings:* Ten organizations were interviewed concerning institutional development and not a single one felt able to say that they were fully sustainable. Their vulnerability depended on the extent to which they relied on external funding; thus the two religious institutions ACK and NCCK noted that they have been able to access funding from diverse donors following capacity building, but their activity level and size is still essentially project dependent. Similarly strong organizations like KECOSKE have diversified funding and feel more secure but this is still dependent on the size of the external donor funding pool. As one KII noted “All civil society is based on donor funding levels when it should be based on ideology.” Three organizations had a slightly different model; two were supported to a certain extent by voluntary contributions of time and funding from their constituency (women and youth) and the third has been able to access government contracts for work on roads. All three acknowledged vulnerability as organizations, citing the issue of livelihoods as a fundamental constraint. One KII expressing it in these terms; “We have the policies in place but personnel is a challenge. Potential leaders went to look for

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<sup>61</sup>There were many nods of agreement from others when the leader said this.

<sup>62</sup>Merry-go-rounds are an economic savings model used by groups who all pay in a certain amount weekly, and then each month one member receives the group savings to use as he or she sees fit or invest the monies. (This is illustrative; there are many variations on the model.)

jobs. We are grooming other people but we have a gap and so our sustainability and activities are down.” Another organization stated bluntly, “Sustainability? Yes, we have been looking at that—we may have to close down if we don’t get more funding soon.”

*District Peace Committees:* **Conclusions:** DPC sustainability is very uncertain.

*Findings:* District Peace Committee sustainability was mentioned in several interviews with KIs<sup>63</sup> raising it as an issue 12 times essentially noting that they are vulnerable, and need continued support. Group Discussions also noted that they face significant challenges (highlighted in Q1) and ongoing capacity building needs (2/10 GDs cited these) as well as a lack of funding (highlighted in 3/10 GDs). Their vulnerability is exacerbated by a lack of clarity over how they will relate to the new county structures and what support they can expect to receive from county government.<sup>64</sup>

*Early Warning Mechanisms:* **Conclusion:** Early Warning mechanisms show some signs of being sustainable but this seems dependent upon goodwill.

*Findings:* Early Warning mechanisms were cited frequently regarding their sustainability as well as the need for continued support. One senior security officer interviewed acknowledged the importance of the information coming from these mechanisms. Eight KIs (and one GD) mentioned EW systems (five of these mentions are from Nakuru) as still being active although at diminishing levels. One KI noted that alerts are one thing but analysis and response are currently difficult to sustain. It is interesting to note that the Nakuru systems are most firmly embedded within an institutional framework with the government supported peace forum, and Peace Corps. In that location 2 KIs discussed the expansion of the EWER mechanism to tackle more issues, specifically wildlife poaching and child protection in Nakuru, pointing to the potential for metamorphosis. Some EW monitors are volunteering their time (reliant on personal commitment) e.g. 1 KI in Bungoma is volunteering and 1 KI in Coast is still in touch with the 63 monitors that were deployed there.

*Targets of Opportunity:* It should also be noted that the TOO approach is a project related mechanism and will therefore stop now the project has completed unless embedded into a future project

### **3. Components relating to activities**

*Peace Dividends:* **Conclusions:** The infrastructure will likely last for many years (e.g. Peace Hut, Water points, Market, School block, and bridges) but it is less clear to what extent the relationships and joint activities are robust (debatably the most important aspects).

*Findings:* Six groups out of eleven where peace dividends were located mentioned their belief that these connector projects are sustainable and still continuing, those noted included the milk collection, bridges, tree planting and road maintenance work. There are two fundamental sorts of connector project or peace dividend; those based around infrastructure and those that are focused on joint economic activities. .

**Conclusion: Economic success may depend on not using ethnically mixed groups.**

*Findings:* Two youth organizations interviewed<sup>65</sup> noted that their groups are still going strong around football teams and economic activity, but the LEAP evaluation (Burbank, K, 2010) noted that there is a tension between the peace objectives and the economic objectives with group formation. In other words to achieve success economically mixed ethnic groups may not be the most effective methodology. Peace surrounding infrastructure can also be fragile as noted by the headmaster at St Cecilia Koilugit Secondary School, Burnt Forest.

<sup>63</sup>Although four of these KIs were with DPC chairmen or Deputy Chairmen.

<sup>64</sup>McCallum, J (2013) LEAP II final evaluation report, July.

<sup>65</sup>ASTEP and Marihiano.

**Peace is a process not an event:** Many of the activities were perceived as strongly aimed at the elections rather than a sustained peace.

*Findings:* One of the debates that emerged as a result of the sustainability discussions was the important point that peace must be seen as a process not as an event. While some of the USAID supported programs were implemented over a period of a number of years nevertheless there is a tension expressed around how these programs were aimed at ensuring a peaceful 2013 elections. Thus 11/23 GDs said that peace should be seen as a process not an event and this was corroborated through 25 key informants observations. For example one respondent in Korogocho said “*projects within the slums especially the hotspots should be an ongoing activity going beyond the 5 year cycle of elections and violence that are usually witnessed*”. A respondent echoed this in Mombasa by remarking, “CSOs and CBOs activities ought to be an ongoing process that should not be stopped after elections are done, only to be revived after 5 years.” This conclusion is also borne out by the findings under question two that suggest that programs were not always addressing root causes sufficiently (for whatever reason; see discussion above).

**Conclusion:** Peace processes may be best addressed during periods away from the elections.

*Findings:* A number of respondents observed that now is the best time to work on peace processes without the distraction of elections, so for instance in Naivasha a respondent observed, “*The process of peacebuilding should start now when there is peace, we should not wait for the campaign period*” or as another noted, “*Now is the time to engage in inter-community dialog when ‘things are cool’*.” Yet another noted that they “*...would ideally like to run the EWARN throughout the next five years.*”

### **Recommendation:**

**Build on Success from the Conflict Mitigation and Peacebuilding Programs:** Although USAID will be operating in a reduced budget environment for these program areas in the future, it is critical to capitalize on the significant investment in peace processes to date. This is important for two fundamental reasons: both to capitalize and build on the progress already made in a context that requires a medium- to long-term commitment; and because the need for conflict mitigation continues.

**Conclusion:** To fully capitalize on the foundations and progress that has been made in terms of peacebuilding and relationship building, USAID’s approach can be considered to have had dual objectives: longer term peacebuilding and capacity building (e.g., the reconciliation processes) alongside the mitigation of election violence during the 2013 elections. Whilst there is evidence of success in relation to the latter objective (electoral violence mitigation), expectations and results in relation to the former have yet to be fully realized. Further investments are required to fully achieve the social return on investments to date and would enhance sustainability and possibly reach a ‘tipping point’. There is a case, for example, for consolidating the inter-ethnic reconciliation work in the Rift Valley undertaken by the 3Ps project.<sup>66</sup>

*Findings:* In ‘Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies’ (Lederach 1997, 80), Jean–Paul Lederach presents a diagram (reproduced in Annex H) showing the time frame needed to progress conflict transformation and achieve the possibility of societal change as between 5 to 10 years. The programs reviewed for this evaluation have established foundations that, in some cases, are just nearing the five year point, so it is possible that further investment will yield the hoped-for benefit. A number of KILs pointed to the fact there is a clear window of opportunity now to move this agenda forward given people’s focus is no longer distracted by elections.

**Recommendations:** In a context of reduced funding, it is suggested that coordinating within the broader donor community around peacebuilding will be even more important to prevent duplication and maximize effectiveness. Correspondingly, it is suggested that USAID (i) Continue to support some

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<sup>66</sup>Catholic Relief Services. 2012. *People to People Peace Project (3Ps) Final Evaluation*.

elements of the peacebuilding portfolio in vulnerable areas to maximize the chances of truly sustainable change, particularly if pursued with a simultaneous agenda of addressing root causes in the same locations (ii) Build on the good donor coordination practice and the relationships established by USAID during the election period to allocate resources even more effectively. (iii) consider coordinating with DFID in relation to their new £14 million Kenya peace and security program to identify gaps and areas of complementarity.

Further, it is recommended that USAID considers the extent of sustainability that they are expecting within projects before their startup, and explicitly acknowledges the expectation in the award. Considerations should include the extent to which sustainability is a) desirable (should all organizations and components be fully sustainable in the long term?) b) Realistic (is sustainability likely to be achieved in the absence of continued external donor support and if USAID withdraw support?) and c) in the event that USAID decides to emphasize sustainability strongly, then the level of support to the model of sustainability that is incorporated in the design of the project.

### **Question 5. To What Extent Did USAID/Kenya Strengthen Civil Society Organizations’—Especially Local Partners’—Ability to Implement and Manage Conflict Mitigation Programs?**

**Description:** This approach aimed to strengthen the technical and institutional capacity of local partners to implement USAID conflict mitigation programs.

**Conclusion:** There are good indications that USAID projects (e.g. KCSSP) improved general management skills of civil society organizations leading to improved *effectiveness* (the ability to achieve objectives and the factors involved) of program implementation.

**Findings:** The sample size for assessing this aspect and answering the question was small (eleven organizations in total consisting of 9 formal and 2 informal ad hoc interviews) (see limitations).<sup>67</sup> The data do raise a number of further questions for USAID to consider that cannot be answered adequately in this report. Strengthening of local partners was undertaken through the following approaches: (i) Organizational development, (ii) Provision of Skills training, (iii) Mentoring and accompaniment, and (iv) Provision of grants to implement programs. (Desk review, KIs with implementing partners)

All of the local partners interviewed (9/9) rated partner support from Pact, MC or IRC very highly pointing to the following evidence<sup>68</sup>:

- Improved manuals, systems and accountability (9/9 mentioned)

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<sup>67</sup>Given the constraints of the evaluation it was necessary to compromise in order to adequately cover the six formal evaluation questions in interviews as well as obtaining insights into the 10 approaches. This meant that to save time and prevent wasted energy<sup>67</sup> some interviewees were asked about a number of different aspects in the same interview. In terms of strengthening local organizations this means that there is a potential for positive bias due to the fact that criteria for KIs were based around their having a deep contextual understanding of the peacebuilding and conflict mitigation sector, the geographic region as well as the political dynamics where they are located. This sort of person is more likely to be a leader within a competent organization with a broad overview and substantive network. Hence the sample may reflect the stronger end of the spectrum of organizations supported through an organizational strengthening process. The other limitation on this section is the reliance on and extent of self-reporting. The findings are drawn from KIs reflecting on their own organizations, some limited subjective triangulation with the IP on occasion, documented OCAs (also self-reporting) and an ad hoc and random self-assessment of aspects of the organization using the IDF. A deeper more satisfactory process would have required a day with each organization assessing its systems and interviewing a range of staff in different departments.

<sup>68</sup>In fact, 10 organizations were interviewed but one of them had not had any specific support from the partners except indirectly as a sub-grantee of a grantee. This organization had decided to undertake the process by themselves seeing its usefulness, using the Pact OCA tools.

- Improved governance and division of roles between board and management (7/7 mentioned; the MC supported organizations had not covered this aspect)
- Improved skills—for example, fundraising proposal writing, advocacy, peace and conflict, monitoring and evaluation, (11/11 mentioned at least one improved skill)
- Additional self-initiated organizational strengthening initiatives—for example, audits, further OCAs (4/9 mentioned).

All local partners who were interviewed (10/10) said that their ability to implement programs had improved. Most emphasized the strengthened organizational structures, systems and policies but then a few were not always able to provide convincing evidence of improved program implementation or application of new skills. Some quotations illustrating positive examples include the following observations from CSO leaders:

- “As a result of improved finance systems we were able to know where we were in our grant spending and better plan and manage our activities.”
- “We were able to use our new skills on governance at the county level using the ‘leadership-vetting tool.’”
- “We applied the peace and conflict training from (KCSP) and Pact in the rapid response we undertook in Baringo addressing the Pokot–Marakwet issue.”
- “The (LEAP) training on how to conduct dialogs from Mercy Corps we had received was very useful and worked well in Burnt Forest when we started to bring communities together to reconcile.”

An example of a less convincing piece of evidence was as follows: “we used the peacebuilding skills in our interactions with people.” This does not necessarily mean that they did not use the skills, but rather may be a reflection of their ability to articulate their use more convincingly.

There was some evidence of a ‘multiplier effect’ with two organizations being able to point out that they had been asked to conduct further trainings for other organizations on the topic of peacebuilding (ACK provided trainings to KTI grantees and NCKC similarly to ACT organizations). It is telling that one of the organizations interviewed had decided to undertake an OCA by themselves without any support from an implementing partner.

There are many challenges associated with attempting to strengthen civil society and at the partners meeting a number of issues were raised that deserve greater analysis; including constraints imposed by USAID programming such as; the limitations of capacity building through the mechanism of grant disbursement, the primary focus on USAID programming objectives rather than on the needs of the organization, the focus on compliance rather than development and learning. Other challenges that were identified included the significance of the CSO leadership for success in organizational change, as well as the importance of political will, without which little will change.

**Conclusion:** Intentional, long-term mentoring adds significant value to basic investments in skills and ID, enabling their enhanced practical application.

*Findings:* Mentoring approaches were mentioned as critical in conjunction with skills training and organizational development (2 local partners spoke about this facet, and importantly the IPs conducting this organizational strengthening support, at the partnership meeting were in broad agreement).

## Recommendations

That USAID build in to their devolution support program, a component that allows for small grants to be provided to civil society so that they can fulfill their role of holding government to account at the county level and practice (a) advocacy campaigns (b) vetting procedures (c) have input into development planning (d) have the capacity to monitor the county budget within sectors.

## Question 6. What Key Lessons and Good Practices Can Be Identified for Future USAID/Kenya Conflict mitigation and Civil Society Strengthening Programming?

This section first examines examples of good practice found amongst the USAID-funded projects before presenting some more strategic examples of lessons learned from the aggregate range of conflict mitigation and peacebuilding initiatives. Finally, it lays out some strategic recommendations for the future not elsewhere covered.

### Good Practices

Two Approaches adopted by the projects stood out as examples of good practice.

**The Land and Conflict Sensitive Journalism** project is described in the project's final evaluation as "one of the foremost examples of good practice in the field of media development."<sup>69</sup> All the journalists interviewed during this evaluation corroborated this view. They considered the experiential 'learning by doing' approach to capacity building and skills development, highly effective. This approach involved a mix of workshop training coupled with on-going mentoring and accompaniment to build their understanding of the key issues, their skills and create stronger linkages with other peacebuilding actors and communities.

**The 3Ps model (People to People Peace Project)** final evaluation report, in its conclusions, notes that this model demonstrated that a community driven and community based approach can yield considerably more than the face value of the project budget.<sup>70</sup> Similar to the comments noted on L&CSJ, the 3Ps model was lauded by participants from six group discussions in both Mombasa and Nakuru. They considered its strength to lie in the fact that it involved all segments of communities and makes use of existing community structures and human resources such as the clergy. It is able to reach even the lowest community levels using techniques such as peer-to-peer discussions groups. A further strength noted, both by KIs and the evaluation report was the integrated blending of community dialogs, community structures (as noted) and importantly the incorporation of connector projects as development and peace 'focal points'.

### Emerging Lessons

This section considers emerging lessons and the specific recommendations flowing from them. Broader recommendations can be found in the final section.

### Conclusion: Integrating GBV and peacebuilding has been shown to be beneficial.

*Findings:* Lessons from the PIK program (interview with program staff) suggest there are significant benefits to be gained of linking approaches to addressing GBV with the peacebuilding approaches. This is at an institutional as well as theoretical/ technical level. Since there were few county level structures working on GBV the PIK project engaged with the peacebuilding architecture. This had the positive benefit of bringing the two communities of actors together. PIK staff consider this discussion needs to go forward so that all peace actors recognize GBV as part and parcel of the language of conflict management and peace. *Conclusions:* Thus the project not only helped to ensure the existing peacebuilding structures were capitalized on to support GBV prevention and responses, but the process also highlighted the linkages between GBV prevention and peacebuilding approaches and that GBV is a peace issue. Identifying GBV as a peace issue meant that it began to receive audience among strong stakeholders (including the police).

<sup>69</sup>G. Adam and N. Harford. 2013. L&CSJ Evaluation, Internews Kenya, iMedia Associates Ltd., I.

<sup>70</sup>Catholic Relief Services. 2012. *People to People Peace Project (3Ps) Final Evaluation*.



**Recommendation:** During the course of the next two years of the ongoing PIK project to a) further explore the linkages between GBV and peacebuilding approaches and to ensure that the two communities of actors continue to interrelate and cross fertilize experience and learning b) to promote violence against women across the board as a security and development issue.

**Conclusion:** Women's role in peacebuilding in Kenya was considered ad hoc but having great potential.

*Findings:* All the KIs where the issue of women's role in peacebuilding was discussed in any depth (10) noted the potential of women's role in peacebuilding. As one pointed out "Often it is just lip service paid and it is just thrown in (to make up numbers) rather than fully considered in an integrated way." The important role that women play in raising key peacebuilding issues in the domestic sphere was also highlighted by the same group of KIs.

**Recommendation:** More work needs to be done to take forward the Kenya National Action Plan on UN resolution 1325, which is under the NSC, including seeing this as an opportunity to stretch the discussion of Women Peace and Security to include not just having women in peace processes but to recognize violence against women across the board as a security and development issue.

**Conclusion:** The value of integrating and balancing peacebuilding and development approaches when targeting youth can pay dividends.

*Findings:* According to program documents<sup>71</sup> the LEAP program worked on the basis that improved economic situations for Kenyan youth through microenterprise and livelihoods programs would reduce the likelihood that they would become involved in violence. In reflecting on the lessons from this program LEAP program staff recognized that while short-term youth employment generation programs can stabilize volatile situations, they were "useful for peace but not necessary for business." This view is supported by broader Mercy Corps research findings that sustaining stability requires investing in longer-term job creation that addresses young people's underlying grievances about the lack of meaningful and viable economic opportunities.<sup>72</sup> This points to a need going forward for programming approaches that

**Recommendation:** Support fully *integrated* approaches to peacebuilding and development—which balance both objectives. This involves exploring solutions to the tensions identified by the LEAP program between achieving economic and peace objectives through multiethnic livelihood groups.

**Conclusion:** Targeting the most *vulnerable* youth is critical in joint peacebuilding and livelihood programming. There are indications that youth may be more likely to use violence.

*Findings:* The findings from the survey showed that in the period before and during the September 2013 elections 17 percent respondents agreed or strongly agreed that violence is justified to achieve political goals. The vast majority (80 percent) of these were youth. Although this does not necessarily mean they would use violence, it is an indicator of the possibility. At the same time 78 percent disagreed or strongly disagreed with the same statement. Again a significant proportion was youth. This finding suggests that targeting is critical for engaging and influencing the "at risk" youths, even though they may only be a small percentage of the overall youth population.

**Recommendation:** That greater effort is placed in future programming to identify the most 'at-risk' groups and understand the drivers of their attitudes and potential behaviors as well as ensure that they are included in mainstream development efforts aimed at youth.

**Conclusion:** Mechanisms to monitor hate speech through social media are insufficiently strong. *Findings:* The evaluation found that monitoring mechanisms were not able to prevent the use of social media (e.g.,

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<sup>71</sup>For instance, see J. McAllum. 2012. *Final Evaluation LEAP II*.

<sup>72</sup>Mercy Corps. 2011. *Peacebuilding Through Economic Development Approach*.

Facebook) as a medium for hate speech. Experience from elsewhere (e.g., Myanmar)<sup>73</sup> suggests that this can become a factor in inciting violence.

**Recommendation:** Monitoring mechanisms for hate speech via social media, such as the Umati Social Media Monitoring Platform need to be strengthened and further resourced. Efforts in curbing hate speech need to be focused both on monitoring mechanisms but also at increasing the likelihood of successful prosecutions and convictions. Whilst the latter is particularly challenging as it speaks to various key vested interests and institutional challenges within the justice system, overlooking this crucial part of the equation risks diminishing the effectiveness of monitoring as a deterrent.

**Conclusion:** Early warning and early response requires a strong integration between the two elements to be successful, in the absence of which there should be a strong referral system as a fail-safe mechanism.

*Findings:* This lesson emerges from the experiences highlighted in the response to question 1 above where there were examples of a) *tolerance* (law enforcers taking early warning reports lightly and were unresponsive or slow, even when it was an emergency) and b) *the possibility of EW system abuse*.

**Recommendation:** monitor the extent of successful convictions arising out of prosecutions for hate speech monitoring and where unsuccessful the reason for the failure to convict as a basis for identifying potential avenues of support.<sup>74</sup>

**Conclusion:** Early warning mechanisms need an improved design to improve efficiencies and effectiveness. There is currently a lack of knowledge and understanding of the relative strengths and weaknesses of the multitude of different EWER mechanisms that were operating during the election period. Coupled with this is the need to understand the importance of the role of the individual in these mechanisms and to expand the space for individual participation as well as individual responses like those of “the Tweeting Chief” in Nakuru. A further lesson is to consider the different efforts, or lack thereof, to be better coordinated at the County level within the new devolved structures—for example, through interagency structures in counties, such as through clusters of thematic working groups.

**Recommendation:** An analysis<sup>75</sup> should be undertaken by USAID of the different early warning mechanism and a paper produced that succinctly summarizes the lessons learned more broadly from the multitude of models that were in action during the 2013 elections. This would inform the introduction of an appropriate EWER mechanism is introduced at the county level in conjunction with the USAID program that ensures the mechanism is embedded structurally and functionally in the peace and security architecture to maximize the likelihood of success (see recommendations in the next section?). A detailed methodology would incorporate the following:

- Identification of the different types of mechanism and their fundamental characteristics
- Identification of a representative sample of the main different types of EWER mechanism for follow-up interview and analysis.
- Retrieval of the quantitative data available from the mechanisms and subsequent analysis of that data to understand better the different efficacies (and associated reasons for them), response rates, and challenges associated with the different models. (Note that the evaluation team was informed that a research permit would be required to access the numerical data of the NSC EW mechanisms, it is likely that this would also be the case for response data from security agencies.)

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<sup>73</sup>Richards. 2013. Confidential conflict assessment for Pact.

<sup>74</sup>This could be undertaken through the NCIC legal department.


<sup>75</sup>As noted in the limitations section of this report, the team was severely constrained in addressing the existing scope of work for the evaluation let alone having the space, time, resources and level of effort required to explore these additional dimensions in sufficient depth to be meaningful.

- Interviewing of key stakeholders involved in the working of the mechanisms in order to elicit findings regarding their relative effectiveness and efficiency, as well as the reasons behind the variation. Interviews should cover the following stakeholders at both national and local levels: implementing operators, data analysts, security agencies involved in response, civil society stakeholders involved in the different phases (i.e., EW and ER).
- Recommendations, lessons and discussion of the findings.

**Conclusion:** The ‘Targets of Opportunity’ mechanism is a useful programming tool for flexible, opportunistic, responsive (and potentially ‘gap-filling’) grant making but requires deeper analysis to understand how best to optimize its utility in the future. The TOO grants give an impression of a scatter-gun approach, but within that there are threads worth disaggregating to understand better how to use such a mechanism more effectively to have deeper and broader impact within a program.

**Recommendation:** Undertake a short but deep TOO “lessons learned” exercise as described in Question 1 to explore the dynamics and tensions expressed in the evaluation (a short paper on the key issues to explore appears in Annex I), to better understand how the mechanism could be used more strategically within the devolution program portfolio in the context of adaptive management, gap-filling, flexibility, and responsiveness.

## The Operating Context for Peace: Strategic Considerations and Lessons Learned



**Figure 2**

It was clear from the evaluation that the successful implementation and sustainability of conflict mitigation and peacebuilding activities depended on a number of extraneous factors. Many of these, particularly the over-arching factors, have been articulated above, but they are worth highlighting as key considerations when assessing the success and sustainability of these initiatives.

**Conclusion:** *Kenyan Peace or the ‘absence of violence’ is very fragile.* It is clear from the findings and conclusions that tension is still high in many parts of Kenya.

**Findings:** Evaluation respondents highlighted multiple potential issues that may lead to

violence as illustrated by the graph below. The traditional hotspots, while still sensitive, are not the only areas that are vulnerable to eruptions of violence. Furthermore, the dynamics created by devolution and resource extraction have the potential to create new areas of tension.<sup>76</sup> These new influences and expressions of Kenyan societal change and frustration are continually evolving and require constant analysis and ongoing efforts to understand them. Failure to do so increases the risk of being caught unawares and increasing instability at the local level. The explosive violence that occurred in Tana River in 2012 and early 2013 relating to access to land and resources that caught people by surprise provide a good example of how this can occur.

**Recommendation:** Donors should invest in strong contextual analysis at both the county and national levels to inform programs, and ensure they continue to be relevant.

## The Current Context and Key Conflict Risks

<sup>76</sup>See 1) International Crisis Group. 2013. Kenya’s 2013 Election, Africa Report no. 197, Jan. 17. and 2) S. Richard. 2013. *Bombing the People With Peace: A Follow-Up Report on the 2013 Kenyan Elections and Disaster Risk-Reduction Efforts*. Feinstein International Center, May.

**Conclusion:** Numerous contextual factors will play into the ability to entrench peace, mitigate conflict, and ensure the sustainability of conflict mitigation and peacebuilding initiatives. These include the political landscape, the erosion of an enabling environment for change, and the devolution initiative.

Findings: The Political Landscape. At the present time there exists in Kenya a very unpredictable political landscape particularly given the current situation at the ICC. In response to the question “What might the conflict risks in the future be?” 35 of the 114 GD and KIs considered the alliance between Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto to be vulnerable and, in the event that one be treated differently from the other as a consequence of the ICC proceedings, great fears were expressed that violence would erupt in the Rift Valley.<sup>77</sup> Other serious potential causes of conflict that emerged during the course of discussions and interviews include the expanding extractive industries, particularly at the coast, Turkana, as well as the Ilemi Triangle. Other big development projects, it was suggested, also held the potential to cause conflict, such as the proposed South Sudan pipeline and the port at Lamu. Youth was considered a rising potential concern, often coupled with the issue of the prevalence of drugs and land continues to be an important issue that needs to be addressed and still has the potential to be a trigger for violence. It is interesting to note that all of these raised concerns feed directly into, or reflect, the list of root causes listed under question 2. This not only illustrates the seriousness of the concerns but also the potential dangers in terms of conflict being expressed in violence in the future. Significantly, the devolution process itself was cited in 35 of the 114 GDs times as being an emerging potential frame for conflict and possible violence. As Figure 2 shows, this got the third highest number of mentions as a conflict risk after land and the outcome of the ICC cases. This will be explored in more detail below given the proposed focus of USAID DRG programming going forward.

Erosion of a Positive Enabling Environment for Change. Concurrently with the broader consideration of the political environment, concerns were also raised from KIs regarding the eroding enabling environment in which the conflict risks described above are emerging. Thus informants noted the lack of progress in the reform agenda that appears to be slipping, as evidenced by the debates in the public arena and visible in the national media on a daily basis. For instance, the proposed introduction of the Media Council of Kenya Bill Act that is considered might curb the independence of the media and its powers of expression. The proposed changes to the Public Benefits Organizations Act, 2013 (known colloquially as the ‘NGO Bill’), include a limit of 15 percent of funding from external donors.<sup>78</sup> Together, these are seen as worrying signs that the space for civil society is reducing which will impact on the ability of civil society to hold the government to account both at national level as well as county level and perform its role properly. In addition to this, each of the two KIs interviewed working specifically on land issues highlighted that the Land Commission has not been sufficiently resourced and supported politically and is therefore struggling to fulfill its mandate.<sup>79</sup> Public disputes between the CIC the Land Commission over whether it has the right to sign land title deeds also reinforce the perception that it is being undermined.<sup>80</sup> Finally, the police reforms also seem to be struggling as noted in a July 30, 2013, Amnesty International report that suggests the Kenya government is attempting to water down reforms.<sup>81</sup> All these issues, taken together, may be perceived as a sign that the environmental context for change is potentially weakened.

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<sup>77</sup>Some were not so pessimistic though, and one key informant noted that, in his opinion, given that eventuality there would in probability be some small outbreaks of violence. The problem, though, according to him would be that this perceived injustice would add to the existing latent sources and be “tapped into” in the light of another trigger event such as the next elections and at that point it might then explode into extensive violence.

<sup>78</sup>This is the same clause as that found in Ethiopia’s Charities and NGO Act which has had a devastating impact on civil society in that country.

<sup>79</sup>KI in Mombasa noted this concern

<sup>80</sup>For instance see recent articles in the Standard newspaper

[http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000096440&story\\_title=cic-says-land-commission-should-not-sign-land-titles](http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000096440&story_title=cic-says-land-commission-should-not-sign-land-titles).

<sup>81</sup><http://www.amnesty.org/en/news/kenya-parliament-must-reject-amendments-police-reform-package-2013-07-30>

**Devolution.** In their efforts to encourage citizens to vote peacefully in 2013, civil society leaders sent out strong messages of the opportunities for citizens to address their grievances through the new system of devolved government in future and the importance of not derailing the advent of the new Constitutional dispensation through violence. While this may, possibly, have contributed to peaceful elections, it has raised the stakes considerably on the need for devolution to succeed. Expectations are now high that devolution will solve a myriad of social problems and some of the root causes outlined above (for instance social and economic marginalization of some communities). In the words of one civil society leader “We gave hope and we promised...now we have to fulfill those promises...” Unfortunately devolution is not a panacea, and if expectations are not met and frustrations continue then violence again may be seen as an option. There is no shortage of challenges to the implementation of devolution given the current low base of knowledge and understanding of the expected shape of county processes, structures and mechanisms. This is aside from the paucity of knowledge of the underlying principles of good governance that will hopefully inform implementation. Thus it is likely that the process will take a number of years before sound positive change is witnessed. This timeframe may be incompatible with current expectations that need to be managed proactively. Importantly though, as highlighted above USAID will need to have an eye to the potential conflict dynamics and concerns that have been raised by stakeholders with respect to devolution.

#### Findings:

- *Deepening of inequalities.* NCIC and senior Kenyan leaders have noted in the Kenyan national media the dangers of deepening inequalities or ethnic minorities being marginalized within the devolved system.<sup>82</sup> The fear that some ethnic groups will not be represented in county government has led to the concept of ‘negotiated democracy’ in some counties where political power sharing is agreed to prevent a group being ‘blocked out’.<sup>83</sup> The deeper danger is that politics at the county level becomes the ‘Politics of numbers’ as described by Dr. Makodindo in his unpublished paper of that name.<sup>84</sup> This portrays a picture of politics, representation and power dominated by ethnic voting blocks, and the numbers within these blocks that can be brought to bear by a group.
- *A fractal of the National picture.* This danger suggests that as articulated by a the national political model is devolved down to the county level. At its worst this may include the less positive facets of national politics such as corruption, the capture of political and economic power in the hands of small number of people, the creation of ‘incestuous socio-economic enclaves’ - a danger in mono-ethnic counties or those with little diversity<sup>85</sup>. Devolution of ethnically-based conflicts: Some sources note that there is a danger of ethnically-based conflict systems operating at the county level even in homogeneous counties. This may have implications for future elections. In the words of one respected Kenya analyst “The next election—2017—will be a lot ‘rougher’ as devolution beds in and the dynamics of ethnic politics and potential for associated violence are played out at the County level.” This point is reflected in Ghai (2007) who states: “Once a community finds that it has outlets for its politics and policies at the local level, intra-community differences come to the surface and become the points of contention in the political process at the local level, represented and fought through competing...parties”<sup>86</sup> This occurrence was also seen during the course of the evaluation where the conflict dynamics and violence in Bungoma have expressed themselves at an intra-clan level.

<sup>82</sup>See for instance <http://www.nation.co.ke/News/politics/Devolution+could+cause+ethnic+tension++warns+NCIC/-/1064/1239506/-/ifsp41/-/> and <http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/07/ruto-meets-ncic-urges-cohesion/>

<sup>83</sup>The evaluation was informed of this taking place in Nakuru, Bungoma and Kwale in particular, although it also took place in other areas (e.g., Isiolo).

<sup>84</sup>Dr. Makodindo. 2013. “The Politics of Numbers.”

<sup>85</sup>O. Nyanjom. 2011. ‘Devolution in Kenya’s ne Constitution’ Constitution Working Paper No.4, Society for International Development (SID), Nairobi

<sup>86</sup><http://www.arrforum.org/publications/occasional-papers/40/94-devolution-restructuring-the-kenyan-state.html>

- *Competition for Resources.* With the challenges associated over the creation of new wards there may be a potential increase in the disputes over borders at the ward and county level as well as other associated resource disputes e.g. particularly natural resources such as land, water (and extractives). The World Bank notes that the county government bill and the IEBC rules around boundaries and wards are themselves in conflict which if followed would require the redrawing of 46 county boundaries.<sup>87</sup> KIs in Nakuru pointed to the emerging risks around boundaries.

## Strategic Recommendations

Following from the strategic analysis of the operating environment for program implementation, there are three key recommendations:

**Embed conflict sensitive approaches** in *all* aspects of the emerging devolution landscape. This will require training of partners and county officials, and ongoing support to implementation of principles in staffing, planning, budgeting, resource allocation, implementation, and the like. Similarly ensure that a conflict lens is applied to all USAID supported sector programs at the county level. Building on the experiences and successful USAID coordination model, ensure that all programs are aware of the potential conflict dynamics that they may inadvertently exacerbate at the county level. The USAID portfolio approach to coordination of projects could bear similar results in terms of improved reach, crossover of sectors and synergies of learning as displayed in the election work.

One way to take the conflict sensitivity agenda forward is through the allocation and embedding of a conflict-sensitive specialist at the county level in a USAID project to advise both government and implementing partners on how to practically apply the principles. This also utilizes the important evaluation finding that ongoing mentoring and experiential on-the-job training adds significant value to capacity building efforts.

**Strong peace architecture:** In conjunction with devolution support being provided through USAID, ensure the emergence of clear peace and conflict mitigation institutions at the county level. The important early experiences of DPCs and EWER mechanisms suggests that they have strong potential to play an essential role in peacebuilding, conflict mitigation and county stability at the community level in the future. This support should comprise addressing the identified challenges from this evaluation including clarifying:

- The broader roles and relationship between civil society and government in the peacebuilding architecture. To what extent should DPCs (or County Peace Committees) involve civil society.
- The structures, selection of members and relationships for PCs and EWER mechanisms.
- The lines of accountability at the county level and linked to the national level. For instance how might the PC link with the County Police Oversight Committee, the Security and Intelligence agencies, and other stakeholders.
- What checks and balances to prevent co-option or corruption by stakeholders need to be put in place to ensure that they continue to be representative of the community, perceived as neutral and do not become “owned” by an official like the governor.

**Monitoring, Research, and Learning:** Close scrutiny of some key elements in the devolution experiment is required to learn and apply emerging lessons more broadly. This suggests that USAID should pay careful attention to its choice of where to invest its resources in support of the devolution process so as to ensure a wide diversity of experience and insight is captured. For instance USAID would be well advised to choose a selection of counties that reflect some of the following features:

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<sup>87</sup>World Bank. 2012. “Making Devolution a Game Changer; 10 Ways to help Transition Succeed.” Presentation to Kenya Parliamentary Caucus on Devolved Government. [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/257994-1335471959878/Making\\_Devolution\\_a\\_Game\\_Changer.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFRICA/Resources/257994-1335471959878/Making_Devolution_a_Game_Changer.pdf).

- Multiethnic or heterogeneous counties where “negotiated democracy” has been agreed—for instance in Isiolo and Nakuru, perhaps in conjunction with a county where it has not been undertaken such as Marsabit where representation is now dominated by minority groups who “clubbed together” and ousted the majority Borana.
- Monoethnic or relatively homogeneous counties—to explore the extent to which conflict does or does not cascade to lower level (i.e., clan or family).
- Counties that might enable comparative analysis on issues such as political commitment and allocation of resources (e.g., Mandera), versus counties where this is not happening despite being beset with chronic conflict.<sup>88</sup>
- Counties that have a high risk of conflict from additional issues such as extractive industries, potential extremism, and political dissent (e.g., the MRC at the coast). Addressing devolution in geographic areas such as these (e.g., Kwale, Lamu, Turkana) would bring USAID to the nexus of the most important emerging issues that will challenge Kenya and its political stability in the future, while simultaneously maximizing its opportunity to make a positive contribution to Kenya’s future.

## **ANNEX A. DESCRIPTION OF PROJECTS**

### **Kenyan Civil Society Strengthening Program—Pact**

#### **Description**

The Kenyan Civil Society Strengthening Program (KCSSP) was designed to serve as a grant-making and capacity-building program for Kenyan civil society. It began before the 2008 electoral violence and shifted to meet the new imperatives of conflict mitigation.

Before the electoral violence in 2008, KCSSP focused on working with Kenya CSOs operating in the areas of democracy and governance and nature resource management. The flexibility of the KCSSP mechanism allowed it to very quickly complement this work with grants and capacity building for civil society organizations, local peace structures, and the Government of Kenya to reduce violent conflict in targeted communities. The conflict mitigation activities initially focused on the Rift Valley but shifted to the Coast in response to pre-electoral violence in that region. For example, KCSSP promoted SAFE-COAST, an activity that partners with the local Kenya Community Support Center (KECOSCE) to implement the Safe Coast Early Warning and Response mechanism (SCEWER). KCSSP’s network and relationships with many civil society organizations provided it with an important convening role and sponsored meetings that promoted civil society information sharing and coordination.

#### **Size and Period of Implementation**

Pact received \$35.5 million for its work on conflict mitigation, the largest single amount given to any of the partners. The program began in 2001 and went through numerous modifications and extensions as it shifted its emphasis in response to the fluid context in Kenya.

#### **Geography**

The program operated across Kenya, with particular emphasis in the area of conflict mitigation in the Rift Valley and later in the Coast.

#### **Approaches**

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<sup>88</sup>The evaluation notes that the NSC is knowledgeable about which counties have decided to allocate resources to peace work—such as Mandera, Migori, and others. USAID could contact Dickson Magotsi for deeper information.

The work of KCSSP touched on all of the 10 approaches



## Kenya Tuna Uwezo—CHF

### Description

The central aim of Tuna Uwezo - which translates to “we have the power - is to create opportunities for, and to build the desire and perception of need for, cooperative action among often conflicting groups within the slums in Nairobi. KTU’s objectives are:

1. Strengthened social networks of community members and civil society groups to collaborate productively on community issues and address grievances.
2. Enhanced ability of local institutions to lead and implement people-to-people peacebuilding independently

It is a two-year program designed to enhance capacities of residents of Nairobi’s informal settlements to withstand political manipulation that leads to violent conflict and provide opportunities for cooperative action on common issues of interest among the different ethnic groups. It is implemented together with local organizations—Peace-Net Kenya and Kituo Cha Sheria.

### Size and Period of Implementation

Kenya Tuna Uwezo is a \$2.1 million program effective from February 27 2012 and ending in February 26 2014.

### Geography

It seeks to strengthen residents of four informal settlements in Nairobi, Kiambiu, Kibera, Mathare, and Korogocho/Babadogo,

### Approaches

- Early warning and early response
- Peace dividends
- Community dialogs and reconciliation efforts
- Peace messaging and SMS platforms
- Capacity building for local partners
- Training for local actors and peace champions
- Relationship building for local peace structures

## **Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace (LEAP II)—Mercy Corps**

### **Description**

The overall LEAP II goal for the first two years (July 4, 2010-July 3, 2012) was to strengthen the ability of local structures to address causes of post-election violence and promote sustainable peace and reconciliation in the Rift Valley province. It had three key objectives:

1. Strengthen sustainable mechanisms for conflict mitigation and reconciliation
2. Sponsor community dialogs and implement joint development projects that build bridges among divided communities and demonstrate tangible benefits to cooperation.
3. Support youth integration and address a key cause of violence through youth leadership training and income generation activities
4. Which were supplemented in the modification by the following
  1. Strengthen transformational platforms that prevent and respond to local conflicts that threaten to destabilize the region.
  2. Promote peaceful elections through education on the reform process and the benefits of nonviolence

The project supported the strengthening of community structures, particularly the peace committees, as well as other structures such as elders and religious groups in the community using a training of trainer's (TOT) approach to training, which gave ownership to the District Peace Committees (DPCs) and expanded the reach of the training. In addition connections between different structures were strengthened facilitating trust between the community, DPCs and government institutions through the joint trainings, support of dialogs, and community projects. 35 district leaders' dialog forums were supported bringing them together to discuss issues affecting peace in their districts. LEAP also supported 84 community-based reconciliation dialogs at the community level. Cash for Work, community connector projects, income generating projects and quick impact projects were also supported with the secondary objectives of economic empowerment, particularly for youth. In the extension the reach of the peace committees was expanded to spearhead the community early warning system with the strategy of using youth *bunges* to cascade the early warning to youth in the communities.

### **Size and Period of Implementation**

The two-year LEAP II program ran from July 2010 through June 2012 at a cost of \$2.7 million.

It was granted a one-year cost extension/modification with a final end date of July 3, 2013.

