



USAID
FROM THE AMERICAN PEOPLE

BUREAU FOR AFRICA
OFFICE OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION STRATEGY



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Acronyms and Abbreviations

ABCG	African Biodiversity Collaborative Group
ADS	Automated Directive System
AERC	African Economic Research Consortium
AFR	Bureau for Africa
AFR/SD	Office of Sustainable Development, Bureau for Africa
AFR/SD/CPG	Conflict, Peace-Building and Governance Division
AFR/SD/EGEA	Economic growth, Environment and Agriculture Division
BFS	Bureau for Food Security
BTU	British Thermal Unit
CAADP	Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Program
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfers
CDCS	Country Development Cooperation Strategy
CY	Calendar Year
DO	Development Objective
DTW	Deworm the World
E3	Bureau for Economic Growth, Education and the Environment
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FSN	Foreign Service National
FTF	Feed the Future
FY	Fiscal Year
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GBV	Gender-Based Violence
HIV/AIDS	Human Immunodeficiency Virus infection/Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome
ICT	Information and Communications Technology
IEHA	Initiative to End Hunger in Africa
IR	Intermediate Result
IRD	Integrated Rural Development
KM	Knowledge Management
M & E	Monitoring and Evaluation
mHealth	Mobile Technologies for Health
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPs	Operational Plans
PPL	Bureau for Policy, Planning and Learning
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PPRs	Performance Plans and Reports
RDCS	Regional Development Cooperation Strategy
SOCOM	United States Special Operations Command
SSA	Sub-Saharan Africa
STIP	Science, Technology, Innovation and Partnerships
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USG	United States Government
WACD	West African Commission on Drugs
WHO-AFRO	African Regional Office of World health Organization

USAID Bureau for Africa, Office of Sustainable Development (AFR/SD) Regional Development Cooperation Strategy (RDCS)

1. Policy Context

In February 2013, President Obama said in his State of the Union Message:

We also know that progress in the most impoverished parts of our world enriches us all –not only because it creates new markets, more stable order in certain regions of the world, but also because it’s the right thing to do. In many places, people live on little more than a dollar a day. So the United States will join with our allies to eradicate such extreme poverty in the next two decades by connecting more people to the global economy; by empowering women; by giving our young and brightest minds new opportunities to serve, and helping communities to feed, and power, and educate themselves; by saving the world’s children from preventable deaths; and by realizing the promise of an AIDS-free generation, which is within our reach.

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is adopting the goal of “eradicating extreme poverty” as the centerpiece of its strategy going forward. “Since our founding, eliminating extreme poverty and its causes and consequences has been at the center of USAID’s mission to advance U.S. interests and American ideals... The world is coalescing around a goal to end extreme poverty by 2030. By cutting extreme poverty in half since 1990 and achieving MDG1 five years early, there is growing optimism that this remarkable goal may be within reach. With World Bank and United Nations commitments, this goal will likely form the foundation of the Post-2015 development agenda. The U.S. Government’s leadership on this issue will be critical to ensuring global progress, and American ingenuity will be essential to solving some of the most complex development challenges that stand in the way of a world without extreme poverty.”¹

This ambitious goal is consistent with earlier policy statements of the Administration, including the 2010 Policy Directive on Global Development and the 2012 U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa. The President’s approach to global development addresses the new strategic context designed by the United States based on the following three pillars:

- A policy focused on sustainable development outcomes that places a premium on broad-based economic growth, democratic governance, game-changing innovations, and sustainable systems for meeting basic human needs;
- A new operational model that positions the United States to be a more effective partner and to leverage our leadership; and

¹ USAID, “Partnership to Eradicate Extreme Poverty,” (2013).

- A modern architecture that elevates development and harnesses development capabilities spread across government in support of common objectives.²

The 2012 U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa lists three key development pillars:

1. **Strengthen Democratic Institutions:** The new strategy commits the United States to work to advance democracy by strengthening institutions at every level, supporting and building upon the people’s aspirations throughout the continent for more open and accountable governance, promoting human rights and the rule of law, and challenging leaders whose actions threaten the credibility of democratic processes. As the President said in Ghana, “Africa does not need strong men, it needs strong institutions.”
2. **Spur Economic Growth, Trade, and Investment:** Through greater focus, engagement, and the deployment of additional resources, the new strategy commits the United States to work to promote economic growth, including through increased trade and investment in sub-Saharan Africa. The United States will promote an enabling environment for trade and investment, improve economic governance, promote regional integration, expand African capacity to effectively access and benefit from global markets, and encourage U.S. companies to trade with and invest in Africa.
3. **Promote Opportunity and Development:** Nowhere in the world are our development efforts more central to our engagement as they are in Africa. We will continue to focus on sustainable development outcomes and the new operational model for U.S. development assistance outlined in the 2010 Presidential Policy on Global Development³.

Taken together, what do these bedrock policies and strategies mean?

- First, that the United States has a deep national interest in economic development.
- Second, that the central goal of economic development is to eliminate extreme poverty.
- Third, that eliminating poverty depends on a balanced approach that strengthens democratic institutions, spurs economic growth, promotes child survival, ensures food security, combats HIV/AIDS, expands access to renewable energy, and improves education.

A key element of USAID’s approach as stated above is “inviting new ideas and fresh perspectives to development efforts in order to find innovative solutions to our greatest challenges.” This is very consistent with the approach outlined in this strategy.

² White House: *Fact Sheet on Global Development*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2010/09/22/fact-sheet-us-global-development-policy>.

³ White House: *Fact Sheet on the New Strategy Toward sub-Saharan Africa*, <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/06/14/fact-sheet-new-strategy-toward-sub-saharan-africa>.

Other Key USAID Policy Documents

USAID has developed a number of important policies and strategies in the past two years, including: USAID's new *Sustainable Service Delivery in an Increasingly Urban World*, USAID's *Implementation of the U.S. National Action Plan on Women, Peace, and Security*; *Ending Child Marriage and Meeting the Needs of Married Children: The USAID Vision for Action*; Strategies on Democracy, Human Rights and Governance, Global Climate Change and Development, Water and Development, Combatting Violent Extremism, Fragile States, and Education—all of which guide this strategy and its implementation. There are, however, two policy areas that require further elaboration: Gender and Youth.

USAID's Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy

The basic theme of USAID's Gender Policy is: "Gender equality and female empowerment are core development objectives, fundamental for the realization of human rights and key to effective and sustainable development outcomes. No society can develop successfully without providing equitable opportunities, resources, and life prospects for males and females so that they can shape their own lives and contribute to their families and communities."⁴ Under this policy, USAID intends to achieve three outcomes:

- Reduce gender disparities in access to, control over and benefit from resources, wealth, opportunities and services –economic, social, political, and cultural;
- Reduce gender-based violence (GBV) and mitigate its harmful effects on individuals and communities; and
- Increase capability of women and girls to realize their rights, determine their life outcomes, and influence decision-making in households, communities, and societies.

Among the seven guiding principles listed in the Policy, two are of particular importance to this Strategy:

- Integrate gender equality and female empowerment into USAID's work; and
- Serve as a thought-leader and provide innovative approaches for bringing about the change.

As we proceed, the Strategy will point out specific areas where integrating gender issues is particularly important.

AID's Youth in Development Policy

The Goal of AID's *Policy on Youth and Development* is to "improve the capacities and enable the aspirations of youth so that they can contribute to and benefit from more stable, democratic, and prosperous communities and nations." The demographic changes in Africa are providing both enormous opportunity and enormous challenges. If the rising population of youth (defined in the *Policy* as those between the ages of 10 and 29) are not fully integrated into Africa's society, economy and politics, then their disaffection could put substantial strains on political stability and reduce the

⁴ USAID, *Gender Equality and Female Empowerment Policy*, 2013, p.

economic growth impacts of a rising supply of labor. The opposite, of course, is true if ways are found to provide good jobs, education, and political space for this cohort.⁵

AFR/SD will undertake analysis and research to help determine how USAID's programs in Africa can best integrate female and male youth, who face different as well as similar challenges and needs, in order to achieve the first objective of the *Youth Policy*: "Strengthen youth programming, participation, and partnership in support of Agency Development Objectives."⁶ Concurrently we will work with our partners both inside and outside USAID to achieve the second objective of the *Youth policy*: "Mainstream and integrate youth issues and engage young people across ... (African) initiatives and operations."⁷

USAID Initiatives

This strategy will support the Administration's global initiatives in food security, Feed the Future, (FTF) and in health, the Global Health Initiative (GHI), as well as the new African initiatives in power and trade (Trade Africa and Power Africa). AFR/SD's Initiative to End Hunger in Africa (IEHA) anticipated much of the work of the FTF initiative, particularly with regard to developing a strong supportive relationship with the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Program (CAADP). While almost all of AFR/SD's work with CAADP has been transferred to the Bureau for Food Security (BFS), AFR/SD's agricultural team continues to work with BFS to support the FTF program in Africa. This is also the case with the Global Health Initiative and the Global Climate Change (GCC) Initiative. AFR/SD will also use the lessons learned from the President's USG Partnership for Growth (PFG) as a framework for engagement with African governments, private sector, and civil society in the development of the tactical implementation of the strategy to assure African ownership.

USAID Forward

Finally, AFR/SD supports the USAID Forward initiative⁸ in a number of important ways:

The Challenge: *Deliver results on a significant scale through a strengthened USAID. In order to maximize our impact with every development dollar, we have to pursue a more strategic, focused, and results-oriented approach.*

AFR/SD's response: The main purpose of this strategy is to deliver results at scale, through the power of better ideas. At every stage in the implementation of this strategy, AFR/SD intends to use a robust

⁵ The youth cohort is currently 40% of Sub-Saharan Africa's population.

⁶ AID, *Youth and Development Policy*

⁷ Gender integration in youth strategies will also be crucial to the empowerment of all youth. Just as women and men face different needs, challenges and opportunities, the future for girls and boys is directly affected by gender norms, expectations, and power imbalances. By ensuring gender-equitable approaches in youth programming, we can help to end the intergenerational cycle of gender inequality in Africa.

⁸ USAID Forward web-page, <http://www.usaid.gov/usaidforward>

monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system to focus on results and to use those results to influence policy and program changes that will result in significant and measurable impacts.

The Challenge: *Promote sustainable development through high-impact partnerships. In order to achieve long-term sustainable development, we have to support the institutions, private sector partners, and civil society organizations that serve as engines of growth and progress for their own nations.*

AFR/SD's Response: An important part of this strategy (Development Objective 3) is focused on supporting African institutions. In addition, the strategy details how it intends to work in partnership with African institutions and researchers (Development Objective 1), and how it intends to work with external partners and stakeholders in transforming ideas into actions (Development Objective 2).

The Challenge: *Identify and scale up innovative, gender sensitive, and breakthrough solutions to intractable development challenges and inequalities.*


AFR/SD's Response: As e described in detail below, the thrust of this RDCS is to support this USAID Forward goal, in part through partnership with the U.S. Global Development Laboratory.

2. Development Context, Challenges and Opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)

Recent Performance

Most of sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) is in the middle of a profound transition. By almost every measure there has been an increase in welfare in most of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa. The basic data are presented in Figures 1 and 2.

Figure 1. Extreme Poverty in SSA



Source: World Bank, *Poverty and inequality Database*

Figure 1 presents data on extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. The blue line presents data on the percentage of households whose incomes are less than \$1.25 per day (right scale)⁹. This percentage peaked in 1993 and has been slowly falling ever since. However, because of population growth, the number of extremely poor people (people living below the \$1.25 per day poverty line) continued to increase until 2005, reaching 394.8 million, at which point the number of extremely poor people (represented by the red bars and the left-hand scale) began to fall.

What has been learned about how extreme poverty has been reduced worldwide?

First, and by far the most important, poverty reduction is strongly correlated with economic growth. A recent World Bank Working Paper summarizes the evidence for the developing world as well as for sub-Saharan Africa:¹⁰

- On the average world-wide, a growth in per capita income of 1% leads to an increase of 1.057% in the income of the bottom 20% of the income distribution and an increase of 1.004% of the income of the bottom 40%.
- For sub-Saharan Africa, a 1% growth in per capita income leads to 0.986% increase in the income of the bottom 20% and a 0.972% increase in the incomes of the bottom 40%.

⁹ The international poverty line for extreme poverty has been defined as \$1.25 in 2005 Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) dollars. The concept of purchasing power parity allows one to estimate what the exchange rate between two currencies would have to be in order for the exchange to be on par with the purchasing power of the two countries' currencies.

¹⁰ Dollar, David, Tatjana Kleineberg and Aart Kraay, "Growth is Still Good for the Poor," World Bank Working Paper No. 6568 (2013).