### **Geography**

Nandi County, Uasin Gishu County, Kericho/Bomet County, Nakuru County, Trans-Nzoia County

### **Approaches**

- Early Warning Early Response
- Peace Dividends Projects
- Community Dialogs and Reconciliation Efforts
- Peace Messaging and SMS Platforms

- Capacity Building for Local Partners
- Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions
- Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures
- Support for and Training of DPCs

## Peace Initiative Kenya—IRC

### Goals and Objectives

The goal of Peace Initiative Kenya (PIK) is to create grassroots networks that have the capacity to prevent and mitigate violence, including GBV, in Kenya's most conflictive zones during the pre and post-election periods. Specifically the project aimed to build capacity for key individuals at the community level to give them the right platforms, information, tools, and skills to be promoters of peace and a voice against GBV in their communities.

The specific objectives of the project are to:

- Develop a Peace Training Campaign targeting community youth, women leaders, teachers and community health volunteers at the village level.
- Engage women's groups and networks to help promote peace and GBV awareness and prevention.

### Narrative Description

PIK project was designed in line with USAID 'Women in Development' policy and recognized both the particular risks that women face in conflict and the specific contribution that women and girls can make in the promotion of a peaceful society.

It was initially a 14-month project initiated in July, 2012 with the aim of contributing to a more protective and peaceful environment in the run-up to the 2013 general elections. The project was implemented by the International Rescue Committee (IRC), in partnership with several local partners; Coalition on Violence against Women (COVAW), the Federation of Women Lawyers—Kenya (FIDA), PeaceNet - Kenya, the Rural Women's Peace Link (RWPL), Sauti Ya Wanawake, African Woman and Child (AWC) and Well Told Story.

### Size and Period of Implementation

It was initially a 14-month project initiated in July, 2012 at a cost of \$3.2 million. The project has now been extended to September 2015 with a strong focus on GBV. Peacenet and FIDA have been dropped out as implementing partners.

### Geography

PIK project had a focus in four hot spot areas: in Mombasa, Kwale, Kilifi, Tana River, Lamu, Taita Taveta, Migori, Kisii, Kisumu, Bomet, Nakuru, Narok, Kajiado, Uasin Gishu, TransNzoia, West Pokot, Mt Elgon Counties and Nairobi informal settlements.

### Approaches

- Early Warning Early Response
- Use of Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring
- Peace Messaging and SMS Platforms
- Capacity Building for Local Partners
- Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions

## **People to People Project (3Ps)—Catholic Relief Services**

### **Description**

The goal of 3Ps was to ensure that communities prone to recurrent conflicts in Burnt Forest, Kuresoi and Likoni coexisted peacefully after a long history of ethnic and religious recurrent electoral conflicts.

The 3Ps was implemented by CRS through three partners, Coast Interfaith Council of Clerics, Catholic Diocese of Eldoret and Catholic Diocese of Nakuru. The project was designed to form and strengthen intra/intercommunity peace structures to improve community relationships in the conflict-prone areas and build their capacities to mitigate potential conflicts. The village was chosen as the intervention unit so as to increase the impact of the project; it therefore supported the establishment of local peace committees at the village and linking the structures to the division and district levels. Other project activities carried out included; formation of peer discussion groups (youth-to-youth, woman-to-woman, elder-to-elder and cleric-to-cleric). Nine joint community- initiated development project identified by the community “connector projects” were implemented by the community themselves to inculcate the idea of community ownership.

### **Size and period of implementation**

The project was implemented for 2 years between “02/26/2010-02/25/2012.” CRS’ People to People Peace Project (3Ps) implementation cost for the two years was \$599,685/=. There was two months no cost extension.

### **Geography**

The project was implemented in Likoni, Burnt Forest and Kuresoi areas. Specifically, the project was implemented in 15 villages within 3 divisions in the 3 target districts with 2,950 direct beneficiaries targeted and 29,500 indirect beneficiaries expected.

### **Approaches**

- Peace Dividends Projects
- Community Dialogs and Reconciliation Efforts
- Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions
- Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures
- Support for and Training of DPCs

## **Reporting for Peace and Land- and Conflict-Sensitive Journalism in Kenya—Internews**

### **Goal and objectives**

The goal of the Program was to promote peace and reconciliation at the community level as well as to mitigate possible conflict and create a thorough understanding of the historical and current manifestations of land-related conflict.

- To strengthen the capacity of selected partner radio and print media to better understand and report on issues, including land and electoral issues, using conflict-sensitive approaches;
- To increase citizens' understanding and broaden civic participation in governance issues including tracking implementation of the National Accord and Reconciliation Act (NARA) particularly in areas that were affected by the post-2008 conflict; and
- To promote civil society and community engagement in land conflict issues while influencing national level discourse and policies on land.

### **Description**

Internews Land and Conflict Sensitive Journalism Project was implemented from 1 January 2010 to 31 May 2013. It sought to deepen the impact of the USAID funded RFP project (December 2008 – December 2009) through greater sophistication of training methodology and a new intensity of activities with partners

The program involved an package of training and capacity building activities in line with a sophisticated methodology that exposure partners to CSJ principles over a sustained period of time, along with specialist training for higher-grade journalists, editors and talk-show hosts. Interwoven into the approach was be a series of activities to strengthen relationships between partner media and peacebuilding civil society actors who are key to a meaningful discourse around democracy, peace and reconciliation themes, including media training for selected CSOs, and supporting content generation relationships between the media, community groups, academia and relevant actors within the private sector and other concerned agencies.

The project included activities to assist media and community representatives in their understanding of the relationship between land, electoral and party-political conflict. This will involve expert training and intensive stimulation of public debate around land issues.

### **Size and Period of Implementation**

The \$2.3 million Internews Land and Conflict Sensitive Journalism Project was implemented from 1 January 2010 to 31 May 2013 and followed the USAID funded Reporting for Peace December 2008 – December 2009.

### **Geography**

Rift Valley and Nyanza Provinces, Nairobi slums and Mombasa.

### **Approaches**

- Use of Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring
- Community Dialogs and Reconciliation Efforts

## ANNEX B. DESCRIPTION OF APPROACHES

**Early Warning and Early Response** This approach was employed to alert all pertinent partners/actors on any potential threats to public order and cohesion and to seek suitable measures to stem these threats before they escalate into violence and to stop it from spreading when it occurs.<sup>89</sup>

**Targets of Opportunity (ToO) Grants** This was an approach that availed funds quickly and expeditiously toward addressing arising and unforeseen conflict and mobilized local communities and other actors, through USAID partners, toward timely resolution of conflict.

**Peace Dividend Projects** These are tangible community projects that demonstrated peacetime benefits as more compelling for communities in comparison to conflict, and engendered reconciliation and cohesion.

**Use of Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring** The media, particularly radio, was used to disseminate accurate and unbiased information across in Kenya. In addition, to reach a growing number of youth, social media were used to communicate peace messages and to monitor cases of hate speech for further action.

**Community Dialog and Reconciliation Efforts** This approach aimed to bring communities together to discuss issues that give rise to conflict between the communities, and thereby develop solutions to the issues without violence.

**Peace messaging and SMS platforms** This approach included all messages that espoused peace and included ICT material and use of SMS blasts, to reach large numbers of citizens particularly before the elections.

**Capacity Building for Local Partners** This approach aimed to strengthen the technical and institutional capacity of local partners to implement USAID conflict mitigation programs.

**Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions** In order to engage as many people as possible to ensure successful management and mitigation of conflict, this approach trained potential actors and peace ambassadors. With this training, alternatives to violence as a conflict resolution mechanism were identified and communities empowered to address issues at the very local level.

**Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures** These were all the efforts toward connecting existing peace structures with peer structures as well as supporting them to have a wider reach on higher levels, influence policy, and expand their networks horizontally and vertically.

**Support for and Training of DPCs** This approach aimed to enhance the impact of District Peace Committees at addressing conflict at the local levels and their capacity to play intermediary roles between the government and local communities in resolution of disputes.

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<sup>89</sup>Amended as per discussion with USAID.

## ANNEX C. THE EVALUATION STATEMENT OF WORK

### Executive Summary

The 2007 election triggered an unprecedented response of conflict throughout Kenya that lasted in localized areas through 2009. Over 1,300 people were killed and roughly 600,000 displaced. The post-election violence arose from some long-standing grievances, specifically related to issues on land reform, ethnic clashes, patronage politics, and weak institutional structures undermined by severe governmental corruption. In response to the violence, USAID/Kenya's Democracy, Rights and Governance Office ramped up its conflict mitigation, reconciliation and peace building activities.

Under this initiative, six projects worked to address conflict and build peace, including:

- Kenyan Civil Society Strengthening Program (KCSSP), implemented by PACT, \$35.5 million
- Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU), implemented by CHF International, \$2.1 million
- Rift Valley Local Empowerment For Peace (LEAP I and II), implemented by MercyCorps, \$2.7 million
- Peace Initiative Kenya (PIK), implemented by International Rescue Committee (IRC), \$3.2 million
- People to People Peace Project (3Ps), implemented by Catholic Relief Services (CRS), \$599,685
- Reporting for Peace, and Land and Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Kenya, implemented by Internews, \$2.3 million

The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of the conflict mitigation activities and civil society strengthening projects in contributing to a peaceful Kenya, looking specifically at the strengths and challenges of each of the six projects. This information will help inform USAID/Kenya's conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening efforts moving forward.

One audience for this evaluation is USAID/Kenya Democracy, Rights and Governance (DRG) Office and USAID/Washington. It is also expected to inform the larger donor community in Kenya. The lessons and recommendations will help inform USAID/Kenya in its strategy for planning for future conflict mitigation activities geared towards election-related violence, especially with a reduced budget.

The evaluation seeks to answer the six following questions:

1. In what ways did USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation *approaches* contribute to peace during the 2013 General Election?
2. To what extent have these identified *approaches* addressed root causes of conflict?
3. To what extent have attitudes and perceptions of individuals and communities changed towards peace and conflict in the targeted areas?
4. What components are likely to continue to influence conflict mitigation after program closure?
5. To what extent did USAID/Kenya strengthen civil society organizations', especially local partners', ability to implement and manage conflict mitigation programs?
6. What key lessons and good practices can be identified for future USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening programming?

The evaluation will be conducted by a six-person team, including three international team members and three national team members. A local survey firm will also support the team in the conduct of a survey



and support the organization of discussions groups. This Evaluation will be theory-based requiring the Evaluation team to construct an overall theory-of-change that will serve as a framework to answer USAID/Kenya's contribution to peace. The evaluation will employ mixed data collection methods including: desk review, key informant interviews, group discussions and survey. The qualitative and quantitative data will be analyzed using a mix of pathway mapping, descriptive statistics, pattern/content analysis, comparison analysis and divergence/convergence analysis.

# I. Background Information

## I.1 Identifying Information

1. Program: Democracy, Rights and Governance
2. Period to be evaluated: January 2008 – August 2013

Project/Implementer/AOR	Summary of Program	End Date	Funding
<b>Kenyan Civil Society Strengthening Program (KCSSP)</b>  PACT Inc.  AOR: Monica Azimi	Strengthen the capacity of civil society in: 1) advocacy for improved governance, 2) conflict management, and 3) Natural Resource Management.	Sept 2013	\$35.5 Million
<b>Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU)</b>  CHF International  AOR: Makena Kirima	The program will use the Constitution as a uniting document to educate and develop civic action interventions in Nairobi slums. Different ethnic groups will be targeted and work conducted through a conflict mitigation lens.	February 2014	\$2.1 Million
<b>Rift Valley Local Empowerment For Peace (LEAP II)</b>  MercyCorps  AOR: Monica Azimi	Strengthen the ability of local actors to address the root causes of post-election violence and to promote peace and reconciliation at the community level.	July 2013	\$2.7 Million
<b>Peace Initiative Kenya – PIK</b> International Rescue Committee (IRC) AOR: Betty Mugo	Train teachers, parent/teacher members, Yes Youth Can leaders, women's organizations, and possibly community health workers to be peace-builders in their communities. Strong focus on GBV.	September 2013 (extension to Sept. 2015 pending in contracts)	\$3.2 Million
<b>People to People Peace Project (3Ps)</b>  Catholic Relief Services (CRS)  AOR: Anne Ngumbi	Strengthen community peace structures at the village and district levels and increase members' skills in peace building. Targeted areas: Burnt Forest, Kuresoi, Likoni.	April 2012	\$599,685
<b>Reporting for Peace, and Land and Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Kenya</b> Internews AOR: Dan Spealman	Work with local media to mitigate conflict and contribute towards peace building; CMM focus on land issues.	March 2013	\$2.3 Million

## 1.2 Development Context

### 1.1.1 Problem or Opportunity Addressed

The 2007 election triggered an unprecedented response of conflict throughout Kenya that lasted in localized areas through 2009. Building up to the elections, political divisions led to a divisive constitutional referendum in 2005, and by the 2007 campaigns, Kenyans were deeply polarized. During the 2007 general elections, Kenyans voted along ethnic lines or as regional blocs. When Kibaki's victory was announced and he was hastily sworn in amidst allegations of fraud, violence erupted in parts of the country and continued for days. Over 1,300 were killed and roughly 600,000 displaced. International pressure and mediation, along with the violence, forced a power-sharing agreement and the formation of a coalition government in February 2008 as well as promises of reform.

The post-election violence (PEV) arose from some long-standing grievances, specifically related to issues on land reform, ethnic clashes, patronage politics, and weak institutional structures undermined by severe governmental corruption.<sup>90</sup> In response to the PEV, USAID/Kenya's Democracy, Rights and Governance (DRG) Office ramped up its conflict mitigation, reconciliation and peace building activities (hereafter referred to as conflict mitigation activities).

### 1.1.2 Target Areas and Groups

Included under USAID/Kenya's conflict mitigation activities are six projects, with distinct (and overlapping) interventions, stated results, and targeted populations. Initial projects focused on the Rift Valley area, but over the following two years the focus shifted to the Coast region to mitigate conflicts generated by the Mombasa Republican Council movement and growing discontent over historical injustices in the region. Many of these projects have been operating for the last three to five years.

Annex E provides information on the different *approaches* of the six projects and areas of operation.



**Project activities active in highlighted counties in Kenya**

<sup>90</sup> USAID (2011) *Kenya: Democracy & Governance Assessment and Strategy*, and, USAID and DFID (2009) *Joint Conflict Vulnerability Assessment on Kenya*.

## 1.3 Intended Results

The 2011 USAID/Kenya Democracy & Governance Assessment and Strategy states the immediate- and medium-term strategic objectives for conflict mitigation. The focus between 2011 and the most recent general elections in 2013 was ensuring that:

- Legislation related to the elections and the new structure of governance is passed and in line with the letter and spirit of the constitution
- The elections are managed in a way that produces credible and peaceful results
- Parties develop issue-based platforms and diminish the use of ethnic manipulation
- The media provides accurate coverage of the campaign, the issues and the election itself and does not indulge in ethnic rhetoric
- Citizens play an active role as candidates and voters

To deliver on these results, the strategy emphasized continuing conflict mitigation in areas hardest hit by the 2008 violence and to build a sense of shared citizenship and national unity.

USAID intended to augment existing conflict mitigation programming by expanding and refocusing its rapid response mechanism to better address tensions in “hot spots,” including supporting new civil society organizations to engage in conflict mitigation and promotion of national unity; supporting existing programming to decrease emphasis on ethnic-driven politics; creating resource centers for youth in priority areas to assist youth in finding ways to engage in the political process; and disseminating civic education through greater use of popular culture. The strategy stressed that USAID also partner with select actors to reduce and mitigate hate speech, and to promote messages of inclusion and unity.

It should be noted that some projects began prior to the DG assessment and strategy. Further the assessment and strategy focused on immediate-term results leading up to the 2013 elections and medium-term results that focused on post-elections. There are no explicit unifying (cross-cutting) intended results for the six projects included in this evaluation. In other words, each project has unique results, outcomes, goals that relate to peace and/or civil society strengthening. Therefore, the intended results under examination by this evaluation will need to be reconstructed and validated as a part of the theory of change (TOC) framework developed by the evaluation team. The TOC is explained in more detail under Evaluation Design (Section 3.1).

## 1.4 Approach and Implementation

A description of the six projects and relevant interventions are detailed below. It should be noted that some project activities covered more than conflict mitigation focused interventions; however, the evaluation will only focus on those components most relevant to the ten *approaches* identified by USAID in the Statement of Objectives (Annex A) and elaborated in Annex E.

PACT: Kenyan Civil Society Strengthening Program (KCSSP): A grant-making and capacity-building program, KCSSP works to strengthen the capacity of civil society organizations, local peace structures and the Government of Kenya to reduce incidences of violent conflict in target areas and ultimately advance peace in Kenya. One initiative of the KCSSP is SAFE-COAST, an activity that partners with the local organization Kenya Community Support Centre (KECOSCE) to implement the Safe Coast Early Warning and Response mechanism (SCEWER). SCEWER promoted conflict prevention and peace building through provision of timely information on potential conflicts and threats to peace and security. SCEWER also partnered with existing networks of USAID-supported Yes Youth Can! *bunges* (local parliaments), religious CSOs, and community health workers to help mitigate tensions in the community, and shared data by linking with other actors to ensure that incidents of conflict received a response.

KCSSP also has a “Targets of Opportunity” rapid response grant-making mechanism that supports short-term programs to address arising conflict mitigation needs.

Mercy Corps: Local Empowerment for Peace (LEAP): This USAID-funded program supports local peace networks in the Rift Valley—including youth and the police—that foster dialogue and reconciliation and spread messages of peace while strengthening Early Warning Early Response (EVER) capacity. Throughout the life of the program, LEAP provided support to local peace structures such as the District Peace Committees (DPCs) through trainings and capacity building. In preparation for the elections, LEAP trained 582 peace monitors, of which 361 served as “trusted agents” for reporting into the EVER systems. LEAP also operationalized two EVER hubs in Eldoret and Molo/Nakuru. Mercy Corps set up a rapid response fund pool to assist local partners and communities to mitigate conflict or support peace building activities in communities where violence was expected to flare up. LEAP has offices in Eldoret, Nakuru and Kericho.

CHF International: Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU): KTU works in Nairobi’s informal settlements of Kibera, Kiambio, Korogocho and Mathare building community networks for cohesion. One of KTU’s key activities was facilitating dialogue forums between warring gangs and ethnically divided communities to come together in search of reconciliation. Some of the cross-identity groups came together for the first time in over five years. In preparation for the elections, KTU identified Cohesion Champions to monitor events around the elections. These Cohesion Champions were trained by Mercy Corps and linked into EVER platform as trusted agents who were able to report and verify incidents in the informal settlements.

International Rescue Committee: Peace Initiative Kenya (PIK): PIK trained community leaders and disseminated information nationally on key topics including the election process, conflict mitigation and gender-based violence. The USAID-supported program focused on the particular risks that women and girls face in conflict as well as the specific contributions that they can make in the promotion of a peaceful society. They continuously engaged women’s networks and helped establish regional and national service-provision links that enabled women to access gender-specific support. PIK trained monitors who reported primarily on sexual and gender-based violence during and after the election period through the identified EVER platforms.

Catholic Relief Services (CRS): The People to People Peace Project (3Ps) was aimed at forming and strengthening community peace structure in the target divisions of Burnt Forest, Kuresoi and Likoni. It supported local peace structures at the village, division and district levels and aimed to increase members’ skills in peacebuilding. Project activities included formation of peer groups (youth-to-youth, woman-to-woman, elder-to-elder and cleric-to-cleric) in three divisions and 45 villages and training in conflict mitigation, early warning, early response, Do No Harm and lobbying/advocacy skills for credible community leaders.

Internews: The Reporting for Peace Program seeks to broaden and enrich the information environment in Kenya, by working with journalists from community and vernacular media, with the aim of mitigating the causes and effects of conflict and contributing towards peace building efforts in the country, especially given the largely negative role that media played before and during the post-election crisis.

## 1.5 Existing Data

The list of collected documentation shared by USAID and partners can be found in Annex F. This should not be considered exhaustive for the purposes of the document review of the evaluation as there are still an outstanding number of individual project documents. Noted missing documents are contained in the right column of Annex G.

Partners have shared an indicative list of beneficiaries on file. The beneficiary list (name and contact information) will be needed for the selection of participants in focus groups and the survey. These lists are expected to be shared with MSI at least 15 days before the start of the evaluation. Any delay can cause a delay in the start of the evaluation.<sup>91</sup>

## 2. Evaluation Rationale

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### 2.1 Evaluation Purpose

The purpose of the evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of the conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening projects in contributing to a peaceful Kenya, looking specifically at the strengths and challenges of each project. This information will help inform USAID/Kenya's conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening efforts moving forward.

USAID/Kenya's DRG Office plans to focus on devolution in the near future with only small interventions in conflict mitigation activities, and some continued work with local civil society organizations. As such, the DRG Office estimates a roughly 90 percent budget reduction in the area of conflict mitigation. This will necessitate moving to one, well-designed mechanism that applies proven effective and sustainable strategies. This evaluation will serve to inform DRG's decision-making on which approaches to carry forward.

### 2.2 Audience and Intended Use

This evaluation is intended for both USAID/Kenya and USAID/Washington's DRG Offices and is also expected to inform the larger donor community in Kenya. The lessons and recommendations will help inform USAID/Kenya in its strategy for planning for future conflict mitigation activities geared towards election-related violence, especially with a reduced budget.

### 2.3 Evaluation Questions

The evaluation seeks to answer the six following questions:

1. In what ways did USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation *approaches* contribute to peace during the 2013 General Election?
2. To what extent have these identified *approaches* addressed root causes of conflict?
3. To what extent have attitudes and perceptions of individuals and communities changed towards peace and conflict in the targeted areas?
4. What components are likely to continue to influence conflict mitigation after program closure? (e.g. organizations, systems, forums, networks, "peace dividends")
5. To what extent did USAID/Kenya strengthen civil society organizations', especially local partners', ability to implement and manage conflict mitigation programs?
6. What key lessons and good practices can be identified for future USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening programming? (especially with a dramatically reduced budget)

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<sup>91</sup> Some partners have reported that they do not have full beneficiary lists. MSI has yet to see the quality or format of the lists to determine full usability for those that have stated they have beneficiary lists. MSI assumes that the lists are of good quality and can be easily used for sampling (either for the group discussions or survey). If MSI learns that the lists are not usable in this fashion, this may lead to a change in methods and/or delay in the evaluation.

Question 1 and 2 specifically examine the ten main *approaches* identified by USAID/Kenya and verified by the implementing partners. Refer to Annex F for the full list and description. For question 2, it is understood that some *approaches* were not intended to address root causes, but served as short-term mitigation strategies leading immediately up to the elections (i.e. Early Warning Early Response, Targets of Opportunity grants, etc.). Therefore it is up to the evaluation team to narrow the list of *approaches* to hone in only on those that were designed to address long-standing grievances. The evaluation team will cite the 2009 Vulnerability Assessment and the 2011 USAID/Kenya Democracy and Governance Assessment and Action Plan for reference of identified “root causes” of the conflict.

Question 3 examines attitudinal and behavioral changes, which will be assessed using a general population survey, coupled with any data from discussion groups with beneficiaries. The collected survey data will evidence attitudes and behaviors of individuals and community groups in targeted communities towards conflict and peace (e.g., openness to conflict mitigation activities, knowledge of early warning indicators, participation in peacebuilding activities, understanding of local dynamics and approaches that mitigate or prevent occurrence of conflict), as well as potential reach and attitudes towards USAID activities. It should be noted that behavior changes take time to occur and are difficult to track without ongoing survey data to draw comparisons.

Question 4 examines sustainability of certain program components, specifically looking at what systems and processes have been put in place that are likely to continue after programs end (in some cases programs have already ended). An indicative list of the components to be examined is attached to the question (e.g. organizations, systems, forums, networks, “peace dividends”). The evaluation team will determine which local structures are still operating (for projects that have closed), and whether certain components have resources (financial or human) designated to support these structures in the future.

Question 5 looks at capacity building of local partners, particularly in management, governance, staff abilities/competencies, etc.

Question 6 will synthesize the findings and conclusions from all questions and data collected/analyzed to distill concrete lessons and good practices to carry forward with the lens of budget reductions.

There is interest by USAID and partners to see whether the programs have harnessed opportunities for peace and have adapted to changes in the political and social contexts. To the extent possible, this will be examined, where appropriate, across the evaluation questions.

**Gender** will be specifically addressed in question 2, but will also be viewed as a cross-cutting theme to be explored where appropriate throughout the evaluation. The evaluation team is expected to be responsive to USAID’s dual expectations for treating gender appropriately: (a) gathering sex disaggregated data and (b) identifying gender differential participation in/benefits from aspects of the program where differences on this basis are possible.

## 3. Evaluation Design and Methodology

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### 3.1 Evaluation Design

This evaluation will first focus on the development of a Theory of Change. “A theory of change explains why we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context. It is intended to make all of our implicit assumptions more explicit, in order to (1) clarify which drivers of violent conflict we are addressing; (2) state clearly what the intended outcome of programs will be; and (3) fully articulate how and why the program will address the drivers of conflict and achieve its intended outcomes.” Put simply, a theory of change is expressed in the following form: “**If** we do X (action), **then** we will produce Y



(change/shift towards peace, stability, security).”<sup>92</sup> An example of a TOC, for reference, is **If** inter-religious violence at schools is reduced, **then** cooperation and coexistence among youth of different religions will increase, **and** they will be less susceptible to manipulation into inter-religious violence overall, **because** their new skills for resolving differences and controlling their emotions peacefully and their new relationships will make them less willing to fight.

For this exercise, the TOC will be derived from project and Mission documentation, and validated by the Mission and the partners during a partner workshop. The TOC will serve as the basis to measure USAID’s contribution to mitigating conflict and building peace. In doing so, the team will need to examine the critical assumptions underlying the TOC, as well as other actors and factors that may have contributed to the overall goal. The identified *approaches* will serve as the “pathways” for change.<sup>93</sup>

The evaluation will be examining *contribution*, however, it is not expected that the team will be making any statements/judgments on *attribution* given the number of external variables that may have played a role in ensuring peace in Kenya.

This evaluation is not a performance evaluation. In that sense, the team are not expected to examine each individual project to see the extent to which the program implemented what was planned, and reached project-specific objectives and project goals, but, rather, looking at the projects collectively (and, if possible, individually) in their contribution to peace. Additionally, the evaluation will only focus on the activities of a program that are related to conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening. For projects (such as PACT) where activities were broader in scope, every activity is not expected to be reviewed. The evaluation team during desk review will determine precisely what elements of each project are to be examined, and this will be spelled out in the Work Plan, which shall also include a detailed methodology.

The evaluation team is expected to use well-developed data collection and analysis methods to address each of USAID’s evaluation questions. A preliminary version of a matrix for associating data collection and analysis methods with evaluation questions (*Getting to Answers*) is provided in Annex D. This matrix shares the initial thinking about appropriate methodological choices. The evaluation team is expected to review and refine this methodology, or suggest higher quality alternatives that could be employed at no additional cost beyond what USAID has allotted for this evaluation. Details the evaluation team adds to this preliminary plan for gathering and analyzing data on each evaluation question shall be submitted to USAID for review/approval as part of the evaluation team’s Methodology and Workplan (Section 4.1).

## 3.2 Data Collection Methods

Some key aspects of the data collection are the following:

### Document Review

The evaluation team will review documentation provided by USAID and the six partners, and any relevant secondary research they collect (especially on Kenya conflict analyses). An instrument will be developed to codify and organize data from the document review for analysis according to the evaluation questions. The team is also expected to begin constructing the overall TOC during the desk review period. This will be further explored, extrapolated and validated during the partner workshop.

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<sup>92</sup> USAID (2013), *Theories and Indicators of Change Briefing Paper: concepts and primers for conflict management and mitigation*.

<sup>93</sup> For more information on theory of change approach for Peacebuilding and Conflict Mitigation, please refer to: 1) OECD (2012), *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results*, DAC Guidelines and References Series, OECD Publishing. 2) USAID (2010), *Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation*.



It is expected that the evaluation team will present initial findings from the document review against the evaluation questions as part of the Team Planning Meeting (Section 4.1) at the beginning of the evaluation.

### Survey

To answer Question 3 on changes in attitudes and behaviors over time, a survey will be employed to collect the necessary data. The survey will gauge perceptions (current and retrospective), as well as individual engagement in and knowledge of USAID activities.

A few of the partner projects conducted baselines. To the extent possible, the baseline surveys, methodologies, tools and questions will be examined during the survey design with an attempt to incorporate, when appropriate, matching questions and/or methodologies to enable comparison data.

The survey will be conducted in six counties: Mombasa, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru, Nandi, Kericho and Nairobi. The selection of the six counties was purposively sampled to include those counties with the most significant number of direct beneficiaries (based on the data shared by the partners) and a high concentration in the number of USAID projects implemented.

The sample selection is based on a geographical stratification as the first level (per region, per county). Within each targeted county, the survey firm will select between 1 and 3 sub-counties to survey based on where there is higher concentration of projects to ensure higher probability of reaching beneficiaries (indirect and direct). Within these sub-counties, the survey firm will select a proportionate number of survey starting points (a landmark, school, bus stop or similar), from where enumerators will spread in randomizing walking patterns (directional spread, left hand rule, household skip, kish grid or birthday rule) to identify specific random respondents. In this way, every citizen has an equal likelihood of being included in the survey.

The sample size of  $n=1,200$  is commonly used for nationwide representative surveys. Its statistical margin of error is smaller than  $\pm 3\%$  for top level variables at 95% confidence. Disaggregation of the data is possible. Variables for which the sub-sample is larger than  $n=100$  are subject to a statistical error margin of 10% or less.

Regional disaggregation might be possible, but most likely not for all regions. A split out by partner organizations or type of activity will not be possible, given the number of cross-cutting activities. We also expect the incidence of direct beneficiaries to be too small to reach a meaningful sample size for separate analysis. For indirect beneficiaries, the sample size would only be large enough for separate top level analysis, if the incidence is close to what the six partner organizations have reported (approx. 10 million indirect beneficiaries reached).

According to the information received from the partner organizations, at least one in four respondents should have been a beneficiary, providing a data set of 300 surveys for project specific analysis. This will only suffice to explore any questions at a very high level of aggregation with high margins of uncertainty.

The survey will be conducted by Research Solutions Africa (RSA), under contract with MSI. Oversight of enumerator training and data collection will be provided by MSI. RSA, with the support of a Conflict Specialist from the evaluation team, will develop the survey tool. MSI will review and make any necessary changes to it. Comments on the tool and approval will be sought from USAID and the partner prior to the initiation of data collection.

### Key Informant Interviews

Under the six projects, key informants will be identified with the support from the partners and USAID. The list of key informants will focus on those supporting the implementation of the projects and other essential direct beneficiaries. Other key actors and donors will be interviewed to better understand the sphere of activities focused on conflict mitigation and peacebuilding efforts. This will assist USAID in perhaps determining complimentary efforts that do not overlap with other donor endeavors. It could also assist in further delineating a specific area of concentration for future limited USAID programming.

### Group Discussions

Group discussions will be held with different beneficiary groups. The groups will be purposively sampled based on the ten *approaches* (and those that lend themselves to group discussions). Five focus groups are planned for each site visit in order to capture the different dimensions of the identified *approaches'* beneficiary group perspectives and experiences. The discussion groups will include: a) beneficiaries of community dialogues and reconciliation efforts (two profiles to be determined after desk review); b) local partners that received capacity building training; c) local actors and champions that received capacity building; and, d) District Peace Committees (DPCs).

### Online Survey

An online survey may be considered to collect quantitative and qualitative data from local partners and activity recipients. This could be useful in further retrieving data from populations that may not be covered during the site visits, especially with regard to training local partners and Targets of Opportunity *approaches*.

### Partner Workshop

In the beginning of the evaluation, a workshop with all six partners and USAID will be facilitated by the evaluation team. The workshop will solicit perspectives and discussion on the TOC and related underlying assumptions, identifying other key actors and contextual factors, as well as any change indicators. The discussion from the workshop will help inform the evaluation framework, and thus the tools.

### Site Visits<sup>94</sup>

The team will visit four sites across the targeted areas: Nairobi, Coast (centered in Mombasa, but also including Kwale and Kilifi), Bungoma (Mt. Elgon), and Nakuru (including Molo and Naivasha). This will allow the team to supplement the data collected through the household survey. During these site visits, the team will conduct key informant interviews and group discussions described earlier. The sites are purposefully selected, considering the following criteria: (a) concentration of targeted projects; (b) diversity of conflict drivers; (3) mix of urban and rural (inclusion of this criterion assumes that conflict eruption travels differently in different settings therefore necessitating distinct conflict mitigation activities).

## **3.3 Data Analysis Methods**

The evaluation team will design a data analysis plan as part of the evaluation methodology. This will ensure that the data collection methods, including tools, feed into the data analysis and synthesis of findings to allow for quick reporting. The main data analysis methods that the team will use are described below.

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<sup>94</sup> In addition to the criteria used for sampling for site visits and the survey, MSI wanted to ensure coverage of the minimum areas for data collection identified in the Statement of Objectives.

### Pathway Mapping

Pathway mapping refers to the sequence or hierarchy of changes and events that map out how things will change. In examining a TOC-focused evaluation, pathway mapping will enable the evaluation team to determine how the *approaches* identified have led to peace. At the same time, during the mapping, the team will need to analyze other possible explanations and factors in the mapping process.

### Comparison Analysis

The team will use comparison analysis in three ways: (a) any baseline data to current survey data (before and after); (b) time series analysis of the survey data collected; (c) a comparison of best practice and between *approaches* to assess which *approaches* (and strategies) are most effective and why (worked well versus not as well).

### Summary Statistics

The team will use summary statistics to analyze quantitative data obtained from the survey and other documents. The two main analytical tools that the team will use include frequency analysis and cross-tabulation analysis.

### Content, Pattern and Trend Analysis

For Group Discussions and Key Informant Interview data, the team will analyze the content of the responses to get an in-depth understanding of the experiences and priorities of beneficiaries and stakeholders. The team will also examine the data for patterns to determine whether some responses are determined by certain variables, such as geography and *approach*. Looking at trends over time will also allow the team to consider changes in implementation that may have occurred over time.

### Validation Workshop

A half-day validation workshop with partners and USAID will be held at the end of data collection and the beginning of data analysis to discuss and validate emerging findings, brainstorm the appropriateness and feasibility of potential recommendations, and fill in any gaps in data that the evaluation team identified.

### Response Convergence/Divergence Analysis

The team will review data collected to determine where there is significant response convergence from the varied stakeholders and beneficiaries. Where divergence is found, the team will follow-up to better understand the context and reasons for divergence in facts, perceptions or opinions.

### Mixed Methods Integration

Since the team is using a mixed methods approach, data collected from the various methods will be integrated to arrive at findings. Where different methods produce conflicting evidence, the evaluation team will, to the extent possible, double back to examine why these data conflict, as well as weight the data from the various methods in terms of strength in validity and reliability.

## 3.4 Methodological Strengths and Limitations

By the time of the evaluation, four of the projects will be closed out. While some of the key individuals who worked on the projects will still be based in Nairobi, their support will be more limited as they will be engaged with other assignments. Further, certain key individuals will no longer be available. There will need to be a stronger focus on documentary evidence to supplement the lack of personnel in country. This evaluation does benefit from having the end of project performance evaluations completed as a source of information.

A few projects conducted baseline information. However, because they were project specific, the surveys are narrower in scope and geographic coverage. This constraint will limit comparison data of pre-project data. While the survey will include retrospective questions, there may be some limitations on the reliability of this data due to recall bias.

Disentangling USAID's concrete contribution to peace will be challenging due to a number of other actors and donors operating in the same geographic areas and working on similar peacebuilding and conflict mitigation activities. Further, many other contextual factors have may have impacted the peaceful elections. Causal inference will be employed to the extent possible to credibly show a relationship between changes that have taken place and the activities the projects undertook.

## 4. Evaluation Products

### 4.1 Processes and Deliverables

Deliverable	Responsible Party	Date
Letter of Introduction to be used with local authorities and will facilitate any meetings at the national level that may be determined necessary.	USAID/DRG	within 10 days of task order award
Draft Survey for Comments from USAID/DRG and partners <sup>95</sup>	MSI	Oct 2 (COB)
USAID/DRG and partners will provide comments on Survey instrument (approval granted if changes are incorporated)	USAID/DRG & partners	Oct 4 (COB)
Initial meeting with USAID to discuss expectations, review evaluation questions, and answer any specific questions.	MSI/DRG/COR	Oct 8
All Day Partner/stakeholder workshop to validate a theory of change, and related underlying assumptions, identifying other key actors and contextual factors, as well as any change indicators: all six partners and USAID	MSI/DRG/Partners	Oct 9
Work plan submitted to USAID, including detailed methodologies for each evaluation question and precisely what elements of each project are to be examined.	MSI	Oct 14 (COB)
Meeting with USAID on Work Plan where agreement is reached and approval provided (perhaps with articulated changes).	MSI/DRG/COR	Oct 16
Dates for key informant interviews with USAID/DRG staff.	MSI/DRG	Possible Oct 17, 18, Nov 5

<sup>95</sup> Please note that MSI will also be providing additional technical feedback on the draft instrument in parallel to USAID and partners. This will enable the evaluation (with survey and qualitative components) to remain on the planned schedule.

A half-day (morning) validation workshop with all partners and USAID	MSI/DRG/Partners	Nov 8
Weekly reports at the end of weeks 3, 4, 5, and 6	MSI	Oct 22, 29, Nov 5, 12
A. Presentation of findings to USAID at USAID	MSI	Nov 14
B. Presentation of findings to IPs and their AOR/CORs at MSI	MSI	Nov 14
C. Presentation for all Mission staff at USAID	MSI	Nov 15
D. Draft Report submitted	MSI	Nov 27
E. Comments from USAID on Draft Report (one week later)	USAID	Dec 4
F. Comments from IPs on Draft Report (one week later)	USAID	Dec 11
Final Report. All background documents collected by MSI for this evaluation shall be provided to USAID on CDs, organized by implementing mechanism, along with the final report.	MSI	Jan 3
G. USAID approval of final report	USAID	Jan 10

A detailed breakdown of the process is listed below (if there are any differences in dates or actions below and the calendar on page 46-48, the calendar takes precedence):

Week 1	<u>Desk Review &amp; Survey Set up</u> In order to initiate data collection, the evaluation team will review all the documents from their home base. These initial findings will be presented to MSI as part of the Team Planning Meeting. The team will also prepare for the partner workshop and begin initial analysis to feed into the theory of change. The evaluation team/USAID/partners are also expected to provide feedback on the survey instrument virtually during this period.
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Week 2	<p><u>Team Planning Meeting (TPM)</u></p> <p>The TPM will be held in MSI offices once the evaluation team is in country. It is expected that the team will have the initial meeting with USAID (Day 2 of Week 2) to discuss expectations, review evaluation questions, and answer any specific questions. An all-day partner workshop (including USAID) is scheduled for Day 3 of Week 2), which will build the theory-of-change for the evaluation.</p> <p>The outcomes of the team planning include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presentation of the initial findings of the document review by evaluation question (MSI-only);</li> <li>• Clear understanding of TOC model for the evaluation;</li> <li>• Clarification of team members' roles and responsibilities;</li> <li>• Establishment a team atmosphere, share individual working styles, and agree on procedures for resolving differences of opinion;</li> <li>• Review of the final evaluation questions;</li> <li>• Review and finalization of the assignment timeline and share with USAID;</li> <li>• Development of data collection and analysis methods, instruments, tools, and guidelines;</li> <li>• Review and clarification of any logistical and administrative procedures for the assignment;</li> <li>• Development of a preliminary draft outline of the team's report; and</li> <li>• Assignment of drafting responsibilities for the final report.</li> </ul>
Week 3	<p><u>Workplan and Methodology</u></p> <p>During the TPM, the team will prepare a detailed work plan which will include the methodologies (evaluation design, tools) and operational workplan to be used in the evaluation. This will be submitted to USAID on Day 1 of Week 3 (COB). The team will meet with USAID on Day 3 of Week 3 for the Work Plan Review Meeting, to discuss the methodology and get approval prior to implementation.</p> <p>To time the survey completion with the data analysis, the survey instrument will need to designed and approved prior to the submission of the workplan and methodology. MSI expects that USAID and partners will also provide feedback.</p>
Weeks 4 through 6	<p><u>Updates on Progress:</u> MSI will present weekly reports by email to USAID starting at the end of the first week of data collection and continuing through the end of week 6, the end of data collection and the beginning of analysis. The report will discuss ongoing activities during the course of the evaluation describing the process, any issues encountered, and relevant emerging findings.</p>

Week 6: Day 5	<u>Validation Meeting:</u> A half-day meeting (morning) with all partners and USAID to validate and discuss findings, answer/clarify any data gaps; and discuss feasibility of potential recommendations.
Week 7: Day 4	<u>Presentation with USAID/DRG and Partners:</u> The evaluation team will present the major findings of the evaluation to USAID and partners in a PowerPoint presentation in two separate presentations (morning for USAID, afternoon for partners). The presentation will follow a similar structure to the final report and present major findings, conclusions, and recommendations. Both the partners and USAID will have an opportunity to comment and provide input/feedback as part of the presentation. These comments will be incorporated into the draft report, as appropriate.
Week 7: Day 5	<u>Presentation to all of USAID:</u> This presentation will be open to all USAID staff interested in learning the main findings of the evaluation.
Week 10: Day 3	<u>Draft Evaluation Report:</u> The written report should clearly describe findings, conclusions, and recommendations, fully supported by triangulated evidence. USAID will provide comments on the draft report within two weeks of submission.
Week 14: Day 3	<u>Final Evaluation Report:</u> The team will submit the final report that incorporates the team responses to Mission comments and suggestions. The format will adhere to the standard reporting guidelines listed in 4.2. USAID has one week thereafter for approval. If there are some outstanding questions, MSI will attempt to answer/incorporate them into the report as appropriate. Otherwise, USAID can consider a Statement of Differences.

The evaluation report will adhere to USAID Evaluation Policy and as such all raw quantitative data will need to be shared with USAID. Qualitative data will also be shared, if specifically requested by USAID.

It is expected that USAID will approve no later than one week after submitting the final evaluation report.

## 4.2 Reporting Guidelines

The format for the evaluation report shall be as follows, and the report should be a maximum of 30 pages not including annexes. The report format should be restricted to Microsoft products and 12-point font should be used throughout the body of the report, with 1" page margins. An electronic copy in MS Word shall be submitted. In addition, all data collected by the evaluation shall be provided to USAID in an electronic file in an easily readable format; organized and fully documented for use by those not fully familiar with the project or the evaluation. If the report contains any potentially procurement sensitive information, a second version report excluding this information shall be submitted (also electronically, in English). Below represents a guideline for the report structure.

- a. **Executive Summary**—concisely state the most salient findings and recommendations (3 pg);
- b. **Table of Contents** (1 pg);
- c. **Evaluation Purpose and Evaluation Questions**—purpose, audience, and synopsis of task (1 pg);

- d. **Project Background**—brief overview of development problem, USAID project strategy and activities implemented to address the problem, and purpose of the evaluation (2-3 pg);
- e. **Evaluation Design, Methods, Limitations**—describe evaluation methods, including constraints and gaps (1 pg);
- f. **Findings/Conclusions/Recommendations**—for each evaluation question (20-25 pp);
- g. **Annexes** that document the evaluation methods, schedules, interview lists and tables should be succinct, pertinent and readable. These include references to bibliographical documentation, meetings, interviews and group discussions.

## 5. Team Composition

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The evaluation team will be composed of six researchers – three international team members and three national team members. The composition of the team seeks to match experiences and expertise in the following areas: evaluation /research methods, conflict mitigation, peacebuilding, and the Kenyan context. With this in mind, the following descriptions were used to collect relevant CVs for review and consideration.

### International Evaluation Team Leader

- Education experience: Master’s Degree in Governance, Political Science, Conflict Studies, or related field; PhD is a plus;
- Proven experience in designing and conducting evaluations of conflict prevention/mitigation and peace building programs. Familiar with theory of change approach evaluation/research;
- Applied knowledge of conflict mitigation, peace building processes (e.g. peace dividends, early warning/early response systems, peace dialogues, reconciliation projects, civil society strengthening, etc.);
- Knowledge of current political economy of Kenya (e.g. new Constitution, 2013 elections, devolution, etc.);
- Experience in USAID, especially in Democracy, Rights and Governance, and Conflict Mitigation;
- Proven experience in quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis methods (including focus group discussion, key informant interviews, survey design and statistical analysis, etc.);
- Demonstrated written communications skills, especially in drafting evaluations and reports, required;
- Familiarity with USAID Forward quality evaluation standards and requirements.

**Technical Advisor, Conflict Mitigation Theory-of-Change Advisor**, responsible for constructing the theory-of change, including leading the partner workshop, in cooperation with the Team Leader, and supporting the development of the methodology, tools and workplan. The position would also provide input to the technical feedback virtually on data collection and the report.

- Education experience: PhD in Governance, Political Science, Conflict Studies, or related field;
- Proven expertise in articulating/development theories of change for conflict mitigation approaches and peacebuilding activities;
- Experience in USAID, especially in Democracy, Rights and Governance, and Conflict Mitigation;
- Experience conducting research and/or evaluations of conflict prevention/mitigation and peace building programs;
- Proven experience in quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis methods (including focus group discussion, key informant interviews, survey design and statistical analysis, etc.).

### Conflict Mitigation Team Members (three positions; national (2) and international (1))



- Education experience: Master's Degree in Governance, Political Science, Conflict Studies, or related field; PhD is a plus; or the equivalent in additional years of experience;
- 8+ year experience in implementing or managing conflict mitigation, peace building, or civil society strengthening programs (e.g. peace dividends, early warning/early response systems, peace dialogues, reconciliation projects, etc.);
- Experience conducting evaluations of conflict prevention/mitigation and peace building programs;
- Proven experience in quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis methods (including focus group discussion, key informant interviews, survey design and statistical analysis, etc.);
- Experience in USAID, especially in Democracy, Rights and Governance, and Conflict Mitigation;
- Demonstrated written communications skills, especially in drafting evaluations and reports, required;
- Fluent in English and Kiswahili (for nationals only).

### **Conflict Mitigation Team Members (national)**

- Education experience: Master's Degree in Governance, Political Science, Conflict Studies, or related field; or the equivalent in additional years of experience;
- 5+ year experience in implementing or managing conflict mitigation, peace building, or civil society strengthening programs (e.g. peace dividends, early warning/early response systems, peace dialogues, reconciliation projects, etc.);
- Proven skills in coordination, logistics and facilitation;
- Experience conducting evaluations of conflict prevention/mitigation and peace building programs;
- Proven experience in quantitative and qualitative data collection and analysis methods (including focus group discussion, key informant interviews, survey design and statistical analysis, etc.);
- Experience in USAID, especially in Democracy, Rights and Governance, and Conflict Mitigation;
- Demonstrated written communications skills, especially in drafting evaluations and reports, required;
- Fluent in English and Kiswahili.

CVs for all personnel are found in Annex B: CVs. Dr. Terrence Lyons, blurb below, will provide oversight and support the team in the design of the methodology.

**Technical Advisor, Conflict Mitigation Theory-of-Change Advisor: Dr. Terrence Lyons** is a world-renowned conflict prevention, mitigation and response specialist whose professional career has focused on conflict resolution in Africa, with particular attention to the Horn of Africa. Dr. Lyons has consulted for the U.S. government, World Bank, United Nations, International Crisis Group, Freedom House, Global Integrity, Council on Foreign Relations, Carnegie Corporation of New York, National Democratic Institute, and other government and non-governmental organizations on issues relating to conflict and democratization. Currently, he is Associate Professor in the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia. Dr. Lyons is also Co-Director of the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University and Senior Associate and Co-Chair of the Ethiopia Policy Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Additionally, Dr. Lyons lectures as a Visiting Professor at the Center for Human Rights at Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia. Dr. Lyons is a frequent Lecturer at the Rift Valley Institute having taught courses on the Horn of Africa in Mombasa, Kenya (June 2012), Lamu, Kenya (June 2009), and Djibouti (October 2008). In February, 2007, he served as a resource person and panelist at the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission Working Group at the Sierra Leone meeting on Elections.

Dr. Lyons was Senior Advisor at the The Carter Center Election Mission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He advised the Carter Center on its election observation mission in Ethiopia and designed and conducted delegate briefings, consulted with President Jimmy Carter, drafted interim and final reports of findings,

and participated in project evaluation. He continued to consult with the center on its Civil Society Dialogues Process and on evaluation of 2010 elections. Dr. Lyons wrote his Ph.D. dissertation at Johns Hopkins University on U.S.-Ethiopian relations and conducted his fieldwork in Ethiopia in 1988-89. From 1990-1998 he served as coordinator of the Conflict Resolution in Africa project at the Brookings Institution and continued his research in northeast Africa. Lyons served as an election observer to the 1992 regional elections in Ethiopia, the 1993 referendum in Eritrea, and as the Senior Advisor to the Donor Election Unit during the 1995 national elections in Ethiopia.

## **6. Evaluation Management**

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### **6.1 Logistics**

USAID/Kenya will provide input through an initial in-briefing to the evaluation team, identify key documents, and assist in introducing the evaluation team to the implementing partner. It will also be available for consultations regarding sources and technical issues with the evaluation team during the evaluation process. USAID/Kenya is expected to participate in the stakeholder workshop and as key informant interviewees.

MSI will assist in arranging meetings with key stakeholders identified prior to the initiation of field work. MSI will be responsible for arranging vehicle rental and drivers as needed for site visits around Nairobi and the field. MSI will also provide hotel arrangements office space, internet access, printing, and photocopying and be responsible for all payments to vendors directly after team members arrive in country.

The evaluation team will be responsible for arranging other meetings as identified during the course of the evaluation. It will advise USAID/Kenya of any meetings with the Government of Kenya and seek advice from USAID/Kenya on whether they choose to participate.

### **6.2 Scheduling**

Work is to be carried out over a period of approximately fourteen weeks, beginning with document review. The survey will be piloted during Week 2 with data processing finding by Week 6, Day 2 to be aligned with the completion of data collection by the evaluation team. Team members will deploy to Kenya at the end of Week 1. Field work will be completed by Week 6. An initial findings presentation will be made in Week 7 and the final report will be submitted in Week 14. Exact scheduling and division of labor will be reviewed during the Team Planning Meeting and presented in the Methodology and Workplan.

## **SIMON RICHARDS**

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### **Proposed Position: Team Leader**

#### **Summary:**

Mr. Simon Richards has over 20 years' experience managing social development and humanitarian programs for diverse international organizations across Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Mr. Richards is a seasoned conflict specialist with expertise in conflict assessment, analysis, prevention, management, training, reduction and peace-building. Over the past two decades his technical work has focused particularly on the areas of: conflict management stabilization and peace building through programming and the provision of technical and strategic advice to all parties including the extractive industry, International and National NGOs and governments. He brings substantive experience in civil society strengthening, governance, institutional development, strategic and community development, capacity building and NGO training, monitoring and evaluation, as well as personnel management for large international development projects. He holds a Master of Science in Development Studies from Deakin University.

#### **Education:**

Master of Science, Development Studies, Deakin University, Victoria, Australia (1997)

Postgraduate Certificate in Education, University of London, United Kingdom (1987)

Bachelor of Science (Honors), Medicinal Chemistry, University of London, United Kingdom (1983)

#### **Experience:**

##### **Independent Consultant, Melbourne, Australia**

**February 2009 – Present**

Areas of specialization include assisting and advising organizations in all aspects of international development including: strategic design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation of projects and programs particularly those aimed at strengthening civil society and governance issues.

Sector expertise includes:

- Conflict assessment and analysis
- Peace-building and conflict management
- Corporate social responsibility – extractive industry
- Civil society strengthening and community empowerment
- Governance
- Capacity building
- Evaluation
- Provision of coaching services to senior management

**IBTCI, South Sudan** **July-September 2013**  
**Evaluation Team Leader**

- Evaluation of the USAID-funded Sudan Transition and Conflict Mitigation (STCM) Program to assess the effectiveness to improve Sudanese confidence and capacity to address the causes and consequences of political conflict, violence, and instability.

**Myanmar Conflict Analysis, Kayah State and Central Myanmar** **June-September 2013**  
**Conflict Advisor and Expert**

- Consideration and understanding of the drivers of conflict to develop recommendations for programming options, as well as DNH and conflict sensitive approaches within the context of Pact's Shae Thot integrated development program.

**Life and Peace Institute, Sweden** **June 2013**  
**Conflict and Peace-Building Training Expert**

- Design and implementation of a global workshop on the monitoring and evaluation of peace-building. Topics include key concepts regarding peace-building and conflict transformation, participatory conflict analysis, evaluating impact and process, monitoring methodologies and considering process as end.

**Feinstein International Center, Kenya** **April-June 2013**  
**Conflict Technical Advisor and Expert**

- *Kenya Post Election Conflict Analysis*, OFDA livelihoods and Disaster Risk Reduction. Consideration and understanding of the drivers of conflict or lack thereof, related to elections in Kenya and development of recommendations for programming options.

**Pact, Inc.** **May 2013**  
**Conflict Technical Advisor**

- Technical input into the design of PEACE III the USAID upcoming cross-border conflict management program follow on from PEACE II. Served as primary program designer for PEACE II while at Pact.

**The World Bank, South Sudan** **April 2013**  
**Conflict Technical Advisor and Expert for Conflict Assessment**

- Conflict assessment and input into the design of a youth and livelihoods program with particular emphasis on gender and conflict in South Sudan.

**IBTCI, Ethiopia** **January-April 2013**  
**Evaluation Team Leader**

- Evaluation of a USAID conflict mitigation and peace-building program in Ethiopia.
- Provided conflict mitigation, resilience and programming recommendations for the next phase of conflict and livelihoods programming.

**Feinstein International Center, Uganda** **October 2012-September 2013**  
**Conflict Technical Advisor and Expert**

- Design and advise the implementation of a social research project into the application of a behavior change model for pastoralist youth involved in conflict and the implications for livelihoods programming in the Karamoja, Uganda – funded by the World Bank.

**United States Institute for Peace (USIP), South Sudan** **December 2012-April 2013**  
**Evaluation of Community Peace-building Program**

- Evaluation of a cross-border peace-building program in Unity State and Southern Kordofan implemented through Peace Direct and funded by USIP.

**IBTCI, Myanmar**

**November-December 2012**

**Team Leader**

- Evaluation of the USAID Leadership Program for Civil Society. Provided social analysis of the context and provision of recommendations for future civil society development programming in Myanmar.

**Plan Vietnam and Matrix Consulting, Vietnam**

**August-September 2012**

**Consultant**

- Developed an improved participatory processes and measurement for the poor and ethnic minorities in a Vietnam government pro-poor governance program.
- Developed an M&E framework and tools for the Participation, Engagement and Accountability Program (PEAP).
- Developed and delivered a Training of Trainers workshop, manual and materials for improved participatory monitoring processes for governance programming to local government, and Plan staff.

**IRD, Horn of Africa**

**August 2012 – Present**

**Consultant**

- Assessment, conflict analysis, preparation and preliminary design of a conflict transformation framework and potential programs to address conflict in the Horn of Africa.

**ACT Alliance, Somalia and Kenya**

**May 2012 - August 2012**

**Consultant**

- Impact evaluation and learning event, Horn of Africa Humanitarian Appeal.

**Plan Vietnam and Matrix Consulting, Vietnam**

**May 2012 (first input)**

**Consultant**

- Developed an improved participatory processes and measurement for the poor and ethnic minorities in a Vietnam government pro-poor governance program. Development of an M&E framework and tools for the Participation, Engagement and Accountability Program (PEAP).
- Analysis of the District Social Economic Development Plans (SEDP) and processes in two provinces in Vietnam to advise Plan Vietnam on how better to improve the participation processes to be pro-poor for both local government officials and community.
- Developed an improved participatory monitoring process for governance programming and then trained local government, community and Plan staff in the new accountability methodologies.

**Minority Rights Group International, Kenya, Uganda and Sudan**

**March 2012**

**Consultant**

- Evaluation: Preventing inter-community conflicts in East Africa.

**Saferworld, UK**

**March 2012**

**Advisor**

- Development of a more systematic M&E framework, indicators and methodologies for community security at the global organizational level. Consideration of how better to measure the impact of community security programs, including government frameworks and their vertical linkages.
- Advisory role including the development of a discussion paper to assist in stimulating an internal organizational debate.

**Saferworld, UK  
Consultant**

**April – May 2012**

- Development of a policy brief assessing the humanitarian needs and conflict situation in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile, published by ODI.
- Development of a comprehensive conflict transformation framework for Sudan.

**Danish Refugee Council, Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia  
Consultant**

- Policy and practical guideline design for conflict analysis, management, resolution and conflict sensitivity in humanitarian programming in Somaliland, Puntland and Somalia.
- Policy and guideline design for conflict analysis, management, resolution and conflict sensitivity in humanitarian programming, for the World Bank Community Driven Recovery and Development program (CDRD) being implemented by DRC and UNICEF and supported by DFID and the World Bank.

**Pax Populus, Australia  
Consultant**

**October 2011**

- Technical design of stakeholder consultations to inform the design of a process and communications strategy to address conflict and governance issues between local government and landholders in a recently designated protected Grasslands Reserves in Australia.

**Pact Inc., Myanmar  
Consultant**

**May 2011**

- Successful Technical Design for a USAID funded - US\$55 million integrated Livelihoods, Health and WASH program in Myanmar (Burma) for a consortium of UN Habitat, UNDP, ACTED and lead by Pact Inc.

**Pax Populous Consulting  
2011**

**December 2010-January**

**Researcher and Team Member**

- Stakeholder Design Process: Research with other team members to obtain stakeholder input to inform a design process for Gunns Ltd and their controversial proposed Bell Bay Pulp Mill in Tasmania.

**Feinstein International Center, Ethiopia  
Consultant**

**October 2010 and February 2011**

- Conducted a conflict analysis and applied the findings to the “Bridges” Education Program (Save the Children, Mercy Corps, Islamic Relief) in the Somali Region of Southern Ethiopia (on behalf of Feinstein International Center, Tufts University and DFID).

**Save the Children, US  
Consultant**

**February 2010**

- Evaluation: ‘Safety Net Approach in Pastoral Areas and Pilot Safety Net Program in Pastoral Areas Pilot: Designed and conducted an impact review of this USAID funded program in the pastoralist Somali region of Southern Ethiopia, considering the conflict sensitivity dynamics and stability of the region.

**Save the Children, Australia  
Transition Manager PNG**

**March-July 2009**

- Assessed the risks, security issues and opportunities as well as oversaw the management, transition and handover of an Aus\$5 million annual budget program from Save the Children New Zealand to Australia.

**Matrix International Consulting, Australia**

**April-June 2009**

**Researcher on Early Recovery (Post-conflict and Post-disaster)**

- Review and analyze AusAID's program experience to date across Asia and the Pacific and prepare a background paper outlining lessons learned and identifying the key principles of early recovery and stability (Post-conflict and Post-disaster) to inform the development of an AusAID policy on early recovery.

**Chevron and Pact, Myanmar**

**July 2009**

**Consultant**

- Conduct a full program evaluation of a livelihoods, health and community empowerment and development program in Myanmar.

**Pax Populus**

**Present**

**Senior Associate**

- Consultant on various assignments for this Australian Social Advisory organization that specializes in provision of services concerning dispute resolution and peace-building, stakeholder engagement and communication, social impact and community development, and corporate social performance.

**Save the Children Australia**

**Aug 2009 –**

**Dec 2010**

**Strategic Programs Advisor** (part-time) includes 5 months as **International Programs Director**

- Provided input, oversight and technical support and advice to develop strategic programs across the organizational portfolio including Australia.
- Developed programs, with particular emphasis on the Horn of Africa, as well as develop relationships with the corporate community and the extractive industries.
- Assisted in identifying strategic linkages, useful lessons and program experiences across and within the institution. Developed strategic partnerships to achieve mission objectives.

**Pact Inc. Kenya and Australia**

**February 2004 – March 2010**

**Corporate Community Engagement Advisor / Senior Associate**

**March 2009-2010**

**Peace and Conflict Advisor**

**Sep 2007- Mar 2009**

- Member of Pact's Africa regional senior management team. Lead the development of strategy for Pact in Peace and Conflict; provided senior oversight and technical support to Horn of Africa regional conflict reduction and peace building efforts as well as development of the Corporate Community Engagement sector. Assisted in identifying strategic linkages, useful lessons and program experiences across the region and within the institution.
- Designed and developed a successful regional USAID funded US\$ 10 million Regional Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (PEACE II) Program addressing cross-border conflict in the Horn of Africa (border areas or Ethiopia, Somalia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda).
- Senior Technical Director on the USAID funded Regional Enhanced Livelihoods Program - Conflict Prevention and Mitigation (CPMR) activity in the Horn of Africa. Oversaw and implemented the development of a set of practical conflict sensitive service delivery tools and workshops to assist local and international livelihoods organizations to consider and mitigate the implications for conflict as a result of their programs.

- Developed a regional strategic direction for expansion into West Africa – focusing on the mining and peace and conflict sectors particularly considering Liberia, Nigeria and Ghana.
- Organized the first Pact ‘Peace Platform’ meeting bringing practitioners together to consider organizational policy and praxis.
- Design and ongoing technical input into regional conflict programs including the USAID - CMM funded cross-border initiatives Sudan – Ethiopia (Gambella region), NRM and extractive industries in DRC (Ituri), and some initiatives jointly funded between USAID and DFID on cross-border trade and conflict in DRC.

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**Pact Inc. Nairobi, Kenya Africa Regional Director  
Peace and Conflict Advisor**

**Sep 2005- Sep 2007**

- Member of the global senior management team. Had direct strategic oversight and management of Pact’s Africa portfolio of 16 Country Directors and programs, including Ethiopia, Sudan, Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, DRC, Zimbabwe and Nigeria, with a combined budget portfolio of ca. US\$250+ million (USAID funds).
- Management of the Regional Support Unit: a team of 10 technical resource and support personnel (governance advisors, HIV/AIDS, and specialist grant managers).
- Trouble-shooting on all USAID-funded programs, as well as support to program managers to ensure contract deliverables achieved.
- Represent Pact and foster relations with donors and other external actors in the region.
- Initiated, lead and managed the first Pact Africa Regional Strategy formulation effort, leading to an approved Strategy 2006-2011 and the development of regional programs as well as country programs.
- Designed and developed a number of strategic cross- border regional programs addressing conflict and stability in the Horn of Africa and in Central Africa.
- Facilitated and implemented organizational change processes, including decentralization of support functions and their development in the region.
- Supported the development, growth and sustainability of 4 new strategic ventures in the areas of: local governance (a barometer index to consider changes in and development of improved local governance in a variety of sectors) corporate social responsibility (USAID, DFID and corporate funded programs); learning and innovation; and women’s empowerment and livelihood improvement (USAID-funded).
- Oversaw the expansion of Pact’s presence and programming in Africa in three new countries, diversified support to partner new donors (DFID, Norad, Danida, Sida, CIDA, etc) including the corporate sector and aside from strengthening the traditional Pact relationship with USAID.
- Developed the regional unit to enhance quality programming and management practices including; introduction of cross-country program peer monitoring and reviews, the development of a monitoring and evaluation community of practice, and the development of an internal Africa Leadership program.

**Pact, Inc. Nairobi, Kenya**

**February 2004-September 2005**

**Chief of Party, Southern Sudan Transition Initiative (SSTI)**

- Overall program Director providing strategic direction and direct supervision of all program activities including managing a team of 20 staff.
- In conjunction with the Sudan Peace Fund, a total of 323 sub-grants awarded to over 150 organizations (>90% Sudanese) during its 3.5 year duration to the value of ca US\$12,000,000.
- Mentored, provided training and support to at least 73 civil society organizations across South Sudan resulting in their improved programming and management of projects. Activities varied from small peace-building, implementing of peace dividends, innovative new governance mechanisms around



NRM, livelihood projects, a large national dissemination of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement using civil society actors, support to various media, direct support to civil society conferences, strategy-making and advocacy efforts (around issues such as the development of local government policy, NGO laws, constitutional processes, etc) as well as Chambers of commerce and a specific methodology for civil society development at the Sub-Regional level.

- Addressed 33 separate conflicts across the Sudan with more than 35,000 participants in over 200 peace conferences and dialogues, resulting in over 50 Community Peace Resolutions and Agreements Signed as well as new civil institutions and actors able to assist in the peace processes such as peace committees, early warning mechanisms, the strengthening of the Government Peace Commission.
- Directed particularly politically sensitive activities involving liaison with the most senior SPLM/A commanders and civil society (eg the national dissemination of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement across Southern Sudan, the return of ca 25,000 Bor Dinka and their ca 1 million cattle out of Equatoria, the mobile courts, cross-line conferences eg the Nuba, particular conflicts, support to the SPLM).
- Ensured that the majority of activities empowered communities to hold their leaders accountable while simultaneously supporting leaders (when appropriate) to make good their commitments to improved behaviors in accord with the principles of good governance.

**Pact Inc., Nairobi, Kenya**

**February 2004-September 2005**

**Senior Program Advisor, Sudan Country Program**

- Provided senior management, programmatic and strategic advice to the Pact Sudan Country program. Member of senior management team (3 persons) overseeing a program with an annual budget of US\$30 million with components covering the whole of South Sudan and the transition areas include Peace-Building and Conflict Mitigation, Water provision within a conflict framework, Civil Society strengthening, good governance, support to the media, water provision, and support to returning IDPs. (The main donor for the program was USAID) Provide technical and program input into partner grants.
- Initiated and chaired the overall Sudan Country Program grant-making committee; evaluating, critiquing and ensuring that the activities were aligned with both project, regional and strategic objectives and of a sufficiently high quality intervention with achievable goals.
- Lead and mentored the Eastern Equatoria team that resulted in some of the most successful and innovative interventions of the program addressing conflict in pastoralist areas.
- Initiated and chaired the Sudan wide joint donor-NGO governance group.
- Successfully diversified and increased the level of donor support to the program which included USAID, OTI/USAID, OFDA/USAID, CMM/USAID, DFID, UNDP, Norway MFA, UNHCR, Italian MFA, and other donors.
- Assisted in the design and initiation of two cross-border programs in the Horn of Africa to augment peace-building in the Sudan: Sudan-Ethiopia- cross-border trade and conflict program (Gambella-Upper Nile) as well as Sudan-Ethiopia community peace program (within Gambella).

**Christian Aid, Nairobi, Kenya**

**Aug 2001-Feb 2004**

**Regional Representative, Eastern Africa**

- Direct oversight over Christian Aid's Eastern Africa programs in South Sudan, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania.
- Responsible for strategic direction, management and security, advocacy campaigns, and response to emergencies.
- Oversaw a team of 15 and managed an annual budget of ca Aus\$4 million. Program sectors included civil society strengthening, good governance, peace-building and conflict mitigation particularly in the

pastoralist areas of the Horn of Africa, HIV/AIDS and livelihoods as well as emergency response programs. Donors for CA programs in the region included USAID, OFDA and DFID.

- Initiated and managed the first East Africa Regional Strategy formulation effort and individual country strategies
- Facilitated and implemented organizational change processes, including decentralization of support functions and their development in the region.
- Restructured the region, staffing and relationships with London, reviewed all partners and streamlined and harmonized strategy with partnerships, sectors and objectives.
- Set up cross-regional partner meetings and learning opportunities.

**Christian Aid, Herat, Afghanistan**  
**Afghanistan Country Representative**

**February 1999 - July 2001**

- Direct oversight over Christian Aid's Afghanistan program including strategic direction, management, security, program quality and capacity building of partners. Representation and negotiation with Donors, the Taliban, governments, authorities, warlords and the press. Managed a team of 12 and annual budget of ca Aus\$3.3 million. Main program sectors included civil society strengthening, credit, capacity building, mines awareness and peace-building livelihoods, women's health, and emergency response.
- Developed and expanded (doubled) a multi-sectoral program portfolio including both long-term development and emergency relief projects implemented by 12 local and international partners in Afghanistan during the Taliban 'era'.
- Initiated and lead a country-wide capacity building sectoral support group to improve the coordination and cohesion of approaches to the capacity building efforts of national Afghan organizations in partnership with the international community.
- Lead the support to improve the quality of administration and management of partners' programs with development of new standards and manuals such that three local organizations 'graduated' to receiving direct funding from DFID and other major donors.
- Initiated coordination group in security, credit, and emergency response sectors in the western region including leading the preparation of agreed common drought assessment and monitoring standards.
- Lead the coordinated response to the West Afghanistan drought.
- Diversified and increased donor support to the program including new donors such as EU, the Irish government, ECHO, the Jersey Government and a number of smaller donors.

**Merlin, Peshawar, Pakistan**  
**Regional Program Coordinator (Pakistan and Afghanistan)**

**July 1998- February 1999**

- Direct responsibility for the implementation of MERLIN primary health projects in Afghanistan (in 3 provinces). Managed a team of ca 7 expatriate and 100 national staff with an annual budget of ca Aus\$3.2 million.
- Negotiated continued operations at national and provincial level for the programs with the Taliban during a period where the majority of NGOs were thrown out of the country.
- Maintained programs from afar with limited access (from Peshawar).
- Oversaw the evacuation (and return) of the majority of program staff during the 'missile crisis' of 1999.
- Closed the major program in Badakhshan under very difficult circumstances.

**Overseas Service Bureau (OSB), Melbourne, Australia**  
**Country Manager** (responsibilities over this period included Indonesia, Malaysia, Cambodia, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Lao PDR, Bangladesh)

**March 1994-July 1998**

- Direct oversight of OSB's programs involving identification of positions, recruitment, placement, supervision and support of Technical Assistance personnel. Major program sectors included natural resource management, civil society strengthening, rights, HIV/AIDS, education, agriculture and health.
- Oversee strategic direction of programs and cross linkages between countries. Numbers of volunteers in the programs varied from 70 Indonesia, 40 Cambodia, 5 Bangladesh, Laos 4, Afghanistan 10, Pakistan 6.
- Refocused the Indonesia program from an English Language Teaching program to be a rights focused program including land, environmental and minority rights placements. Doubling the size of the program from 34 to ca 70 volunteers (within an extremely oppressive environment) placed volunteers in East Timor and West Papua at a time where access was extremely limited.
- Co-led the reopening of the program in Bangladesh and placement of 6 volunteers after a period of a number of years without a volunteer presence, involving negotiations with the government, identification of appropriate placements.
- Tackled and resolved many difficult cross-cultural issues and situations including evacuation of programs (Cambodia, Afghanistan), deportations, deaths, imprisonments, and a myriad of issues arising from differing expectations from different perspectives.
- Initiated coordinated placements of technical volunteers with ACIAR and CSIRO in Cambodia, one of the first times OSB had worked with other agencies.

**Yanaterasila Foundation, Yogyakarta, Java**

**Jul 1993 - Mar 1994**

**Program Development Officer**

- Day to Day Management of foundation activities and staff.
- Organization of upland Rapid Rural Assessments and subsequent evaluation of data on behalf of the Foundation. Identification of future target areas based on these findings, resulting in the setting up of demonstration nurseries to provide other sources of income and improve erosion control.
- Liaison with community groups in Nusa Tenggara Timur to discuss inter-NGO cooperation.
- Evaluation of pilot project: "Home stay apprenticeships for disabled NTT youths."
- Survey of potential partner organizations for involvement in extended programs.
- Development and submission of fundraising proposals to donors.

**St. Michael's Grammar School, Victoria, Australia**

**September 1990-July 1993**

**Coordinator and Teacher of Science**

**SMAK St Gabriel, Maumere, Flores, Indonesia**

**February 1988-September 1989**

**Teacher Trainer**

- Designed, developed and implemented workshops and training sessions for all local teachers concerning teaching methodologies, how to run simple experiments in natural sciences using local materials, as well as the practical applications of science and technology.

**Kings College London, University of London, UK**

**1986-1987**

**Laboratory Technician**

**Languages:**

Indonesian, Malay. Knowledgeable in French, German, Farsi

## SARAH BAYNE

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### **Proposed Position: Senior Conflict Specialist / Team Member**

#### **Summary:**

Ms. Sarah Bayne has over twelve years of experience in the fields of governance, humanitarian assistance, peace building and conflict-sensitive development, engagement in fragile states and armed violence reduction with a particular emphasis on EU external policy. She combines experience of working for donors and non-governmental organizations in Europe and Africa with a strong track record in providing high quality consultancy services. Sarah's past clients have included: DFID, European Commission, Sida, UNDP, European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Department for Peace Studies - Bradford University, Saferworld, OECD DAC, Norwegian Refugee Council and CARE International. Further, she has expertise in applied and policy research; conflict assessments; advocacy and communications; program reviews and evaluation. She has field experience in Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia. Sarah holds a Master of Science Degree in International and European Politics from Edinburgh University.

#### **Education:**

Master of Science, International and European Politics, Edinburg University (1999)  
Bachelor of Arts, Economics, Manchester University (1993)

#### **Experience:**

##### **Consultant**

**2011 to date**

- Consultant within the Fragile and conflict affected states (FCAS) portfolio, *theIDLgroup*.

##### **Conciliation Resources**

**2013**

- Lead consultant in a comparative review of Conciliation Resources' operating model. The review focuses on assessment of the Value for Money of the current operational model and organizational structure. It draws on data and experiences both from Conciliation Resources and other peace building organizations in order to provide a comparative analysis and inform decision making on the most appropriate model going forward.

##### **CARE International UK**

**2013**

- Lead researcher and author of a guidance note for DFID on the M&E of Integrated Peace building and Development Programs as part of the DFID funded Conflict, Crime and Violence Reporting Initiative. Desk review of literature, interviews with leading academics and practitioners, researching three case studies and preparing the final guidance note.

##### **Norwegian Refugee Council and OCHA**

**2012-2013**

- Research into the extent of counter terrorism related conditions present in funding agreements with humanitarian implementing partners and other risk management approaches adopted by a select number of donors.

#### **Conciliation Resources** **2012**

- Supported a participatory process of strengthening and revising CR's organizational logframe as part of a broader process of strengthening and streamlining CR's internal monitoring and data gathering processes.

#### **Norwegian Refugee Council** **2012**

- Research and critical analysis of the policies, preferences, and decision-making procedures that inform and influence the humanitarian financing decisions of selected European donor governments: Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom (UK), Italy and Poland. The analysis will feed into a final report and analysis both as a stand-alone publication and feeding into a broader synthesis report on the current status of principled humanitarian action.

#### **Conciliation Resources** **2012**

- Team leader for an independent progress review of Conciliation Resources Program Partnership Agreement (with DFID).

#### **Saferworld and Conciliation Resources** **2011-2012**

- Lead evaluator of the People's Peacemaking Perspectives (PPP) project, an 18 country 1.83m Euros EC funded joint initiative between Conciliation Resources and Saferworld focused on support to policy advocacy and dialogue informed by high-quality participatory analysis of causes and dynamics of conflict and fragility.

#### **Saferworld** **2011**

- Country analysis – Bosnia and Herzegovina
- Provision of targeted information on the impact of EU policies, strategies and programming on key conflict factors identified in Saferworld's country conflict analysis with a particular focus on youth issues.

#### **Freelance Consultant** **2003-2011**

- Provide technical and strategic advice and support to both governmental and non-governmental organizations in the areas of peace-building, conflict-sensitive development, engagement in fragile states and armed violence reduction. Key clients include: DFID, FCO, Saferworld, OECD DAC, International Alert (IA), and the Centre for International Co-operation and Security (CICS) at the University Of Bradford Department Of Peace Studies.

#### **University of Newcastle** **2011**

Associate Staff Member

- Delivery of seminars as part of the MA course "EU as an International Actor".

#### **European Center for Development Policy** **2010-2011**

- Member of a multi-national and multi-disciplinary team commissioned by the board of ECDPM to undertake an institutional evaluation. Review of the context and performance of the center during the period 2007-2010, assessment of the evolution of the institution, operational structure and formulation of recommendations.

#### **Saferworld** **2010**

- Support to Saferworld's Bosnia Program. Support to the research, drafting and editing of a conflict assessment undertaken with the Nansen Dialogue Centre Sarajevo (NDC) in eight locations across Bosnia. Provided specific guidance on methodology, the formulation of recommendations and identification of key advocacy targets.

**Austrian Center for Peace building and Conflict Resolution** **2010**

- Delivery of training on peace building evaluation as part of a European Security and Defense College (ESDC) pilot course on peace building.

**UNDP – BCPR** **2010**

- Co-author of a background paper for the Oslo Conference on Armed Violence on “Preventing and Reducing Armed Violence: Development Plans and Assistance”. The paper provided an overview of some of the experience, lessons and best practice in the integration of approaches to reducing armed violence within local, national, and donor development planning processes.

**European Commission** **2009**

- Team leader of a review to draw lessons from the implementation of the Peace building Partnership and provided recommendations on its future direction, including organizational modalities. Work involved broad consultation with key stakeholders and experts, and a review of relevant documentation.

**Saferworld** **2009**

- Development of an annotated bibliography of policy documents and literature relating to conflict-sensitive approaches to development for a consortium of peace building, development and multi-mandate NGOS.

**DFID/UK Government** **2009**

- Member of team commissioned to review UK Government experience using Strategic Conflict Assessments (SCAs) and to provide recommendations to inform an update of the methodology and guidance leading to the development of the new HMG Joint Assessment of Conflict and Security. The study involved analyzing the process and outcome of SCAs across 15 countries.

**DFID** **2008**

- Lead consultant for an analysis of post-election violence in Kenya with policy options for the British Government and international partners. The analysis was conceived as an update of the 2007 Strategic Conflict Assessment. The work included consultations with a wide range of actors across affected regions and assessment of the effectiveness of efforts by different actors to respond, identifying gaps and opportunities for additional support.

**Saferworld** **2007**

- Acting Conflict Advisor for Saferworld. Supported a project by Ugandan peace building NGO – CECORE – aimed at assessing the impact of a rural electrification project in Pader District (Northern Uganda). Involved updating the local conflict assessment, supporting local consultations led by the Ugandan team and reporting to Saferworld.

**CICS, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford** **2007**

- Input to thematic research paper ‘Links and Interrelationships between DDR and Development in the Transition from Post-conflict Stabilization to Longer Term Development’. Participated in expert seminar as part of DFID funded project “DDR and Human Security: Post-conflict Security-building in the Interests of the Poor”.

- DFID** **2007**
- Team leader for a Strategic Conflict Assessment, which was commissioned by DFID and the FCO in Kenya to inform their understanding of the drivers of conflict and insecurity across the country and the impact of developments in the region. This included facilitation of expert group seminars and development of policy and programmatic recommendations.
- Channel Research/OECD DAC and Sida** **2007**
- Co-authorship of a report for the CPDC / GOVNET Joint Working Group on Human Rights and Conflict. Involved scoping donor policies, institutional practice and academic analysis on the interface between human rights and conflict, outlining a framework identifying the current links between human rights and conflict, and advising on the methodologies for further research.
- Saferworld** **2006**
- Authorship of Saferworld Briefing Paper “The EC Country Strategy for Uganda: Taking Conflict into Account”. The paper aimed to inform EU policy in Uganda and promote the mainstreaming of a conflict perspective.
- UNICEF Regional Office South Asia** **2006**
- Development of briefing paper on Conflict-sensitive Approaches to Sector Wide and Program based approaches.
- CICS, Department of Peace Studies, Bradford University** **2006**
- Research and co-authorship of policy briefings for Finnish Presidency of EU. These included ‘Approaches towards ensuring effective support for peace support/ keeping missions in Africa’; ‘EU/EC use of political conditionality in cooperation programs with Africa’ and ‘Developing international capacities for Crisis Management and Crisis Response in Africa’.
- International Alert** **2005**
- Research and authorship of analytical framework for a conflict assessment of the Education for All Program in Nepal.
- Saferworld** **2005**
- Researched and authorship of Saferworld publication ‘Aid and Conflict in Uganda’. The paper examined the extent to which conflict issues have been mainstreamed within development plans, policies and programs in Uganda with recommendations. Work involved an extensive desk review of key policy documentation and semi-structured interviews with a wide range of key informants in Uganda.
- UNIDIR** **2005**
- Contribution to UNIDIR report ‘European Action on SALW and ERW’ on mainstreaming SALW issues into the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. Involvement in expert seminar.
- Saferworld** **2005**
- Contribution to Saferworld/ International Alert publication ‘Developing an EU Strategy to Address Fragile States. Priorities for the UK Presidency of the EU in 2005’.
- International Alert, Saferworld and FEWER** **2003**

- Assistance in the conceptualization, research and writing of this key resource on conflict sensitivity. Lead author for chapter four on integrating conflict sensitivity into sector wide approaches.

## **ECDPM**

**2000**

- Research and authorship of ECDPM publication “The EU’s Political and Development Response to Somalia”. Research of ECDPM publication ‘The EU’s Political and Development Response to Sudan’. Both publications included field research.

## **Saferworld, Horn of Africa**

**2001-2003**

### **Project Coordinator, EU and Conflict Prevention**

- Development and implementation of a research, advocacy and capacity building program with local civil society partner organizations in the Horn of Africa. Initiated Saferworld’s engagement in Somalia and Somaliland through facilitating the establishment of the first Non-state actor’s platform within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement.
- Involved supporting the development of partnerships, networks and consultative forums bringing together local civil society groups and regional and international policy makers in the Horn of Africa to discuss issues relating to peacebuilding.
- General project management responsibilities including program development, funding financial management, ongoing monitoring and reporting to donors.

## **DFID, London, England**

**2000-2001**

### **Associate Professional Officer - Governance**

- Researched and drafted policy papers and policy implementation documents (including on Safety Security and Access to Justice; in country project work on governance aspects of DFID support (eg. Andhra Pradesh Governance Reform Technical Assistance Project - India); appraisal of funding proposals.
- Conducted trainings in participatory development (IDS, Sussex); Institutional Development and Governance (DFID Governance Advisory Network); DFID policies, structures and project cycle management.

## **European Commission, Brussels, Belgium**

**2000**

### **In Service Trainee, Horn of Africa**

- Wrote briefings and reports and attended meetings of Council and Parliament in relation to developments in Somalia; liaised with civil society organizations from the Horn of Africa (in particular Somali diaspora groups); monitored political developments in the Horn of Africa.