So, on average, growth leads to poverty reduction. However, (1) this isn't true for all countries and (2) it doesn't mean that the impact of growth on the poor cannot be increased through well targeted and innovative approaches. Growth rates only explain 75% of the changes in the income of the poor; the rest is explained by changes in income distribution. What changes income distribution in a way so as to increase the impact of growth on poverty? Dollar *et. al.* tested a number of political and economic variables and were only able to find one variable that was associated with improved incomes of the poor: growth in agriculture. Agriculture is central to the economic growth programs of USAID in Africa, so improving USAID's FTF programs helps reduce poverty through both growth and redistribution.

Second, we know that improvements in human capital result in reductions in poverty in the long run. Recent work by Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann has demonstrated that while much of the work linking years of education to economic growth is flawed, the relationship between the quality of education (the development of cognitive skills) and long-run economic growth is much more robust.¹¹ The evidence of the impact of health on long-run growth is much more mixed. David Bloom and David Canning provide a good summary of what research has indicated.¹² Reducing fertility rates has an important impact on growth through the *demographic dividend*, which will be discussed in more detail below.


Third, we know that well-designed safety net programs work to reduce poverty in the short run. Whether or not these programs lead to sustainable changes remains uncertain. There is some evidence that conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have worked in middle-income countries, but there has been little evidence evaluating such programs in low income countries. In fact, except for South Africa and other middle-income countries, safety net programs in SSA remain limited in scale, scope, and institutionalization.

¹¹ Eric A. Hanushek and Ludger Woessmann, "The Role of Cognitive Skills in Economic Development," *Journal of Economic Literature*, (2008) Vol 46, Number 3.

¹² David Bloom and David Canning, "Population, Health and Economic Growth," Growth Commission Working Paper Number 24 (2008).

Figure 2. Sub-Saharan Africa's Progress in

Four Charts



Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*

The following facts, illustrated in Figure 2, are reflective of SSA's progress:

- For SSA as a whole, real GDP (in constant PPP dollars) more than doubled over the 1995-2011 period.
- Since 1995, 15 countries have experienced per capita growth averaging better than 3% per year for at least fifteen years (In other words, in the median country in this group, per capita income increased by 88% since 1995).
- During the first decade of the 21st century, 13 of 19 SSA countries for which there is data significantly reduced poverty (in terms of the percentage of households living in extreme poverty) by an average of 26% or 3.7% per year¹³.
- In SSA as a whole, child mortality has declined from 170 per thousand to 108 per thousand, a decline by 4% per year since 1995.
- In SSA as a whole, primary completion rates increased by 58%; the reason poor performers do better is that they started from a very low level.
- Progress in reducing fertility rates was very limited across all categories of performers.

¹³ World Bank, Poverty and Inequality data-base.

In middle income countries CCTs have been effective in reducing poverty and increasing school attendance. However, the effectiveness of these programs in Africa is likely to be lower because of the higher prevalence of poverty, the more limited resources available to transfer and the relatively limited supply of effective schools¹⁴. These conclusions suggest that USAID's (and AFR/SD's) focus should be on (1) economic growth, particularly agricultural growth; (2) improving the effectiveness and equity of education and health programs; (3) exploring ways to make safety nets more effective; and (4) integrating gender equality principles into economic growth strategies.¹⁵

Gender and Development

Sub-Saharan Africa's nascent transition has been marked by a renewed recognition and promotion of women's rights and a shared value of the contributions of women and girls to society. However, to varying degrees, African women and girls continue to experience high rates of maternal mortality, insecurity in conflict-affected areas, non-presence in peace negotiations, persistent violence in the home, weak status in the formal economy, insufficient and unequal returns for their economic contributions, unequal land tenure rights or access to productive assets, inequality in access to finance, low representation or influence in decision-making structures. This is coupled with the existence of discriminatory statutory and customary laws, policies, and practices that all point to a failure to fully adopt and reinforce a range of newly approved frameworks promoting women's rights in Africa.¹⁶

These gender-based inequalities have powerful negative impacts on the rate of economic growth and productivity a nation experiences. Evidence has shown that gender inequality has costs that not only limit individuals, but entire societies across generations. A study by Stefan Klassen in the *World Bank Economic Review*, found that "gender inequality in education directly affects economic growth by lowering the average level of human capital. In addition, growth is indirectly affected through the impact of gender inequality on investment and population growth. Some 0.4–0.9 percentage points of differences in annual per capita growth rates between East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Middle East can be accounted for by differences in gender gaps in education between these regions."¹⁷ Finally, GBV can have real development costs, cutting a country's GDP by 1-2 percent. This loss is a result of lost work time; physical/mental health costs, including increases in stress related injuries, pain, injury, illness and disability; time costs for recovery, attending court, and hiding under

¹⁴ There have been no well-designed evaluations of CCTs in Africa (outside of South Africa).

¹⁵ Women spend more time doing unpaid work, which has economic value, and needs to be considered in economic discussions for the region. Women are faced with a triple threat of economic, time and energy poverty. Women's work also often substitutes for a lack of formal infrastructure. Improvements in women's earning power accelerate economic growth for future generations.

¹⁶ Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000), the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (SDGEA) (2004), the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003), the Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004), the African Union (AU) Gender Policy (2008) and the declaration of 2010-2020 on the Decade for African Women, the launching of the Fund for African Women and other individual sub-regional and national instruments.

¹⁷ Stefan Klassen, "Low Schooling for Girls, Slower Growth for all: Cross-Country Evidence on the Effect of Gender Inequality in Education on Economic Development." *World Bank Economic Review*, Volume 16, Issue 3. (2002).

protection; and the direct monetary costs for courts, police, hospitals and –at the national level –costs for prevention campaigns.¹⁸

Gender inequalities are not consistent across Africa or between categories of equality such as access to land or credit. Some African nations have seen relative improvements in their Global Gender Gap Index scores between 2006 to 2012 (Uganda moved from #47 to #28), whereas others have seen a decline (Ethiopia went from #62 to #118, and Nigeria from #83 to #110). Even in countries where there have been improvements in women’s equality, this does not necessarily translate into women’s empowerment, economic or otherwise. Highly marginalized populations are especially at risk of economic deprivation and subject to violations of their rights.

Disability, especially for women and girls poses a significant development issue, due to its bidirectional link to poverty: disability may increase the risk of poverty, and poverty may increase the risk of disability. The disabled continue to have their rights neglected; to experience discrimination, violence and abuse; to have their opportunities restricted; and to be excluded from being productive members of society. Being disabled and a female poses a double challenge, as disabled women and girls confront not only the prejudice and inequities encountered by many persons with disabilities, but are also constrained by traditional gender roles and barriers. According to a 2011 World Bank study, disability prevalence in Africa is found to be higher among women than men.

Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered (GBT) individuals also face economic deprivation in Africa, in part due to increased discrimination. At present, four African countries maintain the death penalty and 34 sub-Saharan African countries have laws for the imprisonment of individuals “engaged in LGBT behavior.”

Three Mega-Trends

While the recent past has seen substantial progress, what does the future hold? The IMF and the World Bank are predicting continued growth and poverty reduction in SSA over the medium term (through 2016).¹⁹ Over the longer term the context for economic development in Africa is changing profoundly. There are three particularly important trends that will have important impact on the way USAID does business in Africa over the next quarter-century.


Changing the Foreign Assistance Architecture

Economic growth, together with globalization, is changing the role of foreign assistance in Africa. As can be seen from Figure 3 below –which compares the growth of foreign aid and the growth of fixed investment in Africa—foreign aid and fixed investment are basically flat and the ratio between them is unchanged from 1990 to 2002. From 2002 to 2011 domestic investment increased rapidly, while the foreign aid line increased much more modestly. Between 2002 and 2011 foreign aid grew by 150% while gross fixed capital formation more than tripled (314%). In 2002 the ratio of domestic investment to foreign aid was 3:1; nine years later it had grown to 5:1.

¹⁸ <http://devpolicy.org/gender-based-violence-exploring-the-social-and-economic-costs-20130312/>

¹⁹ World Bank, *Global Economic Prospects, June 2013*; International Monetary Fund, *World Economic Outlook, 2013*.

Figure 3. SSA: Foreign Aid and Investment




Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*, developing Africa only

An alternative way to look at what is happening with respect to financial flows into Africa is presented in Figure 4, which presents sources of foreign finance. In the year 2000, Official Development Assistance (ODA) equaled \$13 billion; Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), \$6.7 billion; and remittances, \$4.8 billion. In other words, ODA was greater than the sum of remittances and FDI. By 2011, that had changed. ODA had grown to \$47.5 billion, but FDI had grown to \$42.1 and remittances to \$31.1 billion. ODA had declined from being 53% of foreign inflows to 39%.

This rapid decline in the economic importance of aid to African countries on the demand side is matched by a rapid diversification of aid sources on the supply side. South-south cooperation in development, led by China—but including other countries such as India, Brazil, South Africa and Turkey—has expanded rapidly. Data on Chinese assistance to Africa, both ODA and other official assistance (e.g., trade credits and loans) are difficult to obtain. A recent paper by Austin Strange *et. al.* estimates the flows of Chinese finance into Africa as roughly the same as that of the United States: around \$75 billion for China and \$90 billion for the U.S. over the 2000–2011 period. However, most of this is not ODA and the flows from China comparable to ODA from the United States are considerably lower.²⁰

²⁰ Austin Strange, Bradley Parks, Michael J. Tierney, Andreas Fuchs, Axel Dreher, and Vijaya Ramachandran, “China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection, Center for Global Development Working Paper 323 (April, 2013). It should be noted that it is very difficult to estimate with any accuracy the actual flows because of secrecy of some documents and issues with definitions.

Figure 4. SSA: Sources of Foreign Finance



Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators*

In addition to the broadening of financial partners, Africa is also seeing a broadening of “knowledge” partners, as new, well-funded, foundations and NGOs providing a variety of new research and experience, enter the arena. USAID is already partnering with a number of these players, such as the Gates Foundation, in a process of knowledge generation and knowledge sharing in areas ranging across the development spectrum.

This change is particularly relevant for the RDCS because, in the future, USAID’s comparative advantage in Africa will be more as a thought-leader than a financier, especially given the budget allocation levels that have been provided to USAID in the recent past and that are likely to continue in the future. This is not to say that the pathway to shifting from foreign aid to other resources will be the same for all countries or for all sectors. The poorest and most fragile countries will still need foreign assistance to provide key social and economic services for the near future; however, the better performing countries, the countries with greater access to foreign investment and which are doing a better job of mobilizing domestic savings are making a quick transformation to aid independence and will be looking for a new relationship with external partners. One of the main thrusts of this strategy is to strengthen this new development partnership between USAID and Africa.

Demography

Despite falling fertility rates, SSA’s demographic future is still characterized by rapid population growth and high dependency ratios. The crude birth rate has fallen from 44 per thousand in 1989 to 37.5 per thousand in 2010. The population growth rate, determined by both the crude birth rate and the crude

death rate, peaked in 1981 (at 2.86%) and has been slowly falling to 2.5% in 2010. The population of SSA is expected to reach 2.0 billion by 2050, more than double the 2010 population of 837 million.²¹ By 2050, Nigeria's population alone is expected to increase by 175% to 440 million, greater than the projected population of the United States. Such growth presents more challenges than opportunities.

The decline in both the birth and death rate has begun to affect the dependency ratio (the proportion of the population under 15 and over 65). The ratio of the proportion of the population below the age of 15 in SSA to the working age population peaked at 88% in 1989, and has been slowly falling ever since, reaching 77.5% in 2011. It is projected to fall to 51% by 2050.²² The decline in the dependency ratio can trigger a *demographic dividend*, which has been estimated to result between a quarter and a fifth of East Asia's growth performance.²³ Of course, part of the size of the dividend in East Asia could be related to the high education levels of its workforce.

The growth of the "youth" cohort²⁴ raises an overstated challenge to Africa. While the size of the "youth" cohort is expected to increase from 239 million in 2010 to 528 million in 2050, as a share of total population, it will actually decline slightly by 2050.²⁵ In fact, as is clear from Figure 5 (following page), SSA's dependency ratios will continue to be very high, and the potential to realize a "demographic dividend" will continue to be low for a number of years.²⁶ Aiyar and Mody, in a 2011 article, found that India's demographic dividend in the 1980s was 1.46 percentage points, almost half of overall per capita income growth, based on an increase in the share of the working force of 2.8 percentage points in the ten years 1981-1991.²⁷ By contrast, SSA's increase in the share of the working force is expected to be 1.8 percentage points over 40 years.

The more important demographic trend in SSA is rapid urbanization. Currently the urban population is 36.5% of the total, but it has been growing at 3.8% per year while the rural population is growing at 1.8%. By 2050, Africa is projected to have over 57% of its population living in urban areas.²⁸ This shift will have profound impacts on African development. One issue that will create challenges is the sex

²¹ UN, *World Population Prospects, 2012 Revised Edition*. This projection is for the medium variant.

[http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-](http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2012_POP_F01_1_TOTAL_POPULATION_BOTH_SEXES.XLS)

[Data/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2012_POP_F01_1_TOTAL_POPULATION_BOTH_SEXES.XLS](http://esa.un.org/wpp/Excel-Data/EXCEL_FILES/1_Population/WPP2012_POP_F01_1_TOTAL_POPULATION_BOTH_SEXES.XLS).

²² World Bank, Health, Nutrition and Population Statistics.

<http://databank.worldbank.org/data/views/variableselection/selectvariables.aspx?source=health-nutrition-and-population-statistics:-population-estimates-and-projections#>.

²³ Bloom, David E. and Jeffrey G. Williamson, 1998, Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia, *World Bank Economic Review*, 12: 419 - 455.

²⁴ Defined here as the population between 15 and 29.

²⁵ United States Census Bureau, on-line

<http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/informationGateway.php>.


²⁶ A demographic dividend occurs when rapidly declining birth rates leads to a structural shift in the population, from a population structure with a high proportion of dependents to one with a much lower proportion of dependents. This increase in the share of workers has been shown in Asia to add up to 1.5 percentage points to the rate of growth.

²⁷ Shekar Aiyar and Ashoka Mody, "How Big is India's Demographic Dividend: Evidence from the States," VOX, April 2011, <http://www.voxeu.org/article/how-big-india-s-demographic-dividend>.

²⁸ United Nations, *World Urbanization Prospects, 2011*.

imbalance in cities. For example, in Kenya, men outnumber women by a ratio of 1.46 to 1. Imbalances of this order, even if temporary, can create difficult social problems.

Figure 5. Total Dependency Ratios: 1950 to 2050²⁹



Source: UN Population Division, *ibid.*

Africa’s urbanization will likely be accompanied by:

- Increasing labor force participation by women.
- The growth of the middle class.
- Increased consumption of high valued food and processed food.³⁰

²⁹ The dependency ratio is defined as the ratio of dependents to workers

³⁰ The emerging linkages between Africa’s growing cities and rural areas are going to be critical for poverty-reducing growth in the future. This will be an area of increasing AFR/SD interest. See T. Reardon *et al.*, “The Emerging Quiet Revolution in African Agrifood Systems,” Brief for “Harnessing Innovation for African Agriculture and Food Systems: Meeting Challenges and Designing for the 21st Century; Nov. 25/26 2013, African Union Conf. Center, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

- The continuing decline of agriculture as a share of GDP.
- The broadening of a cosmopolitan culture in terms of fertility, health, marriage, sources of income, education, consumption, behavior, religion and the mirroring of global norms.

The rise of a middle class will have important ramifications for development in Africa. Unfortunately it is difficult to pinpoint the size of this middle class or how fast it is growing. Current population estimates range from a low of 30 million (OECD) to a high of 300 million (African Development Bank). What is clear is that the rise of a middle class will be concentrated in Africa's cities and will be linked to the pace of urbanization. Rapid urbanization will have important implications for economic growth, agriculture, and political stability. USAID has developed a new policy on urban development that will help the Agency determine to what extent this shift in the importance of urbanization will require it to increase its focus on urban challenges and opportunities.³¹

All of these demographic issues will be high on USAID's agenda for the future. The prospective "youth bulge," the potential demographic dividend, the challenges and opportunities of rapid urbanization are issues that need to be addressed today, not twenty years from now. Even more important is the need to develop and promote new ways to voluntarily reduce fertility and population growth. AFR/SD intends, over the five year period of this strategy, to allocate resources to ensure that programs to address these issues are based on the best possible evidence.

Technology


William Nordhaus, a leading economist who has studied technological change, offers a compelling example of the role and the power of technology and development. The increases in efficiency that came from innovation in lighting efficiency between 1750 and 1992 were around 3% per year over 242 years. In 1750, an oil lamp produced 17.5 lumens of light per British Thermal Unit (BTU) of energy. Over the next 125 years improvements in lamp technology raised the efficiency of a lamp to 46.6 lumens per BTU. The shift to electric bulbs (using carbon filaments) in 1883 dramatically increased lighting efficiency to 762 lumens per BTU. The next 100 years saw constant innovation in lighting technology leading to the compact fluorescent bulb that produces over 20,000 lumens per BTU.

Figure 6 shows what this has meant in the cost of producing light. In the early part of the nineteenth century, using candles, you could buy 33 lumens per penny; by 1990 the cost had been reduced so that the incandescent bulb produced 10,000 lumens per penny.³²

³¹ Forthcoming implementation guidance and mechanisms will enhance the ability of Missions to support inclusive, participatory, pro-poor urban services. AFR/SD already supports the Sustainable Water and Sanitation in Africa, a program designed to bring potable water to small African cities in a sustainable way.

³² William Nordhaus, "Do Real Output and Wage Measures Capture Reality? The History of Lighting Suggests Not," in Timothy F. Bresnahan and Robert F. Gordon, eds., *The Economics of New Goods*, Vol. 58, 1997, pp 29-66. <http://cowles.econ.yale.edu/P/cp/po9b/po957.pdf>.

Figure 6. Change in Lighting Efficiency



Source: Calculated from data in Nordhaus, cited below.

The Amazing Potential of New information Technology

USAID Administrator Shah has said, “... the truth is that today, more than ever, we have the technologies and knowledge to confront these challenges and brighten the future for millions of people around the world. In fact, one of the most powerful tools for development in existence is also one of the most ubiquitous. Today, thanks to cell phones, poor farmers can use text messages to compare prices and sell what they grow at higher prices. Community health workers can use phones to collect information and track disease outbreaks in real time. Protestors can use them to document and share videos of electoral violence. And mobile banking can give billions without an account the opportunity to save money for the very first time.”

The growth of mobile phone services in sub-Saharan Africa is staggering – in early 2013, there were over 500 million mobile connections in sub-Saharan Africa, up 20 percent from 12 months earlier. Mobile services are growing faster in the region than anywhere else in the world. Broadband networks are still lagging, but will undoubtedly expand rapidly, especially with the completion of new underwater cables to both East and West Africa and innovations now being piloted to dramatically reduce the costs of delivering such services.³³

The new global economy is an information-based economy. More and more international goods and services are fundamentally information products – ideas, patents and copyrights – or products that manipulate symbols and ideas – public relations, advertising, consulting, accounting, legal services,

³³ A consortium of technology giants led by Facebook is has launched *Internat.org*, a global effort to make the internet available to the next five billion people worldwide. The nexus between development needs on the one hand and the untapped market for ICT firms on the other, promises to make the goal attainable.

communications, entertainment, research, education and training. Traditional goods and services – jeans, houses, apricots, computers etc. – have enormous amounts of information embedded in their design, production, and marketing.

The knowledge economy is comprised of more than computer chips and the internet. It is, importantly, the use of product and market knowledge to produce high-value items for specific markets. For example, success in the world flower market requires technical knowledge (such as how to develop flowers which can maintain quality while being shipped long distances); marketing knowledge (what do consumers in Germany want this year?); and organizational knowledge (how can we get flowers cut today to Amsterdam tonight)? Not only is information (knowledge) critical to the global economy today, it is likely to grow in importance in the future.

Some inkling of the importance of the communications revolution is provided by the World Bank's study on African infrastructure which concludes:

“...Across Africa, infrastructure contributed 99 basis points (1%) to per capita economic growth from 1990 to 2005, compared with 68 basis points for other structural policies. That contribution is almost entirely attributable to advances in the penetration of telecommunication services...”

In other words, beginning in 1990, when cell phone and internet access was in its infancy in Africa, the impact of increased ICT infrastructure added 1% to the sub-continent's economic growth rate (perhaps 25% of the total GDP growth rate). The impact of Information Communication Technology (ICT) on development in Africa over the next twenty-five years can only be guessed. For instance, we know that income, education, and social status –all areas in which women are disadvantaged—are significant in determining one's access to new technologies. One study found that women are 7% less likely to be able to access mobile phones.³⁴ Whereas technological innovation can represent greater opportunity for women – economic, education, health, and empowerment – it also at risk of perpetuating gender biases. Girls in particular are typically excluded from science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) based learning and career opportunities.

USAID is increasingly focused on how to accelerate the adoption of new technologies in Africa and elsewhere in the developing world. New technologies are not the answer to every problem, but increasingly they provide tools to solve many problems, from improving health care to increasing agricultural productivity to expanding access to financial services to the empowerment of rural women. AFR/SD will work with other bureaus and offices in USAID to assist the spread of key development technologies and to adapt those technologies so that they are more useful to Africa.

³⁴ Gillwald, Alison, Anne Miliek and Christopher Stork, “Gender Assessment of ICT Access and Usage in Africa.” Towards Evidence-based ICT Policy and Regulation 1 (2010).

What these mega-trends mean for USAID in Africa.

Taken together, these three mega-trends project an Africa with a growing urban population, a growing middle class, a higher proportion of literate and educated youth, an Africa with deep connectivity to international knowledge and ideas, and an Africa increasingly self-reliant and independent of traditional aid donors. The aid program of the future will be largely based on transformation through knowledge not through development finance. Much of that knowledge will be generated in Africa and the aid role will be in facilitating the exchange of that knowledge. Much of it will be transmitted through direct ICT connections to the Internet or mobile networks. But some of it will come from the experiences and research of aid donors. It is here, working with a variety of partners both international and African, that AFR/SD will be centering its development work in Africa, helping Africa and African institutions, as well as USAID missions, adapt to this changing world. It is in generating, sharing, and disseminating knowledge (“Ideas,” in the parlance of this strategy) that AFR/SD will influence and promote African development and reduce African poverty.

3. AFR/SD Strategy

The Role of AFR/SD

According to the USAID Automated Directives System (ADS), AFR/SD is described in the following way:

- *The **Office of Sustainable Development (AFR/SD)** provides leadership on African development issues through analysis, strategy development, program design, technical assistance, advocacy, and information dissemination in areas of capacity building, institutional strengthening, partnership development, information technology, social sciences, democracy and governance, natural resources management and environment, agriculture, population, HIV/AIDS, health, nutrition, education, and crisis mitigation and recovery. The Office manages a set of strategic objectives that help guide overseas operating units in making decisions about strategic choices, program design, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation;*
- *Supports, encourages, and strengthens the performance of African regional institutions and other international organizations;*
- *Leads the Bureau's strategic thinking in technical areas; and*
- *Reviews performance by operating units and programs within the Bureau and advises AFR/DP on appropriate allocation of resources to them.*

The Position of AFR/SD

A major question AFR/SD faces is how to situate itself between the USAID Missions in Africa on the one hand, and the central bureaus, particularly the four Pillar Bureaus, on the other. Table 1 lays out the most important responsibilities of these three sets of USAID entities. A number of these responsibilities overlap, requiring communication, cooperation, and coordination between Bureaus and Offices.

Moreover, the Pillar Bureaus have significant responsibilities and capacities to also provide technical support and advice to USAID Missions in Africa and to engage with external partners on Africa issues, particularly in the implementation of the Administration’s key initiatives.

Table 1: Comparative Responsibilities

AFR/SD	USAID Missions	Pillar Bureaus
Africa-wide technical responsibility; responsibility for supporting African institutions and supporting USAID programs in Africa	Responsibility for design and implementation of country-specific and sub-regional programs	Agency leader on global technical issues; with PPL, responsible for developing Agency policy and strategy for global issues; works with AFR/SD in supporting USAID Missions
Chief technical advisors to Africa Bureau Front Office; responsible for providing technical support to AFR initiatives and for leading performance monitoring of AFR’s objectives. Represents USAID/Africa to USG and non-USG stakeholders as well as in global fora dedicated to Africa-wide issues and programs	Responsible for working with U.S. Embassy and other USG to ensure that U.S. activities in a given country are conducted to support the U.S. national interest	Agency representative in global and regional technical fora and in interagency processes on global issues pertaining to the sector(s) of focus in the pillar bureau.
Responsible for working with partners active in Africa, including USAID and USG, to support AFR and USAID strategies and policies in SSA	Responsible for working with partners in the country to ensure there is cooperation and coordination and that policies and programs support the development aspirations of the host country	Main provider of technical support to USAID Missions world-wide; works with global and regional partners and partners working in Africa and globally

Prior to developing this strategy, AFR/SD conducted focus group discussions with most Washington partners and conducted a survey with USAID Missions in Africa. The key conclusions were:

- It’s difficult, if not impossible, to draw hard lines around the relative roles of the Pillar Bureaus and AFR/SD. Roles and responsibilities have not developed from a centrally-mandated organogram, but rather from a rich legacy of historical and personal ties. Thus, both AFR/SD and most Pillar Bureau offices provide support to African Missions. In some instances, AFR/SD is the major source of support to a Mission; in other instances it is the Pillar Bureaus; not infrequently, both do. Issues that are largely technical in nature are (in theory) referred to the Pillar Bureaus; issues that are centered on broader programmatic matters and are raised by Mission Management are (in theory) the purview of AFR/SD.
- In the vast majority of cases, AFR/SD and the Pillar Bureaus do not duplicate each other; in fact, cooperation and coordination are very strong, and synergy is much more often the case than conflict or duplication.