## **Scottish Somali Action, Edinburgh, Scotland**

**1997-2000**

### **Coordinator**

- Developed and implemented an advocacy and awareness raising project bringing together UK Diaspora Somali civil society organizations, international NGOs and research organizations on international engagement with Somalia.
- Supervised staff and volunteers; oversaw fundraising and monitoring (including financial monitoring).

## **St John Ambulance International, UK**

**1995-1997**

### **Communications Strategist**

- Developed and implemented a communications strategy in order to strengthen links and exchange of best-practice between international branches of the organization.



**Countries of Work Experience:**

Kenya, Uganda, Somalia and Somaliland, Ethiopia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Sierra Leone.

**Languages:**

English and French

## TERRENCE LYONS

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### Proposed Position: Technical Advisor

Dr. Terrence Lyons is an expert in conflict management and assessment particularly in the Horn of Africa has over 20 years' experience. Dr. Lyons used various conflict assessment frameworks in Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Zimbabwe which included enhanced desk studies, fieldwork and synthesis. He was the Team Leader for USAID's Ethiopia Democracy and Governance Assessment in 2011 where he was responsible for managing team data collection, logistics and deliverables. Dr. Lyons has a demonstrated familiarity with USAID's directives and policies. His consulting experience includes contracts with the World Bank, the United Nations, International Crisis Group, Freedom House and the Council on Foreign Relations. He has written extensively on conflict management including *Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa* for Brookings Institution. Dr. Lyons is currently an associate professor at the School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR) at George Mason University and teaches graduate level classes in Conflict Analysis and Theories of Conflict and Conflict Resolution. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Johns Hopkins University's School of Advanced International Studies.

### EDUCATION

PhD — International Relations, Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, 1994

### SELECTED PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

1999-present      **Associate Professor, School for Conflict Analysis and Resolution (S-CAR), George Mason University, Arlington, Virginia.**

Currently Co-Director of the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University.

2011- present      **Senior Associate and Co-Chair, Ethiopia Policy Forum. Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC.**

2011                **Team Leader, USAID/Johnson Law Group, Democracy and Governance Assessment, Ethiopia**

Led a five person team to conduct a Democracy and Governance Assessment in Ethiopia. The team spent three weeks in the field with two weeks in separate regional sub teams. As team leader, he was responsible for managing team data collection, logistics and deliverables.

### CONSULTANT REPORTS

Lyons, Terrence et al. 2011. **"Ethiopia Democracy and Governance Assessment."** MSI/USAID. Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 2008. **"Evaluation of USAID's Elections and Political Processes Strengthening Program in Liberia."** Democracy International, USAID, Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 2008. **"Somalia Democracy and Governance Assessment."** MSI/USAID. Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 2005. **"Transition from War to Capacity for Development."** Project on Post-Conflict Leadership. The World Bank.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 2003. **"Sudan Conflict Vulnerability Assessment."** MSI/USAID. Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 2002. **"Eritrea Conflict Assessment."** ARD/ USAID. Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 2001. **"Toward Managing the Crisis in Zimbabwe: A Conflict Assessment."** MSI/USAID. Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 1999. "Elections Assistance in Ghana and Mali." MSI/USAID. Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 1999. "Mozambique: From Post-Conflict to Municipal Elections." MSI/USAID. Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 1999. "Technical Assistance for Elections Administration." USAID/MSI. Washington DC.

## **POLICY ANALYSES AND WORKING PAPERS:**

Lyons, Terrence. 2011. **"Ethiopia: Assessing Risks to Stability."** Center for Strategic and International Studies. Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence et al. 2006. **"Avoiding Conflict in the Horn of Africa: U.S. Policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea."** Council on Foreign Relations. Washington DC.

Lyons, Terrence. 2006. "Ethiopia in 2005: The Beginning of a Transition?" Center for Strategic and International Studies Africa Washington DC.

## **SELECTED PUBLICATIONS**

- Lyons, Terrence P. 2005. Demilitarizing Politics: Elections on the Uncertain Road to Peace.
- Lyons, Terrence P. 1999. Voting for Peace: Post-conflict Elections in Liberia. Brookings Institution.
- Lyons, Terrence P. et al. 1996. Sovereignty as Responsibility: Conflict Management in Africa. Brookings Institution.
- Lyons, Terrence P. and Samatar, Ahmed. 1995. Somalia: State Collapse, Multilateral Intervention, and Strategies for Political Reconstruction. Brookings Institution.

## MANASSEH WEPUNDI

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### **Proposed Position: Conflict Specialist**

#### **Summary:**

Mr. Wepundi has over 10 years of experience in conflict analysis, prevention and resolution in Africa. He is an expert in conflict trends analysis, early warning systems, small arms and light weapons. Mr. Wepundi also has experience in designing and implementing training programs on human security, conflict transformation, peace building and conflict sensitivity. Mr. Wepundi has been responsible for coordinating peace and conflict research and analysis functions including: finalization of research outputs for publication and developing research and assessment tools and enriching conflict sensitivity methodologies. He also has knowledge of developing and technically supporting implementation of peace building interventions including early warning, early response conflict analysis, and conflict transformation. Mr. Wepundi is experienced in monitoring and evaluation of peace projects through design of M&E instruments, field visits, data analysis, and reporting M&E expertise offered to World Vision's North Rift Peace Project (2011-2012), the Kenya Conflict Sensitivity Consortium's Conflict Sensitivity Project (2009-2011), and the UNV's post-election Violence Peace-Building Project (2008).

#### **Education:**

Master of Arts, International Studies, University of Nairobi, Kenya (2005)  
Bachelor of Arts, Government and Public Administration, Moi University, Kenya (2002)

#### **Experience:**

##### **Small Arms Survey, UNDP Kenya**

Present

##### **Monitoring and Evaluation Consultant**

##### **Local Capacities for Peace International, Kenya**

2009-  
2012

##### **Program Manager**

- Programmatic specialization in enhancement of LCPI's research and analysis capacities (in human security, peace building and conflict sensitivity).
- Developed organizational programs, identified potential staff and steered the programmatic direction in consultation with directors.

##### **Africa Policy Institute (API), Kenya**

Jul 2007-  
Jan 2008

##### **Senior Analyst / Program Manager of the Uganda Liaison Office**

- Supervised all projects in Uganda Liaison Office, researched, and analyzed peace and security dynamics in the Horn, prepared situation reports and policy briefs on Uganda peace process and develop and maintained strategic partnerships.

**Africa Leadership Institute (AFLI), Kampala, Uganda**

Sep 2006 – June 2007

**Senior researcher**

- Offered research expertise to Ugandan regional political leaders engaged in the Juba peace talks.
- Documented progress of northern Uganda peace process, prepared policy briefs and situation reports, and engaged in public education drives on progress of peace talks.

**Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), Nairobi, Kenya**

2002 - 2006

**Researcher**

- Worked on research projects on conflict and firearms related crimes in the Horn of Africa and Great Lakes Region.
- Gained wide knowledge of issues related to human security, small arms and light weapons, conflict and terrorism in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa.

**SaferWorld, Kenya**

March 2012

**Lead Consultant**

- Baseline assessments on Security in West Pokot, Bungoma and Isiolo Counties ahead of Saferworld's community security project.

**World Vision, Kenya**

Nov 2011 - Jan 2012

**Lead Consultant**

- Evaluated the North Rift Peace Project (NORIPP).

**Geneva & Kenya National Focal Point on Small Arms, Kenya**

March 2011

**Lead Researcher**

- Led team to conduct a national survey on small arms and perceptions of security in Kenya.

**Saferworld, Kenya**

October

2010

**Research Consultant**

- Conducted a conflict analysis for EU early warning and early response strategies on Kenya leading to a publication on "Transition and Reform" capturing people's current hopes and fears about reforms and conflicts and making recommendations for the EU and relevant actors.

**Konard Adeneur Stiftung, Kenya**

August 2011

**Policy Expert**

- Extensive analysis of peace-related policies in Kenya, highlighting strengths and opportunities for policy advocacy.
- Presented findings in three regional policy dialogue forums (in Nyanza, Rift Valley & Western) and at the national policy dialogue forum in Nairobi.

**Kenya Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, Kenya**

Nov 2010 - May

2011

**Lead Consultant**

- Assessment of progress of implementation of conflict sensitivity.

- Documentation/review of case studies on CSA practice in Kenya.
- Consultative forums on advocacy.
- Outreach and review of CSA Toolkit.
- Development of Training Manual.

**Safeworld, Kenya** Jan-Mar 2011  
**Research consultant**

**Saferworld/UNDP, Somaliland** May-Jul, 2010  
**Lead consultant**

- Conflict analysis of Laascaanood and Burao (Somaliland) and development of community safety plan for the respective regions under the Saferworld/UNDP Armed Violence Reduction/DDR Project.

**RECSA / ISS, Kenya** Jun-Aug 2010  
**Lead Consultant**

- Practical disarmament study in Kenya commissioned by the Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA) and Institute of Security Studies (ISS).

**Office of the President's (NSC) / UNDP, Kenya** Jun-Aug 2010  
**Political Expert**

- National conflict mapping in Kenya commissioned by the Office of the President's National Steering Committee on Peace-building & Conflict Management (NSC) and UNDP.

**Life and Peace Institute, Somalia** Dec 2009-Mar 2010  
**Independent consultant**

- Qualitative data analysis and interpretation of field data on the role of Somali Civil Society in Peace-building.

**Action Aid / CAFOD / CARE / Plan International /** Nov 2009-  
Feb 2010

**Skillshare International / Save the Children, Kenya**  
**Lead Consultant**

- Countrywide analysis of conflicts in Kenya as part of the implementation of conflict sensitive practice.

**Action Aid International, Kenya** Jul-Aug 2009  
**Research Consultant**

- Designed research instruments, co-facilitated and co-documented case studies on conflict sensitivity in Kenya and co-facilitated conflict sensitivity self-assessment workshops among members of the Kenyan Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, coordinated by Action Aid International-Kenya.

**Konrad Adeneur-Stiftung, Kenya** Aug-Oct  
2009

**Research Consultant**

- Analyzed conflict trends in Kenya's Western Province to inform current and future interventions.

**Office of the President's (NSC) / APFO, Kenya** May 2005

**Consultant**

- Facilitated validation workshop for the draft National Rapid Response Framework for Kenya and finalized the policy document under the auspices of the Office of the President's National Steering Committee on Conflict Management and Peace building (NSC) & the Africa Peace Forum (APFO).

**Centre for Law and Research International, Kenya**

April 2009

**Consultant**

- Developed and concluded a training manual on decentralized funds.

**Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), Kenya**

March

2009

**Consultant**

- Co-developed and concluded a small arms and human security manual on research methods.

**UNDP/OCHA, Kenya**

Nov 2008-

Feb 2009

**Researcher**

- Conducted UNDP/OCHA research on the conflict in Mt. Elgon focusing on the security issue with aspects of gender conceptions of security.

**Nairobi Peace Initiative-Africa (NPI-A), Kenya**

Nov 2008-Mar

2009

**Consultant**

- Conducted an assessment of the conflict situation in Kenya with a view to developing an Early Warning and Response Plan for NPI-A, the Eastern and Central Africa Regional Secretariat of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (GPPAC).
- Led the development of a Response Plan.

**United Nations Development Program &**

Mar-

Dec 2008

**United Nations Volunteers, Kenya****Training Consultant**

- Trained over 200 trainers countrywide and over 300 Nairobi Emergency Volunteer Scheme (EVS) Volunteers on conflict transformation, peace-building and conflict early warning and response as a post-conflict intervention program in aftermath of Kenya's post-election violence.

**NCCK/UNICEF, Kenya**

Dec 2007-Jan

2008

**Consultant – Child Protection Project**

- Conflict Analysis of clash-hit areas of Molo and Mt. Elgon districts, with specific focus on the impact of the conflicts on children.

**Peace Tree Network – Kenya Chapter , Kenya**

2006

**Research Consultant**

- Coordinated research on “Electoral Processes, Conflict and Peace Building in Kenya”; a countrywide project giving recommendations on exploiting electoral processes for peace building.

**Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA), Uganda**

2006

**Researcher**

- Conducted research on the role of approved state agencies to assist with law enforcement and security.

**International Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW), Kenya**

2006

**Research Consultant**

- Part of SRIC research team on “A Study of the Security Implications and Risks of Introducing Commercial Consumptive Use as an Option in the Wildlife Conservation Strategy in Kenya”.

**Diocese of Nairobi, Kenya**

2005

**Consultant**

- Developed a manual for the Catholic Arch-Diocese of Nairobi (chapters on Conflict and Peace building).



## WINFRED MUTINDI WAMBUA

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### **Proposed Position: Team Member**

#### **Summary:**

Ms. Winifred Wambua is a development professional with more than 8 years of experience in the areas of governance, democracy, human rights, voter and civic education, election capacity, national cohesion, peace-building and conflict transformation with excellent analytical, conceptual and strategic thinking skills. She has extensive experience and proven expertise in capacity & institutional development, multi-stakeholder facilitation, policy formulation, project management, planning, monitoring, evaluation and learning, grant management, quantitative and qualitative research, and financial management including budgeting and tracking, logical framework planning among others.

#### **Education:**

M.A., Development Studies, University of Nairobi, Kenya, 2009  
B.A., Anthropology, 1<sup>st</sup> class Honors, University of Nairobi, Kenya, 2005

#### **Experience:**

##### **Life and Peace Institute**

**Sept 2012 – present**

##### **Program Advisor, Organizational Development**

- ♦ Responsible for leading the organization development aspects of LPI including conducting organization capacity assessments of partner organizations; development of organizational development plans.
- ♦ Coordinating the implementation of the OD plans including management of activities, outsourcing and budget control.
- ♦ Conducting Participatory Action Research (PAR).
- ♦ Capacity building and support to partner organizations in the planning.
- ♦ Project management (Planning monitoring evaluation and learning).
- ♦ Working with communities to design peace intervention processes.
- ♦ Policy advocacy, partnership building and networking.
- ♦ Supporting projects with Partner Organizations (POs) and monitoring compliance with contractual responsibilities.
- ♦ Monitoring progress towards OD expected results and applying adjustments in order to maximize effectiveness and efficiency.

##### **URAIA – Consultant**

**2013**

- ♦ Training of Civic Educators across the Country.
- ♦ National Civic Education Reflection Conference: Successes, Challenges and Opportunities organized by URAIA, UNDP, Amkeni Wakenya and K-NICE.
- ♦ Civil Society Reflection and Repositioning Retreat organized by URAIA, Society for International Development (SID) and Freedom House.

**Ministry of Justice, National Cohesion and Constitutional Affairs  
National Cohesion Officer**

**Nov 2009 – Sept 2012**

- ♦ Responsible for the development and implementation of national cohesion frameworks and programs, including policy development.
- ♦ Conducting and supervising baseline and feasibility studies.
- ♦ Conducting awareness and sensitization forums, coordination and organization of consultative forums on national cohesion and development of communication and promotional materials.
- ♦ Implementing, monitoring and evaluating national cohesion programs and activities.
- ♦ Achievements include being a team member in the development of; Policy on the National Values System, the draft Policy on National Cohesion and Integration and Integrated Manual on National Cohesion and Integration.

**Consortium for the Empowerment and Development of Marginalized Communities  
(CEDMAC)**

**Program Coordinator, Governance and Human Rights**

**Oct 2008 – Nov 2009**

CEDMAC is a founder member of the Election Observation group (ELOG) in Kenya

- ♦ In charge of the overall design, development, formulation and implementation of programs including governance, democracy, human rights, voter and civic education, election capacity among others.
- ♦ Provision of technical and strategic leadership.
- ♦ Managing partnerships and contractual agreements.
- ♦ Undertaking monitoring, evaluation, learning and reporting processes as per program and the organization requirement.
- ♦ Development of civic voter education materials; civic education handbooks, IEC materials.
- ♦ Proposal writing /fundraising and networking.
- ♦ Financial management and budgeting.
- ♦ Research, report writing and documentation, including conducting baseline and feasibility studies.
- ♦ Coordination of partner activities.
- ♦ Representing CEDMAC in donor and stakeholders meetings.
- ♦ Carrying out assessments of partner needs and designing projects that meet their needs.
- ♦ Capacity building of partners to improve their delivery on project activities and objectives.
- ♦ Preparing work, activity, resource schedules for the projects and program.
- ♦ Formulating, tracking and reporting against budgets.

**Consortium for the Empowerment and Development of Marginalized Communities  
(CEDMAC)**

**Program Officer – Civic Education**

**Oct 2006 – Sept 2008**

- ♦ Designed, developed, formulated and implemented governance programs.
- ♦ Development of civic and voter education materials.
- ♦ Organized and conducted CEDMAC program activities.
- ♦ Assisted in proposal writing /fundraising and networking.
- ♦ Financial management and budgeting.
- ♦ Research and documentation, including conducting baseline and feasibility studies.
- ♦ Organized and facilitated field based trainings.
- ♦ Assisted in Monitoring and Evaluation of projects.
- ♦ Prepared work, activity, resource schedules for the projects and programs.
- ♦ Administrative duties; handling correspondence, staff supervision, organization development, networking among others.

**Inter Religious Council of Kenya (IRCK)  
Program Assistant**

**Nov 2005 – Oct 2006**

- ♦ Assisted in the design, development and implementation of IRCK programs.
- ♦ Prepared work, activity and resource plans and schedules for the projects and programs.
- ♦ Generated and developed ideas to enhance the quality and sustainability of programs.
- ♦ Prepared and submitted regular and specific reports to inform supervisors/donors as necessary.
- ♦ Preparation of project budgets and ensuring that the budgets meet the targeted objectives and work plans.
- ♦ Ensured adequate and timely reporting and accounting on received and disbursed grants to CBOs by analyzing their financial and narrative reports and provided feedback to the organization for corrective action.
- ♦ Organized workshops and handled public relations matters for IRCK including travel arrangements, bookings for staff, visitors and conferences and ensured travel expenses are properly accounted for.
- ♦ Prepared reports on project developments and gaps including recommendation on the way forward.
- ♦ Assisted in monitoring and evaluation of projects.
- ♦ Administrative duties: Responded to inquiries regarding the organization, assisting in the procurement of office stationery and assets, developed and managed the office filing system, managed the calendar of activities for the organization and organized workshops, trainings and conferences.

**Languages:**

Fluent in both English and Kiswahili

## **DANIEL KIPTUGEN**

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### **Proposed Position: National Conflict Mitigation Team Member**

#### **Summary:**

Mr. Daniel Kiptugen is a highly qualified professional in knowledge and skills in program management and community development works. With over 23 years in the NGO World, and coupled with experience in situational analysis/ assessments, project liaison, establishment, development and disbursement of information, project re/design, planning and implementation/monitoring of Area Development Programs. His experience ranges from working with government ministries, INGOs, CBOs and general community development work in Kenya and Horn and East Africa region. He has served as an executive member of the joint Armed Violence Reduction Project supporting UNDP and implemented by National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management (NSC), Oxfam, and Arid Lands Resource Management Project, worked as a steering member of the Mifugo project charged with the eradication of Cattle rustling in the East African Region, and has been a member of the Kenya Country Conflict Early warning Response unit at the NSC. He also played a role in the Inter-Agency Committee of the Karamoja Peace and Development Network that was housed at the Practical Action, is Civil Society committee member for the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region for security and stability in the region Network on Peacebuilding and was Oxfam GB Kenya Programme Security, Conflict and Peace Advisor and country focal point person/ Diversity Champion. Most recently, he provided an oversight role in the Saferworld DFID supported Kenya Election Security Project and also played a key advisory role in the USALAMA led project that is pushing for positive security service reforms.

#### **Education:**

Master of Arts, Leadership and NGO Management, Ongoing

University of Wisconsin, Disaster Management 1999

Egerton University, Diploma Certificate in Agricultural Engineering Soil and Water Engineering, 1984

#### **Experience:**

##### **Saferworld, Kenya and Horn of Africa Program**

**2012-**

**2013**

##### **Director**

- Developed, implemented and promoted community-focused and integrated responses to the complex mix of security, conflict and development challenges faced by the people of Kenya and Horn of Africa
- Strengthened the capacity of civil society to engage effectively on development, security and justice, conflict prevention, peace building and arms control issues

- Supported the government of Kenya through partnerships at all levels; to develop the policies, regulatory frameworks and institutions capacity assessments required for effective conflict prevention, peace building and small arms control and the accountable and equitable delivery of security and justice services.

### **Food for the Hungry Millennium Water Alliance**

**2010-2012**

#### **Director**

- Provided leadership for the international organizations Consortium.
- Director in the multi-year funded project Spearheading the push for the attainment of Safe water and sanitation.

### **Oxfam GB**

**2002-**

**2009**

#### **Program Coordinator, Peace Building and Conflict Management**

- Facilitated the reduction of insecurity, suffering and incidence of violent conflict in the country by establishing a National Architecture for peace building and conflict Management in Kenya through policy influencing at the Central Government level and involving all stakeholders.
- Made links with civil society organizations, disseminated information on available conflict reduction funding and proactively identified funding initiatives.
- Responsible for administering and monitoring sub projects funded; ensuring disbursement of funds, monitoring overall performance of a project, receiving progress reports and accounting statements from the recipient organization and undertaking monitoring and evaluation visits as appropriate.
- Ensuring the training and lesson learning sub-agreements are effectively managed in line with objectives in the project documents, and submit progress reports to DFID Kenya as part of overall reporting;
- Prepared quarterly and annual reports to DFID and Foreign and Commonwealth Officers
- Build and maintained links with relevant GOK departments, district administrations, agencies and donors on conflict issues in arid districts.

### **Regional Programs Manager**

**1984-**

**2002**

#### **World Vision Kenya**

- Held various roles in 18 year career with World Vision Kenya including: Regional Programs Manager, Loodariak Area Development Program Manager, Agricultural Extension Officer, and Agricultural, Soil and Water Conservation/Irrigation Officer.
- Spearheaded undertaking of reconnaissance studies, situational analysis/assessments: fundraising documents and other relevant statistics were developed and documented.
- Compiled & timely submitted annual plans and budgets for development programs supported by donors from (Japan, United Kingdom, United States, Ireland, Australia, Canada, Ireland and Australia.
- Represented the programs in liaison and collaboration forums with partners/ stakeholders.
- Facilitated identification and mobilization of locally available human, material and financial resources: improved community participation, and empowerment was achieved.
- Periodically developed and timely submitted technical and progress reports to the senior management.
- Successfully facilitated F/CBOs' capacity assessment and development in the education, food security, water resource development and preventative health sectors: the F/CBOs have developed into strong and sustainable 'vehicles' of development in the communities.


- Ensured maintenance of good relationship between donor/sponsor, sponsored children and the community at large: long-term relationship was developed.
- Participated in program's external and internal audit and evaluation processes; encouraging results were realized.
- Involved in developing and monitoring/supervising of staffs' performance: a highly qualified and motivated team

**Languages:**

English

<b>Name</b>	Simon Richards
<b>Title</b>	Consultant
<b>Organization</b>	Independent
<b>Evaluation Position?</b>	Team Leader
<b>Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)</b>	
<b>USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</b>	
<b>I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.</b>	Yes
<b>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</b> <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.</li> <li>3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</li> <li>4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.</li> </ol>	<p>Potential conflicts of interest could arise because of:</p> <p>(a) Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</p> <p>I am not sure when KCSSP actually started - maybe September 2006? I was definitely Africa Director for Pact when it did start - overlapping for a number of months. I did not design the program and I had a very hands-off approach in general to any specific projects, given the number of direct reports to me (I had 16 country directors and a team of about 6 or 7 in the regionally based technical team that I was responsible for). I basically only spent time on the key, sensitive, politically difficult countries and regional programs at the time - Sudan, Nigeria, Congo, Zimbabwe, RELPA, etc. Or if a program was failing. At that time Steven Sharp was the CoP from about October 2006? and he reported to me in theory (but this meant little in practice unless something was going wrong). I also changed position at the end of August 2007 to a technical position to transition back to Aus (so he was no longer even technically managed by me) and I left Kenya in December 2007 to be based in Australia. In terms of my technical input to KCSSP I only remember giving a one day basic workshop to KCSSP staff and Pact Kenya staff on conflict management at the start of the program before programming began. I was never asked to support it in any way in terms of programming decisions or any technical input throughout its life. In practice I had no day to day involvement with KCSSP at all, either management or technical input for the start-up year while I was in Kenya, but on paper I did have oversight (you have to remember though that the Africa Regional portfolio was about 80% of Pact's global budget at the time - so I was more than a little overstretched).</p> <p>(b) Proposed short term consultant agreement for short assignment with Pact in Myanmar - to undertake a conflict analysis and training for staff</p>


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

<b>Signature</b>	 Signature of Consultant
<b>Date</b>	07 August 2013

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

<b>Name</b>	Winfred Wambua
<b>Title</b>	Team Member
<b>Organization</b>	MSI
<b>Evaluation Position?</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader      X Team member
<b>Evaluation Award Number</b> ( <i>contract or other instrument</i> )	AID-623-I-12-00001
<b>USAID Project(s) Evaluated</b> ( <i>Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable</i> )	
<b>I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes      X No
<b>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</b> <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.</li> <li>3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</li> <li>4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.</li> </ol>	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.


<b>Signature</b>	
<b>Date</b>	8-22-13



Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

<b>Name</b>	Manasseh Wepundi
<b>Title</b>	Team Member
<b>Organization</b>	MSI
<b>Evaluation Position?</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
<b>Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)</b>	AID-623-I-12-00001
<b>USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</b>	
<b>I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<b>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</b> <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.</li> <li>3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</li> <li>4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.</li> </ol>	


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

<b>Signature</b>	
<b>Date</b>	8-22-13

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

<b>Name</b>	Sarah Bayne
<b>Title</b>	Consultant
<b>Organization</b>	Sarah Bayne Consulting
<b>Evaluation Position?</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> am Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> am member (yes)
<b>Evaluation Award Number(contract or other instrument)</b>	
<b>USAID Project(s) Evaluated(Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</b>	
<b>I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<b>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</b> <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.</li> <li>3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</li> <li>4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.</li> </ol>	


I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

<b>Signature</b>	
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Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members

<b>Name</b>	Terrence Lyons
<b>Title</b>	Technical Advisor
<b>Organization</b>	MSI
<b>Evaluation Position?</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Team Leader <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Team member
<b>Evaluation Award Number (contract or other instrument)</b>	AID-623-I-12-00001
<b>USAID Project(s) Evaluated (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)</b>	
<b>I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.</b>	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> No
<b>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</b> <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.</li> <li>3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.</li> <li>4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.</li> <li>6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.</li> </ol>	

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

<b>Signature</b>	
<b>Date</b>	7-11-13

1. Immediate family or close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant/material though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.
3. Current or previous direct or significant/material though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.
4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.
6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.

Disclosure of Conflict of Interest for USAID Evaluation Team Members


<b>Name</b>	DANIEL K. KIPTUGEN	
<b>Title</b>	CONFLICT SPECIALIST	
<b>Organization</b>	M.S.I	
<b>Evaluation Position?</b>	Team Leader	Team member ✓
<b>Evaluation Award Number</b> (contract or other instrument)		
<b>USAID Project(s) Evaluated</b> (Include project name(s), implementer name(s) and award number(s), if applicable)	I have not evaluated a USAID Project before	
<b>I have real or potential conflicts of interest to disclose.</b>	Yes	No ✓ NO
<b>If yes answered above, I disclose the following facts:</b> <i>Real or potential conflicts of interest may include, but are not limited to:</i> 1. Close family member who is an employee of the USAID operating unit managing the project(s) being	NA	

DR



evaluated or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.	
2. Financial interest that is direct, or is significant though indirect, in the implementing organization(s) whose projects are being evaluated or in the outcome of the evaluation.	N/A
3. Current or previous direct or significant though indirect experience with the project(s) being evaluated, including involvement in the project design or previous iterations of the project.	N/A
4. Current or previous work experience or seeking employment with the USAID operating unit managing the evaluation or the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.	N/A
5. Current or previous work experience with an organization that may be seen as an industry competitor with the implementing organization(s) whose project(s) are being evaluated.	N/A
6. Preconceived ideas toward individuals, groups, organizations, or objectives of the particular projects and organizations being evaluated that could bias the evaluation.	N/A

I certify (1) that I have completed this disclosure form fully and to the best of my ability and (2) that I will update this disclosure form promptly if relevant circumstances change. If I gain access to proprietary information of other companies, then I agree to protect their information from unauthorized use or disclosure for as long as it remains proprietary and refrain from using the information for any purpose other than that for which it was furnished.

Signature	
Date	19/08/2013

## ANNEX D. METHODOLOGY AND WORKPLAN

### Final Evaluation of USAID/Kenya Conflict Mitigation Activities Methodology

#### Introduction

The violence that followed the 2007 elections in Kenya killed an estimated 1,300 and displaced roughly 600,000. The post-election violence arose from long-standing grievances, including issues relating to land reform, ethnic clashes, patronage politics, and weak institutional structures undermined by severe governmental corruption. In response to the violence and in anticipation of elections in 2013, USAID/Kenya's Democracy, Rights, and Governance Office ramped up its conflict mitigation, reconciliation, and peacebuilding activities.

Under this initiative, six projects worked to mitigate conflict and build peace, including:

Project/Implementer/AOR	Summary of Program	End Date	Funding
Kenyan Civil Society Strengthening Program (KCSSP) PACT Inc. AOR: Monica Azimi	Strengthen the capacity of civil society in: 1) advocacy for improved governance, 2) conflict management, and 3) Natural Resource Management	September 2013	\$35.5 million
Kenya Tuna Uwezo (KTU) CHF International AOR: Makena Kirima	The program uses the Constitution as a uniting document to educate and develop civic action interventions in Nairobi slums. Different ethnic groups are targeted and work conducted through a conflict mitigation lens.	February 2014	\$1.6 Million
Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace (LEAP II) Mercy Corps AOR: Monica Azimi	Strengthen the ability of local actors to address the root causes of post-election violence and to promote peace and reconciliation at the community level	July 2013	\$2.7 million
Peace Initiative Kenya—PIK International Rescue Committee (IRC) AOR: Betty Mugo	Train teachers, parent/teacher members, Yes Youth Can leaders, women's organization, and possibly community health workers to be peace-builders in their communities. Strong focus on GBV.	September 2013 (extension to Sept. 2015 pending in contracts)	\$3.2 million

People to People Peace Project (3Ps) Catholic Relief Services (CRS) AOR: Anne Ngumbi	Strengthen community peace structures at the village and district levels and increase members' skills in peacebuilding. Targeted areas: Burnt Forest, Kuresoi, Likoni	April 2012	\$599,685
Reporting for Peace, and Land and Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Kenya Internews AOR: Monica Azimi (previously Dan Spealman)	Work with local media to mitigate conflict and contribute toward peacebuilding; CMM focus on land issues.	March 2013	\$2.3 million

The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the effectiveness of the conflict mitigation activities and civil society strengthening projects in contributing to a peaceful Kenya. This information will help inform USAID/Kenya's conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening efforts and influence program decision moving forward, particularly in the context of the ongoing plans for devolution.

Included under USAID/Kenya's conflict mitigation activities are six projects, with distinct (and overlapping) interventions, stated results, and targeted populations. Initial projects focused on the Rift Valley and Nairobi areas, but in the last two years of the evaluation period, the Coast region was added to mitigate conflicts generated by the Mombasa Republican Council movement as well as growing discontent over historical injustices in the region. Many of these projects have been operating for the last three to five years.

On the basis of the target areas identified in the initial Scope of Work (SoW), the evaluation team will focus on four areas for site visits: Nairobi (including the informal settlements); Coast (including Mombasa, Kilifi, and Kwale); Mt. Elgon (Bungoma) and Eldoret; and Nakuru (Molo/Kuresoi and Naivasha). Group discussions, key informant interviews, and site visits (where appropriate) will be undertaken in each of these areas.

Of the six target projects and relevant interventions, it should be noted that some project activities covered more than conflict mitigation-focused interventions. However, the evaluation will only focus on those components most relevant to the 10 approaches identified by USAID in the Statement of Objectives.

## List of Evaluation Questions

The evaluation seeks to answer the six following questions:

In what ways did USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation *approaches* contribute to peace during the 2013 General Election?

To what extent have these identified *approaches* addressed possible root causes of conflict?

To what extent have attitudes and perceptions of individuals and communities changed toward peace and conflict in the targeted areas?

What conflict mitigation-related components are likely to continue after program closure?

To what extent did USAID/Kenya strengthen civil society organizations', especially local partners', ability to implement and manage conflict mitigation programs?

What key lessons and good practices can be identified for future USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening programming?

Question 1 and 2 specifically examine the 10 main *approaches* identified by USAID/Kenya and verified by the implementing partners.\*

These 10 approaches are

Early Warning Early Response

Targets of Opportunity (TOO Grants)

Peace Dividends Projects

Use of Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring

Community Dialogs and Reconciliation Efforts

Peace Messaging and SMS Platforms

Capacity Building for Local Partners

Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions

Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures

Support for and Training of DPCs

For question 1, the evaluation will adopt a theory based approach and apply contribution analysis in order to understand the individual and combined contribution of the different approaches to peace during the 2013 election. These methodologies are explained in the Data Analysis section (Section D) below.

For question 2, the evaluation team used the 2009 Vulnerability Assessment and the 2011 USAID/Kenya Democracy and Governance Assessment and Action Plan to define “root causes” in the context of Kenya. Using this definition, a review of other documents and discussions with partners and USAID at a partners’ workshop, the evaluation team has concluded that none of the approaches were intended to address root causes, but served as short-term mitigation strategies leading immediately up to the elections. The evaluation team does, however, recognize that some elements and activities under the approaches may have addressed root causes of conflict. The evaluators will seek to identify these in the course of the evaluation.

Question 3 examines attitudinal and perception changes. This will be assessed using a general population survey, coupled with any data from discussion groups with beneficiaries. The collected survey data will evidence attitudes and behaviors of individuals and community groups in targeted communities toward conflict and peace (e.g., openness to conflict mitigation activities and participation in peacebuilding

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\*The 10 approaches were identified by USAID in consultation with implementing partners and are included in the scope of work.



activities). Behavioral change will be looked at as an indicator of change in attitude or perceptions. The data collected through the survey will be triangulated against document review and through comparison with other survey data (e.g., AfroBarometer, UNDOC victimization surveys, etc.) where possible.

Question 4 examines sustainability of certain program components, specifically looking at what systems and processes have been put in place that are likely to continue after programs end (in some cases programs have already ended). An indicative list of the components to be examined is attached to the question (e.g. organizations, systems, forums, networks). The evaluation team will determine which local structures are still operating (for projects that have closed), and whether certain components have resources (financial or human) designated to support these structures in the future.\*

Question 5 looks at capacity building of local partners, particularly in management, governance, staff abilities/competencies, and so forth. Local partners are defined as sub-partners who received direct funding from international partners rather than local community based organizations. The evaluation team will gather data through examining existing evaluations and organizational assessments and through key informant interviews. We will draw on the Institutional Development Framework (IDF) and Organization Capacity Assessments (OCA) to inform our questions.

Question 6 will synthesize the findings and conclusions from all questions and data collected/analyzed to distill concrete lessons and good practices to carry forward with the lens of informing future programming decisions.

There is interest by USAID and partners to see whether the programs have harnessed opportunities for peace and have adapted to changes in the political and social contexts. To the extent possible, this will be examined, where appropriate, across the evaluation questions.

Gender and youth will be treated as cross-cutting themes to be explored where appropriate throughout the evaluation. The evaluation team will respond to USAID's dual expectations for treating appropriately by: (a) gathering sex and age group (over 35 years of age, ages 35 and under) disaggregated data through the survey (b) identifying gender and youth differential participation in/benefits from aspects of the approaches where differences on this basis are possible to identify.

## Evaluation Design

This evaluation is based on a Theory of Change approach, as elaborated below. Each approach has one or more theories of change and each theory of change has an associated method of data collection and analysis. In the section below, the Theory of Change framework is presented. Then an overarching Theory of Change and a set of more specific Theories of Change for the 10 approaches are developed. For each TOC, the evaluation team developed a list of linked assumptions based on project and mission documentation and discussion with partners and USAID/DRG at the partners' workshop of October 9, 2013. This framework therefore provides the basis for the theory-based approach to data analysis and comparison analysis (see Section D. Data Analysis Methods).

The evaluation will be examining contribution and it is not expected that the evaluators will be making any statements/judgments on attribution given the number of external variables that may have played a role in ensuring peace in Kenya. To that extent, this evaluation will not examine each individual project to see the extent to which the program implemented what was planned, and reached project-specific objectives and project goals but, rather, looking at the projects collectively in their contribution to peace. Additionally, the evaluation will only focus on the activities of a program that are related to

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\*Per discussion with USAID, "components" is understood to mean "aspects" and "peace dividends" has been removed from this list of components.

conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening. For projects (such as PACT) where activities were broader in scope, every activity will not be reviewed.

## Framework for Analysis

This evaluation will first focus on the development of a Theory of Change. As noted by USAID, “A theory of change explains why we think certain actions will produce desired change in a given context. It is intended to make all of our implicit assumptions more explicit, in order to (1) clarify which drivers of violent conflict we are addressing; (2) state clearly what the intended outcome of programs will be; and (3) fully articulate how and why the program will address the drivers of conflict and achieve its intended outcomes.” Put simply, a theory of change is expressed in the following form: \*

*If we do X (action), then we will produce Y (shift toward peace, stability, security).*

A theory of change is necessarily context specific and may be elaborated further as

*If we do X in context C... then Y*

An example of a TOC in the context of conflict mitigation and peacebuilding might be

*If we provide employment for ex-combatant youth in a post-conflict context, then we will reduce the likelihood of inter-communal violence, because unemployed youths are the most likely to be recruited into fighting, many still hold weapons and remain connected to their command structures.*

Theory of Change analysis is particularly useful in order to make implicit assumptions more explicit. As a tool for evaluation, Theory of Change focuses evaluation on results expected by the relevant theory. For example, if a TOC anticipates that if there is early warning, then there will be effective response, a TOC evaluation for early warning activities will look for effective response.

## Theories of Change and USAID/Kenya Conflict Mitigation Approaches

For this exercise, TOCs for each of the 10 approaches were developed based on project and mission documentation, discussion with USAID, and validated at a meeting with partners at the partners’ workshop. In some cases, as noted below, there are more than one TOC for a given approach and the team has teased out the different causal logics for a given set of activities. The evaluation team further developed an overarching theory of change on the basis of document review, the hypothesis statements provided by the partners, and on the basis of the discussions at the partners’ workshop.

The overarching Theory of Change constructed by the evaluation team is below:

### Theories of Change:

1. If local communities are given the capacity and opportunity to engage through dialog and understand the benefits of peace and unity, then the communities will be less likely to be mobilized into violence.
2. If elections are non-violent and Kenya is peaceful, then potential for advancing the reform agenda is improved.

### Assumptions:

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\*USAID. 2013. *Theories and Indicators of Change Briefing Paper: Concepts and Primers for Conflict Management and Mitigation*. See also OECD (2012), *Evaluating Peacebuilding Activities in Settings of Conflict and Fragility: Improving Learning for Results* DAC Guidelines and References Series, OECD Publishing; USAID (2010), *Theories of Change and Indicator Development in Conflict Management and Mitigation*.

Assumes that awareness of benefits of peace and understanding of dialog processes will change behavior.

Assumes that a non-violent election will lead to reform to address root causes of conflict.

Assumes that local conflicts may be mitigated within the community and do not require national or international action.

### **Early Warning and Early Response**

Description: This approach was employed to alert all pertinent partners/actors on any potential threats to public order and cohesion and to seek suitable measures to stem these threats before they escalate into violence and to stop it from spreading when it occurs.\*

Theory of Change: If timely information sharing and analysis of potential and emergent conflict is collected, well-analyzed, non-partisan, locally sourced, and verified, and if local response mechanisms are in place and able to respond, then appropriate and timely mitigation is more likely and conflict escalation less likely.

#### **Key Assumptions:**

Assumes that “appropriate” mitigation is clear and that early warning will generate an appropriate and timely response.

Assumes that locally sourced information is more accurate.

### **Targets of Opportunity (ToO Grants)**

Description: This was an approach that availed funds quickly and expeditiously toward addressing arising and unforeseen conflict and mobilized local communities and other actors, through USAID partners, toward timely resolution of conflict.

Theory of Change: If there is a funding mechanism that allows for rapid support of conflict mitigation opportunities, then conflict will be mitigated.

Note: Each target of opportunity also had its own theory of change. For example, PACT reported multiple theories of change (or Development Hypotheses) for its Targets of Opportunity grants.

#### **Key Assumptions:**

Assumes that rapid response is needed to seize opportunities.

Assumes that other funding mechanisms are insufficiently rapid.

### **Peace Dividend Projects**

Description: These are tangible community projects that demonstrated peacetime benefits as more compelling for communities in comparison to conflict, and engendered reconciliation and cohesion.

#### **Theories of Change:**

- I. If the benefits of peace are more tangible, then population is less likely to support violence.

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\*Amended as per discussion with USAID.

2. If development projects of common benefit are designed to emphasize connectors and provide a safe place for inter-group dialog and intergroup collaboration, then stronger and more positive relationships will develop and prospects for peaceful coexistence improve.