- There is more than enough work to go around. Despite the large number of technical staff in the Pillar Bureaus, they find themselves unable to meet all the demands made upon them, particularly from the missions, and welcome the assistance AFR/SD provides to supplement their own efforts.

In addition to responsibilities, it's important to outline the comparative strengths of each of these groups. This is done in Table 2 below.

AFR/SD	USAID Missions	Pillar Bureaus
Smaller staff, representing all areas of technical expertise, makes working across sectors easier	Technical staff are experts in the program areas being implemented in a specific country	Large number of technical staff; in many cases highly specialized staff
Africa-specific expertise grounds technical programs in the political and cultural realities of Africa	Deep understanding of the political and cultural realities of a specific country and associated sub-region	Strong ties with global technical stakeholders including NGOs, interest groups and the Congress
Strong personal and institutional links to USAID missions; work with Mission Management and Program Office as well as Technical Offices and Pillar Bureau staffs	Strong potential relationship to host government technical ministries and to other partners working in the country	Strong personal and institutional links to USAID missions and Regional Bureau staff
Able to respond more quickly to needs of AFR management	Able to respond more quickly to the needs of Mission Director and Ambassador	World-wide mandate allows for sharing lessons and experiences from one region to another
More attuned to the diplomatic and political realities of Africa	More attuned to the diplomatic and political realities of a specific country	More attuned to the global political realities of technical areas ³⁵

AFR/SD's relationship to the new U.S. Global Development Lab

The Agency is currently in the process of combining the Office of Science and Technology and the Office of Innovation and Development Alliances into a new entity called The U.S. Global Development Lab (GDL). The U.S. Global Development Lab will produce breakthrough development innovations and accelerate the transformation of the U.S. development mission. The focus of the GDL on Science, Technology, Innovation and Partnerships (STIP) complements AFR/SD's focus on transformative ideas that are largely social and behavioral science based. In particular, AFR/SD will work with the U.S. Global Development Lab in helping identify which constraints and opportunities hinder or enable scaling up of development innovations in Africa. AFR/SD will also work with the U.S. Global Development Lab to help Missions in Africa incorporate the GDL's new innovations and partnerships into their programs.

³⁵ The New Alliance for Food Security and Nutrition and other African-focused endeavors solely related to food security will continue to be led by the Bureau for Food Security.

Thought Leadership. The two tables above describe a rich network of technical strengths and responsibilities. Within this nexus, AFR/SD's most central role is to be **Thought Leader** for the Bureau for Africa and its management. **Thought Leadership** involves:

- Providing analytic support to the AFR Front Office, particularly as it represents AFR to USAID senior management and as it represents AFR and USAID to the interagency process, other partners, and African governments.
- Providing support to geographic offices in the Africa Bureau and to USAID missions, particularly by helping them understand Agency policies, programs, and initiatives, in addition to the latest advances in technical knowledge relevant to their country and programs.
- Representing AFR interests in various discussions within USAID with respect to policies, programs, and resource allocations within the Bureau for Africa.
- Representing AFR and USAID in interagency discussions within the USG and in international technical fora.
- Monitoring trends in African development and analyzing what these trends might mean for USAID programs.
- Reviewing AFR Mission Country Development Cooperation Strategies (CDCSs) and Regional RDCS, Operational Plans (OPs) and Performance Plans and Reports (PPRs), programs and projects, and evaluations as needed and providing the results of these reviews to AFR management.
- Provide technical recommendations on budget allocations within specific sectors.
- Strengthening key African policy institutions and networks.
- Analyzing key and emerging issues and developing and implementing solutions to critical development problems facing Africa.
- Promoting gender-sensitive and -inclusive strategies and practices, and increasing programmatic and activity integration of gender equality principals.

Of course, this is a large agenda and, in each area, priorities need to be identified and adhered to. Moreover, much of this is done in cooperation with other development partners, be they Missions, sub-regional platforms, Pillar Bureaus, or African organizations and networks. In some analytic areas, AFR/SD will take the lead, while in others its role will be more of one-off support. The rest of this paper provides a strategy that will enable AFR/SD to achieve the biggest development impacts from its human and financial resources.

Development Hypothesis.

The ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed, the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually slaves of some defunct economist.

John Maynard Keynes

The Trim Tab Principle. R. Buckminster Fuller was a renowned 20th century inventor and visionary most famous for his invention of the geodesic dome. In 1972 he wrote,

Something hit me very hard once, thinking about what one little man could do. Think of the Queen Mary -- the whole ship goes by and then comes the rudder. And there's a tiny thing at the edge of the rudder called a trim tab. It's a miniature rudder. Just moving the little trim tab builds a low pressure that pulls the rudder around. Takes almost no effort at all. So I said that the little individual can be a trim tab. Society thinks it's going right by you, that it's left you altogether. But if you're doing dynamic things mentally, the fact is that you can just put your foot out like that and the whole big ship of state is going to go.³⁶

Most development theorists and practitioners agree with the propositions of Keynes and Fuller. We know that between 1970 and 1994 most African countries floundered and stagnated, largely because the dominant ideologies in Africa were variants of statism or Marxism or both. When these ideas failed, leading to fiscal bankruptcy, they were jettisoned. In terms of the trim tab metaphor, development outcomes are the port that the ship of state arrives at; policies, investments and programs are the rudder that steers the ship; and ideas are the trim tab that guides the rudder. Statism steered the ship of state into a direction of interfering with the market, creating inefficient parastatals and running unsustainable deficits. Sailing in this direction led to economies running aground, with declining levels of welfare for a country's citizens. Shifting to the ideas underlying a market-based economy freed up exchange rates, opened up the economy to international trade and closed failing parastatals. This has led to sustained economic growth and improved welfare.

The underlying hypothesis of the AFR/SD's strategy is that "ideas matter" and that development actions in Africa can be changed for the better by gathering evidence, testing hypotheses, disseminating ideas that have been demonstrated to be effective, influencing decision-makers at all levels, strengthening Africa's indigenous capacity to undertake policy-relevant research, and using the results to influence policies, investments, and programs across development sectors. This hypothesis is presented in Figure 7 below.

Changing Policy, Programs and Projects

- The "influence" process is much more complicated than presented in the simple diagram above. USAID has been working for decades to encourage African governments and institutions to make important changes in policy and programs. What has been learned in this process? **The Importance of Ownership.** Behavioral change is difficult to sustain without ownership by the organization in the process of change. Organizations may agree to change in order to receive rewards or avoid sanctions, but unless both the leadership and key staff believe these changes are necessary and beneficial, there will be little impetus to sustain the change over time. In addition, the strengthening of policy analysis institutions within key organizations helps sustain the process of reform.

³⁶ Quoted in Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trim_tab.


- **The politics of change are often complicated.** Organizations have adopted policies either because they truly believe they are correct or because they serve the interests of key individuals who have strong influence over these policies. Even in democracies, the strongly held interests of a few frequently trump the weakly held interests of the many.
- **Good information and solid evidence can often be the impetus for change.** Not all policies can be changed in response to evidence that the current policy is not in the best interest of an organization’s stakeholders. However, many can be changed, particularly over the longer run. Thus, AFR/SD will work on developing strong evidence to buttress arguments for change, where change is warranted.
- **Champions are important.** Change is hard and organizations resist it vigorously. Frequently, key individuals in an organization can be encouraged to be champions of change. Once these individuals are identified, external actors can use solid evidence to help them develop strong arguments for change.
- **Not all changes are major and have major political obstacles.** Frequently, positive changes are technical and are not freighted with political obstacles. For example, developing action plans for the use of ICT in ministries of health probably has few political obstacles; the main obstacle is lack of information on what can be done and what has been done elsewhere.
- **Many positive changes involve not “what to do” but “how to do it.”** Frequently, changes in “how” face fewer obstacles than changes in “what.” The “how” questions are more responsive to analysis and the synthesis of global experience.
- **Improving the accountability of key institutions to their stakeholders is critical to sustaining positive change.** In the end, sustaining reform requires strengthening the participation of stakeholders in the development of goals, strategies, and priorities of the organization established to serve them. This issue will be discussed in more detail in the discussion of DO 2.

Two Important Principles. AFR/SD’s work will incorporate two important principles to increase its effectiveness. First, it is anticipated that much of this work will involve multi-sectoral teams. Too often USAID’s work has been limited –by its structure and budget— to focusing on one sector at a time. But development problems are frequently multi-sectoral, and it is not unusual for a problem in one sector to require actions in a different sector in order for these problems to be solved. For example, we know that the demographic dividend can result in accelerated economic growth and poverty reduction (according to the World Bank, 10% of Rwanda’s experience with the reduction of extreme poverty over the past decade is due to its demographic dividend).³⁷ A demographic dividend is the result of rapidly declining fertility, and one of the key determinants of fertility is girls’ education. Thus, improving the access of girls to education can be a powerful driver of economic growth.

³⁷ World Bank, *Rwanda Economic Update: Maintaining Momentum with a Special Emphasis on Rwanda’s Pathway out of Poverty*. 2013. <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/05/17810159/rwanda-economic-update-maintaining-momentum-special-focus-rwandas-pathway-out-poverty>.

Second, AFR/SD intends to involve African scholars, policy makers, and organizations as much as possible in its work. Involving Africans helps ground analysis in the African context; recruits influential scholars and practitioners as part of the process of encouraging positive change; and promotes sustainability of policy, program, and investment changes.

Figure 7. A Graphic Representation AFR/SD’s Development Hypothesis



Gender Equality and Female Empowerment is Integral to the RDCS Success

“We know that long term, sustainable development will only be possible when women and men enjoy equal opportunity to rise to their potential. But today, women and girls continue to face disadvantages in every sector in which we work, and—in other cases—boys are falling behind. With [USAID’s Gender

Equality and Female Empowerment Policy], we can ensure our values and commitments are reflected in durable, meaningful results for all.”³⁸

– Administrator Shah

Gender is not only an issue of equity and rights, but also an issue of development efficiency and effectiveness. We cannot fight poverty without promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls, and we cannot promote these values if our development strategies are designed and implemented without understanding that women and men, boys and girls are faced with different needs, challenges, and opportunities. There are differential positive and negative impacts of development efforts on women versus men, and even between women and between men. With this in mind, Africa SD will develop a strong analytic agenda examining how gender inequities across development outcomes can be reduced in Africa.

Over the period of this strategy, AFR/SD commits to undertake at least one analysis –in a key focus area— in each of the three Gender Policy outcomes:

- Reduce gender disparities in access to, control over, and benefit from resources, wealth, opportunities and services –economic, social, political, and cultural;
- Reduce GBV and mitigate its harmful effects on individuals and communities; and
- Increase capability of women and girls to realize their rights, determine their life outcomes, and influence decision-making in households, communities, and societies.

AFR/SD will also build and strengthen partnerships within USAID and among key stakeholders. AFR/SD will serve as a thought leader for gender issues in sub-Saharan Africa by promoting innovative and evidence-based practices, and harnessing science and technology to improve the level and quality of women’s economic empowerment; improve the prevention of gender-based violence; promote women’s agency in decision making bodies and communities; and promote strategies to help break the intergenerational cycle of gender inequality in Africa. AFR/SD will also partner with other similarly minded organizations to develop better and more comprehensive multi-sector gender-sensitive data in Africa. AFR/SD commits to work with several institutions under IR 3.2.2. to help them integrate gender considerations as well as the issues facing vulnerable populations throughout their program cycle.

Finally, AFR/SD in partnership with other stakeholders, commits to drafting and implementing a gender strategy for AFR, including 1) establishing an Africa Bureau gender working group; 2) establishing new procedures for supporting African Mission-level gender points of contact; and 3) establishing and meeting gender integration training objectives for program, M&E, and contracts staff within USAID Africa Bureau and Missions.

³⁸ USAID, *Gender and Female Empowerment Policy*.

Results Framework—Vision, Goal and Development Objectives

Vision Statement for AFR/SD

Extreme poverty in Africa eliminated

This vision emanates from the statements of President Obama and Administrator Shah and is increasingly the position taken by key development partners and African governments and organizations. The vision is central to the efforts of the Africa Bureau and its Missions. Although the vision is an aspiration and seeing it become reality will take decades, the vision statement helps AFR/SD definitively monitor its progress over the course of implementation and beyond. The goal of the AFR/SD strategy, on the other hand, is designed to achieve results by the end of the strategy period:

The Goal for the Africa Regional Program is “Improved impact of the policies and programs of AFR/SD and its partners* on Africa's poor”

AFR/SD's role here is illustrated by the trim-tab principle described above – to use ideas and influence and direct support to African institutions to improve the policies and programs of its partners. These policies and programs are the foundation of development, the framework that determines the incentives for private investment, the basis for efficiency of government service delivery, and the stability of political processes.

The deworming example is telling in this respect (Box 1 below). Research has shown that deworming leads to better educational outcomes and higher lifetime incomes for those who have been treated. A simple, cheap intervention has a rate of return of 81%³⁹. Developing ideas like deworming and influencing development partners to integrate these ideas in their policies and programs will improve the lives of Africa's poor.

Goal Indicators:

- *Sex-disaggregated under-five mortality rates in targeted countries*
- *Head-count (per capita poverty rates) in targeted countries*
- *Sex-disaggregated stunting in targeted countries*
- *Sex-disaggregated proportion of students who at the end of the primary school cycle are able to read and demonstrate understanding in selected countries*
- *Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance Index*
- *Number of hectares under improved natural resource management*
- *Gender inequality index in selected countries*

These indicators help us understand the development context but are not sufficient to understand how well AFR/SD's programs are working. Because the RDCS has limited resources –while its reach is pan-

* “Partners” includes all of the institutions and organizations that AFR/SD works with, both inside and outside USAID.

³⁹ Baird, Sarah, Joan Hamory Hicks, Michael Kremer and Edward Miguel, “Worms at Work: Long-Run Impacts of Child Health Gains,” Working Paper, Harvard University, 2011.

African —direct indicators need to be supplemented by impact evaluations and *ex post* cost-benefit analysis to determine which of the ideas it is promoting actually led to measurable change in welfare for that proportion of the population currently living in extreme poverty (i.e., with incomes less than \$1.25 a day in 2005 purchasing power parity). These ex-post studies should make it possible to determine the impact of the ideas AFR/SD develops and promulgates on the welfare of the poor in the populations its work is targeting, and enable AFR/SD to revise its strategy and programs accordingly.

Box 1: Deworming – From Research to Action to impact

Intestinal worms affect 1 in 4 people worldwide, primarily the poor. Children who are infected suffer from malnutrition, anemia, stunted growth, and less education (because they are often too sick to go to school). A simple drug treatment is available, and it costs less than 50 cents per child annually. But logistical hurdles, combined with a lack of political will, have stymied the scale-up of treatment for years.

This is where research has played an essential role. In the late 1990's, Michael Kremer (of Harvard) and Ted Miguel (University of California) decided to evaluate the education impacts of school-based deworming campaigns in a randomized study in Western Kenya. The results were impressive, and they even caught the attention of Kenyan politicians. They found that school absenteeism fell by 25% for children offered free deworming treatments. In the study, even children who did not receive the drugs themselves benefited, because their treated friends and family did not have worms to pass on, breaking the cycle of infection transmission. They were able to demonstrate that, compared to other education-promoting interventions (including scholarships, school meals, and subsidized uniforms) deworming programs provide a greater boost to school attendance at a lower cost.

Perhaps more remarkable, a follow-up study one decade later found that the (now) young adults who had received deworming early in life earned over 20% more each year. They also worked more hours each week than their counterparts who had not been dewormed through the program.

How did this critical information get into the right hands? It required numerous meetings with government officials, community leaders, and high-level politicians. The researchers sought out media coverage in Kenya, and partnered with local child advocates and political allies. And in 2008, partly in response to the research, a new non-profit organization called Deworm the World (DTW) was created to help expand access to deworming for young people worldwide.

DTW works with governments and NGOs to design and launch new school-based treatment campaigns. To date, the organization has provided technical assistance to 27 countries, resulting in the deworming of 37 million children across the globe. DTW tirelessly focuses a spotlight on deworming among governments, donors, and the international media.

Ted Miguel, "The Berkley Blog" (Nov 4, 2011)


Critical Assumptions for Achieving the Goal

- *Agency priorities and resource allocations don't change drastically.* This strategy is based on current Agency goals and priorities. A major shift, particularly a decision to further centralize Agency technical staff, could undermine this strategy.
- *New Initiatives do not require substantial reductions in SD's staff and budget.* The start-up of the new African initiatives have been supported by AFR/SD staff and resources and have resulted in some of AFR/SD's staff and budget being shifted out of AFR/SD.

Achieving the Goal.

AFR/SD achieves its goal through three mutually reinforcing development objectives that together will bring new, effective ideas to policies, programs, and projects being implemented by a variety of partners in sub-Saharan Africa, including USAID Missions and Offices, other USG agencies, African governments, other donors, and a broad panoply of private sector actors who have a strong influence on the intellectual environment in which African development is occurring.


Figure 8. Achieving the Goal



Development Objective 1: Capacity of AFR/SD to develop more effective ideas strengthened.

The history of development in Africa, as elsewhere, is littered with bad ideas, ideas that have led to the squandering of billions of dollars of investment and the wasting of years of opportunity. On the other hand, good ideas, however simple, can have large development impacts. A recent example is the new understanding that male circumcision can reduce the transmission of HIV/AIDS. As WHO notes, “There is compelling evidence that male circumcision reduces the risk of heterosexually acquired HIV infection in men by approximately 60%. Three randomized controlled trials have shown that male circumcision provided by well-trained health professionals in properly equipped settings is safe.”⁴⁰ The increased prevention of the spread of HIV/AIDS through a procedure that is cheap and safe is a demonstration of how good, simple, ideas can have deep impacts.

Figure 9. Results Framework for DO1



Good ideas are developed in many different ways. Some are found through a process of trial and error, taking each proposal and submitting it to rigorous testing. This is the process through which Edison found the right filament to make the incandescent bulb a commercial success. Sometimes the question is less “Is this a good idea?” and more a question of “Is the benefit of the change worth the cost?” For example, rigorous testing of deworming medicine proved that the value was much greater than the cost. Sometimes it involves operations research, discovering how a good idea, e.g., bed nets, can be made to work in a specific environment. Not all ideas turn out to be good ones. In the 1970s and 1980s development agencies were convinced that integrated rural development (IRD) was the way to reduce rural poverty. These programs were later found to be too complicated and depended too much on

⁴⁰ WHO web-site, <http://www.who.int/hiv/topics/malecircumcision/en/>

weak government organizations. By the 1990s, IRD was abandoned for focused sectoral approaches. Development of new ideas must be accompanied by testing and rigorous evaluation. Bad ideas that teach important lessons are valuable in and of themselves.

AFR/SD's capacity to develop more effective ideas will be accomplished through two Intermediate Results: one focusing on implementing a process through which AFR/SD will determine what issues to investigate and the allocation of resources to those issues, and the second focusing on improving the capacity of AFR/SD to carry out the implementation of this analytic agenda.

Indicators for DO1:

- Percentage of AFR/SD partners who recognize AFR/SD as a thought leader⁴¹ in targeted areas.
- Number of “innovative” or “effective” ideas/proposals produced by AFR/SD and its partners that meet the criteria for “innovativeness” or “effectiveness” as determined by a selection committee.
- Change in overall capacity of AFR/SD to produce quality analytic products (as measured by a capacity index).

IR 1.1. Inclusive Analytic Agenda process improved.

The analytic agenda is at the core of DO 1. An analytic agenda is more than a list of issues that will be investigated beginning in a given fiscal year. In fact, each agenda item will represent an activity that will be expected to lead to a development outcome. The “idea” will be researchable and practical, rather than overly broad or overly general. Each item is expected to have a clear plan on how to move from the “idea” phase to the “influence” phase. It is expected that much of the analytic agenda will be focused on issues that cut across two or more sectors and many analytic agenda items will use gender sensitive and inclusive methodologies (in addition to the three gender specific analytic agenda items described in the Development Hypothesis).

The process for developing an analytic agenda will be inclusive, rigorous and will be modeled on a typical research grants process. Such a process typically includes:

- A research committee that decides how to allocate funds over proposals.
- Clear guidelines on who may submit proposals.
- Clear guidelines on selection criteria.
- Call for proposals from eligible persons/institutions.

One of the first steps in the implementation of this strategy will be to draft the process for submitting ideas for the analytic agenda. In all cases at least one member of the research team will be a member of the AFR/SD staff, but participation of other USAID personnel, especially Mission personnel, is encouraged. Most, but not all, analyses will be conducted by contractors or grantees, and influence activities will be largely the responsibility with USAID/AFR staff.

⁴¹ “Thought leader” is one of several terms that will be defined in AFR/SD's Performance Monitoring Plan (PMP).

When prioritizing questions for the analytic agenda, AFR/SD's collaboration with other USAID operating units will be critical to improve synergies and cross-learning with other learning efforts, improve cost effectiveness, and avoid duplication of efforts. Because Pillar Bureaus and other units are sometimes pursuing global analytic agendas, it will be important that AFR/SD's analytic agenda supports those global agendas where feasible and incorporates lessons learned from other regions within their respective area of expertise.

Feed the Future, for example, has established an initiative-wide Learning Agenda of priority unanswered questions related to food security and nutrition and maintains an inventory of ongoing and planned analyses that will contribute to answering these key questions. When considering a potential analysis related to food security, AFR/SD will collaborate with the Bureau for Food Security's Monitoring and Evaluation/Knowledge Management (KM) team to determine if the analysis can contribute to some of the learning agenda key questions, if a similar analysis is already taking place in another region, or if the analysis can be done collaboratively to serve multiple purposes. AFR/SD will seek a mutually beneficial/reciprocal relationship with all operating units, which will be critical for ensuring that global agendas, solutions, and lessons learned will be customized for the SSA context when being considered for operationalization/implementation.

For CY 2013/14 (FY2014), the resources used to implement the program will be FY2013 carry-over. To get a head start on the strategy, the FY2014 analytic agenda process will be truncated and less elaborate. AFR/SD expects that during 2014 it will develop an analytic agenda process that will include staff outside AFR/SD in its development. An illustrative list of potential multi-sectoral analytic activities for FY2014 is listed in Box 2. Reviewing, prioritizing, and resourcing these preliminary proposals still needs to be completed.

Indicators for IR1.1:

- Percentage of analytic activities developed in consultation with partners outside AFR/SD.
- Number of analytic activities leading to actionable results (from "idea" to "change").
- Quality of analytic agenda as a whole (result of survey of AFR/SD and partners).

Illustrative Activities for IR 1.1.

Budget and Staff Allocation. It is important to realize that this strategy represents, in many ways, a continuation of AFR/SD's current work. What is different is, first, a commitment to increase AFR/SD's multi-sectoral work and, second, a need to be more explicit as to AFR/SD's priorities. In order to develop and implement the analytic agenda, AFR/SD will have to manage its resources more strategically than has been previously necessary. AFR/SD currently has sufficient staff but those staff are facing a number of new demands, such as providing technical support for the review of project and contracting documents for large projects developed by the Africa Bureau. Managing the very real demands on staff time so as to provide space for staff to pursue analytic activities will be a challenge.

Box 2: Illustrative Cross-sectoral Analytic Activities under DO 1 for FY14

Review of Youth Livelihood Programs to Identify Best Practices – (Economic growth, education and health)

Assessment of Best Practices of Devolution of Government with Respect to Provision of Health Services – (Democracy and health)

Integrated Pilot project Linking Food Security, Climate Change and Biodiversity – (Climate change, biodiversity and agriculture -- in collaboration and funding with BFS and E3)

Ethiopia Country Study on Poverty Reduction – (Economic growth, and democracy and governance)

Identifying Data Gaps in Africa – (SD-wide)

Lessons Learned from Involving Women in Peace Negotiations – (Gender and combatting violent extremism)

Health Financing Study – (Health and economics)

On the budget side, the issue is not the size of the resource envelope that AFR/SD receives to implement its strategy; rather it is the fact that many of these resources are designated for specific purposes. AFR/SD intends to develop a transparent mechanism for combining these funds for multi-sectoral activities that form an important part of its expected activities under DO 1. Finally, in addition to using the mechanisms of the Pillar Bureaus, AFR/SD currently has in place several project mechanisms that can be used for analytic activities. Over the next several years, it may be necessary to supplement what is currently in place, but this is unlikely to present a problem.

Establishing Relationships with Key Partners. In the course of the focus group discussions with the Pillar Bureaus, it became evident that across most areas strong partnerships already existed. AFR/SD has bought into Pillar Bureau mechanisms, attended Pillar Bureau staff meetings, designed joint programs, and even, in some cases, has been provided with resources and staff from the Pillar Bureaus.

As noted above, AFR/SD intends to implement DO 1 in partnership with a broad set of partners. These partnerships are absolutely necessary for a number of reasons:

- Partnerships with USAID Missions will help identify issues that are important to the implementation of USAID's agenda and help ground-truth the conclusions reached through these agenda items.
- Partnership with USAID's regional platforms will ensure that AFR/SD's activities work in synergy with the regional platforms, particularly in supporting regional and sub-regional institutions.