**Key Assumptions:** Peace dividend projects reflect two distinct theories of change, one focusing on the importance of making the advantages of peace visible and the other focusing on the means by which peace dividend projects are designed and managed collaboratively.

Assumes that development leads to peace rather than conflict.

Assumes that projects that are connectors in the short term will not be conflict generators in the longer term.

### **Use of Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring**

**Description:** The media, particularly radio, was used to disseminate accurate and unbiased information across in Kenya. In addition, to reach a growing number of youth, social media were used to communicate peace messages and to monitor cases of hate speech for further action.

#### **Theories of Change:**

If media provide balanced unbiased constructive reporting then people have the information at the community level to constructively address the conflicts affecting them.

If media provide balanced unbiased constructive reporting then citizens will be empowered to make informed decisions.

If media are monitored for hate speech, then they will be less likely to play a role in inciting violence and conflict may be mitigated.

#### **Key Assumptions:**

Assumes that messages are linked to changes in attitudes and behavior.

Assumes that monitoring of hate speech will result in effective response.

Accurate and unbiased media reporting will not incite violence.

### **Community Dialog and Reconciliation Efforts**

**Description:** This approach aimed to bring communities together to discuss issues that give rise to conflict between the communities, and thereby develop solutions to the issues without violence.

#### **Theories of Change:**

If communities are supported to meet and communicate, then they are more likely to understand one another and promote reconciliation.

#### **Key Assumptions:**

Assumes that communities lack sufficient opportunities to communicate and reach common ground

Assumes that communities desire peaceful relations.

**Note—**CHF emphasized dialog between state (police) and community, not just inter-community.

### Peace messaging and SMS platforms

Description: This approach included all messages that espoused peace and included ICT material and use of SMS blasts, to reach large numbers of citizens particularly before the elections.

Theory of Change: If messages of peace and unity are spread, then people will be reminded of the costs of violence and benefits of peace, and then they will be less likely to behave violently.

#### **Key Assumptions:**

1. Messages will shape behavior.
2. If media are used to saturate peace messages, then violence is less likely.

### Capacity Building for Local Partners

Description: This approach aimed to strengthen the technical and institutional capacity of local partners to implement USAID conflict mitigation programs.

Theory of Change: If CSOs have greater capacity, then they will better be able to implement projects that promote peace and mitigate violence.

#### **Key Assumptions:**

Assumes that capacitated CSOs will be more effective at implementing projects that mitigate conflict.

### Training for Local Actors and Peace Champions

Description: In order to engage as many people as possible to ensure successful management and mitigation of conflict, this approach trained potential actors and peace ambassadors. With this training, alternatives to violence as a conflict resolution mechanism were identified and communities empowered to address issues at the very local level.

Theory of Change: If more community leaders are trained in conflict resolution, then they will be better able to manage conflicts pro-actively and non-violently.

Key Assumptions: Assumes that community leaders will apply knowledge, desire non-violent conflict mitigation and that training is the constraint on peaceful behavior.

### Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures

Description: These were all the efforts toward connecting existing peace structures with peer structures as well as supporting them to have a wider reach on higher levels, influence policy, and expand their networks horizontally and vertically.

Theory of Change: If relationships are enhanced and peace structures and stakeholders are linked vertically and horizontally, then early warning and dialog will be improved and incidences of violent conflict reduced.

#### **Key Assumptions:**

Assumes that coordination, better peace architecture and networking are the constraint.

Assumes that there is a consensus on what is the community.

## Support for and Training of DPCs

**Description:** This approach aimed to enhance the impact of District Peace Committees at addressing conflict at the local levels and their capacity to play intermediary roles between the government and local communities in resolution of disputes.

**Theory of Change:** If local peace structures such as District Peace Committees are effective and in place, then governments will be able to respond more quickly to local situations and conflict will be mitigated

### Key Assumptions:

Assumes that if DPCs are neutral, they are more likely to be effective.

Assumes that DPCs are the key link between government and local communities.

## Data Collection Methods

The evaluation team will use well-established data collection and analysis methods to address each of USAID's evaluation questions. The Getting to Answers matrix (see Annex I) describes how each type of answer is associated with a specific data source, method, sampling or selection approach (where appropriate), and data analysis method.

The following table shows which methods will be used to answer the evaluation questions.

*Table 1: Sample data collection methods for the six evaluation questions*

Data Collection Methods	Evaluation Questions
Desk Review	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Group Discussions	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6
Key Informant Interviews	1, 2, 4, 5, 6
Field Observation and Site Visits	1, 2, 3, 4, 5
Survey	1, 2, 3, 4

Data will be collected in the following ways:

### Document Review

The evaluation team have reviewed and will further review incoming documentation provided by USAID and the six partners, with a focus on existing evaluations, reports and project descriptions, as well as any other relevant secondary research, which will include Kenya conflict analyses. Data from the document review will be organized for analysis according to the evaluation questions.

## Survey

A survey will be employed to collect the necessary data in order to provide answers to Question 3 on changes in attitudes and behaviors over time. It will also gauge perceptions (current and retrospective), as well as individual engagement in and knowledge of, the 10 conflict mitigation approaches adopted by USAID partners (current and retrospective) with the exception of capacity building for local partners (approach 7). The draft survey tool is attached in Annex III.

The survey will be conducted in six counties: Mombasa, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru, Nandi, Kericho and Nairobi. The selection of the six counties was purposively sampled to include those counties with the most significant number of direct beneficiaries (based on the data shared by the partners) and a high concentration in the number of USAID projects implemented.

The sample selection is based on a geographical stratification as the first level (per region, per location). Within each targeted county, the survey firm will select between one and three sub-counties to survey based on where there is higher concentration of projects to ensure higher probability of reaching beneficiaries (indirect and direct). Within these sub-counties, the survey firm will select a proportionate number of survey starting points (a landmark, school, bus stop or similar), from where enumerators will spread in randomizing walking patterns (directional spread, left hand rule, household skip, kish grid or birthday rule) to identify specific random respondents. In this way, every citizen has an equal likelihood of being included in the survey.

The sample size of  $n=1,200$  is commonly used for nationwide representative surveys. Its statistical margin of error is smaller than  $\pm 3$  percent for top level variables at 95 percent confidence. Disaggregation of the data is possible. Variables for which the sub-sample is larger than  $n=100$  are subject to a statistical error margin of 10 percent or less.

Regional disaggregation might be possible, but most likely not for all regions. A split out by approach will not be possible, given the number of cross-cutting activities. We also expect the incidence of direct beneficiaries to be too small to reach a meaningful sample size for separate analysis. For indirect beneficiaries, the sample size would only be large enough for separate top level analysis, if the incidence is close to what the six partner organizations have reported (approx. 10 million indirect beneficiaries reached).

According to the information received from the partner organizations, at least one in four respondents should have been a beneficiary of at least one of the 10 approaches, providing a data set of 300 surveys for project-specific analysis. This will only suffice to explore any questions at a very high level of aggregation with high margins of uncertainty.

The survey will be conducted by Research Solutions Africa (RSA), under contract with MSI. Oversight of enumerator training and data collection will be provided by MSI.

The survey is attached along with the other tools at Annex III.

## Site Visits

On the basis of the target areas identified in the initial Scope of Work (SoW), the evaluation team will focus on four areas for site visits: Nairobi (including the informal settlements); Coast (including Mombasa, Kilifi, and Kwale); Mt. Elgon (Bungoma) and Eldoret; and Nakuru (Molo/Kuresoi and Naivasha). This will allow the team to supplement the data collected through the household survey. During these site visits, the team will conduct key informant interviews and group discussions described below. The sites are purposively selected, considering the following criteria: (a) concentration of

targeted projects; (b) diversity of conflict drivers; (3) mix of urban and rural (inclusion of this criterion assumes that conflict eruption travels differently in different settings therefore necessitating distinct conflict mitigation activities).

## **Key Informant Interviews**

Key informant interviews (KIs) will be undertaken with implementing partners, local partners and other peace actors, government officials (e.g. provincial officials, chiefs, police) as well as stakeholders who can provide an overview of the broader context, the local dynamics and insights into future and past patterns of conflict.

Other key actors and donors will be interviewed at the national level. This is in order to better understand the overall context and factors contributing to peace and conflict, as well as the sphere of activities focused on conflict mitigation and peacebuilding efforts. This will assist USAID in perhaps determining complementary efforts that do not overlap with other donor endeavors. It could also assist in further delineating a specific area of concentration for future limited USAID programming.

Key informants have been purposively identified with the support of information provided by partners and on the basis of the cumulative knowledge and expertise of the evaluation team. An initial list is provided at Annex VI. This will be adjusted as necessary during the course of data gathering to reflect a snowball sampling approach.

In order to secure access to key government officials the evaluation team will require a letter of introduction signed by USAID before data collection.

Interview guides are attached with tools at Annex III.

*A note on the ethics of confidentiality.* The evaluation team will provide a list of all interviews conducted but not transcripts or notes from the interviews. This follows best ethical practice for conducting interviews and gathering data on sensitive topics in zones of conflict in order to respect confidentiality and protect respondents. Even with names removed, the potential risk of individuals being linked to content creates unnecessary vulnerability. This issue was discussed with USAID on 16 October 2013, and the evaluators will proceed according to AID's forthcoming decision.

## **Group Discussions**

Group discussions (GDs) will be held with different beneficiary groups to collect data in relation to 8 of the 10 approaches that lend themselves to group discussion. There will be two different types of GDs, Type A and Type B. These GD types will focus on, but not necessarily be limited to, the different approaches outlined in the table below. This methodology has been adopted to ensure the most appropriate respondents are present in the discussions (see sampling below).<sup>\*</sup>

Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) (1) and Peace messaging and SMS platforms (6) Use of Media and Social media (4) will be examined in either or both Groups Types A and B, since both groups of respondents may have participated in, or have benefited from, these approaches.

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<sup>\*</sup>Approaches 2 and 7—Targets of Opportunity and Capacity Building for Local Partners—will be examined through KIs.



Table 2: Group discussions by approach

Type A Group Discussion	Type B Group Discussion
Peace Dividends projects (approach 3)	Relationship building for local peace structures (approach 9)
Community dialogs and reconciliation efforts (approach 5)	Support for and training of DPCs (approach 10)
Training for local actors and peace champions (approach 8)	
Cross cutting approaches (in Type A and Type B GDs)	
Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) (approach 1)	
Use of Media and Social media (approach 4)	
Peace messaging and SMS platforms (approach 6)	

Type A will involve both direct and indirect beneficiaries. Thematic sampling considerations will include:

Beneficiaries of community dialogs and reconciliation efforts

Beneficiaries of peace dividend projects

Local actors and champions that received training

Local opinion leaders (professionals, religious leaders, leaders, local administration, youth groups and leaders, women groups and leaders)

Representatives from community at large (indirect beneficiaries)

Type A GDs will not involve those partners who organized the activities. These perspectives will be gathered during KIIs.

Identity based sampling considerations will include:

Gender segregated discussion groups of men and women in each site at the Coast and, where possible, in other regions.

Representation of religious diversities (especially Christians, Muslims and indigenous groups).

Generational balance in both gender groups (representing elderly, middle aged and youth)

Ethnic balance and where necessary segregation. In Molo separate type A GDs will be held with beneficiaries from Kikuyu and Kalenjin communities. GDs in other location may be segregated according to ethnicity depending on the local dynamics and on the basis of combined experience of the evaluation team.

Sampling Frame: Beneficiary lists will be provided to RSA who will be organizing the groups.

Type B will involve direct beneficiaries, members of DPCs and other peace structures as well as those directly involved in implementation of early warning activities. Type B will not be segregated according to gender or ethnicity, although a proportionate mix will be sought.

Group discussion guides are attached with tools at annex III.

All tools at annex III are draft (interview guides and Group discussion guides). They will be piloted and adjusted in the first week of data collection.

In order to obtain participants for Type B RSA will contacts the partner local organizations in that area as they will know the individuals personally and through their work, which will increase the chances of these stakeholders participating.

## Data Analysis Methods

The evaluators will undertake data analysis using the methods outlined below.

There will be ongoing analysis undertaken during data gathering process in the four areas to ensure quality of information and gap analysis. On return to Nairobi an aggregation and summation process will be undertaken. Data collection methods, including tools will be structured in a way that supports the process of data analysis and synthesis of findings to allow for quick reporting.

*Table 3: Sample data analysis methods for the six evaluation questions*

Data Analysis Methods	Evaluation Questions
Theory Based Approach	1, 4, 5
Contribution Analysis	1
Outcome Mapping	1
Comparison Analysis (TOC—Theoretical to Actual)	1, 2, 4, 5
Summary Statistics	1, 3, 4
Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis of Qualitative Data	1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6

Divergence/Convergence Analysis	1, 2, 4, 5
Mixed Methods Integration	1, 2, 4, 5, 6

### **Theory based approach**

A theory-based approach involves exploring the causal linkages in a results chain (the sequence and hierarchy of changes) and exploring the validity of the assumptions articulated in the theory of change. In this evaluation using a theory-based approach involves making explicit the theories underpinning how the 10 conflict mitigation approaches will contribute to peace (the “if-then” statements; see section B above) and testing these against the understanding and perceptions of stakeholders obtained through the data collection methods.

### **Contribution Analysis**

Contribution Analysis identifies and presents plausible alternative explanations to a program to account for outcomes, such as other approaches, policies, political trends or behaviors unaffected by the program. It helps to reduce uncertainty about the contribution made and strengthens the plausibility of findings in relation to the programs’ impact(s). In this evaluation, contribution will involve considering all the various explanations and factors for the changes identified (beyond the 10 approaches) through the data collection.

### **Outcome mapping**

Outcome mapping re-focuses the evaluation from the formal project deliverables to verifiable changes in the behavior, actions and relationships of those individuals/ groups with whom a project can plausibly claim to have influenced through implementation (boundary partners). In this evaluation outcome mapping will involve seeking to identify changes in behavior, actions and relationships through data collection.

### **Comparison Analysis**

The team will compare the outcome expected by the Theory of Change (the “then” part of the “if...then” statement) with the actual findings on the ground. As outlined above, theory of change statements have been developed for each activity as well as one overarching theory of change.

### **Summary Statistics**

The team will use summary statistics to analyze quantitative data obtained from the survey and other documents.

### **Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis**

For Group Discussions and Key Informant Interview data, the team will analyze the content of the responses to get an in-depth understanding of the experiences and priorities of beneficiaries and stakeholders. The team will also examine the data for patterns to determine whether some responses are determined by certain variables, such as geography and *approach*. Looking at trends over time will also allow the team to consider changes in implementation that may have occurred over time.

### **Response Convergence/Divergence Analysis**

The team will review data collected to determine where there is significant response convergence from the varied stakeholders and beneficiaries. Where divergence is found, the team will follow-up to better understand the context and reasons for divergence in facts, perceptions, or opinions.

### **Mixed-Methods Integration**

Since the team is using a mixed methods approach, data collected from various methods will be integrated to arrive at findings. Where different methods produce conflicting evidence, the evaluation team will, to the extent possible, double back to examine why these data conflict, as well as weigh the data from various methods in terms of strength in validity and reliability.

*A note on conflict sensitivity.*

The evaluation will pay close attention to issues of conflict sensitivity on the basis that all activities in conflict-affected settings should be conflict sensitive. This will involve: (a) paying attention to the extent to which the evaluation process itself is conflict sensitive by drawing on the combined experience and understanding of the team in relation to local conflict dynamics and (b) keeping an eye on the extent to which the implementation of the 10 evaluation approaches themselves were conflict sensitive by ensuring that relevant questions are asked consistently through the Group Discussions and Key Informant Interviews.\*

### **Methodological Strengths and Limitations**

By the time of the evaluation, four of the projects will be closed out. While some of the key individuals who worked on the projects will still be based in Nairobi and in the field sites, their support will be more limited as they will be engaged with other assignments. Further, certain key individuals will no longer be available. There will need to be a stronger focus on documentary evidence to supplement the lack of personnel in country. This evaluation does benefit from having the end of project performance evaluations completed as a source of information.

A few projects conducted baseline information. However, because they were project specific, the surveys are narrower in scope and geographic coverage. This constraint will negate the use of pre-project data. While the survey will include retrospective questions, there may be some limitations on the reliability of this data due to recall bias.

Disentangling USAID's concrete contribution to peace will be challenging due to a number of other actors and donors operating in the same geographic areas and working on similar peacebuilding and conflict mitigation activities. Further, many other contextual factors have may have impacted the peaceful elections. Causal inference will be employed to the extent possible to credibly show a relationship between changes that have taken place and the activities the projects undertook.

This evaluation will examine contribution, not attribution, given the number of variables that played a role in conflict mitigation. Furthermore, this evaluation is not a performance evaluation. The evaluation team is not expected to examine each individual project to see the extent to which the program implemented what was planned or reached project-specific objectives and goals. Instead it will look at the projects collectively in their contribution to peace. Additionally, the evaluation will only focus on the activities of a program that are related to conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening.

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\*Conflict sensitivity refers to the ability of an organization, team or program to a) understand the context in which it is operating, b) understand the interaction between the intervention, activity or approach and that context, and c) act on that understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximize positive impacts on the conflict.

Ideally, the evaluation team would have access to detailed empirical data on levels of conflict by time and location. This information is either held confidentially or has not been collected systematically.

## ANNEX I: Getting to Answers

Program or Project: Final Evaluation of USAID/Kenya Conflict Mitigation Activities

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed  (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection, e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey		Sampling or Selection Approach, (if one is needed)	Data Analysis  Methods, e.g.,  Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
I. In what ways did USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation <i>approaches</i> contribute to peace during the 2013 General		Yes/No	Documents (e.g., conflict analysis, assessments, research)	Document review	Purposive (see criteria in section C)  See survey sample selection	Frequency distributions
		Description				Contribution Analysis
	X	Comparison		Semi-structured KIs		Theory Based Approach  Summary Statistics (frequency

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed  (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection, e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey		Sampling or Selection Approach, (if one is needed)	Data Analysis Methods, e.g., Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
Election?	X	Explanation	Key informants (see list)  Direct and indirect beneficiaries  Partner Workshop  Site Visits  Individuals (indirect beneficiaries)	interviews  Group Discussions  Observation  Survey		and cross tabulation)  Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis of qualitative data  Divergence/Convergence Analysis  Mixed Methods Integration
2. Early Warning/Early Response  Peace Dividend Projects		Yes/No	Documents e.g. Partner documents, evaluations	Document review/desk study		Theory based approach  Contribution Analysis

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed  (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection, e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey	Sampling or Selection Approach, (if one is needed)		Data Analysis Methods, e.g., Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
Use of Media, Social Media, and Hate Speech Monitoring	X	Description	NSC (If approval received)	Observation		Comparison analysis Theory of change ideal to practice (for both the if and then parts)
Community Dialogs and Reconciliation Efforts						
Peace Messaging and SMS Platforms	X	Comparison	Key Informants—including local partners (See list)	Interviews	Purposive (See criteria in section C)	Summary Statistics (frequency and cross tabulation) Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis of qualitative data
Training for Local Partners						
Relationship Building for Local Peace Structures	X	Explanation (Degree to which activities contributed)	Direct and indirect beneficiaries	Group Discussions	Purposive (See criteria in section C)	Divergence/Convergence Analysis Mixed Methods Integration
Support for and Training of DPCs					Nairobi (informal settlements), Coast (Mombasa, Kilifi, Kwale), North Rift (Bungoma (Eldoret), South Rift, Nakuru, Molo/Korosoi, Naivasha.	Outcome Mapping
			Partners	Workshop Discussion		



Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed  (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection, e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey		Sampling or Selection Approach, (if one is needed)	Data Analysis  Methods, e.g.,  Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
			Site Visits (where possible)	Observation	See survey sample selection	
			Individuals (indirect beneficiaries)	Survey		
3. Targets of Opportunity		Yes/No	Documents (e.g. partner documents, evaluations)	Document review/desk study	Purposive (see criteria in section C)	Frequency distributions
		Description		Semi-structured KIs interviews		Contribution Analysis
	X	Comparison	Key informants (see list)			Theory Based Approach
	X	Explanation	Site Visits (where possible)	Observation		Divergence/Convergence Analysis  Mixed Methods Integration

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed  (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection, e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey		Sampling or Selection Approach, (if one is needed)	Data Analysis  Methods, e.g.,  Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
<p>2. To what extent have the identified approaches addressed root causes of conflict?</p> <p><i>Root causes determined by (i) reviewing 2009 Joint Conflict Vulnerability Assessment and 2011 DG Assessment and Strategy and then (ii) asking partners for feedback.</i></p>		Yes/No	Documents e.g., conflict assessments, partner and USAID documents, 2009 Vulnerability and 2010 DG assessment	Document review/desk study		<p>Comparison analysis</p> <p>Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis of qualitative data</p> <p>Divergence/Convergence Analysis</p> <p>Mixed Methods Integration</p>
	X	Description	Key Informants (See list)	Semi-structured interviews	Purposive (see criteria in section C)	
		Comparison	Individuals (direct and indirect beneficiaries)	Group Discussions	Purposive (see criteria in section C)	

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed  (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection, e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey	Sampling or Selection Approach, (if one is needed)	Data Analysis Methods, e.g., Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method	
	X	Explanation	Individuals (indirect beneficiaries)	Survey	See survey sample selection
3. To what extent have attitudes and perceptions of individuals and communities changed toward peace and conflict in the targeted areas?		Yes/No	Individuals (indirect beneficiaries)	Survey	See survey sample selection
	X	Description			
	X	Comparison			
		Explanation	Other sources for triangulation as necessary.  e.g. Afro barometer, Kenya police crime statistics, UNODC victimization survey etc.	Document review	Summary Statistics (frequency and cross tabulation)  Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis of qualitative data

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed  (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection, e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey		Sampling or Selection Approach, (if one is needed)	Data Analysis  Methods, e.g.,  Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
4. What components are likely to continue to influence conflict mitigation after program closure?  Components, as per discussion with USAID, e.g., organizations, systems, forums, and networks.		Yes/No	Individuals (direct and indirect beneficiaries)	Group Discussion	Purposive (see criteria in section C)	Frequency distributions
	X	Description				Theory based approach with contribution analysis
	X	Comparison	Key Informants (see list)	Semi-structured interviews	Purposive (see criteria in section C)  See survey sample selection	Comparison analysis
		Explanation	Documents e.g. evaluations	Document Review/Desk Study		Theory of change ideal to practice (for both the if and then parts)
			Individuals (indirect beneficiaries)	Survey		Summary Statistics (frequency and cross tabulation)
						Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis of qualitative data
						Divergence/Convergence Analysis
						Mixed Methods Integration

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed  (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection, e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey		Sampling or Selection Approach, (if one is needed)	Data Analysis  Methods, e.g., Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
5. To what extent did USAID/Kenya strengthen civil society organizations', especially local partners', ability to implement and manage conflict mitigation programs?		Yes/No	Key Informants (see list)	Semi-structured interviews	International partners, local partner staff, and others	Frequency distributions
	X	Description	e.g. IPs, local partner staff			Theory based approach with contribution analysis Comparison analysis
	X	Comparison	Documents e.g. evaluations, organizational assessments, IDF	Document Review/Desk Study Group Discussions	Purposive (see criteria in section C)	Theory of change ideal to practice (for both the if and then parts)
	X	Explanation	Individuals (indirect and direct beneficiaries) Site Visit	Observation		Content, Pattern, and Trend Analysis of qualitative data  Divergence/Convergence Analysis  Mixed Methods Integration
- Capacity Building for Local Partners Approach						

Evaluation Questions	Type of Answer/ Evidence Needed  (Check one or more, as appropriate)		Methods for Data Collection, e.g., Records, Structured Observation, Key Informant Interviews, Mini-Survey		Sampling or Selection Approach, (if one is needed)	Data Analysis  Methods, e.g., Frequency Distributions, Trend Analysis, Cross-Tabulations, Content Analysis
			Data Source(s)	Method		
6. What key lessons and good practices can be identified for future USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening programming?		Yes/No	Key Informants	Interviews	Purposive (see criteria in section C)	Content Analysis  Mixed Methods Integration
	X	Description				
	X	Comparison	Documents (e.g., evaluations and final reports)	Desk review		
		Explanation	Individuals (direct and indirect beneficiaries)	Group Discussions		

## ANNEX II: Work plan

MISSION: EVALUATION OF USAID'S CONFLICT MITIGATION SUPPORT

DATES: September 30 to January 10

Day	Date	Location	Activities		Survey
October					
Monday	14	Nairobi	Methodology and work plan due to USAID (CoB)		Survey Set up
Tuesday	15	Nairobi	Team Planning meeting—further logistical planning, initial KIIs and any follow up with partners		Survey data collection
Wednesday	16	Nairobi	Discuss and gain USAID approval of methodology and workplan		Survey data collection
Thursday	17	Nairobi–Kibera	Group Discussions (A and B) and KII		Survey data collection
Friday	18	Nairobi—MSI offices	Team review of GD and KII matrices and approach and revise as necessary		Survey data collection
Saturday	19	Nairobi–Korogocho	Group Discussions and KII A and B		Survey data collection
Sunday	20	Fly to Mombasa			
Monday	21	Mombasa	Group Discussions A and B and KII		Survey data collection
Tuesday	22	Kalife GDs/ KIIs	Group Discussions A and B and KII		Survey data collection

Day	Date	Location	Activities				Survey
Wednesday	23	Kawale GDs/ KIIs	Group Discussions A and B and KII				Survey data collection
Thursday	24	Mombasa KIIs and gap filling	KIIs, gap filling and analysis and notes write up. Travel				Survey data collection
Friday	25	Mombasa KIIs and gap filling am  Fly Mombasa to Eldoret and on to Bungoma pm	KIIs, gap filling and analysis and notes write up. Travel				Survey data collection
Saturday	26	Bungoma (GDs)	Group Discussions A and B and KII				Survey data collection
Sunday	27	DAY OFF					
Monday	28	Bungoma (GDs)  Travel to Eldoret and meet Bishop late afternoon	Group Discussions and KII	am	GD A and B (Bungoma)		Survey data collection
				Pm	KIIs (Eldoret)		Survey data collection
Tuesday	29	Early am travel to Koresoi/. Molo (GDs)  Afternoon travel to Nakuru	Group discussions and KII	Am GD Kalenjin			Survey data collection
				Pm GD Kikuyu			
Wednesday	30	Nakuru (GDs and KII)	Group discussions A and B and KII				Survey data processing



Day	Date	Location	Activities		Survey
Thursday	31	Nakuru (analysis KII and gap filling)—travel to Naivasha	KIIs, gap filling and analysis and notes write up		Survey data processing
November					
Friday	1	Naivasha GDs	Group discussions A and B and KII		Survey data processing
Saturday	2	Naivasha— reflection	Analysis and gap filling (KIIs)		Survey data processing
Sunday	3	DAY OFF			
Monday	4	Nairobi	Analysis and gap filling (KIIs)		Survey data processing
Tuesday	5	Nairobi	Further KIIs and meetings with USAAID staff and other KIIs and gap filling		Survey data analysis
Wednesday	6	Nairobi	Data Analysis		Survey data analysis
Thursday	7	Nairobi	Data Analysis		Survey data analysis
Friday	8	Nairobi	Data Analysis		Survey data analysis
Saturday	9	Nairobi	Data Analysis		Survey data analysis
Sunday	10	Nairobi	Data Analysis		
Monday	11	Nairobi	Half day validation meeting, MSI offices		Survey data analysis
Tuesday	12	Nairobi	FCR Workshop		

Day	Date	Location	Activities		Survey
Wednesday	13	Nairobi	Data analysis and dry run presentation		
Thursday	14	Nairobi	Presentation to USAID (am) Presentation to IPs (pm)		
Friday	15	Nairobi	11 am presentation to all USAID mission		
Saturday	16	Nairobi	Report writing		
Sunday	17	DAY OFF			
Monday	18	Home base	Report writing		
Tuesday	19	Home base	Report writing		
Wednesday	20	Home base	Report writing		
Thursday	21	Home base	Report writing		
Friday	22	Home base	Report writing Submit draft to MSI (CoB)		
Saturday	23	DAY OFF			
Sunday	24	DAY OFF			
Monday	25		MSI—Editing Technical review		
Tuesday	26		Report writing		
Wednesday	27		Draft Submission to USAID		
Thursday	28		Report writing		
Friday	29		Report writing		

Day	Date	Location	Activities		Survey
Wednesday	11 Dec		Comments Received USAID		
Friday	3 Jan		Final Report to USAID		

## **ANNEX III: Draft Tools (to be piloted and adjusted)**

### **Guide I: Group A - Discussion Interview Guide**

*Date:* \_\_\_\_\_ *Location:* \_\_\_\_\_ *No in the group:* \_\_\_\_\_

*Gender breakdown (circle as appropriate):* *Mixed,* \_\_\_\_\_ *Male,* \_\_\_\_\_ *Female* \_\_\_\_\_

*Ethnicity:* \_\_\_\_\_

**Purpose:** The purpose of the Group Discussion is to ‘test’ the validity of the Theory of Change at the higher level and for each approach and engage in outcome mapping.

**Covering Approaches:**

Peace Dividends projects (3),

Community dialogs and reconciliation efforts (5)

Training for local actors and peace champions (8)

Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) (1)

Use of media and social media (4)

Peace messaging and SMS platforms (6)

**Feeding into Evaluation Questions:** 1, 2, 4, 5, 6.

**General Entry questions to identify conflict initiatives**

Was there any conflict in your community in 2013? Yes/No? If yes what was it?

Have there been any inter-community or multi-community activities taking place in your community / District aimed at preventing conflict and enhancing peace

What are these initiatives?

Rank the grouped initiatives using the question: “Which of these initiatives do you think was the most important in preventing violence in the 2013 elections”

Peace messaging and SMS platforms (6) *If we hear/see messages of peace and unity, then we will be reminded of the costs of violence and benefits of peace, then behavior will change and violence will be less likely.*

Ask the group in which media did they hear or see peace messages—brainstorm, (TV, Radio, Billboards, Social media, SMS,)

What sort of messages in the media did you hear on radio, television?

How often did you hear these messages? Was this too often, about right, not enough?

Who was giving these messages (famous people, politicians, religious leaders etc)?

Does it matter who is giving the messages? Why / why not?

Do you think these messages influenced your (a) your attitude toward peace / election violence and (b) your behavior? In what ways? Give concrete examples

What do you think would have happened in your community with no peace messages?

Do you think there are negative impacts from the peace messaging? If so what were they?

Use of media and social media (4) (a) *If media is used effectively for peaceful purposes, then message of peace will be better disseminated and violence made less likely.* (b). *If media is used to saturate peace messages, then violence is less likely* (c) *IF MEDIA IS MONITORED FOR HATE SPEECH, THEN CONFLICT MAY BE MANAGED AND MITIGATED.*

Did you see or receive any negative messages about other people, political parties or groups in the lead up to 2007–08 elections and in 2013? (In what form? TV, SMS, FM Radio, etc.)

If yes, what did you do about them? If not why do you think that you did not receive them?

Do you think that the media coverage in 2013 was different from that in 2007–08? In what way?

Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) (1) *If timely information sharing and analysis of potential and emergent conflict is collected, well-analyzed, non-partisan, locally sourced, and verified, then appropriate and timely mitigation is more likely and conflict escalation less likely.*

Do you know any EW mechanisms in your area? What are they? Have you used them? (which)

Do you think that the early warning mechanisms in your area have been successful or not? If so in what ways? What elements are most important? Or if not, why not?

Did any ER actions come out of EW that you observed or experienced? Give specific examples?

Were the EW and ER actions timely or not?

What would have happened if the EW was not there?

In the light of hindsight, what do you think could be improved?

Community dialogs and reconciliation efforts (5) *If communities are supported to meet and communicate, then they are more likely to understand one another and promote reconciliation. If within group dialogs take place before intergroup dialogs then the cross-group dialog will be more successful.*

Have any intra- or inter community dialogs taken place in your community in the lead up to the 2013 elections? If yes, when were they? How many times? Who did they involve? Did you attend?

What do you think was achieved (if anything) through these meetings? Give concrete examples (eg attitudes, behaviors, reduced conflict)

Do you think that they have addressed the causes of your intra-inter-community issues? Why/why not?

Do you think that conflict will arise again in the future? Why/why not?

Peace Dividends Projects (3), *If the benefits of peace are more tangible, then population is less likely to support violence. 2. If development projects of common benefit are designed to emphasize connectors and provide a safe place for intergroup dialog and intergroup collaboration, then stronger and more positive relationships will develop and prospects for peaceful coexistence improve.*

Have any inter community projects taken place in your community in the lead up to the 2013 elections? If yes, what were they? Who did they involve?

What do you think has been achieved through this project? (e.g., reduced conflict, improved relations) Why?

Do you think that the project has helped address the causes of your inter-community issues? Why/why not?

What would have happened if the project had not taken place? Would it have made any difference? Why?

Training for local actors and peace champions (8) *If more community leaders are trained in conflict resolution, then they will be better able to manage conflicts pro-actively and non-violently*

What do you think about the skills, ability and levels of activity (energy) of local peace actors and community leaders in addressing potential or actual conflict in the lead up to 2013 compared with two years ago?

Have there been any changes? Positive or negative? Give examples. Why do you think this is?

#### Overall Reasons for Peace or Conflict

What do you think the main reasons are for the peace/ conflict in your area? Why?

If none of these initiatives had taken place what would have happened?

#### Sustainability

Do you think any of the initiatives and activities that we have been discussing need to continue in the future for peace to be maintained? If so which ones?

Do you think that any of these initiatives actually *will continue* into the future?

If yes, why? What is it about them?

If no why not? Does it matter? What will happen if they stop?

#### Future and Recommendations

Do you consider these peace initiatives overall to be helpful? Why?

Do you think that there is a possibility for violence to occur in your community in the future? If so what do you think the conflicts will be over? Why do you think this? (Conflicts between whom?)

What initiatives do you think should be supported in the future to address (a) any threats or possibilities described above (a) maintain existing peace (b) deepen peace in your region?

Has the initiative been a success? If so in what ways?

Why do think it has been successful? What have been the key elements contributing to this?

What changes have you (or your department) observed or experienced as a result of the initiative? Please give examples if you can?

In the light of hindsight, what do you think could be improved?

Can you provide me with you best examples or stories that illustrate the impact (or lack of impact) from the initiative? Who has benefited? Has anybody 'lost out' from the process?

Have there been any negative impacts from the initiative (context, relationships, etc)?

## Guide 2: Group B - Discussion Interview Guide

Date:

Location:

No in the group:

Gender breakdown (circle as appropriate): Mixed,

Male,

Female

Purpose: The purpose of the Group Discussion is to ‘test’ the validity of the Theory of Change for each approach and engage in outcome mapping

Covering Approaches:

Peace messaging and SMS platforms (6)

Use of media and social media (4)

Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) (1)

Relationship building for local peace structures (9),

Support for and training of DPCs (10)

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 3, 4, 6.

General Entry questions to identify conflict initiatives

Was there any conflict in your community in 2013? Yes/No? If yes what was it?

Have there been any inter-community or multi-community activities taking place in your community / District aimed at preventing conflict and enhancing peace

What are these initiatives?

Rank the grouped initiatives using the question: “Which of these initiatives do you think was the most important in preventing violence in the 2013 elections”

Peace messaging and SMS platforms (6) *If we hear/see messages of peace and unity, then we will be reminded of the costs of violence and benefits of peace, then behavior will change and violence will be less likely.*

Ask the group in which media did they hear or see peace messages—brainstorm, (TV, Radio, Billboards, Social media, SMS,)

What sort of messages in the media did you hear on radio, television?

How often did you hear these messages? Was this too often, about right, not enough?

Who was giving these messages (famous people, politicians, religious leaders etc)?

Does it matter who is giving the messages? Why / why not?



Do you think these messages influenced your (a) your attitude toward peace / election violence and (b) your behavior? In what ways? Give concrete examples.

What do you think would have happened in your community with no peace messages?

Do you think there are negative impacts from the peace messaging? If so what were they?

Use of media and social media (4) a) *If media is used effectively for peaceful purposes, then message of peace will be better disseminated and violence made less likely.* b) *If media is used to saturate peace messages, then violence is less likely.* c) *IF MEDIA IS MONITORED FOR HATE SPEECH, THEN CONFLICT MAY BE MANAGED AND MITIGATED.*

Did you see or receive any negative messages about other people, political parties or groups in the lead up to 2007–08 elections and in 2013? (In what form? TV, SMS, FM Radio, etc.)

If yes, what did you do about them? If not why do you think that you did not receive them?

Do you think that the media coverage in 2013 was different from that in 2007–08? In what way?

Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) (1) *If timely information sharing and analysis of potential and emergent conflict is collected, well-analyzed, non-partisan, locally sourced, and verified, then appropriate and timely mitigation is more likely and conflict escalation less likely.*

Do you know any EW mechanisms in your area? What are they? Have you used them? (which)

Do you think that the early warning mechanisms in your area have been successful or not? If so, in what ways? What elements are most important? Or if not, why not?

Did any ER actions come out of EW that you observed or experienced? Give specific examples?

Were the EW and ER actions timely or not?

What would have happened if the EW was not there?

In hindsight, what do you think could be improved?

Relationship building for local peace structures (9), *If relationships are enhanced and peace structures and stakeholders linked vertically and horizontally, then early warning and dialog will be improved and incidences of violent conflict reduced.*

Of the peace structures identified, which structures and organizations do you communicate with horizontally and vertically—if anyone?

What is the nature of the relationship? (Share information, coordinate, take action together?)

What difference if any, does it make? (implied with regard to conflict but open—to see if it comes out)

Are some relationships (individual people or structures) more important than others for effectiveness? (Horizontally or vertically, e.g. government, police, county forums,)

Support for and training of DPCs (10) *If local peace structures effective and in place, then better able to mitigate conflict* (assumes that DPC is present if we want to assess training per se))

Do you have a DPC? Do you think that it is active? Have you interacted with it?

Can you provide examples or stories that illustrate their work, or impact (or lack of impact? Who has benefited? Has anybody 'lost out' from the process?

Have you seen any changes in the way that the DPC operates in the last couple of years?

Do you have suggestions on how DPCs could be improved? (e.g., right people, resources, etc.)?

Overall Reasons for Peace or Conflict

What do you think the main reasons are for the peace/ conflict in your area? Why?

If none of these initiatives had taken place what would have happened?

Sustainability

Do you think any of the initiatives and activities that we have been discussing need to continue in the future for peace to be maintained? If so which ones?

Do you think that any of these initiatives actually *will continue* into the future?

If yes, why? What is it about them?

If no why not? Does it matter? What will happen if they stop?

Future and Recommendations

Do you consider these peace initiatives overall to be helpful? Why?

Do you think that there is a possibility for violence to occur in your community in the future? If so what do you think the conflicts will be over? Why do you think this? (conflict between whom?)

What initiatives do you think should be supported in the future to address a) any threats or possibilities described above, b) maintain existing peace, and c) deepen peace in your region?

## Guide 3: Key Informant Interview Guide: External Stakeholders

*Name of organization:*

*Respondent:*

*Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:*

*Date:*

*Location:*

**Nota Bene:** These questions will be adjusted depending on the informant (eg Government, CSO, Business or Religious Leader, etc.) but will be consistent across the type of informant to enable analytical comparisons within groups.

**Purpose:** The purpose of this KII (Context Experts, Key Stakeholders, Government, Civil Society, Religious leaders, Businessmen, etc.) is to identify the main factors regarding: learning, best practices, considerations and informed assessments of future conflict risks and program recommendations for USAID.

Feeding into Evaluation Questions: 1, 2, 4, 6.

### General

What is the role of your organization/department with respect to addressing conflict in Kenya?

What was your role during the 2013 elections?

### Election Violence

What do you think are the main factors for the elections of 2013 being generally peaceful?

Which of these factors do you think are the most important and why?

### Conflict in Kenya and Contribution of USAID programming

From the perspective of the different key informants, what do you think were the major *activities* that contributed to the peaceful election? What has been the impact of civil society interventions enabling people to manage the risk of conflict better? What is the evidence on which they judge the impact?

What changes have you seen in levels of conflict over the past few years and to what extent do you think that civil society organizations have contributed in terms of their actions? Please give examples? What factors explain differences in levels of conflict experienced by different communities?

Do you think any interventions during this period have addressed root causes of conflict in Kenya? Which ones and why? Why not?

### Learning

What are the most important lessons that your organization learned during the course of the elections with respect to addressing conflict (both root causes and mitigation)?

What lessons do you think have been learned more broadly from these elections in terms of conflict management?

#### The Future

Do you think there are key elements of civil society work undertaken during the 2013 elections that need to continue in the future for peace to be maintained? If so which ones and why? Do you think that these elements actually *will continue* into the future without external funding?

In the light of your experience more broadly how do you think conflict can be better addressed in Kenya in the future?

Do you see changes in the patterns of conflict? What are they? How are they changing?

Can you identify *specific conflict concerns* for the future? If so what are they and why do you think they are a risk?

Given the broader political trends here in Kenya, what are the implications for civil society development in the future? What do you consider to be the most important task or role of civil society given these trends?

Do you have any further suggestions, comments or ideas?