- AFR/SD will, of course, work with Africa Bureau management to ensure that its activities meet the strategic needs of the Bureau.
- AFR/SD will include, to the extent possible, African researchers and institutions in the implementation of DO 1.
- AFR/SD will work with the Pillar Bureaus to make sure that there is complementarity in programs and activities, mutual learning and, where possible, joint activities.
- AFR/SD will work with the new U.S. Global Development Lab, particularly to help ensure that new learning is fully integrated into the Program Cycle of USAID missions and regional platforms in Africa.

One interesting example that AFR/SD is currently working on is an activity that brings together the Africa Bureau, BFS, and E3 and combines climate change funding, FTF funding, and biodiversity funding to examine linkages between agricultural intensification and global climate change. This program will be implemented in cooperation with USAID Zambia. AFR will also work with the Pillar Bureau office (DCHA, Health, and E3) to identify more effective GBV prevention strategies in parallel with existing medical and legal response mechanisms that support survivors.

IR 1.2. Capacities to do analytic work strengthened.

Implementing this analytical agenda is going to require strengthening AFR/SD staff capacities. AFR/SD technical staff are extremely knowledgeable in the areas in which they are working. However, there is a shortage of certain critical skills in research design, statistical analysis, and a few more specialized technical areas. One way to strengthen capacity is through more aggressive use of training, including secondments of AFR/SD staff to other development partners. AFR/SD can multiply its efforts by developing stronger partnerships with centers of excellence within and outside of AID. In addition, it may be necessary for the Office hire a few additional staff with specialized skills in technical areas that are not substantially covered by other parts of the Agency.

Indicators for IR 1.2:

- Percentage change in AFR/SD's capacity to develop, manage, and review analytic work (as measured by an index of staff skills- proxy indicator).
- Number of analytical products generated by AFR/SD staff.

Illustrative Activities for IR 1.2.

Staff learning is encouraged and enabled. Continuous learning should be a hallmark of AFR/SD, particularly in analytic methodologies and the frontiers of development thinking. One way to promote such learning would be to allocate resources for long-term training (two to three months) in more specialized technical areas and in research design. This training could be augmented with secondments to institutions such as Center for Global Development, the World Bank, Brookings, World Resource Institute, the Centers for Disease Control, and/or other donor agencies, etc.

SD Technical staff are augmented by specialists in quantitative and research methodologies as needed. Another way to augment AFR/SD's skill set is to expand the number of fellows from the physical and social sciences with serious quantitative skills, research experience, and more specialized skills on the frontiers of research in African development⁴². The expectation here is that there would be no more than two or three net additions (and it is possible that there will be no additions, but rather a shift in skills with the same staff numbers).

Critical Assumptions for Achieving DO 1

- *Cooperation among AFR/SD, the U.S. Global Development Lab, PPL, and the Pillar Bureaus is not undermined by turf battles. Success depends on cooperation and synergies; failure is almost certainly ensured by competition, which is destructive and self-centered.*
- *AFR/SD's intention to work across sectors is bolstered by similar emphasis on cross-sectoral work in other USAID operating units.*

Development Objective 2: Policies and Programs of Key Stakeholders Influenced.

It is not enough to have good ideas on paper; this strategy has an equal focus on translating ideas into actions. However, the process of transforming ideas that work on paper into ideas that work in reality can be a long and tangled one. The key steps to influence change in the deworming example (Box 1 above), not all of which are easily replicable, nor would be the responsibility of AFR/SD are:

1. Documenting the value of the "idea."
2. Meeting with government officials and media to disseminate the idea and its potential impact.
3. Piloting the idea; this eventually led to major deworming programs in Kenya, Liberia, Nigeria, and the Indian states of Bihar and Andhra Pradesh as well as other countries.
4. Creating an international NGO to promote the idea world-wide.
5. Raising funding from public and private sources and obtaining support from the leading health and education organizations (including WHO and Education for All).
6. Continuing to spread the value of the idea to new governments and financiers.

This is the most important DO in the strategy (Box 3 describes the influence to date of a recent AFR/SD product). Most of the daily work conducted by AFR/SD staff involves using its technical expertise and its knowledge of African development issues to try to improve the policies and programs that are determining development success in SSA. AFR/SD's daily work includes:

- Providing assistance to Missions as they develop, implement, and evaluate strategies and projects;
- Providing state of the art information to the AFR Front Office as it engages with Agency leadership and other USG agencies, especially through the Interagency process led by the National Security Staff;

⁴² Again, AFR/SD already employs a number of fellows, but these tend to be highly specialized. It may be necessary to bring in one or two experts in statistics and research design and evaluation.

Box 3: AFR/SD's Conflict Prevention and Governance Division (CPG) Influences Multiple Partners

CPG drafted guidance entitled "Counter-Narcotics Programming Guide for Africa" and disseminated it widely. Examples of the responses received from stakeholders follow:

The Drugs Enforcement Agency for Europe and Africa: "Is it possible to receive the final version of your CN programming guide for Africa? We are currently writing a strategy paper for DEA operations in Africa and we would like to mirror some of your themes."

The West African Commission on Drugs: "Your intervention [briefing the WACD Commissioners] highlighted the need to look at the issue from a development perspective and this is well reflected in the current draft outline of the commission's final report, namely Impact of Drug Trafficking on Development. ...some of the issues raised through the guide will be reflected here."

From an FSN in an African Mission: "Thank you so much for sharing this information. I will send it to some of our partners such as the Attorney General's Office and the Central Cabinet for Combat Corruption, the Police and some donors working in justice and anti-corruption areas and others. It is a very good document, congratulations for such a nice job."


SOCOM (United States Special Operations Command): "Congratulations on this report... There will be great interest at SOCOM and among its interagency reps - particularly law enforcement. I will share judiciously and we may consider together the prospect of having you brief this via a SOCOM VTC."

GIZ (German Technical Assistance Agency): "Thanks again for the doc. I had already disseminated it within GIZ and Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development). Everybody was amazed by your innovative approach."

NGO Representative: "I must say that the programming guide is quite impressive. It makes such a strong case on the need for development agencies to attend to the illicit drugs trade problem now and not later, and most importantly, establishes the information base that is necessary so that the problem could not anymore be ignored. Most importantly, because this time it is USAID saying it development agencies should now sit up and take notice."

- Working directly with USG agencies such as Department of State, Department of Defense, and the Office of the United States Trade Representative, to coordinate and improve the USG’s engagement in Africa;
- Working with the Pillar Bureaus, the Bureau for Legislative and Public Affairs, the General Counsel and PPL to develop Agency-level policies and strategies;
- Working with private partners (NGOs, foundations, for-profit firms) to assist their involvement with Africa and to learn from them;
- Working with African institutions and networks to strengthen their capacity and to help inform their policies, programs, and projects;
- Working with African governments at national and sub-national levels to strengthen and deepen policy reforms and allocate investment funds more effectively;
- Working with other donor agencies and international networks to apply knowledge to development issues in SSA.

Figure 10. Results Framework for DO 2



This strategy intends to broaden and deepen AFR/SD’s influence among its partners working on African development. This RDCS will help AFR/SD prioritize its activities and more effectively monitor both how it is using its influence as well as the impact of this influence. Being more conscious about its work should lead to having a greater impact on African development than has been the case previously.

First and foremost is the need to develop an effective system to manage the knowledge that AFR/SD and its partners are accumulating. Equally important is the need to strengthen its partner network and relationships. This development objective will not be achieved by merely establishing a web-site and mailing newsletters. Personal relationships, sharing of research and public events between AFR/SD and its partners will help develop the trust that is necessary for deep discussions about policy and programs. Finally, AFR/SD's influence within USAID is critical for the achievement of DO 2. Central to increasing SD's influence is improving AFR/SD's reputation, particularly with AID missions in Africa, and the Africa Bureau Front Office. So the logical framework here is that *Influence* follows *Reputation* and that *Reputation* follows *Performance*.

DO 2 will be accomplished through the following three IRs:

- IR 2.1. Knowledge Management (KM) Systems for sharing of information/data established and implemented.
- IR 2.2. Partnerships between AFR and key external actors established.
- IR 2.3. AFR/SD's reputation as a provider of high quality technical services to USAID Missions and USAID/W colleagues improved.

Indicator for DO 2:

- *Number of stakeholders'/partners' policies and programs improved*

IR 2.1. Knowledge Management Systems for sharing of information/data established and implemented.

AFR/SD's systems for knowledge management and communications have eroded in the last few years. Without the ability to understand the results of AFR/SD's analytic work and a capacity to share that work effectively, the office's ability to influence its partners will be reduced. AFR/SD needs a strong KM system to organize its outreach and influence activities and to strengthen the sharing of information internally. Effective knowledge management systems are difficult to develop and more difficult to maintain. In addition to strong processes, deep cooperation among staff is required. AFR/SD intends to place priority on the development of this system.

Indicators for IR 2.1:

- *Percentage of AFR/SD's internal and external partners citing AFR/SD as an important resource for research and analytical products (client survey).*
- *Knowledge Management system quality index (as evaluated by survey of AFR/SD staff and partners).*

Illustrative Activities for IR 2.1.

Tools for dissemination of important ideas and research established. AFR/SD intends to develop a suite of dissemination instruments. These will probably include a web-site and a monthly e-newsletter;

workshops and seminars conducted regularly; and the distribution of research papers, abstracts, and short policy notes. AFR/SD also intends to integrate social media into its strategy implementation.

Twitter, for example, is an important medium in Africa, particularly among young professionals. Using Twitter to alert Africans about new results from AFR/SD analyses will lead to a very broad dissemination of ideas. All of this will be done in coordination with AFR/DP.

IR 2.2. Partnerships between AFR and key external stakeholders established.

The basis for influencing others is familiarity and respect. That is why establishing and strengthening partnerships with AFR/SD's stakeholders, namely, key African governmental institutions, is integral to the success of the strategy. Partnerships with other assistance providers, including traditional and non-traditional donors, could lead to AFR/SD coordinating and, in some cases, pooling resources to achieve joint goals. These partnerships needn't be formal but they do need to be built on a foundation of effectively working together, especially around issues of common interest. Bringing evidence-based ideas to the table with partners who are working towards the same development goals will help strengthen existing, and develop new, relationships, spreading AFR/SD's influence on its partners.

Indicators for IR 2.2:

- Number of new cooperation/collaboration MOUs established between AFR/SD and key external partners.
- Rating of quality of cooperation between AFR/SD and its external partners.

There are three steps to strengthening AFR/SD's partnerships with external stakeholders: identification, coordination, and partnership. An example for how all this works can be seen in Box

Illustrative Activities for IR 2.2.

Development and Implementation of a process for mapping key external stakeholders' objectives and needs. In many ways, the identification process is simple. AFR/SD already has many institutions and individuals with whom it has built strong connections. However, it may be possible to identify, in a deeper way, institutions and individuals who have stronger influence on policy-makers. A relatively new tool, influence-mapping, can be used to understand the players who matter most in a given instance. This tool has been recently used to great effect by USAID/Rwanda, and AFR/SD intends to test it in a number of cases to determine whether it deepens AFR/SD's understanding of how to increase its influence and on whom (Box 4).

Establishment of relationships between AFR and key external stakeholders. Currently AFR/SD's engagement with external stakeholders tends to be *ad hoc* rather than regular and periodic. Over the strategy period AFR/SD intends to institutionalize a number of these engagements, so as to better understand the issues driving key external stakeholders' decisions, the constraints they face, the resources they bring, and the interest they have in working jointly.

Coordinating knowledge sharing with key external partners and other USAID entities. AFR/SD does not have the staff nor budget resources to work by itself. By coordinating with other USAID organizations, particularly, but not solely, the Pillar Bureaus, AFR/SD will be able to bring the substantial expertise of its partners within USAID to the table. For example, AFR/SD, together with Global Health, and several USAID Missions and regional platforms, held a workshop in 2012 that brought together a number of partners to explore new uses of ICT in health (Box 5).

Box 4: Influence Mapping: the Case of USAID/Rwanda

USAID/Rwanda began using influence maps as part of the design of their CDCS. The purposes of an influence map are:

- USAID often fails to target relationships with key stakeholders strategically. Relationships tend to be more personality-driven than results-driven.*
- Collaboration Maps can help coordinate efforts among various partners but more importantly help USAID determine where to focus relationship-building efforts.*
- Combines influence (both financial and non-financial) with the level of interaction.*
- Serves as a monitoring tool for stakeholder engagement.*

As a result of this exercise, USAID/Rwanda recognized that some stakeholders had more influence on the development outcome they were trying to achieve than others, and therefore it would be a good idea to put more emphasis on influencing those stakeholders (e.g., UK's Department for International Development). They also learned that some of the stakeholder relationships they built were dependent on one individual and were thus at greater risk of being broken if and when that individual moves on to other duties.

IR 2.3. AFR/SD Technical Services to USAID Missions and USAID/W colleagues valued.