## Guide 4: Key Informant Interview Guide: Senior IP Program Staff

*Name of organization:*

*Respondent:*

*Role of respondent in their institution and main responsibilities:*

*Date:*

*Location:*

**Purpose:** The purpose of this KII is to identify; learning, best practices, considerations and informed assessments of future conflict risks and program recommendations for USAID.

**Feeding into Evaluation Questions:** 1, 2, 4, 6.

What are the most important lessons that XXX [*interviewer to insert name of project*] has learned during the course of this project in terms of:

Project design and addressing conflict (both root causes and mitigation)

Content of the program

Working in this political environment

Management and logistical arrangements

If you were starting again (i.e., in the light of hindsight), what would you do differently? What advice would you give to yourself about the above aspects?

What are the XXX [*name of project*] achievements that you are most proud of?

Have there been any unintended outcomes, benefits or negative aspects as a result of your program that you have seen?

Do you think there are key elements of program work that need to continue in the future for peace to be maintained? If so which ones and why? Do you think that any of these initiatives actually *will continue* into the future without funding?

If yes, why? What is it about them?

If no why not? Does it matter? What will happen if they stop?

**Overall Reasons for Peace or Conflict:** What do you think the main reasons are for the peaceful 2013 elections? Why? If none of the USAID funded programs had taken place what do you think would have happened?

In the light of your program experience more broadly how do you think conflict can be better addressed in Kenya in the future?

Can you identify *specific conflict concerns* for the future? If so what are they and why do you think they are a risk?

Given the broader political trends here in Kenya, what are the implications for civil society development in the future that donors should be aware of?

Do you have any further suggestions, comments, or ideas?

The household questionnaire is intended primarily to address Evaluation Question 3, and will contribute to Questions 1, 2, and 4.

*Evaluation Survey on Contribution of Various Stakeholders in Peacebuilding—Kenya*

# Household Questionnaire

## ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION

Questionnaire number				
Date of interview:	DD	MM	YY	
Time of interview:	Start	HH	MM	Stop
(24 hour clock)				
Name of interviewer:				
Place of interview:				
Region				
County				
District				
Division				
Location				
Sub-location/Village				
Number of visits (max. of 3)				

Reason for call back		Number of visits		
		1	2	3
Refused to be interviewed			1	1
Target respondent not at home			2	2
No one in the household			3	3
Respondent not able to be interviewed due to medical reasons (very sick, dumb, etc.)			4	4
No adult member in the household			5	5
Language barrier			6	6
Other (specify)			98	98
Not applicable		99	99	
Outcome of final visit		Successful	Incomplete	Replaced
Field quality control checks ( <i>sign as appropriate</i> )				
Activity	Activity undertaken by			
	Interviewer	Team leader	Supervisor	
Edited				
Reviewed				
Accompanied				
Back checked				
Called back				



## INTRODUCTION

Good morning/ afternoon/ evening? My name is ..... from Research Solutions Africa, a Market and Social Research firm based in Kenya. We are currently conducting an evaluation survey on the contribution of *various stakeholders toward peacebuilding in this area*. We are trying assess the contributions of various programs to peacebuilding.

The interview is likely to take about 45 minutes, and there is no right or wrong answer. The information that you provide will be kept strictly confidential and if we are to quote any response from this interview, then your name will not be used. There is no financial gain for taking part in this survey and you have the right to decline and/or abort the interview at any point.

Are you willing to take part in the survey?

### Notes for the enumerators

The enumerators *need to ask all the questions from section B down by the four specified time periods*. They need to ask the respondents to *'go back to that period in time in their minds'* so:

Time period 1: Take yourself back to immediately after the 2007 elections.

Time period 2: Take yourself back to the time immediately after the constitutional referendum in August 2010

Time period 3: Take yourself back to the time just before and during the March 2013 general election

Time period 4: This is the present—what you think now.

*During the course of the survey the respondents should be constantly reminded to go back to the time period specified.*

*All questions will be asked for time period 1 before moving on to ask all questions for time period 2 and so on.*

..... *Administer the screener*.....

## SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

I would like to start off the interview by asking you some general questions about yourself and your household.

Respondents details		
A1	Gender ( <i>observe</i> )	Male Female
A2	Name	
A3	Telephone contact	88. Refused to answer
A4	How old are you? ( <i>years completed</i> )	
A5	What is your highest level of education completed?	PRIMARY SECONDARY COLLEGE UNIVERSITY NONE Refused to answer OTHER (Specify) .....
A6	What is your marital status?	SINGLE MARRIED WIDOW WIDOWER DIVORCED REFUSED TO ANSWER

A7	Do you have children?					Yes No ..... GO TO A8
A7.1	If yes, how many children do you have?					
A8	What is the size of your household?					
Description of the household members:						
A8	A8.1	A8.2	A8.3	A8.4	A8.5	
Number (size)	Relationship with the head of the hh ( from the oldest to the youngest)	Gender	Age (in completed years)	Main Occupation	Average monthly income (Kshs)	
	Hhd head		0–11		Below 5,000	
	Wife/husband/partner	1: Male	12–17		5,000–10,000	
	Father		18–25		10,001–15,000	
	Mother	2: Female	26–35		15,001–20,000	
	Son		36–54		20,001–25,000	
	Daughter		55+		25,001–30,000	
	Brother				30,001–35,000	
	Sister				35,001–40,000	
	Other relative				40,001 and above	
	Other (specify)				Dependent	
					Refused to answer	
					Don't know	
					Not applicable	
	Name	code				
1						
2						

3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						
A 9	<p>What is your current employment status?</p> <p>(Tick all that apply)</p>	<p>EMPLOYED (<i>formal</i>)</p> <p>EMPLOYED(<i>informal</i>)—casual worker</p> <p>SELF EMPLOYED (<i>technical</i>)</p> <p>SELF EMPLOYED (<i>business operator</i>)</p> <p>FARMER</p> <p>STUDENT</p> <p>OTHER (<i>specify</i>) .....</p>				
A 10	How much on average do you earn per month through ... (Kshs.)	1.	2.	3.	98.	
		Formal employment	Informal employment	Donations / assistance from others	Others (Specify) ..... .....	
SECTION B: AWARENESS ON CONFLICT SITUATION IN AREA						
B1	Where were you living in the following time periods?					

	Period	Place of residence by given time period				
	1	Immediately after the December 2007 general elections				
	2	After August 2010 Referendum				
	3	Just before and during the March 2013 general election				
	4	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)				
B2	Was there conflict in this area in the given time periods?		1	2	3	4
	1. Yes  2. No ..... GO TO B7  90. Don't know ... GO TO B7		Immediately after 2007 general elections	After 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the 2013 general election	After the 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
B3	What was the level of conflict in this area in the given time periods?					
	Period		Conflict level			

	Enumerator to use a show card for the different conflict levels		None	Low	Moderate	High
				Where	Where	Where
				Low = small number of people involved; Short duration; Minimal disruption to everyday life	Moderate = Medium number of people involved; Periodic duration; Some disruption to everyday community life	High = Large numbers of people involved; Chronic or sustained duration; Major disruption to everyday life
	1	Immediately after 2007 general elections				
	2	After 2010 Referendum				
	3	Just before and during the 2013 general election				
	4	After the 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)				
B4	<p>If yes in B2,</p> <p>What was the conflict about?</p> <p>(Enumerator to enter all answers given)</p>			<p>Land and resources</p> <p>Political manipulation</p> <p>Ethnic violence</p> <p>Cattle raids</p> <p>Disputed election results</p> <p>Disputed boundaries</p> <p>Lack of economic opportunity</p> <p>Other (specify)</p>		

B5a	<p><i>If yes in B2,</i></p> <p>Has your household been affected in any way?</p>	<p>Yes</p> <p>No ..... GO TO B6</p>		
B5b	<p>How was household affected?</p> <p><i>(Enumerator to circle answers given or add other)</i></p>	<p>1. Lost a family member</p> <p>2. Lost property: land, building, business, etc.</p> <p>Lost income</p> <p>Lost my job</p> <p>Sexual or gender based violence</p> <p>Family disintegration</p> <p>My children stopped going to school</p> <p>Had to relocate to a new location</p> <p>98. Other (specify) .....</p>		
		B4	B5a	B5b
	Time period	<p><i>If yes in B2,</i></p> <p>What was the conflict about?</p>	<p><i>If yes in B2,</i></p> <p>Was your household affected in any way?</p>	<p><i>If yes in B5a,</i></p> <p>How was your household affected?</p>
	Immediately after December 2007 general elections			
	After August 2010 Referendum			
	Just before and during the March 2013 general election			

	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)					
Statement			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
B6	Was there less conflict in this area in the given time period than before?  Yes  No ..... GO TO B7  Don't know ... GO TO B7					
B6.1		1				
		2				
		3				
B7	Do/ did you foresee the possibility of future conflict in this area?  Yes  No ..... GO TO B8					
B7.1		1				
		2				



	What do/ did you think would cause the future conflict?	3				
		4				
	Land and resources Political manipulation ethnic violence cattle raids Disputed election results Disputed boundaries Lack of economic opportunity Other (specify)	5				

## STATEMENTS ON ATTITUDE, BEHAVIOR AND RELATIONSHIPS

On a scale of 1 to 5

Where 1 = Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3= Undecided, 4=Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree,

Would you agree or disagree with the following statements, as applicable in given time periods?

Statement	Time period			
	1	2	3	4
	Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)

B 8	There is/was a cordial relationship between the various ethnic communities in this area.				
B 9	I appreciate(d) the value of peace.				
<p>On a scale of 1 to 5</p> <p>Where 1 = Never, 2=Not likely, 3= Undecided/neutral, 4=likely, and 5 = Very likely,</p> <p>How likely are/were you to undertake the following activity in the given time periods?</p>					
B 1 0	Statement	Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	Discuss conflict issues with a member from a different ethnic community living in this area?				
<p>On a scale of 1 to 5</p> <p>Where 1 = Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3= Undecided, 4=Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree,</p> <p>Would you agree or disagree with the following statements, as applicable in given time periods</p>					
Statements		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
B 1 1	Any ethnic group can live in this area				

B 1 2	I am my ethnic group first and a Kenyan second				
B 1 3	Violence is justified to advance political goals				

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
B14	<p>On a scale of 1 to 4 where</p> <p>Poor</p> <p>Neutral (neither good or bad)</p> <p>Cordial</p> <p>Very Cordial</p> <p>How would you rate the quality relationships amongst the various ethnic communities living in this area?</p>				

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
B15	<p>On a scale of 1 to 5 where</p> <p>Very unfair</p> <p>Not fair</p> <p>Neutral</p> <p>Fair</p> <p>Very fair</p> <p>How would you rate the sharing of resources (e.g. land, water, markets etc.) amongst the various ethnic communities living in this area?</p>				
<p>On a scale of 1 to 5</p> <p>Where 1 = Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3= Undecided, 4=Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree,</p> <p>Would you agree or disagree with the following statement, as applicable in given time periods</p>					
B16	Statement	Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	I will report potential for conflict				

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
B I 6. I	If agree or strongly agree,          Who would you report to?	DPC/Peace Committee	DPC/Peace Committee	DPC/Peace Committee	DPC/Peace Committee
		Media	Media	Media	Media
		SMS/hotline	SMS/hotline	SMS/hotline	SMS/hotline
		Early warning mechanism	Early warning mechanism	Early warning mechanism	Early warning mechanism
		CSO	CSO	CSO	CSO
		Neighbour	Neighbour	Neighbour	Neighbour
		Community Elders	Community Elders	Community Elders	Community Elders
		Local government	Local government	Local government	Local government
		Security services	Security services	Security services	Security services
		Religious leaders	Religious leaders	Religious leaders	Religious leaders
		Other (specify) ...	Other (specify) ...	Other (specify) ...	Other (specify) ...

## SECTION C. ACTIVITIES AND ACTORS IN PEACEBUILDING

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
CI	<p>Are you aware of any activities to reduce or prevent conflict that are/were being undertaken by anyone in this community?</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>No ..... <i>GO TO C10</i></p>				

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
CI.I	<p><i>If yes in CI,</i></p> <p>What are/were these activities?</p> <p>Early Warning, Early Response</p> <p>Rehabilitation of militias</p> <p>Livelihoods, education, building, etc. projects undertaken across different ethnic groups to support coexistence</p> <p>Hate speech monitoring</p> <p>Peace monitors</p> <p>Peace journalism, engagement with the media and SMS</p> <p>Community Dialog and reconciliation</p> <p>Cross-cultural events—e.g., sports, road shows, music</p> <p>Training and capacity building for peace</p> <p>Supporting peace structures (committees and DPCs)</p> <p>Other (specify)</p>				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
CI.2	Of the mentioned peacebuilding activities in CI.1 which are/were the most effective in your opinion (maximum three)?	1				
		2				
		3				
	87. None					
CI.2.1	<p>For the first one, why do you say so?</p> <p>For the second one, why did you say so,</p> <p>For the third one, why did you say so</p>	1				
		2				
		3				
CI.3	Of the mentioned peacebuilding activities in CI.1, which ones are/were the least effective (maximum three)?	1				
		2				



			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	87. None	3				
C1.3.I	Why do you say so?	1				
		2				
		3				
C1.4	Have you participated in any way in these activities ( <i>in C1.1</i> )?  Yes  No ..... <i>GO TO C2</i>					
C1.4.I	<i>If yes in C1.4</i>	1				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	In which activities have you participated?	2				
		3				
		4				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	<p>Early Warning, Early Response</p> <p>Rehabilitation of militias</p> <p>Livelihoods, education, building, etc projects undertaken across different ethnic groups to support coexistence</p> <p>Hate speech monitoring</p> <p>Peace monitoring and SMS</p> <p>Peace journalism</p> <p>Community Dialog and reconciliation</p> <p>Cross-cultural events e.g. sports, road shows, music etc.</p> <p>Training and capacity building for peace</p> <p>Supporting peace structures (committees and DPCs)</p> <p>Other (specify)...</p> <p><i>Please enter all that apply</i></p>	5				

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
C2	Do/did any of the activities you are aware of (in C1.1) address the causes of conflict?  Yes  No ..... GO TO C3  Don't know ... GO TO C3				
C2.1	If yes in C2,  Which ones?				
C3	How have these activities in C1.1 played any role in positively changing your attitudes toward other ethnic groups in this area?  Not at all  Slightly  A lot  A great deal				
C4	Have these activities in C1.1 played any role in changing your behavior toward other ethnic groups in this area?  Yes  No ..... GO TO C5				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
C4.1	If yes in C4,	1				
	What are/were these changes in behavior that you have individually experienced?	2				
		3				
	Participating in others' cultural	4				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	celebrations  Going to the same markets  Participating in common recreation or sports  Sharing common resources amicably  Engaging in joint business activities  Recognition of a common dispute resolution mechanisms  OTHER (SPECIFY) ...	5				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
C5	Have these activities in C1.1 played any role in positively changing your community's attitudes toward other ethnic groups in this area?	Not at all Slightly A lot A great deal				
C6	Have these activities in C1.1 played any role in changing your community's behavior toward other ethnic groups in this area?	Yes No ..... GO TO C7				
C6.1	If yes in C6,	1				
	What are/were these changes in behavior in your community that you have observed?	2				
		3				
	Intercommunity and	4				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	<p>intracommunity peace</p> <p>2. Stronger belief in inter- and intra-community harmony</p> <p>3. Reconciliation with other communities (peace pacts etc.)</p> <p>4. Increased sense of security</p> <p>5. Security of property ownership (including land)</p> <p>6. Inclination to violence</p> <p>8. Increased tensions between/among communities</p> <p>98. OTHER (SPECIFY) ...</p>	5				
C7	What else could be/have been done in order to address the causes of the conflict in this area?	1				
		2				



			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	Undertake land reform	3				
	Fast track security sector reform	4				
	Resettle IDPs	5				
	Provide safe housing					
	Create jobs					
	Facilitate peacebuilding, Cohesion and Reconciliation activities					
	Enhance access to justice (courts of law)					
	Improve inter-religious tolerance	5				
	Don't know					
	Other (specify) ....					

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
C8	<p>Suppose the activities mentioned above (<i>in Cl.1</i>) were to end today, do you think the peace situation would deteriorate?</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>No</p> <p>Don't know</p>				
C9	<p>Suppose CSOs were to stop their conflict prevention and reduction activities in the area today, do you see the activities being carried forward by the community members?</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>No</p> <p><i>Please justify your answer</i></p>				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
C9.1	If yes, why do you say so?	1				
		2				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
		3				
		4				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
		5				
C9.2	If no, why do you say so?	1				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
		2				
		3				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
		4				
		5				
C10	Have you contributed resources (e.g. transport, food, money etc.) in support of peacebuilding in this area?  Yes  No					

		Time period				
		1	2	3	4	
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)	
C11	<p>Have members of your community contributed resources (e.g. transport, food, money etc.) in support of peacebuilding in this area?</p> <p>Yes</p> <p>No</p> <p>Don't know</p>					
C12	Have/had you heard of any of the following CSOs, within the given time periods?					
	1. Yes      2. No ..... GO TO C13					
	1	PACT/Kenya Civil Society Strengthening Program (KCSSP)				
	2	Mercy Corps/Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace (LEAP II)				
	3	CHF International/Kenya Tuna Uwezo				
	4	International Rescue Committee/Peace Initiative Kenya (PIK)				
	5	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)/People to People Peace Project (3Ps)				



			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	6	Internews/Reporting for Peace, and Land and Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Kenya				
C12.1	<i>If yes in C12,</i>  Which ones are/were active in this area?  PACT  Mercy Corps  CHF International  International Rescue Committee  Catholic Relief Services (CRS)  Internews  None ..... <i>GO TO C14</i>  Don't know ... <i>GO TO C14</i>  <i>Enter all that apply</i>	1				
		2				
		3				
		4				
		5				
		6				
C13	Which (other) CSOs are/have been active in peacebuilding activities in this area, over the given time periods?   <i>List all mentioned here then enter</i>	1				
		2				
		3				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	by year as appropriate	4				
	1.	5				
	2.	6				
	3.	7				
	4.	8				
	5.	9				
	6.	10				
	7.					
	8.					
	9.					
	10.					
	90. None					
<p>How much do you agree with the following statement, as applicable in the given time period?</p> <p>Totally disagree with statement</p> <p>Disagree</p> <p>Undecided</p> <p>Agree</p> <p>Totally agree with the statement</p>						
C I	Statement	Time period				

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
4		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	The activities by CSOs in general have contributed to peaceful co-existence amongst the various communities in this area				

*Thank you very much for your cooperation and participation in the survey.*

**END**

#### ANNEX IV: Profile of team members

##### Team Leader, Simon Richards

Simon Richards has over 20 years' experience managing social development and humanitarian programs for diverse international organizations across Africa, Asia and the Pacific. Richards is a seasoned conflict specialist with expertise in conflict assessment, analysis, prevention, management, training, reduction and peacebuilding. Over the past two decades his technical work has focused particularly on the areas of: conflict management stabilization and peacebuilding through programming and the provision of technical and strategic advice to all parties including the extractive industry, International and National NGOs and governments. He brings substantive experience in civil society strengthening, governance, institutional development, strategic and community development, capacity building and NGO training, monitoring and evaluation, as well as personnel management for large international development projects. He holds a Master of Science in Development Studies from Deakin University.

##### Senior Conflict Specialist /Team Member, Sarah Bayne

Sarah Bayne has over twelve years of experience in the fields of peacebuilding and conflict-sensitive development, engagement in fragile states and armed violence reduction with a particular emphasis on EU external policy. She combines experience of working for donors and non-governmental organizations in Europe and Africa with a strong track record in providing high quality consultancy services. Sarah's past clients have included: DFID, European Commission, Sida, UNDP, European Center for Development Policy Management (ECDPM), Department for Peace Studies - Bradford University, Saferworld, OECD DAC, Norwegian Refugee Council and CARE International. Further, she has expertise in applied and policy research; conflict assessments; advocacy and communications; program reviews and evaluation. She has field experience in Kenya, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia. Sarah holds a Master of Science Degree in International and European Politics from Edinburgh University.

##### Conflict Specialist/Team Member, Daniel Kiptugen

Daniel Kiptugen is a highly qualified conflict specialist with over 23 years of experience, knowledge and skills in program management and community development work and extensive expertise in conflict sensitive development, peacebuilding and conflict management. Daniel has worked closely with government ministries, INGOs, CBOs and communities in Kenya and Horn of Africa region. Until May 2013, Daniel was the Head of Kenya and Horn of Africa Program at Saferworld Kenya, an independent international organization working to prevent violent conflict and build safer lives. While at Saferworld, he facilitated and oversaw a number of initiatives at the regional and country level. Daniel has been a member of the Kenya Country Conflict Early Warning Response unit at the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding. Most recently, Daniel provided an oversight role in the DFID Kenya supported Saferworld's Election Security Project and also played a key advisory role in the USALAMA led project that is pushing for positive security service reforms. In December 2012, he was awarded with the Head of State Commendation for his dedicated service to the Kenyan people with a special focus on his conflict management, peace and development work.

##### Technical Advisor, Conflict Mitigation Theory-of-Change Advisor, Terrence Lyons

Terrence Lyons is a world-renowned conflict prevention, mitigation and response specialist whose professional career has focused on conflict resolution in Africa, with particular attention to the Horn of Africa. Lyons has consulted for the U.S. government, World Bank, United Nations, International Crisis Group, Freedom House, Global Integrity, Council on Foreign Relations, Carnegie Corporation of New York, National Democratic Institute, and other government and non-governmental organizations on issues relating to conflict and democratization. Currently, he is Associate Professor in the School for

Conflict Analysis and Resolution at George Mason University in Arlington, Virginia. Lyons is also Co-Director of the Center for Global Studies at George Mason University and Senior Associate and Co-Chair of the Ethiopia Policy Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. Additionally, Lyons lectures as a Visiting Professor at the Center for Human Rights at Addis Ababa University in Ethiopia. Lyons is a frequent Lecturer at the Rift Valley Institute having taught courses on the Horn of Africa in Mombasa, Kenya (June 2012), Lamu, Kenya (June 2009), and Djibouti (October 2008). In February 2007, he served as a resource person and panelist at the United Nations Peacebuilding Commission Working Group at the Sierra Leone meeting on Elections.

#### Conflict Specialist/Team Member - Winnie Wambua

Ms Winnie Wambua is mature development professional with more than 8 years of experience in the areas of governance, democracy, human rights, voter and civic education, election capacity, national cohesion, peacebuilding and conflict transformation with excellent analytical, conceptual and strategic thinking, writing skills for research, proposals, reports as well as communication purposes. She has extensive experience and proven expertise in capacity and institutional development; multi-stakeholder facilitation;; project management; planning, monitoring, Evaluation and Learning; grant management, quantitative and qualitative research, and financial management including budgeting and tracking, logical framework planning among others. She has broad experience in both government and non-governmental organizations.

#### Conflict Specialist/Team Member - Manasseh Wepundi

Manasseh Wepundi has over 10 years' experience in the peace and security sector in Eastern Africa. Most of his focus has been on human security research including focus on conflict assessments, small arms dynamics, application of conflict sensitive methodologies, crime research, and the evaluation of peacebuilding interventions. He has worked with the Small Arms Survey, Geneva in small arms research; UNDP-Kenya (as a monitoring and evaluation specialist), besides consulting for different government and non-governmental organizations in peacebuilding issues. He has several publications to his name including special reports, manuals, situation reports and policy briefs. He holds a Master of Arts Degree in International Studies.

## ANNEX V: Roles and Responsibilities

Team Member	Roles and Responsibilities
Simon Richards Team Leader Level of Effort (LOE) 54 Days	Overall Responsibility Conduct Methodology Design Conduct KII Interviews Conduct GD Interviews Desk Review Analysis Overall Report Writing
Terrence Lyons Technical Lead LOE 20 Days	Technical Input Methodology Design Conduct Desk Review Analysis Ensure Best practice Academic References and Input Oversight on Report and Quality of evidence
Daniel Kiptugen Team Member LOE 49 Days	Methodology Design Conduct KII Interviews Conduct GD Interviews Conduct Desk Review Conduct Analysis Section Report Writing Cross-cutting oversight Conflict sensitivity

<p>Sarah Bayne</p> <p>Team Member</p> <p>LOE 51 days</p>	<p>Methodology Design</p> <p>Conduct KII Interviews</p> <p>Conduct GD Interviews—women's team</p> <p>Desk Review</p> <p>Analysis</p> <p>Section Report Writing</p> <p>Cross-cutting oversight Gender</p>
<p>Manasseh Wepundi</p> <p>Team Member</p> <p>LOE 49 days</p>	<p>Methodology Design</p> <p>Cross-cutting oversight Survey</p> <p>Conduct KII Interviews</p> <p>Conduct GD Interviews</p> <p>Conduct Desk Review</p> <p>Section Report Writing</p>
<p>Winnie Wambua</p> <p>Team Member</p> <p>LOE 49 days</p>	<p>Methodology Design</p> <p>Conduct KII Interviews</p> <p>Conduct GD Interviews—women's team</p> <p>Conduct Desk Review</p> <p>Section Report Writing</p>

ANNEX VI: Key informant interviews (initial draft)

Name	Title/Position	Institution	Covering Theories of Change
Dr Kibunjia	Former Chairman	NOIC	1,4,5,6,8,9,10
Alice Nderitu	Commissioner	NOIC	1,4,5,6,8,9,10
Hassan Sheik Mohammed	Ex Secretary	NOIC	1,4,5,6,8,9,10
Guyo Liban	HOD Reconciliation	NOIC	
SK Maina		NEC	1,4,5,6,8,9,10
Magotsi		NEC	1,4,5,6,8,9,10
Peter Mwamachi	Situation Room	NEC	1,4,5,6,8,9,10
Steve Kiriimi	CEO	Peacenet	1,2,3,4,,5,6,7,8,9,10
Stephen Kadenyo	Manager	Peacenet	1,2,3,4,,5,6,7,8,9,10
David Kimaiyo	Inspector-General	Kenya Police Service	1,4,6,9
Mutea Iringo	Principal Secretary	Internal Security	1,4,6,9
Susy Ibutu	Director Programs	NOCK	1,4,6,10
Adan Wachu	Chair	SUPKEM	1,4,6,10
Latif Shaban	Secretary	Supreme Council of Muslim	1,4,5,6,8,9,10
Abbas Gullet	Secretary of General	Kenya Red Cross	1,3,4,5,6,7,8,
Daudi Were	ihub	Ushahidi	4,6,
Rachael Brown	CEO	Sisi Ni Amani	4,6
Irene Tulei		Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission	1,
Linus Onyango	(IEBC	Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission	1,
Kawive Wambua	Director	CRECO	
Lucy Ndungu	Coordinator	Partnership for Peace and Security	1,4,5,6,8,9,10
Victor Bwire	Dep CEO	Media Council	4,6
Dominic Ruto		UNDP/Drought Monitoring Authority	1,2,3,4,,5,6,7,8,9,10
Dr Roba Sharamo	Team Leader	UNDP	1,2,3,4,,5,6,7,8,9,10
Dan Spealman		USAID	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Monica Azimi		USAID	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Sam Kona		USAID	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Bett Mugo		USAID	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
John Langlois		OTI/USAID	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
?? MaKena		USAID	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Karen Freeman	Mission Director	USAID	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Jebiwot Sumbelywo	C&P	IRC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Kassie		Ex Pact	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Maurice Amolo		Mercy Corps	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Celine Korir		O-F	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Grace Ndungu		CP6	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
		Internews	4,6,9
Betty Maina	CEO	KEPSA (Private Sector)	1,2,3,4
Camilla Sugden		Dfid	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
		EU	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Njeri Karuru	Senior Program Officer	IDRC	Future
Houghton Irungu		Steering Committee for Concerned Kenyans for Peace, Ex pan	Future
Mugo Kibati	Director General	Vision 2030	Future
Ernest Munyi		Regional Commissioner for Coast	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Warfa Hassan		Regional Commissioner for Rift Valley	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Juma Assiogo	Coordinator	Global Network on Safer Cities	Future
Patrick Ochieng	Director	KNFP on Small Arms	uture
Florence Mpaayei	EX - CEO	NPI	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Kentice Tikolo	Chair	Public Relations Society of Kenya	1,2,3,4, Future
Otieno Ombok	Freelancer	Peace Campaigner	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Dr. Ekuru Aukot	Director Committee of Experts	Constitutional Review	Future
Kennedy Masime	Chair	Election Observers Group (ELOG, CEO CDG	Future



	<b>COAST Region</b>		
Nelson Marwa	County Commissioner Mombasa	Provincial Administration	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Evans Achoki	County Commissioner Kwale		1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Maalim Mohamed	County Commissioner Kilifi		1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Patrick Ochieng	Ujamaa Centre		1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Phylis Muema	CEO	KEOCOSCE	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Suleiman	Coordinator	PeaceNet Coast Region	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Rahma	CEO	Muhuri	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Jane Jilani	Coordinator	NCKK	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Sheikh Dor	Chair	CPK	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Rev. Fr. Lagho	Chair	CCC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Rev. Anyenda	CEO	CCC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Phelix Lore		Haki Zetu Centre	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
	<b>NAKURU/Naivasha</b>		
Apollos Machira	CEO	CCR	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Ngetich	Program	NCKK	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Father Waweru	Coordinator	CPC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Kinuthia Mbugua	Governor	Nakuru County	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Odour	County Commander -Police	Nakuru County	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Hillary Korir	Director	Caritas	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Mary Achieng' Oyath	Project Officer	CPC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Mr. J Kavita	District Commissioner	Molo District	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Mr. Silas G. Gatobu	District Commissioner	Kuresoi District	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Agnes Mwamburi	CEO	DGP	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Mohamed Birik	County Commissioner	Nakuru	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Dr. Wanguru	Peace Monitor	Nakuru County	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Mama Rijab	DPC	Banita Settlement	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
	<b>ELDORET</b>		
Cornelius Korir	Bishop	Catholic Diocese of Eldoret	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Rtd. Major Seii	Chair	Kalenjin Council of Elders	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
	Chair	Kikuyu Council of Elders	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Rev. Fr. George Okoth	Director	Caritas	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Samuel Kosgei	Project Officer	CPC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Florence Njeri	Community Mobilizer	CJPC Tarakwa	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Abdi Hassan	Uasingishu County Commissioner	Eldoret West	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
	<b>BUNGOMA/MT. ELGON</b>		
Albanus Muga	Coordinator	CPC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Emmanuel Were	Program Officer	CBO - Against Torture	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Francis Mauryaw	Chair	Community Policing	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Lazarus Pepea	Peace Data Analyst	NBC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Jackline Wamalwa	Women/Gender	CPC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Edwin Kilong	County Peace Monitor	NBC	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Kenneth Lusaka	Governor	Bungoma County	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
	<b>Nairobi Region</b>		
John Elungata	District Commissioner	Langata District	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
George Natembeya	District Commissioner	Kiambu	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Mary Moi	DPC Chair	Mathare	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Nyabuto Omache	Chief	Korogocho	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Alfonse Abong'o	Cohesion Champions	Change Agents (Mathare)	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Rose Mbone	Cohesion Champions	Korogocho	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Nicera Wanjiku	CBO	Young Women Initiatives ( Kibera)	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Peter Mwangi	CBO	Miss Koch (Korogocho Baba Ndogo)	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Joseph Opiyo	CBO	Umbrella Youth Group (Kiambu)	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Father Webotsa	Catholic Priest	Korogocho	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10
Dr. Evans Kidero	Governor/Dep.	Nairobi	1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10

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## ANNEX F. LIST OF KEY-INFORMANT INTERVIEWS

ORGANIZATION	NAME	POSITION
ACK	Reverend Maritim Rirei	Coordinator
Active Youth Alliance	Daniel Saya	Coordinator
Administration Police—Peace Cops	Inspector Justice Kimele	Sub-Unit
	Inspector Patricia Buore	
Africa Sports and Talents Empowerment Program	Timothy Lusaza	Program Coordinator
Anglican Church of Kenya	Rev Marituri Rirei	Program Coordinator
Baptist Church and Kalenjin Council of Elders Nakuru	Rev Peter Chembwaset	Elder
Catholic Church	Bishop Korir	Bishop
Center for Community Dialog and Development	David Busienei	Secretary General
CEPAD	Andrew Ole Koisamu	Project Coordinator
Changamwe OCPD	Superintendent Muthee	OCPD
CHF	Selline Korir	Chief of Party
CICC	Sheik Ghazi,	Board Member
	Esther Kaleli	Project Office
	Gloria Likhoti	Project Officer
	Precious Dama	Project Officer
	Livingstone Nyado	Project Officer
CJPC	Fr Samuel Waweru	Program Coordinator
CJPC Eldoret	Samuel Kosgei	Project Officer
	James Kimisoi	Program Coordinator
Community Initiatives for Social Equity	Kamau Ng'ang'a - Waithera	Programme Coordinator
		Vice Deputy Chair Partnership for Peace
Council of Kalenjin and Kalenjin-related Elders	Major John Seii	Chairman Emeritus
	David Kalessi	Chairman of Peace Committee and Member of Council of Elders
Council of Kikuyu Elders	Albert Githuka	Coordinator
	Rev'd Sammy Mbugua	Chairman
CRS	Grace Ndugu,	Program manager;
	Charles Ndegaiou	M&E coordinator
DFID Kenya	Camilla Sugden	Conflict Advisor
DPC Changamwe	David Mobogo	Chairman
DPC Committee Bungoma South	Fleria Mutenyo Mukhola	Chairperson
DPC Nakuru North	Rev Boniface Gitanga Mwaura	Chairman


Gospel Churches of Kenya		
DPC Solai Division	Kijoh Ali Juma	Vice Chair
Drought Management Authority	Dominic Ruto	Program Coordinator
Fida	Cynthia Onyango	CEO
GAIN	Adan Kabelle	Director
Gender Based Violence Network	Trizer Musya	Peace Monitor
Haki Zetu	Phelix Lore	CEO
Human Rights Agenda	Eric Karisa Mgoja	Project Officer
ICG	Cedric Barnes	Horn of Africa Project Director
	Bryan Kahumbura	Kenya Researcher
Independent Consultant	Joseph Riwongole	Independent Consultant
Initiative for Peace and Security Devolution Seminar	Lucy Ndung'u	Project coordinator
Integrated Development Toward Guided Parenthood	Agnes Mwamburi	CEO
	Brice Rimbaud,	Program Director
Internews	Ida Jooste,	Chief of Party
	Tolle Nyata	Senior Journalism Trainer
IRC	Jebiwot Sumbeiywo	Chief of Party - PIK
Kasauni PCPD	Superintendent Julius Wanjohi	OCPD
Kenya Community Support Center	Phyllis Muema	Executive Director
Kituo Che Sheria	Muselino Waitaka Thuku	Heading Advocacy, Govenance and Community Partnerships—AGCP
CJPC		
Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung ...	Jane Murutu	Project Co-ordinator
Kwale County Local Authorities	Evans Achoki	County Commissioner
Marithiano	James Chacha	Executive Member
	Nelson Kuria	Executive Member
	Leah Chelagat	Executive Member
	Simon Njuguna	Program Coordinator
Media Consultant	Njuguna Matonyo	Consultant
Mid-Rift Human Rights Organization	Joseph Omondi	CEO
Mombasa sub-county DPC	Feisal Bahero	Chairman
MRC	Randu Nzai Ruwa	Secretary General
	Richard Lewa	Deputy Spokesman
	James Melimbi Mwatshau	Assistant Secretary Elders Council
	Omar Faraj	Assistant Coordinator




MRC ex militia Kwale	Nasoro Suleiman Shibe	Community Action member
Muhuri	Francis Auma	Program Officer
Mwatikho Torture Survivors Organization	Emmanuel Were	Advocacy Officer
Naivasha ACK Peace Initiative Group	Danson King Wanyike	ACK
Naivasha Green Grassroots Action	Dominic Mwangi	Community Mobiliser
Nakuru County NSIS	Superintendent Charles Mwaizinga	Superintendent
National Steering Committee	Dickson Magotsi	Senior Programme Manager
National Steering Committee	Dr Solomon Wanguru	NSC Peace Monitor
NCKK	Ronoh Dennis	Field Officer
OCPD	Nicholas Maina	Superintendent
OTI	John Langlois	OTI Country Representative
OTI	Galeeb Kachra	OTI Deputy Country Representative
PACT	Lynette Ochola,	Chief of Party, Project Officer
	Laura Chao,	Vice President of East and West Africa
	Katie Schwarm	
Peacenet	Sultan Suleiman	Regional Coordinator
Peacenet	Stephen Kirimi	CEO
Peacenet – Eldoret	Wesley Chebii	Chairman
Police	David Kamaiyo	Inspector General
Politician	Mwakio Ndau	Independent
Provincial Peace Forum	Felix Kisalu	Coordinator
PRSK	Kentice Tikolo	Chair
Radio Armani	Wakio Mbogho Ochieng	Journalist / News Editor
Rift Valley Peace Forum	Col. Rtd Dickson Swegenyi	Peace data analyst
Rift Valley Region	Hassan Farah	Regional Commissioner
Rural Women Peace Link	Mary Lagat Chepwony	CEO
Saferworld	James Ndung'u	Kenya Projects Manager
Sauti Wanawake Pwani	Violet Muthiga	Coordinator
	Naima Achieng	Volunteer
Sayare Radio	Alex M'Nera	Editor
Sisi ni Amani	Rachel Brown	CEO
State Political Section	Mike Kelleher	Political Adviser
Ste Cecilia Koiluget Secondary School, Burnt Forest	Mr Kosgei Lagat	Headmaster
Supreme Council of Muslims	Usted Ali	Member
Supreme Council Of Muslims	Latiff Shaban	Director General
The People Daily Newspaper	Winstone Chiseremi	Journalist

Uasin Gishu County	Christopher Wanjau	Deputy County Commissioner
UN Women	Lazarus Pepela	Peace and Gender Data Analyst
UNDP Kenya	Roba Sheramo	Team Leader
USAID	Betty Mugo	AOR IRC
USAID	Pamela Wesonga	Education and Youth
	Rosemary Wanjala	
USAID	Monica Azimi	DRG
USAID	Karen Freeman	Mission Director
USAID	Anne Ngumbi	AOR DRG
USAID	John Smith-Sreen	Director Democracy and Governance Office
Usalama	Phillip Ochieng	Project coordinator
Ushahidi	Daudi Were	
Vision 2030 Secretariat	Jonathan Lodompui	Agriculture Director
Yijuna Umoja Pamoja Foundation	Diphus Kiprop NG'eny	CEO

## ANNEX G. SELECTED SURVEY DATA



## ANNEX H. BUILDING PEACE—JEAN-PAUL LEDERACH



Source: John Paul Lederach, *Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1997), p. 80.

## ANNEX I.TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY

### *The nature of grants*

110 grants (from a total of 306 under KCSSP) were disbursed through the mechanism with the only apparent common feature being the short-term nature of the activity. The majority of grants (97/110) took place over a period of three months or less. A wide range of different types of grant activity was funded, as evidenced by the KCSSP list of grants,<sup>\*</sup> which *appear* to reflect flexibility and program innovation. It is difficult, however, to grasp the full nature of the grants as descriptions in the list of grants are confusing and often project titles do not appear to accurately reflect the types of activity described. In the light of this opacity it may also be worth analyzing the extent and balance to which grants have been:

- Opportunistic *versus* Strategic and simultaneously opportunistic
  - Rapid Response ‘one-off’ grants *versus* being linked to follow-up or longer term grants
- Scale or number of beneficiaries *versus* Impact
- Piloting *versus* Scaling up of innovation
- Geographic Grant Distribution and Focus *versus* Geographic Civil Society capacity (as opposed to say being a reflection of needs). An approximate tally suggests that grants were disbursed as follows; 26 coast, 22 national, 20 Nairobi, 19 Rift, 23 ‘Other’.<sup>†</sup>

These findings suggest while responsive in nature, TOOs could have been used to contribute more purposefully to the national picture with respect to conflict and election stability

### *The speed of disbursement*

The evidence on speed is contradictory with Pact produced evidence suggesting rapid turnaround for disbursements (e.g. emails showing dates of grant application, approvals from USAID, and fund disbursement over a few days), and described grant-supporting field processes of two days confirmed by reports from grantees (2/2) in the field. Nevertheless other local partners interviewed (4/7) suggested that it took 3-4 weeks. One key informant considered that if the grant process had only taken a few days it would have saved a life. Partners (3/7) also noted that if you did not have internal funds then you had to wait for monies to arrive in your bank account before undertaking the activity.

These findings suggest that had there been significant violence the mechanism may not have been able to respond fast enough.

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<sup>\*</sup>KCSSP Thumbnails.

<sup>†</sup>This is approximate because a variety of areas may be covered by one grant, or the extent of coverage is unclear.