Certainly, the most important and most influential relationship AFR/SD has is with USAID bilateral Missions and Regional Missions in Africa. Resources are too limited to engage all Missions or all areas. Nevertheless, AFR/SD has provided significant technical and program support to a number of USAID Missions. Some examples include:

- AFR/SD/(education) has worked with African Missions to help them reprogram education resources in the light of the Agency's new education strategy;
- AFR/SD/EGEA has provided extensive support to Missions in designing strategies and programs to implement the Agency's new strategy on Global Climate Change;
- AFR/SD/CPG has provided ongoing technical support to USAID/Benin to develop a groundbreaking \$2.3 million rule of law and anticorruption program in an effort to address underlying governance issues that foster transnational organized crime;

Box 5: Coordinating with Other Partners

In November 2012, a regional meeting on “Using Mobile Technology to Improve Family Planning and Health Programs,” was held in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Sponsored by AFR/SD and the Global Health Bureau, it brought together country teams comprising representatives from governmental and non-governmental organizations, the private sector, and civil society from 13 countries and two regional programs.

Lessons Learned Include:

- *The intersection of mobile banking and mobile health offers much potential for effective interventions and innovation.*
- *Mobile phone use focused on communities, and designed with the end user in mind, can dramatically improve the health system.*
- *Commodity stock-outs in both the private and public sectors can be reduced notably through mobile phone reporting and ordering.*
- *Mobile technology has tremendous creative potential to impact and energize programming with youth, especially through multichannel approaches.*
- *Mobile technology can help countries overcome human resource constraints by providing cost-efficient approaches to supervision and continuous training.*
- *The private sector is a critical partner for taking mHealth programs to scale.*

Vision and Action Plans: Next Steps for Advancing the mHealth Agenda. *On the final day of the meeting, each of the country teams developed a vision for expanding the integration of mobile technology into their health programming and identified actions to undertake over the next year in order to realize their vision. The actions identified by the teams are:*

- **i. Advocacy:** *All countries identified advocacy as an important next step in generating country commitment following the meeting. Many countries propose to do this through the establishment of a national task force.*
- **ii. National Strategy:** *At present, only Kenya and Tanzania have developed a national eHealth strategy. These countries have also been extremely successful in moving their e- and mHealth agendas forward. Burundi, Malawi and Nigeria have proposed to develop one.*
- **iii. Public-private partnership:** *The country teams from DRC, Kenya, Madagascar, and Nigeria included strong participation from private sector companies. These countries plan to expand and strengthen engagement with the private sector by partnering with mobile telecommunications companies to scale up mHealth programs.*
- **iv. Evaluation and Assessments:** *Many participants stressed the need for assessments of the current mHealth landscape in their country and evaluations of mHealth projects to determine impact, scalability, and sustainability. Burundi, Malawi, and Nigeria plan to conduct an assessment of the current status of technology use in order to move forward*

This meeting brought together state-of-the-art ideas already in practice with practitioners eager to learn what is available. It resulted in the development of country action plans to advance mhealth applications and the improved understanding between government staff and private sector

- AFR/SD/Health participated in the evaluation of USAID/EA's flagship HIV/AIDS program called ROADS (Regional Outreach Addressing Health and Development), which provides HIV/AIDS support to new transport corridor development in East Africa.
- AFR/SD's gender advisor conducted regional gender integration training on how to undertake gender analyses and incorporate gender equality into PADS, solicitations, indicators, etc.

Most of AFR/SD's support for Missions will be done in concert with PPL and the Pillar Bureaus. The exact division of labor will be decided on a case by case basis depending on resources and historic links. One important area the strategy will concentrate on is mentoring young officers in the field. In recent years, USAID has seen the retirement of a large number of its senior officers and a hiring of an equally large number of young and talented, but inexperienced, new officers. Because of limited budgets, these new officers have been thrown into positions of authority without mentoring by more senior people. AFR/SD intends to deepen its links with new technical officers in the field.

Indicators for IR 2.3:

- *Percentage of USAID Missions and AID/W Offices expressing satisfaction with the technical support provided by AFR/SD (as evidenced by customer satisfaction surveys).*
- *Rating of quality of cooperation between AFR/SD and other USAID Bureaus in providing services (as measured by surveys).*

Illustrative Activities for IR 2.3.

High quality support to AFR Front Office and Other AFR Offices. AFR/SD sees its support to the Africa Bureau's Offices in Washington as the highest priority and intends to increase and improve that support. Of primary importance is support to the AFR Front Office in a variety of areas, including policy and technical advice with respect to internal USAID issues and support in the interagency process where increasingly vital national security issues are discussed. For example, AFR/SD has been deeply involved in the drafting of U.S. Strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, standing up TradeAfrica and PowerAfrica, and implementing the Presidential Order on Wildlife Trafficking.

It is important to the Africa Bureau Front Office's mission that the Africa Bureau is seen as adding value to the interagency process, and this will be of prime importance to AFR/SD going forward.

Establishment of a process for focus and selectivity in SD's provision of technical support. In order to have the greatest influence on Mission policies, programs, and projects, AFR/SD will need to establish a process for prioritizing its support. These priorities will be established around which Mission receives support and dependent upon the type of support being provided. Of prime importance are the priorities established by the Africa Bureau Front Office, which has developed a taxonomy of countries and has identified the countries of greatest importance to the mission of the USG in Africa. In addition to prioritizing countries, AFR/SD will also prioritize the type of assistance it will provide, also based on Agency priorities. Thus, at the top of the list is the Agency's new intention to review all activities over \$25 million. AFR/SD will also prioritize strategies (including integrating new strategies into Mission programs) above projects and PAD development above other forms of assistance.

AFR/SD will additionally work with Missions to develop new procedures for supporting Mission-level gender points of contact and gender advisors.

Regularizing coordination with other USAID/W entities in provision of support to USAID Missions. As is the case in other parts of this strategy, it is important to regularize AFR/SD's support to USAID Missions in Africa with those of other AID bureaus and offices. In preparing for this strategy, AFR/SD held a series of focus groups meetings with the Pillar Bureaus. For the most part, these meetings demonstrated that there was a strong spirit of cooperation between AFR/SD and the Pillar Bureaus. The division of responsibilities with respect to Mission support was not determined by a clear apportionment but rather by historic and personal relationships. By and large, the Pillar Bureaus felt that this was a workable system and didn't need to be changed. The intention here is not to set up a more formal division of labor, but rather to periodically check whether all parties remain comfortable with the working relationship in this area, to ensure nothing falls through the cracks, and to resolve any disputes.

Critical Assumption for DO 2

- *Changing priorities with respect to Mission support are accepted; Missions are able to find other mechanisms for routine technical support.* Both AFR/SD and the Pillar Bureaus are changing priorities to concentrate technical support more strategically. This will leave smaller USAID Missions with less technical support from USAID/Washington than has been the case. These Missions will need to seek support from outside USAID.

Development Objective 3: Key African institutions and networks develop an evidence-based culture in formulating their own policies, programs, and projects and those of other partners⁴³

Finally, if the behavioral change induced by these new ideas is to be sustained, and, more importantly, if development ideas are to be generated in Africa, African institutions and networks need to strengthen their capacity to develop and develop evidence based policies, programs, and projects. The key institutions identified for strengthening by AFR/SD vary in their scale, scope, evolution, and constituencies, thus requiring a case-by-case approach. Moreover, AFR/SD's involvement with each institution will be different depending on the resources SD can bring to the table and the size of the institution. In some cases, we will focus on institution-wide engagement, while in others we will focus on one or two aspects of the institution or network involved. Institutional capacity analysis specific for each key institution targeted will provide initial capacity status: a roadmap with milestones and metrics for monitoring progress. In some, USAID will be a member promoting change from within and, in others, be an interested donor supporting improved capacity; but, in all cases, AFR/SD can only be a facilitating agent.


⁴³ It is important to remember the distinction between the generic term "institutions," and the more specific term "organizations." "Institutions include organizations, but they also include rules, laws, and customs which determine how societies behave. While we use "institutions" here we are really referring to organizations.

There are a large number of organizations in SSA –public and private, national, regional and pan-African, for-profit and non-profit—that provide services and commodities and those which focus on advocacy, research organizations, think-tanks, etc. Some of these organizations are very young, very small, or have limited capacities and influence; others are more mature, larger, or have more developed capacities and influence. Some are very narrowly focused, either in terms of geography or area of specialization, while others are broader. These organizations and networks are vital to sustainable development in sub-Saharan Africa, because they bring African solutions to bear on African problems. As their capacities are enhanced (for example, to bring evidence to bear on policy questions, to advocate and influence policy makers, or to network among stakeholders) home-grown African ideas will lead to more effective policies and programs.

Some examples of key institutions and networks, and their mandates, with whom AFR/SD is currently working with are:

- The African Union and the African Commission: The Pan-African forum for all African states intended to promote Unity and development.
- The Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA): a network of donors and African Ministers of Education to promote dialogue and policy change in education.
- WHO-AFRO: A UN based organization that works to improve health programs and policies in Africa.
- African Economic Research Consortium (AERC): a network of university-level economic departments and their economic researchers, promoting improved quality of economic research and education.
- The Afrobarometer: an independent, non-partisan research project that measures the social, political, and economic atmosphere in Africa through a series of public attitude surveys. Led by The Centre for Democratic Development in Ghana, the Afrobarometer Network comprises more than two dozen African member organizations that conduct field research, analyze data, and publicize results to media and users in the policy-making community.

Figure 11. Results Framework for DO 3



AFR/SD is committed to strengthening a set of **key** African institutions and networks to help them broaden their influence and become more effective in promoting evidence-based solutions to African problems. With limited resources it is important to prioritize among the many organizations seeking assistance, choosing those that already have strong capacity and see their mission as influencing policy through empirical evidence.

DO 3 will be accomplished through two IRs:

- IR 3.1. Key African Institutions' capacity for the sustainable production and use of evidence-based advice strengthened.
- IR 3.2. Key institutions' advocacy efforts to influence policies and programs of partners increased.

Indicators for DO 3:

- *Percentage change in capacity index scores of AFR/SD-supported institutions and networks.*
- *Number of AFR/SD-supported institutions and networks that have changed their policies and those of other partners using evidence-based approaches.*

IR 3.1. Key African Institutions' capacity for the sustainable production and use of evidence-based advice strengthened.

Many African institutions supported by AFR/SD are already engaged in the process of influencing their partners to improve policies and programs. For example:

- The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC) conducts regular conferences on economic policy issues;
- The African Union (AU) has among its many roles that of convener of African Government organizations (e.g., Ministries of Finance) in order that experiences can be shared and those governments that are performing well in a particular area can encourage those that are not doing as well;
- The Association for the Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) is a group of Ministers of Education and development partners whose purpose is to advance improvements in education programming and practices among African partners.

AFR/SD intends in this IR to work with these institutions to strengthen their capacity to develop and use evidence-based analysis. This involves specific activities with regard to improving technical capacity and analytic processes. But it also includes activities to strengthen key institutional capacities.

Indicator for IR 3.1:

- Percentage change in institutions' and networks' capacity to use and produce evidence-based advice (a subset of capacity assessment score).

Illustrative Activities for IR 3.1.

Strengthen capacity of key institutions and networks to use evidence for policy, program, and project analysis. AFR/SD will work with key African institutions and networks to, *inter alia*:

- Support development of improved data. In this role, AFR/SD will not support data collection itself, but will work with partners to identify data gaps and work to find financing for critical data collection activities (such as improved collection, analysis, and use of sex disaggregated and gender-sensitive data across all sectors).
- Provide opportunities for key technical staff to be seconded to USAID or other development institutions for short periods to improve collaboration.
- Increase the participation of staff from these institutions in international communities of practice.
- Help these institutions develop strategies for the use of analytic tools in policy dialogue.

Increasing transparency and accountability of key institutions and networks. An important aspect of institutional capacity is a set of characteristics that can be grouped under the broader category of transparency and accountability. These include:

- Clear rules of governance that includes lines of authority and clarity in decision-making authority at all levels;
- Transparent financial management including timely reporting and regular auditing of accounts;
- A process for eliciting input from and responding to the stakeholders of the institution;
- A vision as to what the purpose of the organization is and how it will accomplish that purpose;
- A clear strategy linking objectives to resources;
- A process for regular monitoring and evaluation of progress and obstacles to achieving the institution's goals.

Institutions that display these characteristics are likely to be able to achieve their goals and adapt to changing circumstances. AFR/SD will work with its partner institutions to support them in achieving greater transparency and accountability, as needed.

IR 3.2 Key institutions' advocacy efforts to influence policies and programs of partners increased.