## ANNEX J. PEACE MESSAGING ‘GAP MAP’

	Kibera	Korogoch o	Mombasa	Kwale	Kilifi	Bungoma	Molo	Kursesoi	Nakuru	Naivahsa
Uiano (NSC), CBO/ NGO led or supported messaging (including youth groups and women's groups)										
Door to door campaigns										
Caravans theatre/ Cinema shows/ public preaching / sports events										
T Shirts, head gear, wrist bands etc.										
Posters, banners and flags, billboards										
TV and radio messages, newspapers (shows etc.)										
SMS blasts and/ or social media										
Boda boda / Matatu operators										
Private sector										

	Kiberia	Korogoch o	Mombasa	Kwale	Kilifi	Bungoma	Molo	Kursesoi	Nakuru	Naivahsa
Bill boards										
Preaching peace										
Political leaders preaching peace (e.g. encouraging people to be calm ahead of the election in awaiting results, and in accepting the results)										
Political leaders (via media, SMS, preaching)										
Administration led										
Chiefs / leaders (barazas, door to door campaigns)										
Religious leaders										
Religious leaders										

## **ANNEX K. RSA FIELDWORK REPORT**

# **FIELDWORK REPORT**

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**Evaluation Survey on Contribution of Various  
Stakeholders in Peacebuilding - Kenya**

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**by**

**Research Solutions Africa (RSA) Ltd**

***November 2013***



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### *Executive summary*

This report gives an overview of how the primary data was collected in the quantitative component of the ***Evaluation Survey on Contribution of Various Stakeholders in Peacebuilding in Kenya***, in the period between 11<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> October 2013. It outlines the methodology used during the data collection, the teams involved, the challenges encountered and how these were mitigated.

During the implementation of the fieldwork, a total of 33 enumerators were identified for the training, out of which 30 were finally selected to participate in the survey. Overall fieldwork supervision was provided by RSA field supervisor and the Project Manager.

By the end of the exercise, a total of six counties, 12 districts, 24 divisions, 48 locations and 48 sub-locations/villages in Kenya had been visited. The final output data shows that of the targeted 1,200 interviews, a total of 1,255 successful interviews were administered.

## Introduction

Research Solutions Africa was sub-contracted by MSI to undertake data collection and processing activities in ***the Evaluation Survey on Contribution of Various Stakeholders in Peacebuilding in Kenya***, under a project on the conflict mitigation, reconciliation and peacebuilding activities, implemented by the USAID/Kenya's Democracy, Rights and Governance Office (DRG) through a number of its local partners\*.

The survey was funded by USAID and strove to gather information from household respondents living in randomly selected districts in six counties of Kericho, Uasin Gishu, Mombasa, Nairobi, Nakuru and Nandi. It was aimed at informing the USAID/ Kenya DRG Office on what approaches in the project were most effective and sustainable. In particular the survey was to assess and provide answers to six key questions, i.e.: (a) In what ways did USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation *approaches* contribute to peace during the 2013 General Election? (b) To what extent had these identified *approaches* addressed root causes of conflict? (c) To what extent had attitudes and perceptions of individuals and communities changed toward peace and conflict in the targeted areas? (d) What components were likely to continue to influence conflict mitigation after program closure? (e) To what extent did USAID/Kenya strengthen civil society organizations', especially local partners' ability to implement and manage conflict mitigation programs? And (f) What key lessons and good practices could be identified for future USAID/Kenya conflict mitigation and civil society strengthening programming?

The findings of the were to inform USAID/ Kenya DRG Office's focus on its devolution as it continued to work with local civil society organization, in a way that was meaningful and cost effective.

This report describes how the quantitative data collection activities in the survey were implemented by RSA. It starts by giving a summary of the Setup Activities that were implemented before the commencement of fieldwork. These included Drafting, Translation and Programming of the Survey Questionnaire; Recruitment of Enumerators; Sampling; Enumerator Training, Piloting and Finalization of the Survey Questionnaire; and Selection of the Final Team of Data Collectors to engage during fieldwork. Section 2 is on actual Fieldwork. It describes how the Quantitative data collection component of the survey was implemented; the distribution of the various fieldwork teams, and the final outputs from the fieldwork. It is followed by Section 3 on the Survey Challenges, and how we handled and/or mitigated them, and the Conclusion in Section 4.

Included in the Annex are: the Enumerator Training Program; the List of Participants during the enumerator training; the Survey Household Questionnaire (English version only), and the Screener as used during the selection of target household respondents in the survey.

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\*Such partners included PACT, Mercy Corps, CHF International, International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Services, and Internews.

## Setup Activities

The set up activities in this survey included the drafting, designing and finalization of the survey questionnaire; translation of the final English-version questionnaire into Kiswahili and Kalenjin; programming of the survey questionnaires into the phones; sampling of the enumeration points per county; recruitment of the survey enumerators; enumerator training, piloting and finalization of the survey questionnaire; and selection of the final data collection team members in the survey.

Each of these activities is discussed below:

### Drafting, designing, and finalization of the survey questionnaire

We did prepare the initial draft of the survey questionnaire, and shared the same with the MSI project team for comments and possible improvements. By the time we had the final version of the survey questionnaire, we had drafted a total of 10 other versions, each incorporating the various comments and related inputs from the MSI survey team and USAID.

The English version of the final questionnaire is included with this report, as Annex IV.

### Translation of the survey questionnaire

We translated the final English version of the survey questionnaire into Kiswahili and Kalenjin, using the MAPI approach. A total of three independent translators took part in the translation of each of the local languages.

In the said approach, two independent translators who must not have seen the English version of the question before the translation process undertake forward translation from English into the target local language. Once this is done, the two then come together to compare their independent translations for any noted variations. They would discuss and agree on the most appropriate terms and/or phrases to use for all points of divergence, and in the process generate a harmonized final version of the forward translation. It is this harmonized version that would then be back-translated into English by the third translator who should not have seen the original English version of the questionnaire. Once this is done, the three translators meet to review and compare the back translation against the original English version of the questionnaire, and edit as appropriate any terms/phrases that might have been used wrongly leading to different interpretations as witnessed in the back translation. The review would be done on the harmonized forward translation. This would lead to the final version of the local language translation as discussed and resolved by the three independent translators. A senior project team member (project manager, field supervisor, etc) would chair each of the meetings to resolve points of divergence.

The need and choice of the local language translations was informed by our understanding and projection that some of the target household respondents in the target counties of Mombasa, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru, Nandi, Kericho, and Nairobi may not be able to effectively communicate in English during survey interviews. The enumerators were to verify the fluency of target respondents in any of the three survey languages, and then pick as appropriate the version that was most appropriate. Once a given language had been picked, the same was used throughout

the administration of the interview in question. All the three language versions of the questionnaire were programmed into the survey software as describe in Section 1.3 below.

We shared with the MSI team the final versions of the local language translations of the questionnaire.

Programming of the finalized survey questionnaire into the HHDs

We programmed into the survey software, each of the three language versions of the questionnaire, for subsequent use during data collection activities using the Huawei IDEOS and Samsung Android phones.

To confirm the accuracy and completeness of each of the soft-versions of the questionnaire we implemented several independent mock interviews using the phones to detect and correct as appropriate, any likely errors and/or issues that needed attention before the actual fieldwork.


We used 'Dooblo survey to go' software to undertake programming in the HHD-data collection approach.

Sampling

To undertake the general population survey of 1,200 respondents in the six target counties of Mombasa, Uasin Gishu, Nakuru, Nandi, Kericho and Nairobi we designed our approach such that overall, we needed to visit six counties, 12 districts, 24 divisions, 48 locations and 48 sub-locations/villages. To arrive at these figures, we planned to target two districts per county, two divisions per district, two locations per division, and one sub-location/village per location.

In the design, we targeted a total of 25 respondents per village/sub-location, hence 200 respondents per county.

Figure 1 below illustrates this stratified selection of sampling points per county.



**Figure 1:** *The proposed stratified sampling structure for the quantitative phase of the survey*

To implement this sampling design, we used a multi-faceted sampling approach involving both purposive and random sampling approaches, at three distinct levels, to determine the target enumeration areas (EAs), the target households per EA and the target respondents per household.

The sampling approach at each of these levels is described below:

Determination of the target enumeration areas

To determine the target EAs in the survey, we used both purposive and simple random sampling techniques.

Using the summary of projected number of project beneficiaries by partner organizations, as provided to us by the MSI project team, we purposively identified all the districts with relatively higher numbers of beneficiaries, to develop a list of districts from where to randomly select our target districts in the survey. We particularly ensured that the beneficiary numbers were read against the project activities as implemented by the six local partner organizations in the project: PACT, CHF, Mercy Corps, IRC, CRS and Internews. Once this had been done, we then randomly (simple random selection) selected two target districts for each of the six target counties in the survey. In each of such districts so selected, we again applied simple random

sampling technique to select two target divisions. We relied on the current listing of the administrative areas in Kenya as given by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS). Since an accurate listing of the administrative units in the said reference stopped at the divisional level, we pre-selected all our target sampling units up to this level.

Table I below gives the survey sample distribution up to the divisional level as described.

**Table I:** Sample distribution in the survey by each enumeration level

FINAL SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION IN THE MSI EVALUATION SURVEY - KENYA												
TEAM	COUNTY		DISTRICT			DIVISION			LOCATION		SUB-LOCATION	
	NAME	n	#	NAME	n	#	NAME	n	NAME	n	NAME	n
1	KERICHO	200	1	KERICHO	100	1	AINAMOI	50		25		25
										25		25
						2	BELGUT	50		25		25
										25		25
			2	KIPKELION	100	3	KIPKELION	50		25		25
										25		25
						4	CHEPSEON	50		25		25
										25		25
	SUB-TOTAL	200	2		200	4		200	8	200	8	200
2	NAKURU	200	1	NAKURU	100	1	MUNICIPALITY	50		25		25
										25		25
						2	LANET	50		25		25



									25		25	
			2	MOLO	100	3	MOLO	50		25		25
										25		25
						4	ELBURGON	50		25		25
										25		25
SUB-TOTAL		200	2		200	4		200	8	200	8	200
3	NANDI	200	1	NANDI NORTH	100	1	KIPKAREN	50		25		25
										25		25
						2	KABIYET	50		25		25
										25		25
			2	NANDI EAST	100	3	LESSOS	50		25		25
										25		25
						4	NANDI HILLS	50		25		25
										25		25
SUB-TOTAL		200	2		200	4		200	8	200	8	200
4	UASIN GISHU	200	1	WARENG	100	1	KESSES	50		25		25
										25		25
						2	KAPSERET	50		25		25
										25		25
			2	ELDORET	100	3	AINAPKOI	50		25		25

				EAST					25		25	
						4	MOIBEN	50		25	25	
									25		25	
	SUB-TOTAL	200	2		200	4		200	8	200	8	200
	NAIROBI	200		NAIROBI NORTH	100	1	KASARANI	50		25		25
								25		25		
						2	STAREHE	50		25		25
								25		25		
				NAIROBI EAST	100	3	MAKADARA	50		25		25
								25		25		
						4	EMBAKASSI	50		25		25
								25		25		
	SUB-TOTAL	200	2		200	4		200	8	200	8	200
5	MOMBASA	200	1	KISAUNI	100	1	KISAUNI	50		25		25
								25		25		
						2	ISLAND	50		25		25
								25		25		
			2	LIKONI	100	3	LIKONI	50		25		25
								25		25		
						4	LONGO	50		25		25

								25		25		
	SUBTOTAL	200	2		200	4		200	8	200	8	200
TOTAL		1200	12		1200	24		1200	48	1200	48	1200

The applicable target sampling points at the location and sublocation level were determined in the field, by the team leaders in consultation with the local administrators like village elders, assistant chiefs, chiefs, District Officers (Dos), etc. This was done during the courtesy calls by the team leaders to the respective officials during the visits by the survey teams to the respective administrative units, as appropriate.

Identification of the target households in the survey

The number of households to target in the survey was equal to the number of target respondents in the survey—that is, 1,200.

We employed systematic random sampling approach, and followed the left hand rule in our random walk pattern. The applicable skipping interval at each EA was determined by the team leaders at the EA level, based on the observable distribution of the target households.

Overall, the applicable skipping interval ranged from 1 to 10; EAs with a higher concentration of households had higher intervals, while those with low concentrations had low intervals.

See Table 2 below for the actual intervals used in each of the EAs in the survey.

The data collection team operated in sub-teams of 5 enumerators and one team leader. The team leader for each sub-team identified the starting point for the random walk by the sub-team enumerators per EA. Each such point had to be a landmark which was easily recognizable, e.g. a main road junction, a church, mosque, school gate, etc. The team leader also had to determine an appropriate skipping interval for the EA before the team commenced the walk pattern.

Once the team leader had determined the start point, the respective enumerators walked in a ‘+’ pattern so that two members generally walked counter to each other; as the first enumerator walked toward the East, the second one walked toward the West; and as the third one walked toward the North, the fourth one walked toward the South. The fifth enumerator was assigned to the quadrant with a relatively higher concentration of households in the EA. This way all quadrants with the most number of households had two enumerators.

From the starting point, each enumerator skipped a given number of households as determined by the team leader, before reaching the target household. Once the target household had been determined, the enumerator introduced him- or her-self, the study and thereafter requested the contact person to help him/her capture all the household members aged 18 years and above. The enumerator then used the applicable screener to identify the appropriate target household respondent, and thereafter requested the contact person if he/she could speak to identified respondent. However, in case of an outright refusal, we substituted the household with the immediate next household, in the general direction of the walk pattern. This process continued until each enumerator achieved his/her set quota for the day, and/or the sub-team achieved its set quota for the EA.

However, in instances where the ‘+’ walk pattern could not apply for example in EAs where households were distributed in a linear or such like pattern, e.g. along a river, road, etc, the enumerators were distributed such that there was a fair distribution of the target respondents in the entire EA without an obvious over-concentration in any section of the village or sub-location.

**Table 2:** Summary of the skipping interval as applied during the systematic random selection of households in the survey

COUNTIES	DISTRICTS	DIVISIONS	LOCATIONS	SUB-LOCATIONS / VILLAGES	SKIPPING INTERVAL USED
Kericho	Kericho	Ainamoi	Kapsoit	Kapsoit	3
			Nyagacho	Kipchimchim	3
		Belgut	Kaborok	Kaborok	3
			Waldai	Sosiot	3
	Kipkelion	Kipkelion	Kipkelion	Kipkelion Town	3
			Macheisok	Matarmat	1

		Chepseon	Chepseon	Chesinende	3
			Kapseger	Chepsir	3
<b>Mombasa</b>	<b>Kisauni</b>	Island	Makupa	Baharini	3
			Tudor	Moroto	3
		Kisauni	Barsheba	Barsheba	3
			Kisauni	Msikitini	3
	<b>Likoni</b>	Likoni	Likoni	Manyatta	3
			Majengo Mapya	Misufini	3
		Longo	Mtongwe	Midodoni	3
			Mwenza	Mwenza	4
<b>Nairobi</b>	<b>Nairobi East</b>	Embakassi	Dandora	Dandora	3
			Kayole	Soweto	3
		Makadara	Makadara	Makadara	4
			Mukuru Kwa Reuben	Mukuru Kwa Reuben	4
	<b>Nairobi North</b>	Kasarani	Mwiki	Mwiki	4
			Zimmerman	Zimmerman	3
		Starehe	Mathare	Huruma	10
			Pangani	Mlango Kubwa	10
<b>Nakuru</b>	<b>Molo</b>	Elburgon	Maishani	Maishani	4
			Matwiku	Matwiku	4
		Molo	Kasino	Kasino	4
			New Location	New Location	4
	<b>Nakuru</b>	Lanet	Murunyu	Murunyu	1
			Wanyororo	Wanyororo	1
		Municipality	Kaptembwa	Kaptembwa	4
			London	London	4
<b>Nandi</b>	<b>Nandi North</b>	Kabiyet	Kabisaga	Kabisaga	3
			Kabiyet	Kabiyet	5

		Kipkaren	Kipkaren	Kapserton	5
			Laboret	Laboret	5
	<b>Nandi East</b>	Lesos	Koilet	Cheptuingeny	1
			Lesos	Lesos	2
		Nandi Hills	Junction	Junction	4
			Kapsoiywo	Kapsoiywo	4
<b>Uasin Gishu</b>	<b>Eldoret East</b>	Ainapkoi	Kapsoya	Munyaka	1
			Orlale	Burnt Forest	1
		Moiben	Moiben	Moiben	1
			Tugen	Tugen	1
	<b>Wareng</b>	Kapsaret	Kapsaret	Kapsaret	2
			Pioneer	Pioneer	2
		Kesses	Cheptiret	Cheptiret	1
			Kesses	Kesses	2

#### Identification and selection of the target household respondents

As indicated above, the enumerators used the household contact persons to identify and list in the screener, all household members aged 18 years and above who currently reside in the household. For each such member so identified the enumerators captured their latest birth day details with respect to the day of visit, and screened for any ineligible candidates. Household members who were very sick/old/drunk to effectively communicate, the deaf/dumb, and those who could not effectively communicate in English, Kiswahili or Kalenjin were to be excluded from the likely target household respondents.

The target household respondent was the person whose birth day was the most recent with respect to the day of our team's visit to the household.

If the identified target respondent was available at the time of visit, and was willing to be interviewed, then the interview proceeded immediately thereafter, otherwise the enumerator in question requested to know when it would be most appropriate to make a call back, to be able to meet the respondent.

We made a maximum of two call backs, so that if the outcome of the last (third) visit was unsuccessful, then we replaced the household. To identify the replacement household in such a case, the enumerator in question continued with the recommended walk pattern, starting at the farthest household from the original starting point for the day, where he/she had a successful interview. Depending on the distances in question, and the general distribution of household in the EA, the enumerator could also change the general direction of the walk pattern, provided care was taken not to venture into an area already covered by another member of the sub-team.

We did not undertake respondent substitution at the household level.

Recruitment of the survey enumerators

We recruited all the field team members from our internal data base of experienced and multiply-tested personnel with whom we have been working over the years.

The data base is made up of all the field staff we have trained and successfully utilized in a number of surveys, both locally and internationally. During our enumerator recruitment and deployment to the field, we always endeavor to observe gender equity per team and staff levels as much as is possible. We have persons whose ethnic backgrounds cut across almost all the ethnic communities in the country; this has always facilitated our deployment of the field teams to various EAs where there is a likelihood of language being a barrier to effective implementation of the data collection—as was the case in this survey.

In identifying the candidates for the fieldwork activities in the survey we were guided by six key qualities: individual fieldwork experience; level of education; fluency in the target local language of interest; past performance record in similar assignments with RSA, gender and availability during the entire data collection phase.

All fieldwork team members were persons with at least one year's fieldwork experience; had at least tertiary level of education; and were fluent in both written and spoken English, and any other of the two local languages: Kiswahili or Kalenjin. They each confirmed their availability for the training, piloting and fieldwork activities in the survey.

We recruited for the training a total of 15 male and 18 female participants.

Enumerator training, piloting, and finalization of the survey questionnaire

The field team members were taken through detailed two-day training session, a half-day piloting exercise and a half-day pilot de-brief.

Enumerator training

The enumerator training was undertaken at RSA Board Room. The training ran for two days from Friday 11<sup>th</sup> to Saturday 12<sup>th</sup> October, 2013.

During the training we discussed in detail the general background of the survey; why the survey was being undertaken in the identified target areas; survey objectives; the survey questionnaire (English version); use of the Phones in administering the interviews; the survey samples (target respondents, sample points and sizes) and the related sampling approaches; the survey timelines; the standard fieldwork procedures to be implemented during fieldwork, including data quality control measures and ethical issues applicable; client expectation of the data collection team; modalities for handling field challenges and related issues; logistical plan in the survey; mode of final team member selection; payment terms and the applicable contracts; and the communication protocol to be used during the survey.

The survey questionnaire review entailed the reading and discussion of each of the questions, and plenary mocking sessions by the enumerators to assess the flow, consistency and appropriateness of the phrases and terms used therein. We used both the paper- and phone-based versions of the questionnaire during the training.

The training was facilitated by the RSA Project Manager (Peter Otienoh), assisted by the Project Supervisor (Collins Athe) and DP Supervisor (Lennox Charles).

A total of 33 enumerators were trained for the fieldwork.



## Piloting

After the training, the participants were taken through a half-day piloting exercise in Kangemi, Dagoretti, Riruta Satellite and Uthiru areas of Westlands district, Nairobi County. The pilot was aimed at assessing the training participants' understanding of the survey tool and related processes, and how effective (in terms of flow, consistency and appropriateness of terms and phrases) the questionnaire was as data capture tool in the survey.

It was implemented on Sunday, 13<sup>th</sup> October 2013, and a total of 32 participants from the training took part. One member had requested to be excused from the survey, to attend to an urgent academic issue. The participants were grouped into sub-teams as summarized in Table 3 below:

**Table 3:** Distribution of the participants during the piloting activity in the survey in Kenya

MSI CONFLICT EVALUATION PROJECT—PILOTING TEAMS AND DESTINATIONS							
TEAM		1	2	3	4	5	
TEAM LEADERS	1	DANSTONE OGENO	BONIFACE WAWERU	NICHOLUS KOECH	KIVUITU NGOTHO	IRENE AKINYI	
ENUMERATORS	2	Sasha Jepkemoi	Victor Kipngeno	Elijah Motanya	Washington Bett	Emmanuel Machio	
	3	Steve Oyugi	Beatrice Chepkurui	Cynthia Muggi	Nancy Kiare	Micheal Orwe	
	4	Florence Atieno	Polycarp Masio	Bryan Ndunda	Susan Wangui	Pauline Oduol	
	5	Kelvin Nduati	Maurine Wambui	Virginia Achieng	Caroline Njeri	Paul Sharon	
	6	Doreen makona	Brenda Okeyo	Gertrude Senelwa	Faith ndinda	Norah Wekesa	
	7				Eric agoi Mbuka	Whitney Gladys	
PILOTING SITE		KANGEMI	DAGORETTI	RIRUTA SATELLITE	UTHIRU	KANGEMI	TOTAL
GENDER	M	3	3	3	3	3	15

	<b>F</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>17</b>
<b>SUM</b>		<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>32</b>

We had a quota of two interviews per enumerator for the piloting exercise.

## Pilot de-brief

We had the pilot debrief at the RSA Board Room, from 3:30 to 5:30 p.m., Sunday, Oct. 13, 2013. It was undertaken immediately after the piloting exercise, and was geared at capturing any likely challenges that needed to be addressed before the team was deployed to the field, including any final changes to the questionnaire should there be such a need. Also in attendance during the debrief was Manasseh Wepundi from MSI.

The following observations were reported by the participants during the debrief:

Most of the respondents in all the piloting sites were quite willing to participate in the survey. However, in Kangemi one would-be respondent declined to be interviewed saying that he had been a victim of the post-election violence of 2008, and did not want to talk about it. He said that his house was broken into by members of a certain community, who took almost all his household goods.

Several households were vacant during the piloting period as majority had gone to church. The enumerators had to do a lot of substitutions, to be able to meet the set quota of two.

In Kangemi, one respondent wondered why we were asking questions on household income yet the survey was on peacebuilding issues.

Some of the respondents were not willing to disclose the names of their household members.

In a particular section of Uthiru, almost every available household member in majority of the households was too drunk to participate in the survey; the enumerator in the said section had to do several substitutions before achieving the desired number of interviews.

Two skipping errors and one data-type anomaly were detected in the soft-version of the questionnaire.

## Finalization of the survey questionnaire

No changes were made to the questionnaire as used during the pilot, save for the correction for the programming errors indicated above.

Further mock-interviews were undertaken by a team of 8 enumerators on Monday 14<sup>th</sup> October 2013 to confirm that the questionnaire was complete and had no more programming errors that could hinder effective data collection once actual fieldwork had started.

Selection of the final data collection team members

Of the 32 enumerators who were trained and later participated in the piloting exercise, 30 were selected to constitute the main fieldwork team, based on their performance during the training and piloting activities. The balance 2 least performers were to serve as likely reserves in case anyone of the first 30 pulled out of the survey for any reason.

The 30 members were then grouped into five fieldwork sub-teams, each sub-team being made up of a team leader and five enumerators. All the team members worked in Nairobi Region, before leaving for the other target regions in the survey.

No team member pulled out of the survey during the actual data collection activities in the survey.

Table 4 below illustrates the distribution of the fieldwork sub-team members into the various target counties in the survey.

**Table 4:** *The final survey fieldwork team members and the assigned Counties*

MSI CONFLICT EVALUATION - KENYA: FINAL FIELDWORK TEAM MEMBERS AND THE ASSIGNED COUNTIES						
TARGET REGION		KERICHO	NAKURU	NANDI	UASIN GISHU	MOMBASA
TEAM LEADERS	1	DANSTONE OGENO	BONIFACE WAWERU	NICHOLUS KOECH	KIVUITU NGOTHO	IRENE AKINYI
		722104646	710877575	722937559	724727574	722872950
ENUMERATORS	2	Beatrice Chepkurui	Norah Nekesa	Victor Kipngeno	Eric agoi Mbuka	Emmanuel Machio
	3	Steve Oyugi	Elijah Motanya	Cynthia Muggi	Nancy Kiare	Polycarp Masio

	4	Whitney Gladys	Micheal Orwe	Bryan Ndunda	Virginia Achieng	Florence Atieno	
	5	Kelvin Nduati	Maurine Wambui	Susan Wangui	Pauline Oduol	Paul Sharon	
	6	Doreen Makona	Brenda Okeyo	Gertrude Senelwa	Sasha Jepkemoi	Faith Ndinda	<b>TOTAL</b>
<b>GENDER: M/F</b>		3/3	3/3	3/3	2/4	3/3	14/16
<b>TEAM SIZE</b>		6	6	6	6	6	30

## Fieldwork

As indicated in Section 1.7 above, the field team members were grouped into various groups and assigned to specific counties for ease of administration of fieldwork.

Owing to the late start date for the data collection by about a week due to the delayed finalization of the survey questionnaire, we strategically boosted the number of enumerators to engage in the survey so that overall, the survey timelines and especially the date for the submission of the final clean data set remains as originally planned (5<sup>th</sup> November 2013).

In terms of personnel levels, we had enumerators, team leaders and a supervisor, each with specific duties and responsibilities to undertake to allow for an effective implementation of the data collection activities in the survey.

### **The Enumerators**

The enumerators were responsible for the actual administration of the face to face interviews to the respective target respondents, using the Huawei IDEOS and Samsung smart phones, or paper questionnaires when necessary. They worked under close leadership of the team leaders.

We had a total of 25 enumerators distributed in the five fieldwork sub-teams as in Table 4 above.

### **The Team Leaders**

The team leaders were responsible for ensuring that the quotas set for their sub-teams were accomplished efficiently, rightly and using the recommended quality control procedures. They assigned specific interviews to their respective enumerators, ensured that the study respondents were correctly sampled, and that the interviews were administered as recommended. They undertook quality control checks in the field including sit-ins, call backs and back checks. A summary of the quality control checks undertaken by each team leader (and the RSA supervisor) is given in Table 5 below. They were also responsible for paying the necessary courtesy calls to the relevant local authorities in each of the EAs as appropriate.

The team leaders liaised very closely with the Field Supervisor in addressing or reporting on any noted challenges in, and fieldwork progress by, their respective sub-teams.

We had a total of 5 team leaders as indicated in Table 4 above.

## **Field Supervisors**

The Field Supervisor (RSA) coordinated all the fieldwork activities, and apprised the head office of all the developments during the data collection activities by the various teams, including reporting on the teams' daily progress - output and any challenges encountered. He also randomly implemented similar quality control checks as the team leaders and advised them as appropriate in case of any noted anomalies during the recruitment or interviewing of the target respondents or in addressing any noted team challenges encountered while in the field.

The field supervisor ensured that there existed a cordial working relationship amongst the various team members and that there was a balanced distribution of interviews among the various team members.

## **Data collection**

The fieldwork activities in the survey ran from Tuesday 15<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> October 2013, during which time we were able to effectively administer a total of 1,255 out of the targeted 1,200 interviews. All the five teams began the fieldwork by working in Nairobi county, where two districts of Nairobi North and Nairobi East had been sampled. Thereafter, they moved out to the other five counties: Kericho, Nandi, Nakuru, Uasin Gishu and Mombasa. Overall, the fieldwork lasted for 7 days.

During the data collection, the two sampling approaches (simple random and systematic random sampling) were observed by each sub-team per enumeration area, as described in Section 1.4 above.

Simple random sampling was used by the team leaders to select the target locations and sub-locations in each division, after consultation with the local administration officials like the local chiefs, District Officers, District Commissioners, and Officer Commanding Police Division (OCPD) as appropriate.

Systematic random sampling was used by the enumerators to identify the target households in the EAs.

The mode of data collection used in the survey was mainly phone-based face to face interviews using the 'Dooblo survey to Go' software to record and transmit the data. However, in a few instances, paper-based interviews were administered because of phone problems or when the security situation in the enumeration area demanded so. In a number of the EAs, it was absolutely not safe / recommended to use the phones for fear of being mugged.

The interviews were administered in English, Kiswahili or Kalenjin depending on the proficiency and/or preference of the given respondent in the language in question.



## Field supervision and data quality assurance

Each sub-team had a Team Leader who was mainly responsible for the co-ordination of fieldwork. All Team Leaders undertook regular quality control checks with their enumerators to ensure that the data collected were accurate, complete, and from the right respondents who were identified and selected using the recommended sampling procedures for the survey. They used sit-ins, back checks and call backs to confirm and ensure that data quality control procedures were being observed by the enumerators as planned.

Above the Team Leaders was the Field Supervisor whose main responsibility was to co-ordinate all the teams in the field. He undertook similar quality control checks as the Team Leaders with a number of the survey enumerators and/or interviews. All the Team Leaders reported to the Field Supervisor (RSA).

The Project Manager also undertook field visits to assess the progress of data collection, provide necessary technical and moral support to the teams, and confirm that the recommended survey processes were on-going as proposed, the related survey challenges in some of the EAs notwithstanding. In particular, he was with the data collectors in Moiben and Tugen Estate (Uasin Gishu) and Lessos (Nandi).

Overall, a total of 661 data quality control checks were undertaken by the Team Leaders and the Field Supervisor. The Field Supervisor had a total of 6 sit-ins, 2 back checks and 60 call backs. The team leaders did a total of 212 sit-ins, 215 back checks and 166 call backs. The details of these quality checks are summarized in Table 5 below.

**Table 5:** Summary of the quality control checks by the Team Leaders and the Field Supervisor

Team	District	Interviewer Name	Quality Control checks						Comments
			Team Leaders			Supervisor			
			Sit-ins	Back checks	Call backs	Sit-ins	Back checks	Call backs	
Kericho	Kericho	Beatrice Chepkurui	3	3	2	0	0	2	Okay
		Whitney Gladys	3	2	3	0	0	0	Okay
		Doreen Makona	3	3	3	0	0	2	Needs to master the tool better

		Kelvin Nduati	3	2	2	0	0	0	Okay
		Steve Oyugi	3	2	2	0	0	2	Okay
	<b>Kipkelion</b>	Beatrice Chepkurui	3	3	2	0	0	0	Okay
		Whitney Gladys	3	2	3	0	0	2	Okay
		Doreen Makona	3	3	3	0	0	2	Okay
		Kelvin Nduati	3	2	2	0	0	2	Okay
<b>Mombasa</b>	<b>Kisauni</b>	Steve Oyugi	3	2	2				Okay
		Florence Atieno	4	5	7	1	0	3	Okay
		Faith Ndinda	4	6	5	0	0	2	Okay
		Sharon Paul	5	6	6	0	0	2	Okay; GPS capture issues
		Emmanuel Machio	5	5	7	1	1	2	Okay
		Policarp Masio	4	6	6	1	1	2	Okay
	<b>Likoni</b>	Florence Atieno	5	4	4	0	0	2	Okay; GPS capture issues
		Faith Ndinda	4	6	5	0	0	0	Okay
		Sharon Paul	4	5	6	0	0	0	Okay
		Emmanuel Machio	4	4	7	0	0	0	Okay
		Policarp Masio	4	5	6	0	0	2	Okay
<b>Nakuru</b>	<b>Molo</b>	Brenda Okeyo	3	3	2	0	0	1	Okay
		Elijah Motanya	3	3	2	0	0	2	Okay
		Norah Nekesa	3	3	2	0	0	0	Okay
		Maureen Wambui	3	3	2	0	0	0	Okay
		Michael Orwe	3	3	2	0	0	2	Okay
	<b>Nakuru</b>	Brenda Okeyo	3	3	3	0	0	2	Okay
		Norah Nekesa	3	3	3	0	0	2	Okay
		Maureen Wambui	3	3	3	0	0	2	Okay
		Michael Orwe	3	3	3	0	0	0	Okay
		Elijah Motanya	3	3	3	0	0	0	Okay

<b>Nandi</b>	<b>Nandi North</b>	Victor Kipng'eno	6	4	0	0	0	0	Okay
		Cynthia Muggi	8	3	1	0	0	1	Okay
		Susan Wangui	8	8	1	0	0	0	Okay
		Bryan Ndunda	7	6	0	0	0	0	Okay
		Getrude Senelwa	5	8	0	0	0	2	Okay
	<b>Nandi East</b>	Victor Kipng'eno	3	4	0	0	0	2	Okay
		Cynthia Muggi	3	3	1	0	0	2	Okay
		Susan Wangui	3	4	0	0	0	2	Okay
		Bryan Ndunda	4	2	1	0	0	2	Okay
		Getrude Senelwa	2	5	1	0	0	0	Okay
<b>Uasin Gishu</b>	<b>Eldoret East</b>	Eric Mbuka	3	3	2	0	0	0	Okay
		Nancy Kiarie	3	3	3	0	0	2	Okay
		Sasha Jepkemoi	5	4	3	0	0	2	Okay
		Pauline Oduol	2	3	4	0	0	0	Okay
		Virginia Achieng'	3	3	2	0	0	1	Okay
	<b>Wareng</b>	Eric Mbuka	2	4	3	0	0	2	Okay
		Nancy Kiarie	3	5	2	0	0	0	Okay
		Sasha Jepkemoi	4	4	5	0	0	0	Okay
		Pauline Oduol	3	3	1	0	0	2	Okay; GPS capture issues
		Virginia Achieng'	2	4	3	0	0	2	Okay
<b>Nairobi</b>	<b>Nairobi East and Nairobi North</b>	Beatrice Chepkurui	1	2	1	0	0	0	Okay
		Whitney Gladys	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
		Doreen Makona	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
		Kelvin Nduati	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
		Steve Oyugi	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
		Florence Atieno	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
		Faith Ndinda	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
		Sharon Paul	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay

	Emmanuel Machio	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Policarp Masio	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Brenda Okeyo	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Elijah Motanya	1	1	1	1	0	0	Okay
	Norah Nekesa	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Maureen Wambui	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Michael Orwe	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Victor Kipng'eno	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Cynthia Muggi	1	1	1	1	0	0	Okay
	Susan Wangui	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Bryan Ndunda	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Getrude Senelwa	1	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Eric Mbuka	2	1	1	1	0	0	Okay
	Nancy Kiarie	2	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Sasha Jepkemoi	2	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Pauline Oduol	2	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	Virginia Achieng'	2	1	1	0	0	0	Okay
	<b>TOTALS</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>215</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>60</b>	

## Summary of County-specific fieldwork

### Nairobi County

We visited two districts in Nairobi region. Data collection in Nairobi ran from 15<sup>th</sup> to 16<sup>th</sup> October 2013. During this period we were able to successfully interview a total of 213 out of the targeted 200 respondents.

We visited the following locations in the two target districts of Nairobi County:

**Nairobi East:** Makadara, Mukuru Kwa Reuben, Kayole and Dandora (phase 3)

**Nairobi North:** Mwiki, Mathare, Pangani and Zimmerman

Mukuru Kwa Reuben was quite insecure, and we had to engage a village elder to accompany the area enumerators. In one instance, a group of youths there loudly commented that '*Hawa sio wa huku; leo kitaumana*' which can be loosely translated to mean 'these are not people from this area; they will see'. However, there was no incident as we had the village elder who the youths easily recognized as one of them. We also did engage a village elder in Dandora phase 3, for similar reasons. Dandora was one of the areas which were highly affected by the 2008 Post Election Violence (PEV).

There was very tight security in Soweto slums on our visit day, as it coincided with the First Lady's visit to the area.

A lot of GPS capture challenges were also reported in Mlango Kubwa due to the tall buildings there.

#### Mombasa County

We worked in Mombasa County from 17<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> October 2013. We were able to achieve a total of 206 successful interviews out of the targeted 200 for the County.

The locations that we visited in the two target districts in Mombasa County were:

**Kisauni:** Barsheba, Makupa, Tudor, and Kisauni

**Likoni:** Mwenza, Likoni, Majengo Mapya and Mtongwe

The main challenge with the data collection activities in Mombasa County was insecurity, particularly in Barsheba, Msikitini, Manyatta and Misufuni. Barsheba and Msikitini areas were dominated by persons dealing in drugs; they are often very suspicious of outsiders, and would turn violent toward the same without any provocation. And although our enumerators had local village guides to accompany them, some of the target respondents strongly advised them (enumerators) not to venture beyond certain points, and never to use their phones anywhere within the EA. In Barsheba, a lady respondent advised our lady enumerators thus: '*Tafadhali msipite hapa kama hamtaki kufa*' (please do not venture beyond this point if you don't want to die). The advice was given after the enumerator had had a successful interview, and was about to continue sampling into the EA as recommended in the applicable walk pattern in the survey.

On the other hand, the Likoni EAs were dominated by persons believed to be sympathetic to the Mombasa Republican Council (MRC). As in Kisauni, the residents were suspicious of outsiders, and a number of target respondents outrightly refused to be interviewed or were not willing to disclose their contact details, insisting that we were indirectly scouting for ICC witnesses.

#### Nakuru County

We worked in Nakuru County from 17<sup>th</sup> to 20<sup>th</sup> October 2013. We were able to achieve a total of 208 out of the targeted 200 interviews for the county. The following were the specific locations we visited in each of the target districts:

**Nakuru:** London, Wanyororo, Murungu and Kaptembwa

**Molo:** Kasino, New Location, Maishani and Matwiku

A number of respondents were not willing to disclose their contact details in Molo, an area which was highly affected by the 2008 PEV.

Getting the clearance to proceed with the survey in the area also did take us a lot of time as lower level administrators were not willing to give their permission, preferring rather to direct us to the next higher authorities. A chief in Molo said the tension in the area following the 2008 PEV was still quite high such that he could not authorize the survey team to work in the identified EAs unless we got express permission from the DO I. The DO I was also not willing to give his consent, and advised that we go to the District Commissioner (DC). The DC did not object to the survey, but felt that it was ill-timed, considering the on-going ICC cases for the President and his Deputy.

#### Kericho County

The data collection activities in Kericho County ran from 17<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> October 2013. We were able to achieve a total of 200 successful interviews out of the targeted 200.

We specifically administered the Kericho County interviews in the following locations:

**Kericho:** Kapsoit, Nyagacho, Kaborok and Waldai

**Kipkelion:** Kipkelion, Macheisok, Chipseon and Kapseger

The area enumerators had travel problems especially in Chepseon where there was very poor road network to the target EA. This was made worse by the rainy weather during the data collection exercise in the area.

A number of respondents also thought that the survey was targeted at identifying likely ICC witnesses, and as such were not willing to participate in the survey. In Nyagacho area, one of our lady enumerators was almost physically attacked by some rowdy youths who strongly believed that the survey was ICC-related, and as such they could not understand how one of them (a Kalenjin) could agree to be a participant in a survey whose key objective was to take its community members to the ICC. The lady-enumerator in question was a Kalenjin, the same ethnic community as that of the area locals.

#### Uasin Gishu County

Primary data collection in Uasin Gishu County ran from 17<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> October 2013. We were able to successfully administer a total of 203 out of the targeted 200 interviews for the County. In each of the target districts in the region, we went to the following specific locations:

**Eldoret East:** Kapsoya, Orlale, Moiben and Tugen Estate

**Wareng:** Kapsaret, Pioneer, Cheptiret and Kesses

The chief in Kesses was not willing to okay the survey unless we had the go ahead from the District Commissioner's Office; we had to spend a lot of time to follow up with the DC, who had no misgivings for the survey. Another lady enumerator in Kapseret (Wareng) also encountered respondent hostility similar to that which befell the lady enumerator in Kericho. In this case the household members became very abusive of the enumerator and rudely asked her out of their compound, saying that they could not be tricked into contributing to the ICC cases. To them the survey was about ICC witnesses, and that our survey introduction indicating that the survey was on peacebuilding activities was simply a way of blind folding the area residents to give their views on the on-going ICC cases for the President and his Deputy.

Several other households in Tugen Estate also declined to participate in the survey, for similar reasons. We gathered that during the 2008 PEV several members of a particular ethnic community were killed and/or their property forcefully taken or destroyed by the area locals.

#### Nandi County

We were in Nandi County from 17<sup>th</sup> to 21<sup>st</sup> October 2013, during which time we were able to achieve a total of 225 successful interviews out of the targeted 200. We specifically captured the primary data in the following locations in each of the target districts:

**Nandi North:** Kabisaga, Kabiyeet, Kipkaren and Laboret

**Nandi East:** Koilot, Lessos, Junction and Kapsoiywo

The team sent to this county mainly faced travel challenges especially in Kipkaren where there were no public service vehicles, and they had to rely on motor cycle (*boda boda* operators) to take them to and from the EA. Owing to the poor weather condition (it was rainy) and the poor road network, two members who were sharing the same motorbike at the time, got involved in an accident while travelling from Kipkaren to Kapsabet. They had a few bruises and had to seek prompt medication in Kapsabet before they could proceed with the fieldwork activities in the other EAs allocated to the team.

Other minor challenges for the team were GPS-capture problems in Kipkaren, Laboret and Lessos due to the cloudy weather. It also took the team quite a while before they could obtain the authorization to proceed with the interviews in Kapsoiywo in Nandi Hills.

Table 6 below provides the overall fieldwork output against the set targets for each of the enumeration areas in the survey.

**Table 6:** Summary of the fieldwork output: achieved quotas against the set targets by the EAs

SAMPLING LEVEL					SAMPLES		REMARK
COUNTY	DISTRICT	DIVISION	LOCATION	SUB-LOCATION / VILLAGE	ACHIEVED	TARGETED	
Kericho	Kericho	Ainamoi	Kapsoit	Kapsoit	25	25	Achieved
			Nyagacho	Kipchimchim	25	25	
		Belgut	Kaborok	Kaborok	25	25	
			Waldai	Sosiot	25	25	
	Kipkelion	Kipkelion	Kipkelion	Kipkelion Town	25	25	
			Macheisok	Matarmat	25	25	
		Chepseon	Chepseon	Chesinende	25	25	
			Kapseger	Chepsir	25	25	
Mombasa	Kisauni	Island	Makupa	Baharini	25	25	



			Tudor	Moroto	27	25	Surpassed	
		Kisauni	Barsheba	Barsheba	25	25	Achieved	
			Kisauni	Msikitini	27	25	Surpassed	
	Likoni	Likoni	Likoni	Manyatta	25	25	Achieved	
			Majengo Mapya	Misufini	25	25		
		Longo	Mtongwe	Midodoni	26	25	Surpassed	
			Mwenza	Mwenza	26	25		
	Nairobi	Nairobi East	Embakassi	Dandora	Dandora	32		25
				Kayole	Soweto	25		25
			Makadara	Makadara	Makadara	27	25	Surpassed
Mukuru Kwa Reuben				Mukuru Kwa Reuben	27	25		
Nairobi North		Kasarani	Mwiki	Mwiki	25	25	Achieved	
			Zimmerman	Zimmerman	25	25		
		Starehe	Mathare	Huruma	27	25	Surpassed	
			Pangani	Mlango Kubwa	25	25	Achieved	
Nakuru		Molo	Elburgon	Maishani	Maishani	30	25	Surpassed
				Matwiku	Matwiku	25	25	Achieved
	Molo		Kasino	Kasino	25	25		
			New Location	New Location	25	25		
	Nakuru	Lanet	Murunyu	Murunyu	27	25	Surpassed	
			Wanyororo	Wanyororo	25	25	Achieved	
		Municipality	Kaptembwa	Kaptembwa	26	25	Surpassed	
			London	London	25	25	Achieved	
	Nandi	Nandi North	Kabiyet	Kabisaga	Kabisaga	30	25	Surpassed
				Kabiyet	Kabiyet	31	25	
Kipkaren			Kipkaren	Kapserton	29	25		
			Laboret	Laboret	26	25		

	Nandi East	Lesos	Koilet	Cheptuingeny	26	25	
			Lesos	Lesos	28	25	
		Nandi Hills	Junction	Junction	27	25	
			Kapsoiywo	Kapsoiywo	28	25	
Uasin Gishu	Eldoret East	Ainapkoi	Kapsoya	Munyaka	25	25	Achieved
			Orlale	Burnt Forest	26	25	Surpassed
		Moiben	Moiben	Moiben	25	25	Achieved
			Tugen	Tugen	25	25	
	Wareng	Kapsaret	Kapsaret	Kapsaret	25	25	
			Pioneer	Pioneer	27	25	
		Kesses	Cheptiret	Cheptiret	25	25	Achieved
			Kesses	Kesses	25	25	
	TOTAL				1,255	1,200	

## Survey Challenges and How They Were Mitigated

We did face a number of challenges while implementing the data collection activities in the survey. The following is a summary of the challenges and how we handled them:

Delays in obtaining permission from the local administrators to proceed with the survey in given EAs

This was particularly the case in Kasino (Molo) where both the area Chief and DO I were not willing to allow the survey to go on in their areas of jurisdiction without the express authority from the District Commissioner. This was due to the perceived latent hostility and distrust amongst the various communities living in the area, following the 2008 PEV. They said that it was not very safe yet to undertake such a survey touching on the PEV, since a number of the residents there were quite affected by the violence and had not yet healed or recovered from the losses they had incurred. Moving from the various offices, from the chief to the DC's took quite a while which impacted quite negatively on the possible output by the team on that day.

A similar scenario was reported in Kesses (Eldoret East) where the area chief advised that the team obtain the requisite permission from the DC as he could not authorize a survey touching on PEV. We gathered that quite a number of members from a particular ethnic community living in the area were either killed or forcefully evicted from their homes during the 2008 PEV, and a number had not yet recovered from their losses.

It took the teams to Maringo (Nairobi East) and Kapsoiywo (Nandi East) quite a while to obtain the relevant authority from the area chiefs, who were reported to be busy with other official duties.

It was essential that we obtain the support and express go-ahead from all the relevant local administrators and as such we had to wait until we were granted the said permission before we carried on with the interviews. In most cases, the team leaders travelled ahead of the other team members to the next new EAs to seek the details and consent of the relevant officials before they were joined by the other team members.

### Insecurity

In a number of EAs in the survey, we could not freely walk around or use our HHDs to capture the primary data due to insecurity.

In Mukuru Kwa Reuben slum (Nairobi East), we had to engage the services of a village elder to accompany our enumerators throughout the data collection exercise in the village. The same scenario was reported in Dandora Phase 3 (Nairobi North), Barsheba and Kisauni (Kisauni), and in Likoni.

The case in Kisauni and Bersheba was due to the high number of drug addicts who live in the target EAs, while in Likoni it was due to the presence of MRC sympathizers and/or members who were said to be the majority amongst the locals there.

We engaged the services of local village elders/guides as appropriate, and interviewed using the paper-questionnaire. Such data were later transferred into the hand held devices (HHDs) and then synched to the survey server. This approach brought with it the inability of the affected team members to capture GPS-coordinates at the point of interviews. In such cases, the affected team members took the GPS coordinates from the nearest and safest points to the actual interviews points.

Respondents unwilling to disclose their contact details

A number of respondents in Kaptembwa (Nakuru), Molo, Belgut and Longo (Likoni) were not willing to disclose their names and/or telephone numbers in the survey, fearing that they could be traced and victimized later on for having participated in the survey. These areas were said to have witnessed more intense levels of the PEV, and the trust levels amongst the local communities were still very low.

Where it was not possible to capture the respondents' telephone numbers or names, we just proceeded with the interviews and indicated as appropriate why the contact details were missing.

Language barrier

In a few cases, language barrier became a problem in that the target respondents could not communicate in any of the survey languages (English, Kiswahili or Kalenjin), or the concerned enumerator was not fluent in the language of the respondent, and the other team member who could assist as appropriate was either unreachable or busy with other interviews. This challenge was noted in Elburgon (Kikuyu) and Kipkelion (Kalenjins).

Since Kikuyu was not a survey language, we replaced all target respondents who could only communicate effectively in Kikuyu. In Kipkelion, the Kalenjin-team member assisted where possible, otherwise we substituted the household as appropriate.

Travel challenges

The enumerators in Nandi had to use *boda bodas* (motor bikes) to access Kipkaren in Nandi North. The case was made worse by the poor road network and the rainy weather, so that a substantial part of the journey was covered walking as the motor bike riders maneuvered their way in the mud. A similar case was reported in Londiani and Chepseon areas of Kericho County.

The Nakuru team had to travel very long distances on very poor rough roads to access Murunyu and Wanyororo EAs in Lanet.

The team in Uasin Gishu travelled in overloaded vehicles, with male members having to hang outside the *matatus* to access Moiben and Tugen Estate. The same trend was reported in the Kesses EA. Overloading of public service vehicles was said to be the norm in these areas.

Road accidents

Some of the Nandi and Uasin Gishu team members were involved in an accident when their vehicle hit a zebra in Naivasha, while they were on their way from Nairobi to Eldoret. None of the team members reported any physical injury.

Two members of the Nandi team were also involved in a motor cycle accident while traveling from Kibiyet to Kapsabet; they had minor bruises which were attended to in Kapsabet before they could carry on with the data collection activities.

Poor weather

Kibiyet, Chepseon, Belgut, Ainamoi, Lanet and Molo EAs were characterized by very poor weather; the areas recorded heavy rains by the time of our data collection. This made travel from one point to the other a very big challenge and the concerned enumerators at times had to start fieldwork very late owing to unavailability of PSVs plying the target areas in the morning when the roads were still very wet and impassable.

The Nakuru team members reported being rained on very heavily while they were on their way from Wanyororo and Murunyu.

In Mombasa the challenge was the very hot temperatures. One enumerator said he ended up sweating so much so that he could not effectively use the phone during interviews as the phone could not respond to his sweaty palm/fingers when scrolling down the questionnaire.

Hostility from respondents suspecting the survey to be ICC-related

Two respondent-hostility cases stood out during the data collection, and all concerned Kalenjin-speaking lady enumerators in mainly Kalenjin-speaking EAs.

In Nyagacho EA in Kericho district our lady enumerator identified a target household and went on with the survey introduction as expected. However when the household members heard that the survey was about Peacebuilding activities in the area following the 2008 PEV in the area, they demanded to know from the lady the 'true' aim of the survey. They strongly believed that the survey was connected with the on-going ICC cases and that the enumerator was one among many other persons secretly seeking to recruit witnesses for the ICC cases. The explanations by the enumerator - who was by then conversing in Kalenjin - that that was not true only infuriated the household members. She was rudely asked out of the house by three male household members. The lady obliged and excused herself to the next household where she had a very welcoming female respondent. While proceeding with the interview in the second household, the three male youths from the previous household followed her to the new household and wanted to know why she was still carrying on with the interview there yet they had told her to leave. Before she could respond, her host took over and told the rowdy youths to leave her (enumerator) alone, as she (host) was the one with the right to dictate what went on in her house. She asked the youths to go to the area chief or the police if they had a reason to suspect that the enumerator was not who she said she was, or anything to prove that the survey was about ICC cases and not peacebuilding activities as had been stated by the lady enumerator.

Realizing that the lady host would not change her position to terminate the interview, the youths left.

The incident really shocked the enumerator, who later wondered aloud what the case would have been were the lady respondent to side with the youths, or were it that she did not speak Kalenjin.

A similar case befell another lady enumerator in Kapseret (Wareng), whereby immediately after she had introduced the study the household members rudely asked her to leave their compound saying that they could not be tricked into contributing to the ICC cases. They strongly felt that the survey was a disguise to scout for more witnesses to the ICC case, and as such they did not want to be part of it at all.

For the Kapseret case, the affected enumerator reported the case to the team leader who in turn cascaded the matter upwards to the RSA office. We advised that the enumerator maintains the same general quadrant assigned to her in the EA but should change her location and continue with the household selection from a different section. She did this and was able to successfully interview and complete her set quota in the EA without further incidents.

Some target respondents refused to participate in the survey, suspecting it to be ICC-related

In a number of other households, the respondents did not turn violent as in the two cases above, but rather opted not to take part in the survey.

This was the case in some households in Maringo (Makadara, Nairobi East), Tugen Estate (Moiben), Waldai (Kericho), Kaptembwa (Nakuru) and in Likoni.

Being refusals, we substituted the households with the immediate next ones as outlined in the survey sampling plan above.

Several households were vacant during the morning hours

Several households were reported to be locked (Zimmerman, Nairobi North) and without adult household members (in Kipkelion, Kericho) during the morning hours. For the latter case, the adults were mostly said to have gone to the farm.

For households which were locked and had no one to help our enumerators determine when the target household members would return, we substituted as appropriate. However, in Kipkelion, we opted to start the data collection activities a bit late in the day so that we could find a number of adult household members who were already back from the farms; this did quite improve our chances of having successful interviews in the EA.

Phone-related challenges

A few isolated phone-related challenges were reported by the enumerators.

A number of phones took too long to capture the GPS coordinates, especially in areas with rainy/cloudy weather during the time of fieldwork: Kipkelion, Kericho, Molo, and Nakuru

districts. In Mlango Kubwa (Nairobi North), the problem was caused by the presence of very tall buildings surrounding the target households.

One phone presented synching problems in Kipkelion.

In Mombasa, one enumerator was faced by very slow phone response during the interviews due to excessive sweating; the relatively high temperatures in Mombasa made the affected enumerator to sweat a lot, including on his fingers. He had to undertake several presses for the phone to detect his actions.

This was an expected challenge, and the enumerators had been advised to undertake several trials for the GPS capture, and where this did not work, they were to return to the affected areas the following day or move to points near the point of interview and continue with the GPS-capture trials, until they succeeded.

Unwillingness to disclose household size details

In one case in Kapsoit (Kericho district), the target respondent refused to disclose the number of his household members saying that it was a taboo to give the count of household members in their custom.

We treated the case as a refusal and substituted as appropriate.

Lack of power to charge the phones

This was a one of case affecting the Nandi team while in Kabiyeet. They reported that there was a three-day black-out in the area and its surroundings by the time they were implementing the data collection activities in the EA.

They had to use the paper-based questionnaires when their phones ran out of power, and transfer the related interviews into the phones immediately they moved into an area with power to charge their phones.

Some area residents insisted that they should be included in the survey

Although a number of the target respondents were not willing to participate in the survey in several of the EAs as indicated in challenge 3.9 above, the case was quite different in Kasino (Molo) where a number of area residents insisted that they should also be interviewed, mistaking the survey to be a Red Cross exercise where details of its likely future beneficiaries in relation to the PEV were being captured. Four such cases were reported in the area.

We informed them that the survey was not a Red Cross assignment, and that we were targeting only a few randomly selected households in the area. Since the random selection did not land us to their households, we could not include them in the survey.

Emotional memory of the 2008 PEV by a respondent in Molo

In Molo, one male respondent who preferred not to disclose his contact details became very emotional and broke down into tears in the course of the interview, when describing the losses he suffered during the 2008 PEV.

## Conclusion

Although the fieldwork in Kenya was faced by a number of challenges, we were able to effectively implement the data collection activities within the allocated time. We visited all the targeted EAs, and by the end of the fieldwork we had achieved a total of 1,255 out of the targeted 1,200 interviews. We achieved and/or surpassed the set targets in each of the six Counties.

It is our sincere hope that the quality of the work delivered by RSA in this assignment will be up to the standard expected by the client, and that the final clean data set will be found to be valid, accurate, reliable and an actual reflection of the prevailing situation on the ground. We will welcome any follow up queries and clarifications on the survey process and the captured primary data. For every such case, we will ensure that we provide adequate and timely response to allow for effective analysis, reporting and presentation of results to the relevant project stakeholders.

We would like to acknowledge the diligent and valuable input we got from the MSI team during the implementation of all the survey activities in Kenya. We are particularly very grateful for the cooperation and support we received from among others, Ami Henson, Sarah Bayne and Manasseh Wepundi during the finalization of the survey questionnaire and/or implementation of the data collection activities in the survey. It is our hope that we will have more opportunities in the future to share our skills, experiences and expertise with this and other similar dedicated team(s) from MSI.

We would like to register our appreciation to all the participants who contributed in one way or the other to the success of the ***Evaluation Survey on Contribution of Various Stakeholders in Peacebuilding in Kenya***. We are grateful to the data collection team made up of the supervisor, team leaders and enumerators who were very dedicated in their work, the several challenges highlighted above notwithstanding. We are kindly indebted to all RSA project staff from Field, Data Processing, and Client Service Departments for their unity of purpose in the study, and to the entire RSA Management, led by Dr Jasper Grosskurth for ensuring that there was timely and adequate institutional support during the implementation of the survey.



## Enumerator Training Agenda

<b>Date:</b>	<b>Oct. 11–14, 2013</b>	
<b>Venue:</b>	<b>RESEARCH SOLUTIONS AFRICA OFFICE—WESTLANDS, NAIROBI (K)</b>	
<b>Facilitators:</b>	<b>Peter Otienoh</b> , Lead Facilitator and Project Coordinator, RSA (the Project Manager) <b>Collins Athe</b> , Field Supervisor, RSA (the Project Field Supervisor) <b>Charles Lennox</b> , DP Supervisor, RSA (the Project DP Supervisor)	
<b>Time</b>	<b>Contents</b>	<b>Facilitator</b>
<b>DAY I. Friday, Oct. 11, 2013</b>		
<b>08:30–9:00 a.m.</b>	Registration	Collins Athe
<b>09:00–10:00 a.m.</b>	Introduction; Ground Rules	Peter Otienoh / MSI Rep.
	Opening Remarks	
<b>10:00–10:30 a.m.</b>	<b>TEA BREAK</b>	<b>All</b>
<b>10:30–11:30 a.m.</b>	Background and Overview of the Evaluation Study	Peter Otienoh / MSI Rep.
<b>11:30–11:45 a.m.</b>	Role of RSA in the study	Peter Otienoh
<b>11:45 a.m. to 01:00 p.m.</b>	Questionnaire Review	Collins Athe / Peter Otienoh / Charles Lennox
<b>01:00–02:00 p.m.</b>	<b>LUNCH BREAK</b>	<b>All</b>
<b>02:00–03:00 p.m.</b>	Questionnaire Review	Collins /Peter Otienoh / Charles Lennox
<b>03:00–04:00 p.m.</b>	Mock Demos	Collins Athe

04:00–04:30 p.m.	<b>TEA BREAK</b>	<b>All</b>
04:30–06:00 p.m.	Plenary Mocking	Collins Athe
06:00–06:15 p.m.	Day 1 Wrap Up	Peter Otienoh
<b>DAY 2. Saturday, Oct. 12, 2013</b>		
08:30–10:00 a.m.	Feedback from Mock	Collins Athe
10:00–10:30 a.m.	<b>TEA BREAK</b>	<b>All</b>
10:30–01:00 p.m.	Sampling Approaches in the Study	Peter Otienoh
01:00–02:00 p.m.	<b>LUNCH BREAK</b>	<b>All</b>
02:00–03:00 p.m.	Field Procedures	Collins Athe
03:00–04:00 p.m.	Review / Expectations / Project Contractual Terms	Peter Otienoh
04:00–04:30 p.m.	<b>TEA BREAK</b>	<b>All</b>
04:30–05:00 p.m.	Piloting Plan / Day 2 Wrap Up	Peter Otienoh
<b>DAY 3. Sunday, Oct. 13, 2013</b>		
08:00–10:00 a.m.	Pre-pilot Meeting at RSA Office	Collins Athe
10:00–02:00 p.m.	Field Piloting	All
02:00–04:00 p.m.	Pilot debrief/Departure	Peter Otienoh /Collins Athe
04:00–06:00 p.m.	Questionnaire finalization Final Team selection Communication to Selected Team Members	Peter Otienoh / Collins Athe
<b>Tuesday, Oct. 14, 2013</b>		
<b>Morning</b>	Fieldwork Begins in Nairobi	All Members Constituting

		the Final Fieldwork Team
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*Annex II: List of participants during the enumerator training in the survey*

**Project team:**

Peter Otienoh, Project Manager (RSA) - 0724314115

Collins Athe, Field Supervisor (RSA) - 0720538892

Lennox Charles, DP Supervisor (RSA) - 0723801788

**Enumerators:**

<b>Name</b>	<b>Gender</b>	<b>Phone Contact</b>
Danstone Ogeno	MALE	0722104646
Boniface Waweru	MALE	0723885834
Brenda Okeyo	FEMALE	0713351571
Whitney Gladys	FEMALE	0726571523
Norah Wekesa	FEMALE	0701652769
Beatrice Chepkurui	FEMALE	0723932118
Micheal Orwe	MALE	0717904063
Nancy Kiare	FEMALE	0723958814
Elijah Motanya	MALE	0752518366
Gertrude Senelwa	FEMALE	0720035333
Steve Oyugi	MALE	0724331515
Maurine Wambui	FEMALE	0720798195
Virginia Achieng	FEMALE	0705832643
Victor Kipngeno	MALE	0725450024
Nicholas Koech	MALE	0728864179
Kelvin Nduati	MALE	0710847110
Bryan Ndunda	MALE	0723096838
Paul Sharon	MALE	0723231230
Kivuitu Ngotho	MALE	0721954049
Susan Wangui	FEMALE	0716980790
Polycarp Masio	MALE	0711281575

Florence Atieno	FEMALE	0724098675
Pauline Oduol	FEMALE	0725470524
Washington Bett	MALE	0717332287
Sasha Jepkemoi	FEMALE	0715201370
Cynthia Muggi	FEMALE	0724507543
Doreen makona	FEMALE	0711159747
Caroline Njeri	FEMALE	0722788083
Emmanuel Machio	MALE	0725766654
Eric agoi Mbuka	MALE	0715410348
Faith ndinda	FEMALE	0714328931
Maureen Odongo	FEMALE	0728257321
Irene Akinyi	FEMALE	0704751154

*Annex III: Survey questionnaire*

***Evaluation Survey on Contribution of Various Stakeholders in Peacebuilding—Kenya***

# **Household Questionnaire**

## **ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION**

<b>Questionnaire number</b>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>		
<b>Date of interview:</b>	<b>DD</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <b>MM</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	
<b>Time of interview:</b>	<b>Start</b>	<b>HH</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <b>MM</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<b>Stop</b>
(24 hour clock)		<input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>	<b>HH</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/> <b>MM</b> <input type="text"/> <input type="text"/>
<b>Name of interviewer:</b>			
<b>Place of interview:</b>			
<b>Region</b>			
<b>County</b>			
<b>District</b>			

<b>Division</b>			
<b>Location</b>			
<b>Sub-location/Village</b>			
<b>Number of visits</b> (max. of 3)			
<b>Reason for call back</b>	<b>Number of visits</b>		
	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>
Refused to be interviewed		1	1
Target respondent not at home		2	2
No one in the household		3	3
Respondent not able to be interviewed due to medical reasons (very sick, dumb, etc.)		4	4
No adult member in the household		5	5
Language barrier		6	6
Other (specify)		98	98
Not applicable		99	99
<b>Outcome of final visit</b>	<b>Successful</b>	<b>Incomplete</b>	<b>Replaced</b>
<b>Field quality control checks</b> (sign as appropriate)			
<b>Activity</b>	<b>Activity undertaken by</b>		
	<b>Interviewer</b>	<b>Team leader</b>	<b>Supervisor</b>
<b>Edited</b>			
<b>Reviewed</b>			
<b>Accompanied</b>			
<b>Back checked</b>			
<b>Called back</b>			

## INTRODUCTION

Good morning/ afternoon/ evening? My name is ..... from Research Solutions Africa, a Market and Social Research firm based in Kenya. We are currently conducting an evaluation

survey on the contribution of **various stakeholders toward peacebuilding in this area**. We are trying assess the contributions of various programmes to peacebuilding.

The interview is likely to take about 45 minutes, and there is no right or wrong answer. The information that you provide will be kept strictly confidential and if we are to quote any response from this interview, then your name will not be used. There is no financial gain for taking part in this survey and you have the right to decline and/or abort the interview at any point.

Are you willing to take part in the survey?

### **Notes for the enumerators**

The enumerators **need to ask all the questions from section B down by the four specified time periods**. They need to ask the respondents to **'go back to that period in time in their minds'** so:

**Time period 1:** Take yourself back to immediately after the 2007 elections.

**Time period 2:** Take yourself back to the time immediately after the constitutional referendum in August 2010

**Time period 3:** Take yourself back to the time just before and during the March 2013 general election

**Time period 4:** This is the present—what you think now.

*During the course of the survey the respondents should be constantly reminded to go back to the time period specified.*

*All questions will be asked for time period 1 before moving on to ask all questions for time period 2 and so on.*

**..... Administer the screener.....**



## SECTION A: DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION

I would like to start off the interview by asking you some general questions about yourself and your household.

Respondents details		
<b>A1</b>	<b>Gender (observe)</b>	Male Female
<b>A2</b>	<b>Name</b>	
<b>A3</b>	<b>Telephone contact</b>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 100px; height: 15px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between;"><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div><div></div></div> 88. Refused to answer
<b>A4</b>	<b>How old are you? (years completed)</b>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 15px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between;"><div></div><div></div><div></div></div>
<b>A5</b>	<b>What is your highest level of education completed?</b>	PRIMARY SECONDARY COLLEGE UNIVERSITY NONE Refused to answer OTHER (Specify) .....
<b>A6</b>	<b>What is your marital status?</b>	SINGLE MARRIED WIDOW WIDOWER DIVORCED REFUSED TO ANSWER
<b>A7</b>	<b>Do you have children?</b>	Yes No ..... <b>GO TO A8</b>
<b>A7.1</b>	<b>If yes, how many children do you have?</b>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; width: 50px; height: 15px; display: flex; align-items: center; justify-content: space-between;"><div></div><div></div><div></div></div>
<b>A8</b>	<b>What is the size of your household?</b>	

Description of the household members:						
A8	A8.1		A8.2	A8.3	A8.4	A8.5
Number (size)	Relationship with the head of the hh ( from the oldest to the youngest)		Gender	Age (in completed years)	Main Occupation	Average monthly income (Kshs)
	Hhd head			0–11		Below 5,000
	Wife/husband/partner		1: Male	12–17		5,000–10,000
	Father			18–25		10,001–15,000
	Mother		2: Female	26–35		15,001–20,000
	Son			36–54		20,001–25,000
	Daughter			55+		25,001–30,000
	Brother					30,001–35,000
	Sister					35,001–40,000
	Other relative					40,001 and above
	Other (specify)					Dependant
						Refused to answer
						Don't know
						Not applicable
	Name	code				
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						
8						
9						
10						

<b>A9</b>	<b>What is your current employment status?</b>  <i>(Tick all that apply)</i>	EMPLOYED ( <i>formal</i> )  EMPLOYED( <i>informal</i> )—casual worker  SELF EMPLOYED ( <i>technical</i> )  SELF EMPLOYED ( <i>business operator</i> )  FARMER  STUDENT  OTHER ( <i>specify</i> ) .....			
<b>A10</b>	<b>How much on average do you earn per month through ... (Kshs.)</b>	1.	2.	3.	98.
		Formal employment	Informal employment	Donations / assistance from others	Others (Specify) ..... .....

## SECTION B: AWARENESS ON CONFLICT SITUATION IN AREA

<b>B1</b>	<b>Where were you living in the following time periods?</b>				
	<b>Period</b>		<b>Place of residence by given time period</b>		
	1	Immediately after the December 2007 general elections			
	2	After August 2010 Referendum			
	3	Just before and during the March 2013 general election			
	4	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)			
<b>B2</b>	<b>Was there conflict in this area in the given time periods?</b>  I. Yes	1	2	3	4
		Immediately after 2007 general elections	After 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the 2013 general election	After the 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)

	2. No ..... <b>GO TO B7</b>					
	90. Don't know ... <b>GO TO B7</b>					
<b>B3</b>	<b>What was the level of conflict in this area in the given time periods?</b>					
	<b>Period</b>  <i>Enumerator to use a show card for the different conflict levels</i>		<b>Conflict level</b>			
			<b>None</b>	<b>Low</b>	<b>Moderate</b>	<b>High</b>
				Where	Where	Where
				<b>Low =</b> small number of people involved;  Short duration;  Minimal disruption to everyday life	<b>Moderate =</b> Medium number of people involved;  Periodic duration;  Some disruption to everyday community life	<b>High =</b> Large numbers of people involved;  Chronic or sustained duration;  Major disruption to everyday life
	1	Immediately after 2007 general elections				
2	After 2010 Referendum					
3	Just before and during the 2013 general election					
4	After the 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)					
<b>B4</b>	<i>If yes in B2,</i>  <b>What was the conflict about?</b>		Land and resources  Political manipulation  Ethnic violence  Cattle raids  Disputed election results			

	(Enumerator to enter all answers given)	Disputed boundaries Lack of economic opportunity Other (specify)		
<b>B5a</b>	If yes in B2, <b>Has your household been affected in any way?</b>	Yes No ..... <b>GO TO B6</b>		
<b>B5b</b>	<b>How was household affected?</b>  (Enumerator to circle answers given or add other)	1. Lost a family member 2. Lost property: land, building, business, etc. Lost income Lost my job Sexual or gender based violence Family disintegration My children stopped going to school Had to relocate to a new location 98. Other (specify) .....		
		<b>B4</b>	<b>B5a</b>	<b>B5b</b>
	<b>Time period</b>	If yes in B2,  <b>What was the conflict about?</b>	If yes in B2,  <b>Was your household affected in any way?</b>	If yes in B5a,  <b>How was your household affected?</b>
	Immediately after December 2007			

	general elections					
	After August 2010 Referendum					
	Just before and during the March 2013 general election					
	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)					
<b>Statement</b>		<b>Time period</b>				
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)	
<b>B6</b>	<b>Was there less conflict in this area in the given time period than before?</b>  Yes  No ..... <b>GO TO B7</b>  Don't know ... <b>GO TO B7</b>					
<b>B6.1</b>	If yes,  <b>What was the reason?</b>	<b>1</b>				
		<b>2</b>				
		<b>3</b>				
<b>B7</b>	<b>Do/ did you foresee the possibility of future conflict in this area?</b>					

	Yes				
	No ..... <b>GO TO B8</b>				
<b>B7.1</b>	<i>If yes,</i>  <b>What do/ did you think would cause the future conflict?</b>  Land and resources Political manipulation ethnic violence cattle raids Disputed election results Disputed boundaries Lack of economic opportunity Other (specify)	1			
		2			
		3			
		4			
		5			

## STATEMENTS ON ATTITUDE, BEHAVIOR AND RELATIONSHIPS

On a scale of 1 to 5

Where 1 = Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3= Undecided, 4=Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree,

Would you agree or disagree with the following statements, as applicable in given time periods?

Statement	Time period			
	1	2	3	4
	Immediately	After August	Just before and	After the

		after December 2007 general elections	2010 Referendum	during the March 2013 general election	March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
<b>B8</b>	<b>There is/was a cordial relationship between the various ethnic communities in this area.</b>				
<b>B9</b>	<b>I appreciate(d) the value of peace.</b>				

**On a scale of 1 to 5**

**Where 1 = Never, 2=Not likely, 3= Undecided/neutral, 4=likely, and 5 = Very likely,**

**How likely are/were you to undertake the following activity in the given time periods?**

<b>B10</b>	<b>Statement</b>	<b>Time period</b>			
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	<b>Discuss conflict issues with a member from a different ethnic community living in this area?</b>				

**On a scale of 1 to 5**

**Where 1 = Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3= Undecided, 4=Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree,**

**Would you agree or disagree with the following statements, as applicable in given time periods**

<b>Statements</b>		<b>Time period</b>			
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
<b>B11</b>	<b>Any ethnic group can live in this area</b>				
<b>B12</b>	<b>I am my ethnic group first</b>				



	and a Kenyan second				
<b>B13</b>	<b>Violence is justified to advance political goals</b>				

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
<b>B14</b>	<p><b>On a scale of 1 to 4 where</b></p> <p>Poor</p> <p>Neutral (neither good or bad)</p> <p>Cordial</p> <p>Very Cordial</p> <p><b>How would you rate the quality relationships amongst the various ethnic communities living in this area?</b></p>				
<b>B15</b>	<p><b>On a scale of 1 to 5 where</b></p> <p>Very unfair</p> <p>Not fair</p> <p>Neutral</p> <p>Fair</p> <p>Very fair</p> <p><b>How would you rate the sharing of resources (e.g. land, water, markets etc.) amongst the various ethnic communities living in this area?</b></p>				
<p><b>On a scale of 1 to 5</b></p> <p><b>Where 1 = Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3= Undecided, 4=Agree, and 5 = Strongly agree,</b></p>					

		<b>Time period</b>			
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
<b>Would you agree or disagree with the following statement, as applicable in given time periods</b>					
<b>B16</b>	<b>Statement</b>	<b>Time period</b>			
		<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	<b>I will report potential for conflict</b>				
<b>B16.1</b>	<i>If agree or strongly agree,</i>          <b>Who would you report to?</b>	DPC/Peace Committee	DPC/Peace Committee	DPC/Peace Committee	DPC/Peace Committee
		Media	Media	Media	Media
		SMS/hotline	SMS/hotline	SMS/hotline	SMS/hotline
		Early warning mechanism	Early warning mechanism	Early warning mechanism	Early warning mechanism
		CSO	CSO	CSO	CSO
		Neighbour	Neighbour	Neighbour	Neighbour
		Community Elders	Community Elders	Community Elders	Community Elders
		Local government	Local government	Local government	Local government
		Security services	Security services	Security services	Security services
		Religious leaders	Religious leaders	Religious leaders	Religious leaders
Other (specify) ...	Other (specify) ...	Other (specify) ...	Other (specify) ...		

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)

## SECTION C: ACTIVITIES AND ACTORS IN PEACEBUILDING

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
CI	<p><b>Are you aware of any activities to reduce or prevent conflict that are/were being undertaken by anyone in this community?</b></p> <p>Yes</p> <p>No ..... <b>GO TO CI0</b></p>				
CI.I	<p><i>If yes in CI,</i></p> <p><b>What are/were these activities?</b></p>				

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	<p>Early Warning, Early Response</p> <p>Rehabilitation of militias</p> <p>Livelihoods, education, building, etc. projects undertaken across different ethnic groups to support coexistence</p> <p>Hate speech monitoring</p> <p>Peace monitors</p> <p>Peace journalism, engagement with the media and SMS</p> <p>Community Dialog and reconciliation</p> <p>Cross-cultural events e.g. sports, road shows, music etc.</p> <p>Training and capacity building for peace</p> <p>Supporting peace structures (committees and DPCs)</p> <p>Other (specify)</p> <p><i>(Enumerator to enter all answers</i></p>				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	<i>that apply or add other)</i>					
CI.2	<b>Of the mentioned peacebuilding activities in CI.1 which are/were the most effective in your opinion (maximum three)?</b>  87. None	1				
		2				
		3				
CI.2.1	<b>For the first one, why do you say so?</b>  <b>For the second one, why did you say so,</b>  <b>For the third one, why did you say so</b>	1				
		2				
		3				
CI.3	<b>Of the mentioned peacebuilding activities in CI.1, which ones are/were</b>	1				
		2				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	<b>the least effective</b> (maximum three)?  87. None	3				
C1.3.1	Why do you say so?	1				
		2				
		3				
C1.4	<b>Have you participated in any way in these activities</b> <i>(in C1.1)?</i>  Yes  No ..... <b>GO TO C2</b>					

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
<b>CI.4.1</b>	<i>If yes in CI.4</i>					
	<b>In which activities have you participated?</b>	1				
	Early Warning, Early Response					
	Rehabilitation of militias					
	Livelihoods, education, building, etc projects undertaken across different ethnic groups to support coexistence	2				
	Hate speech monitoring					
	Peace monitoring and SMS					
	Peace journalism	3				
	Community Dialog and reconciliation					
	Cross-cultural events—for example, sports, road shows, music					
	Training and capacity building for peace	4				
	Supporting peace structures (committees and DPCs)					

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	Other (specify)...	5				
	<i>Please enter all that apply</i>					
<b>C2</b>	<b>Do/did any of the activities you are aware of (in C1.1) address the causes of conflict?</b>  Yes  No ..... <b>GO TO C3</b>  Don't know ... <b>GO TO C3</b>					
<b>C2.1</b>	<i>If yes in C2,</i> <b>Which ones?</b>					
<b>C3</b>	<b>How have these activities in C1.1 played any role in positively changing your attitudes toward other ethnic groups in this area?</b>					



		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	Not at all Slightly A lot A great deal				
<b>C4</b>	<b>Have these activities in C1.1 played any role in changing your behavior toward other ethnic groups in this area?</b>  Yes  No ..... <b>GO TO C5</b>				
<b>C4.1</b>	<i>If yes in C4,</i>  <b>What are/were these changes in behavior that you have individually experienced?</b>	1			
	Participating in others' cultural celebrations  Going to the same markets	2			
	Participating in common recreation or sports  Sharing common resources	3			

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	amicably	4				
	Engaging in joint business activities					
	Recognition of a common dispute resolution mechanisms	5				
	OTHER (SPECIFY) ...					
C5	<b>Have these activities in C1.1 played any role in positively changing your community's attitudes toward other ethnic groups in this area?</b>  Not at all  Slightly  A lot  A great deal					
C6	<b>Have these activities in C1.1 played any role in changing your community's behavior toward other ethnic groups in</b>					

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	<b>this area?</b> Yes No ..... <b>GO TO C7</b>				
<b>C6.1</b>	<i>If yes in C6,</i>  <b>What are/were these changes in behavior in your community that you have observed?</b>	1			
	Intercommunity and intracommunity peace	2			
	2. Stronger belief in inter- and intra-community harmony	3			
	3. Reconciliation with other communities (peace pacts etc.)	4			
	4. Increased sense of security	5			
5. Security of property ownership (including land)					
6. Inclination to violence					
	8. Increased tensions between/among communities				
	98. OTHER (SPECIFY)				
	...				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
<b>C7</b>	<b>What else could be/have been done in order to address the causes of the conflict in this area?</b>	1				
	Undertake land reform	2				
	Fast track security sector reform					
	Resettle IDPs	3				
	Provide safe housing					
	Create jobs					
	Facilitate peacebuilding, Cohesion and Reconciliation activities	4				
	Enhance access to justice (courts of law)					
	Improve inter-religious tolerance	5				
	Don't know					
	Other (specify) ....					

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
C8	<b>Suppose the activities mentioned above (<i>in C1.1</i>) were to end today, do you think the peace situation would deteriorate?</b>  Yes  No  Don't know					
C9	<b>Suppose CSOs were to stop their conflict prevention and reduction activities in the area today, do you see the activities being carried forward by the community members?</b>  Yes  No  <i>Please justify your answer</i>					
C9.1	If yes, why do you say so?	I				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
		2				
		3				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
		4				
		5				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
<b>C9.2</b>	<b>If no, why do you say so?</b>	1				
		2				
		3				



			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
		4				
		5				
<b>C10</b>	<b>Have you contributed resources (e.g. transport,</b>					

		Time period				
		1	2	3	4	
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)	
	<b>food, money etc.) in support of peacebuilding in this area?</b>  Yes  No					
<b>C11</b>	<b>Have members of your community contributed resources (e.g. transport, food, money etc.) in support of peacebuilding in this area?</b>  Yes  No  Don't know					
<b>C12</b>	<b>Have/had you heard of any of the following CSOs, within the given time periods?</b>  1. Yes      2. No ..... <b>GO TO C13</b>					
	1	PACT/Kenya Civil Society Strengthening Program (KCSSP)				
	2	Mercy Corps/Rift Valley Local Empowerment for Peace (LEAP II)				
	3	CHF International/Kenya Tuna Uwezo				
	4	International Rescue Committee/Peace Initiative Kenya (PIK)				
	5	Catholic Relief Services (CRS)/People to People Peace Project (3Ps)				
	6	Internews/Reporting for Peace, and Land and				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
		Conflict Sensitive Journalism in Kenya				
<b>C12.1</b>	<i>If yes in C12,</i>  <b>Which ones are/were active in this area?</b>  PACT Mercy Corps CHF International International Rescue Committee Catholic Relief Services (CRS) Internews None ..... <b>GO TO C14</b> Don't know ... <b>GO TO C14</b>  <b>Enter all that apply</b>	1				
		2				
		3				
		4				
		5				
		6				
<b>C13</b>	<b>Which (other) CSOs are/have been active in peacebuilding activities in this area, over the given time periods?</b>  <i>List all mentioned here then</i>	1				
		2				

			Time period			
			1	2	3	4
			Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	<i>enter by year as appropriate</i>	3				
	1.					
	2.	4				
	3.					
	4.					
	5.	5				
	6.					
	7.	6				
	8.					
	9.					
	10.	7				
	90. None					
		8				
		9				
		10				

		Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
<p><b>How much do you agree with the following statement, as applicable in the given time period?</b></p> <p>Totally disagree with statement</p> <p>Disagree</p> <p>Undecided</p> <p>Agree</p> <p>Totally agree with the statement</p>					
<b>C14</b>	<b>Statement</b>	Time period			
		1	2	3	4
		Immediately after December 2007 general elections	After August 2010 Referendum	Just before and during the March 2013 general election	After the March 2013 general election (March 2013 to Present)
	The activities by CSOs in general have contributed to peaceful co-existence amongst the various communities in this area				

***Thank you very much for your cooperation and participation in the survey.***

***END***

CASE NUMBER .....

## THE SURVEY SCREENER

**S1. How many adults aged 18 years and above live in this household? .....** (Enter number)

**Use the table below to list (from oldest to youngest) and capture the relevant screening details for each of the adults in the household.**

S2		S3	S4		S5	S6
#	Name of each adult household member  (Oldest to youngest)	Age	When did .... Celebrate his/her latest birthday?  (Day, Month)		Does ... belong to any of the following categories?  House help Very sick to effectively communicate Very old to effectively communicate Dumb/deaf Too drunk to effectively communicate Does not understand English, Kiswahili and Kalenjin Is a visitor to the household  <b>Yes .... Exclude from likely respondents</b> <b>No</b>	The selected target household respondent is .....  (Tick)
			Day	Month		
1						
2						
3						
4						
5						
6						
7						

8						
9						
10						
11						
12						
13						
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						