As in AFR/SD's own strategy, African institutions need to advocate effectively. For some institutions, such as the African Union and WHO Afro, their basic role is advocacy, technical support, and convening African governments to improve policies and programs in African governmental institutions. AFR/SD's role here is to assist key institutions to identify advocacy areas that need strengthening and provide technical and financial assistance. Text Box 5 illustrates how the AERC, which has been supported by AFR/SD for over 20 years, has been instrumental in improving economic policies in Africa.

Indicators for IR 3.2:

- *Percentage of partners and stakeholders expressing increased satisfaction with technical advice provided by AFR/SD-supported institutions.*
- *Number of evidence-based advocacy/policy dialogue events held by AFR/SD-supported networks and institutions.*
- *Number of advocacy/policy dialogue events that advocate integration of vulnerable populations into policy and programs.*

Illustrative Activities for IR 3.2.

Strengthen Partners' Capacity to Communicate Effectively. Institutions that are intended to have an impact on the policies, programs, and projects of others need to have a strong communications capacity. This includes knowledge management systems, regular production of newsletters and other communications products, an up-to-date web-site, and increasingly, a strategy for using social media. To be effective, clients and stakeholders need to clearly understand your vision, recognize your strategy, be apprised of what you are learning and what policy positions you are taking on key issues as well as why you are taking these positions. Without an effective communications strategy, an institution will lose political and, potentially, financial support.

Work with key institutions and networks to increase their effective advocacy for inclusion of vulnerable populations in partners' programs.

African institutions are relatively late-comers to the idea of inclusion. However, there has been great progress in recent years. For example, the African Union has developed a suggested set of actions for gender equality and female empowerment. These include legislation and policy change that would end gender discrimination in the work-place, improve women's property rights including in those countries coming out of violence, prohibit all forms of violence against women, including rape both within and without the family. The AU further states: *Furthermore, female genital mutilation, early marriage, and forced widow marriages seriously undermine the bodily integrity and human rights of women and girls and should therefore be eliminated.*⁴⁴

Another example is the work AERC has been doing to expand the participation of women in the network. One effort has been *“Increased and deliberate efforts of outreach towards under-represented groups (women) and countries (fragile and post-conflict states). Participation by women in AERC research and training activities has increased to the range of 25-30% each year from a previous range of under 10%. Despite efforts to increase representation from fragile states the percentage still remains low at an annual average increase of 4%. Efforts to increase participation from these groups continue through holding special technical research workshops targeting individuals from fragile states and women to build their skills in undertaking economic research.”*⁴⁵

In addition, AFR/SD is working with the Diaspora Marketplace to create a funding and technical assistance platform to support women business owners and diaspora members to expand or establish businesses in their countries of origin or heritage. AFR/SD will continue to work with the institutions it supports to advocate strategies and policies for greater inclusion of vulnerable groups across Africa.

Critical Assumptions for DO 3

- *AFR/SD will be able to use its influence coupled with limited funding to increase policy analysis capacity within key institutions.* AFR/SD intends to prioritize its engagement with African institutions; nevertheless, limited resources may require even more concentration on a few key institutions than is currently planned.

⁴⁴ African Union, “Social Policy framework for Africa,” pp.36-37.

⁴⁵ AERC, Annual Report, 2012.

Box 6: The African Economic Research Consortium (AERC)

AFR/SD has supported the AERC since its creation in 1988. In the beginning, the support focused on improving economic researchers' skills and later on providing financial support for a collaborative M.S. program in economics (followed in a few years by a Ph.D. program). Later, grants focused on poverty analysis and the 2008 financial crisis. In part, because of AFR/SD's urging, the AERC began a series of policy seminars, which brought together academic economists and government policy makers. One notable result of the policy analysis work was a series of policy papers on the global trading system, which helped African countries formulate their position in World Trade Organization negotiations during the Doha Round.

Equally important has been the network of AERC graduates who have worked in key policy-making positions. These include:

- *Central banks in Africa (8 current and former governors and deputy governors)*
- *Ministries of Economy/Finance/Treasury in various countries, e.g., Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda (including current and former ministers and deputy ministers)*
- *Planning commissions of Nigeria, Tanzania*
- *United Nations Economic Commission for Africa*
- *Central African Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC), Bangui, CAR*
- *East African Community, Arusha, Tanzania*
- *African Development Bank (2 consecutive chief economists)*
- *The World Bank, Washington, D.C.*
- *International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.*
- *Universities across sub-Saharan Africa*
- *Policy research institutes across Sub Saharan Africa.*

*

4. Learning, Adapting and Collaborating

What's Different about this Strategy?

The core of this strategy is ideas, and their influence on behavior. It is, therefore, extremely important that learning and adapting is central to its implementation. As should be apparent from the examples provided in the text boxes, this new strategy is not a fundamental change in what AFR/SD has been doing in the recent past (and, in fact, from its creation in the mid-1990s). AFR/SD has been involved in analysis and research, has been using the results of that analysis and research to influence the behavior of partner institutions, has provided technical support to both the AFR Front Office and to USAID missions and regional platforms in Africa, and has supported Africa-based institutions and networks. Nevertheless, looking back on the successes and failures of the past years has led to a rethinking of AFR/SD's approach. As a result, this strategy reflects a substantial departure, not in what AFR/SD is trying to accomplish, but in how AFR/SD intends to achieve its goal and development objectives.

What has been learned?

A new emphasis on multi-sectoral and inclusive development approaches. It is no secret that USAID, like most institutions, has serious difficulties in working across sectoral areas. Yet we know that development is a complex, multi-system problem. We know that educating girls has important effects on fertility, health, and even the economic well-being of all members of the family. We know that climate change intersects with agriculture in extremely important ways. We know that violent extremism is driven, in part, by poverty and hopelessness, and that, in return, violence can impede economic growth and poverty reduction. AFR/SD, because of its size, relative to the Pillar Bureaus, has prided itself in its ability to work across sectors. However, that comparative advantage is only a potential advantage, because even in AFR/SD, people work in silos and not across them. We know that every sector benefits from gender-sensitive programming and that gender-inclusive activities have more of a positive impact when integrated into and across sector strategies. Furthermore, we recognize that inclusive development approaches require us to think beyond the binary of female and male, by considering the needs of LGBT, disabled, elderly, and other marginalized communities. This strategy seeks to change that by:

- **Emphasizing cross-sectoral and inclusive development work in its analytic activities.** AFR/SD will reserve a portion of its budget for this type of work.
- **Improving communications within AFR/SD.** One of the concomitant results of working in silos is a lack of knowledge of what people in other silos are doing. Currently, communications among staff are limited. In the new strategy, a serious attempt will be made to establish a knowledge management system that expands staff's understanding of the work being done by others.

A stronger emphasis on collaboration within USAID. As noted above, prior to the development of this strategy, AFR/SD held focus group meetings with other Washington offices including the Pillar Bureaus. By and large, those meetings revealed that cooperation and collaboration were taking place reasonably

well across all areas of AFR/SD's work. Nevertheless, there is still substantial room for improvement and the new strategy emphasizes the following changes, many already being implemented:

- **Developing an inclusive analytic agenda.** As discussed above, the core of DO 1 is to develop an analytic agenda process for identifying priorities in research and analysis. In the past, analytic activities have been chosen by individuals or groups of individuals based on their own views as to what is important or valuable. Going forward, AFR/SD intends to make the following changes: (i) bring analysts from outside SD into the process, including those outside USAID; (ii) add rigor to the process by creating a research committee that will include analysts inside and outside of AFR/SD; and (iii) make decisions regarding which questions to examine an AFR/SD corporate responsibility.
- **Improving cooperation with other USAID offices and bureaus in knowledge sharing.** Much of the work AFR/SD has done under DO 2 (Influence) has been done jointly with other AID partners. For example, the workshop on utilizing ICT in health, described in Text Box 5, was done in collaboration with the Global Health Bureau. Nevertheless, as AFR/SD ramps up its knowledge management capacity, there is substantial room to do so in a way that takes into account what is being learned elsewhere in USAID.
- **Improving cooperation with other USAID offices and bureaus in providing technical assistance to USAID missions and regional platforms in Africa.** In the focus group discussions cited above there was little sense of competition between AFR/SD and the Pillar Bureaus in supporting USAID Missions in Africa. In fact, most discussants felt that there was more than enough work to go around, and that, while there were no clear lines determining who supported whom, the system was working well. However, there have been changes in priorities in certain Pillar Bureaus, and there is a genuine risk that some Missions, especially non-initiative Missions will be left adrift. It is, therefore, very important that there is greater clarity in priority-setting, both in terms of what to support and which missions to support.

A need to strengthen knowledge management. The knowledge management (KM) system within AFR/SD is largely not functioning. There is no M&E system and no system for sharing information either within or without AFR/SD; there are no regular communications within the Africa Bureau or with USAID missions in Africa; the web-site is out of date; it is difficult, on a regular basis, to obtain even basic information as to what AFR/SD is doing and the impact it has on policies, projects, and programs. A strengthened knowledge management system is critical to the success of DO 2. AFR/SD intends, under this strategy, to develop the following:

- A strong M&E system (complete with periodic evaluations).
- A KM system that is designed to provide information at the right time to the right person.
- A system for feeding back what is being learned from the M&E system into a continuous process of learning in designing new activities and re-designing ongoing activities (i.e., a feedback loop).

This is a complex task, but one that is central to success of the RDCS. The first task is to fill an existing position within AFR/SD for a Knowledge Management specialist in the Office. Second, AFR/SD will establish a KM committee cutting across all areas of the Office. Third, AFR/SD will work with AFR/DP

and KM experts both inside and outside the Agency to develop a plan for knowledge management. This plan should be completed by the end of the third quarter of FY14. The plan will contain a detailed discussion of how KM can be implemented within each DO; what capacities need to be strengthened across the Office; how the plan will be managed, monitored, and changed in response to learning; and what the lines of responsibility and dates for completion of each task are.

A need to integrate AFR/SD’s work with African institutions (DO 3) with its work on influence (DO 2).

In the past, AFR/SD has occasionally failed to link its work with African institutions with the rest of its work. Too often, the institutional development work has been conducted in isolation and, as a result, there has been little cross-fertilization of the policy-relevant evidence developed by AFR/SD with that of the institutions it supports. Under this strategy, that will change. Substantial efforts will be undertaken to develop “communities of practice” between AFR/SD and the African institutions it supports, as well as among AFR/SD-supported institutions themselves. Ultimately, this will result in more work being carried out jointly.

Learning Going Forward

AFR/SD will focus on four mechanisms for learning going forward:

1. A robust M&E system
2. Evaluations
3. Joint learning with partners
4. Knowledge management

Monitoring

A formal Performance Management Plan (PMP) will be developed soon after this strategy is approved. As most indicators will require surveys and qualitative assessments and will not be available from readily accessible data sets, this will require substantial investments to create baseline values. However, once these surveys and investments have been created, updating them periodically will be relatively easy.

Evaluation

The critical evaluation question is whether the development hypothesis presented in the strategy is deemed valid. Has AFR/SD been successful in improving the policies and programs of its partners? What actions have been particularly successful in influencing others and what actions have been less successful or haven’t worked at all? AFR/SD will conduct a mid-term evaluation and a final evaluation (probably in 2017 to inform the next RDCS).

The regular evaluations will focus on the outcomes (how successful was the strategy in changing policies and programs?); however, determination of the success of the strategy will involve asking “so what?” questions. What difference did changes in policies and programs mean? In order to answer this question, AFR/SD will conduct a number of impact evaluations in order to tease out the results of changes in policies. For example: Did the change result in income growth? For whom? Were there improvements in health status? Is there anything that can be said about the impacts of policy change on poverty in a selected country? Because of the breadth of AFR/SD’s programs, these impact evaluations

cannot examine the entire AFR/SD portfolio, but will be limited, rather, to a number of concrete outcomes in a number of specific areas. It is impossible at this time to be more specific.

Joint Learning. As described earlier in this document, AFR/SD is actively engaged with a large number of partners within and without USAID in developing, testing, and implementing more effective ideas. In particular, AFR/SD staff participate in, and sometimes initiate, a number of communities of practice. Examples include:

- Countering violent extremism
- Inclusive growth (initiated by World Bank)
- Malaria in pregnancy
- Pro-poor Livestock Development

Knowledge Management. As described above, improved knowledge management is critical to the success of this strategy. AFR/SD intends to develop its capacity to identify, create, represent, distribute, and enable adoption of information and experiences.

A schematic for linking learning to communities of practice, development of new ideas, and influencing of other partners is presented in Figure 12 below. This schematic, which is still in draft, was developed by the African Biodiversity Collaborative Group (ABCG), which is comprised of seven U.S.-based international conservation non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with field programs in Africa. ABCG explores emerging and high priority African conservation issues, shares lessons learned, and seeks opportunities for collaboration. ABCG was started by and is supported by AFR/SD.

Figure 12. Project Plan for Africa Biodiversity Collaborative Group (ABCG)

ABCG Core Competencies Results Chain - Draft 2013-10-23




Figure 13. COP Results Chain

